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CHAPTER - I 
 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION:  
 
I f  we refer to the most famous  mythological epic 
“Ramayana”,  it  says,  “Raghukul  reet sada chali  aayi,  
pran  jaye  par  vachan  na  jaye”.1  ‘Vachan ’  that is 
‘promise ’  to perform, is considered not only a part of duty 
but the ‘Dharma ’ .   
 
But  gradually with  day by day  development and  growth  
of economic  and commercial aspects,  the human being 
became  greedy.  He started thinking about his own profit 
and loss in al l the matters of l ife.  Even if  the promise was  
made  by his  own self   in the past,  the party to the  
promise started  taking  shelter  under dif ferent  heads and 
start ing giving dif ferent  excuses  for  non-performance  or  
non-fulf i l lment  of  the promise and  this is how  the concept  
of breach of contract  comes  into  existence.  In the ancient 
t ime, oral or verbal exchange of words was considered to be 
sacred commitment or promise.  It  had its own binding 
nature even without anything made in writ ing.  
 
Why should promise be enforced?  To this quest ion various 
answers have been given.  The simplest answer is that of 
intuit ionists,  namely, the promises are sacred perse, that 
there is something inherent ly despicable about not keeping 
a promise and that a properly organized society should not 
tolerate this.  Popular sent iment generally favors the 
enforcement of those promises, which involve some quid 
pro quo (equivalent thereof). In this common law Justice 
                                      
1  “Chopai” from Hindu Mythological Epic “Ramayana”. 
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Holmes expressed the view that a contract is properly to be 
regarded as the taking of a r isk creat ing liabil ity to pay 
damages in a certain event.  Professor Goodhard, who was a 
protagonist of moral theory, said “that the moral basis of the 
contract is that the promisor has by his promise created a 
reasonable expectation that it  shall be kept.” 
 
The concept of ‘morality ’  and ‘Dharma ’  was given complete 
go-by in the new era.  So in those circumstances, i t became 
very diff icul t for the system to maintain the law and order 
situat ion in the commercial t ransact ions.  The only opt ion in 
that situation left with the system i.e. to the framers of law, 
juries, Judges and other decision making authorit ies was to 
make individual understand how to honour and how to abide 
by his own words which is in the nature of a commitment 
within the four corners of law and to make the individual  
understand if , he is not at all  ready and will ing to fulf i l l  or 
perform his own commitment, then, to bear the bitter fruits 
and circumstances arising out of  it .  This is how the 
codif ication of the Contract Act comes into picture even for 
the promise which is being made by one party to the 
another, which is always a subject matter of two part ies; 
performance of which always gives a r ight   in personam 
and not right in ram.  
 
In its slow and steady growth, the law relating to “Damages 
For Breach of Contract” goes deeper and deeper into the 
social, economical and legal problems. The main focus of 
this thesis is to show how the dif ferent Courts, in England 
as well as in India, availed the opportunity to develop the 
systematic law for Damages for Breach of Contract.  
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  Requirement to develop the concept of 
Damages for Breach of Contract: 
      
The law was never static, is never stat ic and wil l  never be 
al lowed to be stat ic. It is always dynamic in nature and 
always subject to change from t ime to t ime.  The object or 
purpose to develop the systematic law of damages for 
breach of contract is,  whether personnel or public must be 
to sustain the stabil i ty of the society and help its progress.  
In Manu’s   scr ipt, i t is famously said in Sanskrit,   
“Dharnadarm Mitya Hoon, Dhami Dharayate Pragnah”.2 
Meaning thereby, the structure of any society, which wants 
to be strong, homogeneous and progressive, must, know 
about, being steady but not stat ic; stable but not stat ionary.  
The revision of law is must in a dynamic society l ike ours, 
which is engaged on the adventure of creating founded on 
faith in the value system of social economic justice. 
 
  The action for breach of promise: 
 
It was abandoned in the early sixteenth century in a series 
of cases' culminat ing in Pickering v Thoroughgood,3 for 
reasons which are st i l l not wholly clear, but may owe 
something to rivalry with Chancery or to the church courts. 
Spelman J. in that case said:  
 
“And in some books a dif ference has been taken 
between nonfeasance and malfeasance; thus on the 
one an action of covenant l ies, and on the other an 
act ion on the case l ies. This is no distinct ion in 
reason, for if  a carpenter for £1 00 covenants with me 
to make me a house, and does not make it  before the 
                                      
2  Manu’s Script. 
3  Pickering v Thoroughgood,  (1533) 8. 
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day assigned, so that I am deprived of lodging, I shall 
have an act ion for this nonfeasance just as well  as if 
he had made it badly.”  
 
This was a momentous development, for the common law 
now had a form of act ion whereby in pr inciple any 
undertaking could be sued upon; the act ion had become an 
act ion for breach of promise, and the al legation of an 
undertaking was indeed commonly coupled with one of a 
promise. The action could now remedy breach of any 
informal agreement. It was triable by jury and led to the 
award of compensatory damages. This new departure gave 
rise to two problems, which preoccupied the courts in the 
sixteenth century. The f irst involved the relat ionship 
between assumpsit ’s and the older forms of act ion, 
particularly debt sur contract. The second involved the 
evolution of a body of doctrine, which would def ine which 
promises were actionable, and which not, a doctr ine to 
define the scope of promissory l iabi li ty. 
 
1.2 COSMOS: 
 
1.2.1   Damages:  
 
Under certain circumstances, a contractual promise may be 
enforced directly. This may be by an act ion for the agreed 
sum, for instance the price it has been agreed would be 
paid for goods or some other performance, by an order for 
specif ic performance of the obligat ion, or by an injunct ion to 
restrain the breach of a negative stipulation in a contract,  or 
to require the defendant to take posit ive steps to undo a 
breach of contract.  These remedies have dif ferent historical  
roots, the claim for an agreed sum being a common law 
remedy whereas specif ic performance and injunct ions are 
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equitable remedies, which were once exclusively admin-
istered by the Court of Chancery. At common law the 
breach of a contract was regarded as the breach of a purely 
personal obligation but equity would sometimes regard a 
contract as conferr ing a proprietary interest on the person 
to whom property was to be transferred, and even where 
this was not the case, would come to the aid of the injured 
party where damages would be, for that party, an 
inadequate redress. The specif ic remedies are not subject  
to the l imits imposed on damages; for instance, rules of 
remoteness and mitigation and a plainti f f may therefore 
prefer specif ic rel ief  where these would l imit  the damages 
recoverable. 
 
With a breach of contract occurrence the injured or 
aggrieved party becomes entit led to any of the fol lowing 
remedies:  
(1)  Rescissions of contract; 
(2)   Suit for remedies; 
(3)  Suit upon quantum merit;  
(4)   Suit for specif ic performance;  
(5)  Suit for injunct ion;  
(6)   Suit for rectif ication; 
(7)   Suit for restitut ion; and  
(8)   Suit for cancellat ion of contract.   
 
1.2.2 Breach:  
 
To understand the entire concept of  breach of contract, i t  
becomes necessary to understand the clear meaning of 
breach. Dif ferent renowned dict ionaries of the World def ine 
the ‘breach’ in the following words: 
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  “Breach can be a troublesome word. It ’s most frequent 
legal use in the phrase breach of contract.  The word 
breach always suggests its more common cognate, 
break.  One can either breach or break a contract; and 
another may refer to one’s breach or breaking of i t. ”4 
 
  Breach, A violation or infraction of a law or obligat ion.  
 
“A breach may be one by non-performance, or by 
repudiat ion, or by both.  Every breach gives rise to a 
claim for damages, and may give rise to other 
remedies.  Even if  the injured party sustains no 
pecuniary loss or is unable to show such loss with 
suff icient certainty, he has at least a claim for nominal 
damages. If  a court chooses to ignore a trif l ing 
departure, there is no breach and no claim arises.”5   
 
  Breach means “The negligent performance of a 
contractual obligat ion, to the point of acting outside 
the contract’s terms.  Under Louisiana law, act ive 
breach of contract is contrasted with passive breach 
of contract, which is a fai lure to perform the 
obligat ions created by the contract.  Unlike a passive 
breach, an active breach of contract may give rise to 
claims in contract. Cf. passive breach of contract.”6  
 
  Breach is “The act of breaking; violation; infr ingement; 
now used only f iguratively of the violation or neglect 
                                      
4  B.A. Garner, Modern Legal Usage,  2nd Edn. 
5
  Restatement (Second) of Contracts * 236 cmt. A 
(1981).  
6  Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edn. 
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of a law, contract, or any other obligation, or of a 
custom.”  Violation of a duty, or invasion of a right.    
The action of breaking:   
 
(1)   Failure to perform dut ies under a contract.  
(2)  Failure to use reasonable care in a negligence 
situat ion.7  
 
  Breach is basically “An act of breaking, especially 
breaking of a law or promise, etc. or a failure to fulf i l l  
or carry out a duty, promise, etc.,  or to break (a 
promise etc.) or fail  to carry out (a duty or 
commitment, etc.)8  
 
Thus, Breach of contract means violat ion of a contractual  
obligation, either by fai l ing to perform one’s own promise or 
by interfer ing with another party’s performance.   
 
1.2.3 Contract: 
 
  Contract: an accordion word  
 
Contract is an accordion word and is condit ioned at any 
t ime by the tune society sets for i t . The law of Contract is 
the product of inter-action of polit ics and economics and 
hence, the necessity of study of history for proper 
appreciat ion of the development of the law. In the words of 
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bhagwati, when he was Judge of the 
High Court of Gujarat, in Lalbhai Dalpatbhai and Co., M/S 
                                      
7  P.R. Aiyer , (2005), 3rd Edn., Vol .1, Advanced Law 
Laxicon.    
8  21st Century Dictionary. 
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v. Chittranjan Chandulal Pandya,9:  "We must remember that 
the law must adapt itself  to the changing needs of the 
society and wherever i t is possible, we must not hesitate to 
adopt new principles or, otherwise, law will  become 
'ant iquated straight-jacket and a dead letter'  and 'the 
judicial hand would stif fen in mortmain"'.   
 
I t  would be necessary in order to have a panoramic view of 
the development of the concept of contract to go over the 
history of that development through the ages in dif ferent 
countr ies. Whether our quest takes us to the East or the 
West, the ancient or the modem times, whether we go to 
Hindu Contract, Roman Contract, Brit ish Contract, i ts 
cont inental counterpart or American cousin, we find that 
the underlying essential idea of a contract is offer and 
acceptance.  
 
  Concept of contract: Hindu Law  
 
I t  would be interesting to trace the history of the concept of 
contract from the ancient t imes to the present day to get a 
panoramic view of the development. 
 
In ancient India, during the Chandragupta’s  period the 
Hindu concept of contract was a bi lateral transaction 
between two individuals or group of individuals const itut ing 
legal ent it ies, the essential element of which was free 
consent and consensus on al l  material terms and 
condit ions. It was an open contract, openly arr ived at. It 
was laid down that the following contracts were void: -  
 
                                      
9  Lalbhai Dalpatbhai and Co., M/S v. Chittranjan Chandulal  
Pandya,  AIR 1966 Gujarat 189. 
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(i)   Contract formed during the night;  
( i i)  Contract entered into the interior compartment of a 
house;  
( i i i )  Contract made in a forest; or  
( iv)  Contract made in any other secret place.  
 
The law frowned on clandestine contract but certain 
exceptions were made which are l isted below:  
 
( i)   Contract made to ward off  violence, attack and affray;  
( i i)  Contract made in connection with the celebration of 
marriage; 
(i i i )  Contract made under orders of Government; 
(iv)  Contract made by purdanashin women; or  
(v)  Contract made by traders, hunters, spies and others 
who have to roam in the forest frequently.  
 
The contract was a defensible concept,  rendered void if  
there was any undue inf luence or if  contract was entered 
into a f it  of  anger or under influence of intoxication, etc. 
Again, though as a general proposit ion contracts made 
during the night were void, exceptions were made in the 
following cases:-  
 
( i)  Contract relating to a heavy debt (as publication of 
such an event would lower the person concerned in 
the estimation of others);  
( i i)  Contract, object of which could not be expressed and 
brought to the notice of others owing to delicacy 
attaching thereto, e.g.,  a contract between a 
concubine and her paramour (concubine was 
recognised as a fact of l ife and therefore contract 
regarding the same given validity). 
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  Concept of contract: Mohammedan Law  
 
Dur ing the Mohammedan rule, the Mohammedan Law 
of  Contract  governed al l  the subjects,  in matters of  
contract.  The word cont ract  in Arabic is  'Aqd'  meaning 
a conjunct ion.  I t  connotes conjunct ion of  proposal 
( I jab )  and acceptance (Qabul ) .  As succinct ly 
summarised by Abdur Rahim,: " In other words,  a 
contract requires that there should be two part ies to 
i t ,  that  one party should make a proposal and the 
other accept i t ,  that  the minds of  both must agree, 
that  is,  their  dec larat ion must re late to the same 
matter and the object  of the cont ract  must be to 
produce a legal result" .10 
 
  Concept of contract: Indian Contract Act11  
 
With the advent of the British Rule, the Hindus who during 
the Mohammedan rule were subject to the Muslim Law of 
Contract, had a revival of their own laws consequent on the 
regulat ions and charters granted by the Brit ish Crown to the 
East India Company. The Hindu concept of the law was 
more particular ly revived in the Saddar and Mofussil  courts.  
The revival of Hindu law and the application of 
Mohammedan law to Muslims, brought in new problems. The 
need for a unif ied code appl icable to all  was felt to be a 
necessity. This eventually led to the enactment of the Indian 
Contract Act of 1872 based on the Common Law of Contract  
obtained in U.K. Indian Contract Act, 1872 def ines, in 
                                      
10  Abdur Rahim,  Mohammedan Jurisprudence,  p.  282.  
11  Indian Contract Act, 1872  (Act 9 of 1872) comes into force from 
01/09/1872. 
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section 2(h), a contract as an agreement enforceable by 
law. This again takes us to the def init ion of agreement 
contained in section 2(e) of the Indian Contract Act. "Every 
promise and every set of promises forming the 
consideration for each other is an agreement." This raises 
two questions: what is a promise and what is considerat ion? 
A promise, as def ined by section 2(b) of the Indian Contract 
Act, is "a proposal when accepted". This again raises two 
questions: what is a proposal and what is acceptance? 
section 2(a) of the Indian Contract Act defines a proposal 
as "when one person signif ies to other his wil l ingness to do 
or abstain from doing anything with a view to obtaining the 
assent of that other to such acts or abstinence, he is said to 
make a proposal".  Sect ion 2(b) of the Indian Contract Act 
defines acceptance as, "when the person to whom the 
proposal is made signif ies his assent thereto, - the proposal 
is said to be accepted". Sect ion 2(c) of the Indian Contract 
Act further def ines promisor and promisee in the following 
terms: "The person making the proposal is called the 
promisor and the person accepting the proposal is called 
the promisee". Consideration, as def ined by sect ion 8(d) of 
the Indian Contract Act,  is, "when at the desire of the 
promisor, the promisee or any other person has done or 
abstained from doing or does or abstains from doing 
something, such act or abstinence or promise is called 
consideration for the promise".  
 
1.2.4 Breach of contract: 
   
I f  one of two part ies to a contract breaks an obligat ion, 
which the contract imposes, a new obligat ion wil l in every 
case arise, that is, an obligation to pay damages to the 
other party in respect of any loss or damage sustained by 
the breach. Besides this, there are circumstances under 
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which the breach not only gives rise to a right of act ion for 
damages but also gives the innocent party the right to 
decide not to render further performance under the contract 
and to be discharged from its obligations.  
 
However, not every breach of contract operates as a 
discharge. In order to have this effect the breach must be 
such as to const itute repudiation by the party in default of 
its obligat ions under the contract.  
 
I t  is common to speak of the contract as having been 
'discharged by the breach'.  The phrase, though convenient,  
is not str ict ly accurate. A breach does not, of i tself , ef fect a 
discharge; what it  may do is to just i fy the innocent party, if  
that party so chooses, in regarding itself  as absolved or 
discharged from further performance of the contract. It does 
not automatically terminate the innocent party's obl igation 
since that party has the option either to treat the contract 
as sti l l  continuing or to regard itself  as discharged by 
reason of the repudiation of the contract by the other party.  
An acceptance of repudiation must be clear and 
unequivocal. Once the option is exercised to either keep the 
contract on foot or terminate it,  the decision is not 
revocable. A fresh opt ion may arise, however, if  the 
repudiat ion continues or there is another separate 
repudiatory breach.  
 
In principle an innocent party who does not 'accept' the 
repudiat ion is entit led to continue to insist on performance 
because the contract remains in ful l  ef fect. The appellant,  
an advert ising contractor, agreed with the respondent,  a 
garage proprietor, to display advert isements for his garage 
for 3 years. On the same day, the respondent refused to 
perform the agreement and requested the appellant to 
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cancel the contract. The appel lant refused to do so, and 
elected to treat the contract as sti l l cont inuing. It made no 
effort to re- let the space, displayed advertisements as 
agreed, and sued for the ful l amount due.  
 
It was contended on behalf  of the respondent that, since he 
had renounced the agreement before anything had been 
done under i t, the appellant was not ent it led to carry out the 
agreement and sue for the price: its remedy, if  any, lay in 
damages. A bare majority of the House of Lords rejected 
this contention and held that the appel lant was entit led to 
the full contract sum. 
    
1.2.5 Damages for breach of contract: 
   
DAMAGES are the pecuniary compensation, obtainable by 
success in an act ion, for a wrong which is a breach of 
contract, the compensation being in the form of a lump sum 
awarded at one t ime; uncondit ionally and generally, but not 
necessari ly, expressed in English currency. 
 
This def init ion covers the usual and strictly correct meaning 
of the term "damages" and excludes claims for money other 
than those which are for compensation for a breach of 
contract." Accordingly there are four types of case in which 
pecuniary sat isfaction is gained by success in an action and 
which are yet outside the present def init ion: actions for 
money payable by the terms of a contract, actions in 
restitution formerly quasi-contract, act ions in equity and 
act ions under statutes where the equitable or statutory right 
to recover is independent of any or breach of contract.  
 
Damages should in general be restr icted to compensation 
for loss. That is what damages are all about-damages are 
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for damage in English law, damnum in Roman law, 
dommage  or dommage-interets in French law. Unjust 
enrichment covers the situation where the defendant is 
enriched but nothing is taken from the plaint if f  and it  is 
misguided to talk of damages where the key to unlock the 
remedy remains not any loss to the plainti ff  for which 
damages could properly be awarded but the enrichment of 
the defendant which must be reversed. The appropriate 
place for these cases is within the law of restitution, not 
within the law of damages. Actions claiming money under 
statutes, where the claim is made independently of a wrong, 
which is a breach of contract, is not an action for damages.  
 
1.3         AIM OF STUDY:  
    
Law relating to damages for breach of contract makes 
vicinity constituting of a segment in the area of remedies for 
breach of contract.  Normally a contract, unless performed, 
stands terminated either by deliberate or negligent act of 
one of the parties to the contract or by automatic 
dissolution due to supervening circumstances occurring 
irrespect ive of violat ion of the promise by the party which 
makes performance of the contract himself .  For proper 
study of this branch of law, i t is necessary to have a clear 
concept of contract through the ages with a particular 
reference to the doctrine of two part ies – sacred – 
sacrosanct – binding on them as a piece of private 
legislat ion.  They were at l iberty to enter into contract they 
like, unless forbidden by law.  The Court could only 
interpret the contract.  The Court could not make or modify 
the contract.  The Court could only enforce the contract.   
The Court could not grant dispensation from the obligation 
imposed by the contract.   
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There was a t ime in the nineteenth century when the 
doctr ine of laissez-faire prevailed. The economic freedom 
spelt f ree market. In that age equal bargaining power was 
the order of the day but now inequality of bargaining power 
is a recognised fact. Courts have assumed powers to give 
rel ief against the unjust results of such a contract. Courts 
have accepted the fact that supervening events cannot all  
be foreseeable and therefore cannot be provided for.  
Contract is a transaction of sharing of risks fairly and 
squarely between the part ies. While bargaining for their 
"respect ive posit ion in sharing of risk, a certain situation or 
state of thing is assumed by the part ies to continue during 
the operation of the contract, but i f  due to no fault of the 
either party, the supervening circumstances have the effect 
of destroying this foundation of the contract, the result  
would be that the contract from that point of t ime becomes 
radically dif ferent and stands frustrated.   
 
Study of development of breach of contract would reveal 
that dif ferent theories have been evolved to explain and 
propound the theories of breach of contract, whatever 
theory, whatever the principle, which may f ind acceptance, 
the effect is the same. The academicians may dif fer, the 
Judges may f ind varying supporting reasons but the 
conclusion is the same and very practical point of v iew, the 
effect is the same i.e. breach is committed in contract.   
   
Here the questions arise, do the parties owe each other or 
duty to negotiate in good faith?  Do the parties once the 
contract is concluded owe each other a duty to perform the 
contract in good faith? Unti l recent English lawyers would 
not have asked themselves these quest ions or, i f  asked 
would have dismissed them with a cursory “of course no”.   
on being told that the Ital ic Civil  Code provides for duty to 
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negotiate in good faith or the German Civi l Code means a 
duty to perform a contract in good faith, a thoughtful 
English lawyer might have responded by suggesting that the 
pract ical problems covered by this Code posit ions were 
often covered in the Engl ish law but in dif ferent ways, and 
as it  is covered under English law, it is presumed that i t  
must have been adopted as a part and parcel in the Indian 
Contract Act, 1872. This may sti l l  be regarded as an 
orthodox posit ion but the lecturer of English law has began 
to consider it  more careful ly whether there might not be 
merit in explicit ly recognizing the advantages of imposing 
good faith duties on negotiat ions and performance. There is 
an underlying principle of good faith in the law of contract.   
Although it is dif f icult to f ind a clean and comprehensive 
statement of i t and in the case of fai lure to perform, the 
different remedies are provided for breach of contract.  The 
claim for damages for breach of contract is one of the very 
important and widely used remedies amongst all the other 
remedies.  The damages being one of the remedies for 
breach of contract has its own study in the eye of law.  
 
We are here mainly concerned with the pract ical steps, 
which an innocent party may take if  the other party breaks 
the contract. I t should be noted, however, that in the law of 
contract, unlike some other branches of the law, rights and 
remedies are inextricably intertwined. So we have already 
seen, that if  a party is induced to enter into a contract by 
the other party's misrepresentat ion, he can rescind and 
similar ly that serious failure by one party to perform may 
entit le the other to withhold his own performance and or to 
terminate the con tract. Rescission, withholding one's 
performance and termination are al l in one sense rights but 
equally they are often the most effective way of remedying 
the breach.  
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We may make some other preliminary points. It is common, 
even for lawyers, to talk of 'enforcing the contract ' . In fact 
English law does not usually enforce the contract in the 
sense of compelling the parties to carry out their primary 
obligations. At common law the only case is where the 
guilty party's   outstanding obligation is to pay a f ixed sum 
of money; in equity there exist the remedies of specif ic 
performance and injunction but these, as we shal l see, are 
only exceptionally granted. In practice, the injured party's 
remedy is most commonly an act ion for damages to 
compensate him for the breach of contract.  
 
I t  is important f inal ly to notice that the part ies enjoy a wide 
freedom not only to provide for their pr imary rights but also 
to plan their own remedies. In contracts of any 
sophist icat ion it is very common for the parties to insert,  
provisions, which either add to or subtract from the 
remedies that the general law would otherwise provide. 
Even in relat ively simple contracts i t may make an 
excellent sense to contract for a remedy, which wil l  avoid 
the need to go to court.  
 
I t  sounds reasonably easy to decide under which head 
remedy is to be claimed for breach of contract, but such a 
simple question gives rise to lot many complicated issues to 
be answered by the parties, l ikewise: 
  
After deciding the major quest ion that under what head the 
remedy is to be claimed if  the aggrieved party comes to a 
conclusion that it  would be claimed under the head called 
“damages for breach of contract”, fol lowing questions arise 
for consideration before a party who wants to claim 
damages, such as: 
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  On what ground the damages can be claimed? 
  Such damages are to be claimed from whom?   
  What would be the amount of damages to be claimed? 
  What amount can be termed as reasonable and fair  
amount of damages to be granted by the Court? 
  Whether the damages are merely a compensation or 
penalty? 
  Whether the aggrieved party claiming damages for 
breach of contract can be al lowed to make prof it out 
of it? 
  What is the concept of remoteness of damages? 
  What can be the reasonable quantum of damages? 
 
1.4 SCOPE AND OBJECT OF STUDY:  
 
This study revolves around the decisions taken by the 
English Courts, the Privy Council, the Court of Appeals, the 
Chancery Division, exchequer court, the Hon’ble Supreme 
Court of India, Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat and Hon’ble 
High Courts of all  other States in India in the development 
of law of damages for breach of contract.   
 
Hypothesis of the researcher has set up a focused for 
research is, “How effective is the legislat ive and judicial  
controll ing in the area of awarding damages for the breach 
of contract?”  “How the concept of law of damages is 
developed step by step by eminent Judges through their 
judicial decisions?   
 
This study would reveal that the hypothesis is focused on 
how far the decisions, comments, judicial pronouncements 
and intervention of the English Courts, the Privy Council,  
the Court of Appeals, the Chancery Division, the Hon’ble 
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Supreme Court of India, Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat and 
other Hon’ble High Courts of al l other States in India, have 
helped in developing the law of damages for breach of 
contract.  This study is justi fying the hypothesis as the 
legislat ions are also helping the judiciary to decide new 
challenges brought before them to decide.   
 
1.5 HYPOTHESIS: 
 
The main object behind the present research exercise is to 
bring analyt ical and comparative focus on the decided 
cases, which have developed law of damages for breach of 
contract in England as well as in India.   
 
In the developing society l ike that of India, the Court has 
discharged rare and responsible function of – 
  
(1) Balancing and computing the claim of damages as 
well as assuring unhampered development of 
commercial transaction; 
(2) To undertake where and when necessary to exercise 
judicial interference in commercial transaction;  
 
It  has been the endeavor of the present researcher to place 
on record how far the English Courts, the Privy Council, the 
Court of Appeals, the Chancery Divis ion, Exchequer court, 
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, Hon’ble High Court of 
Gujarat and Hon’ble High Courts of al l other States in India, 
have succeeded in their task in giving a loud and clear 
voice to the law of damages to the breach of contract.  
 
  Whether the efforts of all  these Hon’ble inst itut ions 
arr ived at a success?   
  Upto what extent these efforts have been successful?  
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  Whether the efforts have not resulted into ult imate 
success?   
  Whether there are loopholes in the present l it igat ion 
or whether enforcement of law is weak?   
  How do we make the entire procedure to claim 
damages for breach of contract smooth, s imple, stable 
and steady to provide the ult imate justice to the 
aggrieved party? 
 
The research scholar to find out the answers of aforesaid questions 
pose to her own self undergoes the entire research exercise.  
 
1.6 RESEARCH DESIGN: 
 
The study undertaken is,  of course, on vast Compass i.e. 
analytical and comparat ive study of decisions of English 
Courts as well as Indian Courts on the subject of law of  
damages for breach of contracts.  The method adopted by 
the researcher is both analyt ical  as well as crit ical. It is 
mainly doctrinal, report ive study. The method used for 
carrying out this research work is based on a systematic 
desk review of al l the relevant l iterature available related to 
the subject i .e. damages for breach of contract. In carrying 
out the above task of analytical study and research all  
available l i terature on the topic under focus based on case-
law material, legislat ion and articles evolved.  The writ ings 
of the jurists have been perused. The greater emphasis, 
undoubtedly during this analytical study, is on case-law 
developed by the English Courts, the Privy Council,  the 
Court of Appeals, the Chancery Division, the Hon’ble 
Supreme Court of India, Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat and 
other Hon’ble High Courts of al l other States in India. 
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Thus, i t  has been a doctr inarian research approach 
combined with limited empirical  study descript ive, 
evaluative, crit ical,  explanatory study, which includes the 
following: 
 
(I) Recognise the problem. 
(II)  Ident ify and def ine the problem. 
(III )  Formulate a problem hypothesis, deduce 
consequences and def ine basic terms and variables.  
 
1.7 SOURCES: 
 
The sources, on which the ent ire research work is based, 
can broadly be divided into two categories:  
(I) Primary Sources;  
(II)  Secondary Sources.  
 
  Primary Sources: 
 
The researcher has mainly relied upon the articles and 
reports written by the eminent Jurists and legal experts, 
decided case laws of England and Indian Courts as well as 
al l the possible information available on the Web-sites for 
analytical and comparative study of judicial trend in India 
and England on the subject of damages for breach of 
contract.  A detailed l ist of the same is given in the 
Bibl iography.  
 
  Secondary Sources: 
 
Books written by eminent authors of both the countries i .e.  
England and India, Law Journals published by the 
authorized publication houses of England and India, are 
rel ied upon as a secondary source of research. A detai led 
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l ist of the secondary source is also given in the 
Bibl iography. 
 
1.8 BREAK-UP OF THE STUDY: CHAPTERISATION: 
 
The introductory chapter deals with the revolutionary 
cycles. The plan and the methodology employed in the 
present study are also dealt  with in this chapter.   
 
It  would be important to advert to the condit ions which 
would permit a person to claim damages or claim 
compensation which would take within it sweep liabil ity for 
damages, measure of damages, proof of damages and 
remote and indirect loss so as to claim specif ic damages.  
However, before damages can be measured, it  would be 
important to understand the legal r ights, which are 
conferred on a person.  The purview of Sect ion - 73 and 74 
of the Indian Contract Act would have to be analysed. What 
would amount to breach of contract, which would permit a 
person to claim damages may be liquidated or unliquidated. 
Damages come into picture only when a contract has been 
broken and breach of contract is proved before posing the 
question about damages. No damages can be awarded by 
the Court without coming to concrete conclusion about 
breach being committed, merely on the ground that 
defendant has been prof ited by the contract. Chapter-II  
exclusively deals with concept of breach of contract.  
 
Having considered the importance of concept of breach of 
contract and discussion made on it , it  becomes necessary 
to discuss the basic doctrine of frustrat ion of contract. The 
said concept is discussed in Chapter-I II where the entire 
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performance of contract becomes substant ial ly impossible 
without any fault on either side or any malafide intent ion on 
either party; the contract is prima facie dissolved by the 
doctr ine of frustration.  
 
Chapter-IV gives an idea about how development of the 
doctr ine of frustrat ion of contract is made by various modes 
i.e. by making enactments by delivering dif ferent judgments 
on the said issue by the competent Court of law in England 
and India as wel l. What would be the rights and l iabi l it ies of 
the parties to frustrated contracts? And how these rights 
and l iabi l it ies are decided and day-by-day developed by the 
judicial pronouncement is the crux of this chapter.  
 
The basic foundation of every action of damages in the case 
of contract is a result or outcome of breach of contract.   It 
is but obvious that such breach of contract is one of them. 
Therefore, whenever a breach of contract is proved al l the 
cases made out that the breach is committed, law infers 
some damages to the plaint i ff  and according to the maxim 
ubi jus ibi remedium the common law of England as well as 
India considers that there is no wrong without a remedy and 
the remedy is by way of an act ion for damages, is one of 
the most important and widely accepted remedy amongst  
the others.  Chapter-V gives an idea about foundation of  
l iabil i ty for breach of contract.  
 
Any person who has suffered loss, detr iment, or injury, 
whether to his person, property, or rights, through the 
unlawful act or omission or negligence of another is ent it led 
to a pecuniary compensation or indemnity.  Any person who 
is a sufferer may recover such compensation or indemnity in 
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the Courts. Chapter-VI is an attempt to throw some l ight on 
origin and history of term damages.  
 
Chapter-VII deals with the term damages, its def init ion and 
the object for awarding damages for the breach of contract. 
The rule of law governing damages is also dealt with, 
statutory law applicable in India and England. The chapter 
deals with the judicial pronouncements in pre-independence 
India and post-independence India and a comparative study 
between the decisions of courts of England and decisions of 
Indian Courts. The damages are specif ied into different 
kinds and dealt wi th in extensor. The chapter throws light 
on the researcher’s ideas on the comparative study of term 
damages and the rule to grant damages and the chapter is 
prelude to chapter on discussion on remoteness of contract 
as propounded by the English Court in Hadley v. 
Baxendal.12  
 
Chapter-VIII gives an attempt to give an idea about 
development of general rule for providing compensat ion for 
breach of contract. The scope of measure of damages in 
act ion on Contract is basically very limited.  The Jury or the 
decision making authority or those standing in the place of 
jury have to decide the measure of damages for breach of 
Contract within i ts four corner.  While deciding the 
damages, the decision making authority has not to traverse 
any vague fields.  Basically the damages are never “at large 
in action on Contract”.  The injury sustained by the 
promisee can in almost every case, be very nearly 
measured by a pecuniary standard, and satisfaction 
rendered with a near approach to completeness.  One can 
                                      
12  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex. 341. 
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say that damages in act ions on Contract are only 
compensation, not the prof it making issue.  But the dif f iculty 
is even this is frequently inadequate because the Law has 
set its own limits upon the theory of compensation.    
  
Chapter-IX mainly gives an idea about different types or 
kinds of damages. After deciding the nature of damages, i t  
becomes reasonably easy or affordable for the Juries, 
Courts or decision making authorit ies to award damage 
under the head of a particular type or kind of damage. The 
damages of fol lowing all the different types are recognized 
and awarded as well by the England and nat ive Courts. 
More or less, the all  types of damages are divided into the 
following four broad categories: 
 
(a) General Damages. 
(b) Special Damages. 
(c) Nominal Damages.  
(d) Exemplary Damages. 
 
Chapter-X exclusively deals with the concept of l iquidated 
damages and penalty.  Whether the agreed sum is 
recoverable from the party in breach depends upon whether 
it constitutes l iquidated damages, when it is recoverable, or 
a penalty, when it  is not.  The law as to l iquidated damages 
and penalt ies has a long involved history, and a brief 
account of the development over the centuries is necessary 
for a full understanding of the modern law.  
 
It has been stated in one of the previous chapters that the 
damages is considered too remote, if  despite the wrongful 
act of the defendant, the plainti ff by fail ing to use 
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reasonable care to avoid, al lows himself  to suffer the 
damage by his own negligence or indif ference to the 
consequence. In an act ion on contract, the damages, which 
an injured person is ent it led to recover, must result directly 
from the wrongful act and no claim can be made to 
damages, which are only remotely connected with it.  The 
basic principle underlying this rule wi l l,  therefore, be found 
in the maxim in jure non remota causa ed proxima 
spectatur.  Chapter-XI gives an idea about quantum of 
damages.   
 
Chapter-XII deals with the f inding and researcher’s 
assessment and recommendations as well  as concluding 
remarks and the suggest ions.  
 
Crit ical and analyt ical study of decisions, their drawbacks 
and the legislat ive drawbacks are discussed in the above 
chapters. All the aforesaid chapters give an exhaust ive and 
comparative analysis as well as crit ical analysis, judicial  
trends on the subject and suggestions for future study to be 
undertaken.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER - II 
 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION: 
 
Before discussing the genesis of the term damages, i t  would 
be now important to advert to the condit ions which would 
permit a person to claim damages or claim compensat ion 
which would take within i t sweep liabil ity for damages, 
measure of damages, proof of damages and remote and 
indirect loss so as to claim specif ic damages. However, 
before damages can be measured, it  would be important to 
understand the legal rights, which are conferred on a 
person.  The purview of Sect ion - 73 and 74 of the Indian 
Contract Act would have to be analysed. What would 
amount to breach of contract, which would permit a person 
to claim damages may be l iquidated or unliquidated. Here, 
construction of contract would be very important for our 
purpose. 
 
In India, it  is an admitted posit ion of law as legislated by 
provisions of Sect ion 3 to 8 of the Indian Contract Act that a 
contract is concluded when the sequence of offer and 
acceptance is complete. It is for the courts to spell out with 
a meticulous sif t ing of the correspondence, which took 
place between the parties at the t ime, the alleged contract 
said to have been undertaken or concluded or not 
concluded. The suit for damages would l ie only when the 
contract is concluded out of free wi ll of  the part ies. The 
parties may enter into contract or conclude the same by 
their own terms and condit ions. Mutual agreement would 
either absolve the parties or compel the party to do certain 
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things and if  the said term is not performed, the other party 
would be l iable for loss, damages, compensation, delay 
which may directly or indirectly, arise even for the act of 
God.1 The provisions of Sections 23 and 24 of the Indian 
Contract Act would also be required to be considered as 
they are necessary for validity of the agreement unless 
there is an exception clause. The consideration or object of 
the agreement should always be lawful then only other party 
would be ent it led to damages if  the agreement itself  is 
unlawful, the said unlawful considerat ion would make the 
entire agreement void as per the provisions of sect ion 64 of 
the Act. If  the unlawful considerat ion is severable, the 
lawful portion of such consideration can be acted upon 
either by specif ic performance or by claiming damages can 
be sought from the default ing party.  
 
Either of the party to the contract wi ll  get discharges from 
the contractual obligat ion mainly by two ways: 
 
(1) Discharge by performance and 
(2) Discharge by breach. 
 
It is easy to see that if  one party completely performs what 
he has promised to do his obligations are at an end. 
However, important and dif f icult questions arise as to the 
effect of something less than perfect performance. From 
view point of the performer this is a problem in performance 
but to the other party it wil l appear as a problem in breach, 
since usually, a less than perfect performance wil l  be a 
breach. It seems more convenient; therefore, to consider 
the problems together, s ince to a considerable extend one 
is the mirror image of the other.  
                                      
1  M/s. Basanti Bastralaya v. River Steam Navigation C. Ltd.; AIR 1987 
Cal 271. 
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The provisions of  Sect ion 73 and 74 speak about the 
compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of 
contract, and therefore, analyzing these sections, i t would 
be relevant for our study to advert back to what is a 
contract and when it can be said to have been broken and 
to further analyse what would constitute breach of such 
contract. After having understood this concept, i t would be 
relevant what would be the compensation to be paid to such 
party who has been wronged. This law of damages is further 
qualif ied by the term arose in the usual course of thinking 
from such breach. One more aspect is provided in the 
Section it self  that the parties must be knowing that what 
would be the loss or damage if  such breach occurred and 
this knowledge is attributed at the t ime when the contract 
itself  is made. However, the proviso makes it clear that no 
compensation should be given for remote and indirect loss 
or damage. Even compensation can be granted for failure of 
discharging obligat ions, which would resemble one, which is 
created by such contract. Therefore, quasi contract are also 
taken care of.  
 
Before advert ing to the principles on which the damages 
can be granted, it  would be important to get a rough idea 
about the provisions of Sect ion 4 and 5, which deal with the 
formation of bilateral contract.  
 
A person who had made an offer may withdraw the offer but 
it  has to be withdrawn before the acceptance or even if it  is 
accepted before it was communicated to him. It is cardinal  
principle that the acceptance should be uncondit ional and 
absolute if  there is no binding, contract between the parties 
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or if  the acceptance is neither absolute nor uncondit ional, a 
party would not be ent it led to damages. The next aspect, 
which has to be looked into for grant of damages, is that the 
consideration should not be unlawful. The law not only 
requires considerat ion but also insists on lawful  
consideration. The object also must be lawful. Sect ion - 23 
makes it clear that a deal which has unlawful considerat ion 
is void (i l legal). This is also seen that at t imes, damages 
have to be asserted if on the basis of terms of contract and 
if  on time, term is essential ingredient.   
 
Section 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 lays 
down the principles for assessment of damages where there 
is a breach of contract. Therefore, ease to these vexes 
problems, and therefore, it  would be necessary to f irst go 
through the aspect of breach of contract. The def init ion of 
contract wi l l have to be understood and if  there is no 
contract, there can be no breach, therefore, the f irst aspect 
for awarding damages would be a concluded contract,  and 
therefore, i t  would be necessary to deal with the aspect of 
concluded contract. Thereafter, what would amount to 
discharge by performance and what would amount to breach 
of contract, will have to be discussed. 
 
2.2 THE ORDER OF PERFORMANCE AND NON-
PERFORMENCE: 
 
Where both part ies have obligat ion to perform, in case of a 
bi lateral contract,  question may arise as to who is to 
perform f irst. This is prel iminary a quest ion of construction 
of a contract assisted by presumptions as to the normal rule 
of contracts of a particular kind. Often, it  wil l not be a case 
of one party performing al l his obligations f irst but rather of 
someone obl igations of one side having to be performed 
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before related obligat ions of the other side. So in a contract 
of employment, the employer’s obl igat ions to pay wages will  
normally be dependent on the servant ’s has completed a 
period of employment at the cost of his obligat ion to provide 
a safe system of work at the place of employment. It is 
often helpful to analyse this problem by using the language 
of condit ions. In a contract between A  and B ,  while 
discussing about the contract we may explore at least three 
possibi l it ies: 
 
(I) An undertaking by A  is a condit ion precedent to an 
undertaking by B .  
(II)  Undertaking by A and B  may be concurrent condit ions 
in nature, and 
(III )  Some undertakings by A  and B  may be independent in 
nature. 
 
From the aforesaid discovery of three dif ferent possibi l i t ies 
il lustrate the f irst  two possibi l it ies by considering the 
obligations of buyer and sel ler as to delivery of goods and 
payment of pr ice under the contract of sel l of  goods. The 
obligation of the seller to deliver and of the buyer to pay 
price are said to be prima facie concurrent, but in many 
cases varies this rule. In many commercial contracts the 
seller agrees to grant the buyer normal trade terms, for 
example, payment within 30 days of delivery of invoice. I t is 
clear that in such a case, the seller must deliver f irst and 
cannot demand payment on delivery.2 Completely contrary 
to this, in internat ional sel ls,  buyers often agree to pay by 
opening a banker’s commercial credit, and here it is clear 
that the seller need not to take steps to del iver goods unt il  
the buyer has arranged for opening of credit I the 
                                      
2  Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd. v. Thompson Garages (Biggin Hill) Ltd., 
[1971] 3 All ER 1226. 
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conformity with the contract.3 Where the buyer’s and seller’s 
obligations are concurrent, this means in pract ice that the 
abil ity to either party to complain of the other’s non-
performance depends on its own abil ity to show that he was 
ready, wil l ing and able to perform.  
 
It is quite common for the some of the obligation of the 
parties to be quite independent of the performance of 
obligations by the other party. We have already discussed 
the employer’s duty to provide a safe system of work; an 
example on the other side would be the servant ’s duty of 
f idel ity to the master.4 In the case of such independent 
covenants the covenantor cannot argue that his obligation 
is postponed unt il  the covenantee has performed some 
other obligations.  
 
  Some decided case laws of non-performance: 
 
In Prema v. Mustak Ahmed,5 the plainti ff appel lant (a Hindu) 
al leged that the defendant respondent (a Musl im) had made 
a breach of promise to marry her and claimed Rs. 
1,00,000/- as damages. The Trial Court found no such 
promise by sift ing the evidence and non-sui ted the plaintif f. 
The High Court disagreed with the appreciation of evidence 
and held that the defendant-respondent had made a 
promise to marry and had breached it. The Court 
approvingly quoted from Anson’s Law of Contract.6  
 
`Damages for breach of contract are given by way of 
compensation for suffered, and not by way of punishment 
                                      
3  W.J. Alan & Co. Ltd., v. El Nasr Export and Import Co. [1972] 2 QB 
189 : [1972] 2 All ER 127. 
4  Hivac Ltd. v. Park Royal Scientific Instruments Ltd., (1946) CH 169. 
5  Prema v. Mustak Ahmed; AIR 1987 Guj. 106. 
6  Anson’s Law of Contract, 27th Edition, Oxford University Press. 
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for wrong inf licted. Hence, the `vindict ive’ or exemplary’  
damages of law have no place in the law of contract. To this 
rule, however, the act ion for breach of promise of marr iage 
is an exception; in that case injury to the feelings of the 
disappointed party may be taken into account in the 
assessment of damages.’ 
 
The Court opined that this is the well-sett led common law in 
England, which applies in India also. The Court granted Rs. 
60,000/- as damages on the ground of what would be a 
reasonable sum “commensurate with the social and 
economic status of the husband and wife in case of 
desert ion of the wife by the husband. This Court measured, 
would “not have been less than Rs. 500/- per month”.  
 
The question that arises is what would be the measurement 
of damages in a supposed case where the breacher   is a 
female and not a male? Should not the Court, then take into 
consideration the social condit ions in the country and not 
merely the mental feelings, if  any of the male?7  
 
Section - 74 of the Indian Contract Act, does not say that 
compensation can be awarded even though no loss, what so 
ever, has been caused, for the very concept of award of 
compensation is to fol low the loss or damage that results 
from a breach of contract. Al l that Section -74 permits is the 
award of compensation even where the extent of the actual 
loss or damage is not proved and gives discret ion to the 
Court to f ix the amount.  
 
                                      
7  See Lucy Carrooll, “The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act, 1986: A Retrogressive Precedent of Dubious 
Constitutionality”, 364, 28 JILI (1986); also see her views on Indian 
society and women. 
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The plainti ff  had f i led a sui t c laiming damages to the extent 
of Rs. 394.40p. for the al leged breach of contract for the 
sell of  sawdust. The defendant was a Forest Contractor and 
a t imber merchant. The defendant had opened the branch 
off ice at Murtizapur for the sell of t imber and sawdust. In 
the year 1948, one Gopikisan was appointed as manager of  
the shop. This Gopikisan entered into the contract with the 
plaint if f  for supplying of 2000 bags of sawdust within four 
months at the rate of Rs. 1/- per bag. Rs. 250/- was paid to 
Gopikisan. Gopikisan had delivered only 323 bags of 
sawdust. Neither he nor the defendant delivered the 
balance bags to him. The contract st ipulated that on breach 
of contract the defendant would be l iable to pay Rs. 1,000/- 
by way of damages, therefore, the plainti ff  claimed the 
amount with sum of Rs. 102/- which was an excess of the 
amount which he had paid to Gopikisan over and above the 
price of 423 bags supplied by him from time to t ime. The 
defendant in his written statement denied the claim but 
admitted that Gopikisan was his servant and had also 
denied that Gopikisan was manager of the shop or Diwan 
and he had not any authority to enter into contracts for 
purchase or sel l of  goods. Unfortunately for the plainti f f,  the 
Trial Court dismissed the suit but Appellate Court granted a 
decree for refund of Rs. 102/- and damages for Rs. 394.  
The Hon’ble High Court has held that the f igure specif ied in 
the contract was f ixed not as a pre-estimate by the part ies 
of the damage, which the plaintif f  would suffer by reason of 
the breach, but in terrorem.  Where such is the case, i t  
cannot be presumed that the plainti ff  must have suffered 
some damage. Therefore, the plaint i ff  must prove that he 
did in fact suffer some damages, though he need not prove 
the actual extent of the damages. Here the al legation is that 
the saw dust was to be used for manuring the f ields of the 
plaint if f  and that the fai lure of the defendant to supply the 
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full  quant ity of saw dust contracted for resulted in damages 
to the plaintif f . There is no evidence to show that saw dust  
is used as a manure nor has one word been said by any one 
in this case that the use of saw dust gives a better yield of 
crops than otherwise. It would, therefore, fol low that the 
plaint if f  has not shown that he had suffered any damage at 
al l.  I t  can be analyt ically stated that no doubt Sect ion 74 
says that where a sum is stated in the contract as payable 
to a party i f the other party thereof causes a breach, the 
Court has power to grant compensation to the party even 
though actual loss or damage is not proved. But that does 
not mean that compensation can be awarded even though 
no loss whatsoever has been caused. For the very concept 
of award of compensation is bound up with loss or damage 
that result f rom a breach of contract. All that Section 74 
permits is award of compensation even where the extent of 
the actual loss or damage is not proved and given 
discretion to the Court to f ix the amount. Where, as here, no 
loss or damage has ensued, there can be no question of 
awarding compensation. In my opinion, therefore, the 
plaint if f  is not ent it led to claim any damages.  
 
In view of the sett led legal posit ion enunciated after this 
judgment, the view that only Rs. 102/- were admissible and 
that the plaintif f  had not suffered any damage and he was 
not be ent it led to damage is bad. The Court has felt that 
damage can be awarded only when some loss has been 
caused. The award of compensation is bound up with loss 
or damage and not based on the aspect of breach of 
contract. Sect ion 24 permits the compensation where in act  
of loss or damage is not proved and discret ion is given to 
the Court to award damages. 
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The Apex Court later in Union of India v. M/s. Jol ly Steel  
Industr ies (P) Ltd.8 held that the damages for non-delivery 
was to be f ixed on the basis of the price prevailing at the 
date on which delivery ought to have been made, according 
to contract. This judgment is based on the landmark 
judgment given in the case of Murlidhar Chiranji lal v.  
Harishchandra Dwarkadas9 wherein the Apex Court held 
that the f irst pr inciple on which damages in cases of breach 
of contract are calculated is that, as far as possible, he who 
has proved a breach of a bargain to supply what he 
contracted to get is to be placed, as far as money can do it ; 
in as good a situat ion as if  the contract had been 
performed; but this principle is qualif ied by a second, which 
imposes on a plainti ff  the duty of taking all reasonable 
steps to mit igate the loss consequent on the breach, and 
debars him from claiming any part of the damages which is 
due to his neglect to take such steps. These two principles 
also fol low from the law as laid down in Sect ion 73 read 
with the explanat ion thereof.  
 
2.3 EXCUSES FOR NON-PERFORMANCE: 
 
As per the above discussion, prima facie it  seems that 
failure to perform is amount to breach. This is true in 
majority of cases but at the same time, it is pert inent to 
recognize that in certain circumstances fai lure to perform 
contract as per the agreed terms is excusable. Those 
excuses in nutshell  are as below: 
 
 
                                      
8  Union of India v. M/s. Jolly Steel Industr ies (P) Ltd., AIR 
1980 SC 1346. 
9  Murlidhar Chiranj i lal  v. Harishchandra Dwarkadas,  AIR 1962 
SC 366.  
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(1) Agreement: 
 
The parties may have made some agreement or 
arrangement after the contract was concluded, which 
permits one party not to perform or to perform in a different 
way. Such type of agreement can certainly be considered as 
a valid excuse.  
 
(2) Impossibility of performance and frustration: 
 
Some times, some event takes place after the contract has 
been made in such a manner that makes performance 
impossible or commercially steri le. In a l imited number of 
cases, this may have the effect of bringing the contract to 
an end. This concept has been elaborately discussed in the 
next chapter of this research work.  
 
(3) Impossibility of performance falling short of 
discharging frustration: 
 
In some cases, unforeseeable event,  although not bringing 
the contract to an end, may provide an excuse for non-
performance, so in most modern contracts of employment, 
an employer who did not go work because he was suffer ing 
influenza would not amount to breach of contract,  although 
the il lness would not be suff iciently serious to frustrate the 
contract. 
 
(4) Contractual excuses for non-performance: 
 
Out side the relat ively narrow scope of the last two 
headings, the common law has been slow to infer that 
unforeseen developments should rel ieve a party from 
prompt and perfect performance. This att itude is commonly 
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just if ied on the ground that the part ies should make express 
provision themselves, and this invitation is very often 
accepted. So for instance, al l the standard forms of building 
and engineering contract contain provisions, which may 
entit le the contractor to extra t ime for performance where 
he has been delayed by such matters as exceptionally 
adverse weather conditions, or labour disputes. The 
effectiveness of these clauses may involve consideration of 
the law as to exemption clauses though it is thought that  
many of them should be regarded as def ining liabil i ty rather 
than excluding it .  
 
(5) Limitation: 
 
In principle, when one party has fai led to perform on time, 
the other party can sue and at this moment the appropriate 
limitation period will  begin to run. At the end of this period 
the action wil l normally no longer be maintainable.  
 
2.4 RIGHT TO CLAIM PAYMENT OR PERFORMANCE 
FROM THE OTHER PARTY WHO DOES NOT 
PERFORM PERFECTLY: 
 
There is not a sl ightest whisper of doubt that there are 
number of cases where it has been stated that a party who 
does not perform perfect ly is not ent it led to claim payment 
or performance from the other party to the contract. Here 
the researcher wants to make an attempt to vividly il lustrate 
the aforesaid concept by quoting old case of Cutter v. 
Powell.10 
 
                                      
10  Cutter v. Powel l , (1795) 6 Term Rep 310; Sincla ir  v. 
Vowles, (1829) 9 B & C 92; Vigers v. Cook, [1919] 2 KB 
475; Stoljar  34 Can Bar Rev 288. 
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The defendant agreed to pay Cutter thirty guineas provided 
that he proceeded, cont inued and did his duty as second 
mate in a vessel sail ing from Jamaica to Liverpool. The 
voyage began on 2 August and Cutter died on 20 
September when the ship was nineteen days short of  
Liverpool.  
 
An act ion by Cutter’s widow to recover a proportion of the 
agreed sum fai led, for by the terms of the contract the 
deceased was obl iged to perform a given duty before he 
could demand payment. 
 
In this case, of course, Mr. Cutter did not break the contract 
by dying in mid-Atlant ic but his right to payment was held to 
depend on complet ion of the voyage and the same principle 
was held to apply in the case of breach in Sumpter v. 
Hedges .11 In that case the plaint if f ,  who had agreed to erect 
upon the defendant’s land two houses and stables for ₤565, 
did part of the work to the value of  about ₤333 and then 
abandoned the contract. The defendant himself  completed 
the buildings. I t was held that the plainti f f could not recover 
the value of the work done. 
 
A modern example of this principle is Bolton v. Mahadeva.12  
 
The plainti f f contracted to instal l  a central heating system in 
the defendant’s house for the sum of ₤800. He installed the 
system but it  only worked very ineffectively and the 
defendant refused to pay for it .  The Court of Appeal held 
the plainti f f could recover nothing.  
 
                                      
11  Sumpter  v. Hedges, [1898] 1 QB 673. 
12  Bolton v. Mahadeva, [1972] 2 All ER 1322 : [1972] 1 WLR 
1009. 
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I t  wil l  be seen that in each of these cases, the defendant 
made an uncovenanted profit, s ince he obtained part of 
what the plaintif f  had promised to perform without having to 
pay anything. It is not surprising therefore that these results 
have been cr it icized nor that attempts have been made to 
mitigate or avoid them. 
 
2.4.1 The doctrine of substantial performance: 
 
In the very keen desire to do just ice between contracting 
parties, the courts, have developed the doctr ine which 
popularly known as doctrine of substantial performance. 
The said doctrine is basically providing a relaxation to the 
requirement of exact and precise performance of ent ire 
contract. In the most famous words of Lord Mansf ield while 
delivering the judgment of Boone v. Eyre13 His Lordship 
stated that, “If  there has been a substantial though not an 
exact and li teral performance by the promisor, the promise 
cannot treat himself  as discharged. Despite a minute and 
trif l ing variat ion from the exact terms by which he is bound, 
the promisor is permitted to sue on the contract, though he 
is of course l iable in damages for his partial non-
performance. According to this doctrine, the question 
whether ent ire performance is a condit ion precedent to any 
payment is always a question of construct ion.14 Thus in 
Cutter v. Powell15 the court construed the contract to mean 
that the sailor was to get nothing unless he served as mate 
during the whole voyage. Again, in a contract to erect 
buildings or to do work on another’s land for a lump sum, 
the contractor can recover nothing if  he abandons 
operations when only part of the work completed, since his 
                                      
13  Boone v. Eyre, (1779) 1 Hy B1 273. 
14  Hoenig v Isaacs, [1952] 2 All ER 176. 
15  Cutter v. Powell ,  (1795) 6 Term Rep 310. 
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breach has gone to the root of the contract. But if ,  for 
example, the contractor has completed the erection of the 
buildings, there has been substant ial  performance and the 
other party cannot refuse all payment merely because the 
work is not in exact accordance with the contract,16 any 
more than the employer in Cutter v. Powell could have 
repudiated all  l iabil i ty i f  on one or two occasions the sailor 
had failed in his duty as mate.17  
 
In the landmark rul ing of Broom v. Davis18 it  was held that, 
“So long as there is substantial performance the contractor 
is ent it led to the stipulated price, subject only to cross 
objection or counter claim for the omissions or defects in 
execution. If  these were not the case and if  except 
performance in l i teral  sense were always require, the 
tradesman who had contracted to decorate a house 
according to certain specif ications for a lump sum might f ine 
himself  in an intolerable posit ion. For instance, if  he had put 
two coats of paint in one room instead of three as agreed as 
per the terms of contract the owner would be ent it led to 
take the benefit of  all  that had been done throughout the 
house without paying a single penny for the work already 
done.”19  
 
In that sense the substantial performance doctrine can be 
regarded as the qualif ication of rule, rather than an 
exception to i t,  and it wil l be notice that in the case of 
Cutter v.  Powell,  Sumpter v. Hedges and Bolton v. 
Mahadeva there was in fact a failure or substantial  
                                      
16  H Dakin & Co. Ltd. v. Lee, [ 1916] 1 KB 566. 
17  Hoenig v Isaacs, [1952] 2 All ER 176. 
18  Broom v. Davis, [1794] 7 East 480n : Bolton v. Mahadeva, 
[1972] 2 Al l ER 1322 : [1972] 1 WLR 1009. 
19  Mondel v. Steel (1841)8 M & W 858 at 870; H Dakin & Co Ltd. v. Lee 
[1916] 1 KB 566. 
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performance. A signif icant key to understanding here is 
again the distinction between individual undertakings and 
the whole carpus of undertakings, which a party makes. It 
wi ll be very unusual for a party to have to perform exactly 
every undertaking he has made but much less uncommon 
for exact compliance with one requirement to be necessary. 
Clearly the distinctions between condit ions and warranties 
can be substant ial signif icance here.  
 
2.4.2 Acceptance of partial performance by the 
promisee: 
 
Although a promisor has only partially fulf i l led his 
obligations under the contract, it  may be possible to 
interfere from the circumstances, a fresh agreement by the 
parties that payment shall be made for the work already 
done or for the goods, in fact,  supplied. Where this 
interference would be just if iable the plaint i ff  sues on a 
quantum meruit  to recover remuneration proportionate to 
the benefit conferred upon the defendant, but an essential  
of success is an implicit promise of payment by the 
defendant.  
 
Thus, i t  has been held that if  a ship freighted to Hamburg is 
prevented by restraints of princes from arr iving, and the 
consignees accept the cargo at another port to which they 
have directed it to be delivered, they are l iable upon an 
implied contract to pay freight pro rata it ineris .20  
 
2.4.3 Prevention of performance by the promisee: 
I f  a party to an entire contract performs part of the work that 
he has undertaken and is then prevented by the fault of the 
                                      
20  Christy v. Row (1808) 1 Taunt 300; St. Enoch Shipping Co. Ltd. v. 
Phosphate Mining Co., [1916] 2 KB 624 at 628. 
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other party from proceeding further, the law does not al low 
him to be deprived of the fruits of his labour. He is ent it led, 
of course, to recover damages for breach of contract, but 
alternat ively he can recover reasonable remunerat ion on a 
quantum meruit  for what he has done. The leading authority 
for this obvious rule is Planche v. Colburn .21  
 
2.4.4 Divisible Covenants: 
 
Another avenue of escape is presented by the dist inct ion 
between ent ire and divisible contracts. A contract may be 
described as divisible in several senses. In contracts of 
employment, it  is usual to provide for payment at weekly or 
monthly intervals and this has the effect of oust ing the 
principle in Cutter v. Powell22 at least for every completed 
week or month. Similar ly in building contracts, i t is usual to 
provide for payment at intervals, usual ly against an 
architect ’s cert if icate, and this avoids to a substant ial  
extent the result in Sumpter v. Hedges .23  
 
In i ts technical connotat ion, the term divisible, means, 
however, rather that s ituation where one party’s 
performance is made independent of the other’s. in this 
sense, as we have already seen, it  is more accurate to talk 
of divisible covenants rather than divisible contracts, since 
in relat ion to any particular contract,  there may be some 
obligations which are dependent and others which are 
independent of the other party’s.24  
                                      
21  Planche v. Colburn, (1831) 8 Bing 14. 
22  Cutter v. Powell ,  (1795) 6 Term Rep 310.  
23  Sumpter  v. Hedges, [1898] 1 QB 673. 
24  General Bill Posting Co. ltd. v. Atkinson, [1909] AC 118; Taylor v. 
Webb, [1937] 2 KB 282 : [1937] 1 All ER 590; Appleby v. Myers, 
(1867) LR 2 CP 651 at 660-661; Robers v. Havelock, (1832) 3 B 7 Ad 
404; Menetone v. Athawes, (1764) 3 Burr 1592; Hewood v. Wellers 
[1976] QB 446 : [1976] 1 All ER 300. 
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2.5 RIGHT TO CLAIM FOR RECOVERY OF ADVANCE 
MADE IN THE EVENT OF FAILURE OF PERFECT 
PERFORMANCE: 
 
Suppose, as discussed in the aforesaid case of Bolton v. 
Mahadeva,25 the defendant had paid for the work in 
advance, could he being a innocent party to the breach of 
contract, recovered his payment? The answer to the 
question is that he could not, since the test for recovery in 
such cases is “total failure of consideration”. The defendant 
would have been l imited to an act ion for damages, which 
would presumably have provided about ₤200, and therefore, 
₤600 was better off  because he must paying on complet ion 
rather than in advance. The result is particularly strik ing in 
a case such as Cutter v. Powel l,26 that the employer would 
have had no act ion for damages, since there was no breach 
of contract.  
 
2.6 RIGHT TO CLAIM TERMINATION OF THE 
CONTRACT BY THE INNOCENT PARTY: 
 
The concept to claim terminat ion of contract by the innocent 
party sounds interconnected with the above discussed 
topics but it  is certainly dist inct in its own nature. For 
example, A  charters a ship from B for a voyage charterparty 
to carry frozen meat from Auckland to Liverpool, i t is clear 
that A  is under no obligation to load the meat if  on arrival at 
the docks he f inds that the ship’s refr igerat ion is not 
working,27 but it  does not fol low that he is entit led to bring 
the contract to an end. This will  depend on whether the law 
                                      
25  Bolton v. Mahadeva,  [1972] 2 All ER 1322 : [1972] 1 WLR 
1009. 
26  Cutter v. Powell ,  (1795) 6 Term Rep 310. 
27  Stanton v. Richardson, (1872) LR 7 CP 421. 
  
- 45 - 
permits B  t ime to repair the refrigerators and whether, it  so, 
he is able to make use of it .   
 
Under the contract of sell  of  goods, some very strict 
doctr ines have been developed as to the buyer’s right to 
reject goods which do not conf irm to the agreed terms of 
contract. The str ictness of the law in this respect  is well  
i l lustrated by the duty of the seller to make delivery of 
goods as per the exact standard agreed upon by the parties 
as a part of terms and conditions of  contract. Thus, if  the 
seller delivers more goods than which have been ordered, 
the buyer may reject the whole consignment and cannot be 
required to select the correct quantity out of the bulk 
delivered.28  In the same manner, if  less than the correct 
quantity is delivered than also buyer may reject the entire 
consignment of goods agreed upon as per the terms of the 
contract.  
 
Now let us see in what circumstances does a breach entit le 
the innocent party to terminate the contract?29 A breach of 
contract, no matter what form it may take, always entit les 
the innocent party to maintain an action for damages, but 
the rule established by a long l ine of authorit ies is that the 
right of a party to treat a contract as discharged arises only 
in two types of case. 
 
(1) Where the party in default has repudiated the contract 
before performance is due or before it has been fully 
performed. 
 
(2) Where the party in default has committed what in 
modern judicial parlance is cal led a fundamental  
                                      
28  Cunliffe v. Harrison, (1851) 6 Exch 903. 
29  Delvin [1966] CLJ 192; Treitel 30 MLR 139. 
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breach. A breach is of this nature if , having regard to 
the contract as whole, the promise that has been 
violated is of major as dist inct from minor importance. 
 
2.6.1 Repudiation: 
 
Repudiat ion in the present sense occurs where party 
intimates by words or conduct that he does not intent to 
owner his agreed obligat ions when they fal l  due in future as 
per the terms of contract.30 In the words of Lord Blackburn: 
 
“Where there is a contract to be performed in the future, if  
one of the parties has said to the other in effect ‘ i f  you go 
on and perform your side of the contract I will  not perform 
mine’, that in effect, amounts to saying ‘I  wil l not perform 
the contract ’. In that case the other party may say, ‘you 
have given me distinct not ice that you wil l not perform the 
contract. I wi ll  not wait  unti l you have broken it, but I will  
treat you as having put an end to the contract, and if  
necessary I  wil l sue you for damages, but at all  events I will  
not go on with the contract.”31  
 
Repudiat ion may be ei ther explicit or impl icit. An example of 
the former type is afforded by Hochster v. De la Tour,32 
where the defendant agreed in Apri l to employ the plaint iff 
as his courier during a foreign tour commencing on 1 June. 
On 11 May he wrote that he had changed his mind and 
therefore, would not require a courier. The plaintif f  sued for 
damages before 1 June and succeeded. 
 
                                      
30  Heyman v. Darwins Ltd., [1942] AC 356 at 378, 398 : [1942] 1 All ER 
337 at 350, 360. 
31  Mersey Steel and Iron Co. v. Naylor Benzon & Co., (1884) 9 App Cas 
434. 
32  Hochster v. De la Tour, (1853) 2 E & B 678. 
  
- 47 - 
A repudiat ion is implic it where the reasonable inference 
from the defendant’s conduct is that he no longer intends to 
perform his die of the contract. Thus, ‘ if  a man contracts to 
sell  and deliver specif ic goods on a future day, and before 
the day he sel ls and delivers them to another, he is 
immediately l iable to an act ion at the suit of the person with 
whom he f irst contracted’. So also, i f  A conveys a house to 
C,  which he had previously agreed to devise to B ,  A  wil l  be 
taken to have repudiated the contract.33 The leading 
authority on this type of case is Frost v. Knight34 where the 
defendant, having agreed to marry the plaint if f  upon the 
death of his father, broke off the engagement during the 
latter’s l ifet ime. The plaintif f immediately sued for damages 
and was successful. This part icular situation can no longer 
recur, since act ions for breach of promise of marriage have 
now been abolished, but the principles laid down in Frost v. 
Knight  are sti l l  of  general application.  
 
The result,  then, of a repudiat ion, whether explicit  or 
implicit,  is that the innocent party acquires an immediate 
cause of act ion. But he need not enforce it. He can either 
stay his hand or wait unti l  the day for performance arr ives 
or treat the contract as discharged and take immediate 
proceedings. 
 
2.6.2 Fundamental breach: 
 
The next class of case in which the party is entit led to treat 
himself  as discharged from further l iabi l ity is where his co-
contractor,  without expressly or impliedly repudiat ing his 
                                      
33  Synge v. Synge, [1894] 1 QB 466; Lovelock v. Franklyn, (1846) 8 QB 
371. 
34  Frost v. Knight, (1872) LR 7 Exch 111; Short v. Stone  
(1846) 8 QB 358. 
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obligations, commits a fundamental breach of the contract. 
Now the question arises, what nature must be a breach be 
before it is called “fundamental”? To answer this question in 
a loud and clear manner there are two alternative tests 
provided. The court may f ind the decisive element either in 
the importance that the part ies would seem to have 
attached to the term, which has been broken, or to the 
seriousness of the consequences that have, in fact, resulted 
from the breach. Here the researcher would l ike to suggest 
that although the tests are often stated and quoted as 
alternat ives, they in fact, both have a part to play. If  one 
applies the f irst  test the governing principle is that 
everything depends upon the construction of the contract in 
question. The court has to decide whether, at the t ime when 
the contract was made, the parties must be taken to have 
regarded the promise which ahs been violated as of major 
or of minor importance. In the words of Bowen LJ: 
 
“There is no way of deciding that question except by looking 
at the contract in the l ight of the surrounding 
circumstances, and then making up one’s mind whether the 
intention of the parties, as gathered from the instrument 
itself , will  best be carried out by treating the promise as a 
warranty sounding only in damages, or as a condit ion 
precedent by the fai lure to perform which the other party is 
rel ieved of his liabi lity.”35  
 
Whether one looks to promise or breach one of the 
diff icult ies, has been to formulate with any approach to 
precision the degree of importance that a promise or breach 
must possess to warrant the discharge of the contract. A 
variety of phrases has been used in an endeavour to meet 
                                      
35  Bentsen v. Taylor, Sons & Co. (No. 2), [1893] 2 QB 274 at 281. 
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this need. It has been said, for instance, that no breach will  
discharge the innocent party from further liabil ity unless it  
goes to the whole root of the contract, not merely to part  of 
it ,36 or unless it goes so much to the root of the contract 
that i t makes further performance impossible37 or unless it  
af fects the very substance of the contract.38 Sachs LJ, ‘at  
the risk of being dubbed old-fashioned’, has recent ly stated 
his preference for the expression ‘goes to the root of the 
contract’, which ahs been the favourite of the judges for at 
least 150 years.  
 
That leaves the quest ion whether the breach does go to the 
root as a matter of degree for the court to decide on the 
facts of the particular case in the same way as it ahs to 
decide which terms are warrant ies and which are 
condit ions.39  
 
To speak of ‘the root of the contract’  is, no doubt,  to rely on 
a metaphor; and Lord Sumner once said that ‘ l ike most 
metaphors it is not nearly so clear as it seems’.40 I t  does not 
solve the problem, but rather restates it in picturesque 
language. Yet a picture is not without value; and the phrase 
may help judges to crystall ize the impression made on their 
minds by the facts of a particular case. In the Austral ian 
case of Tramways Advert ising Pty Ltd. v. Luna Park (NSW) 
Ltd.,41 Jordan CJ said: 
 
                                      
36  Davidson v. Gwynne, (1810) 12 East 381 at 389. 
37  Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd., v. Kawasaki Kaisen kaisha Ltd., 
[1962] 2 QB 26 at 64, [1962] 1 All ER 474 at 484. 
38  Wallis, Son and Wells v. Pratt and Haynes, [1910] 2 KB 1003 at 1012. 
39  Decro-Wall International SA v. Practitioners in Marketing Ltd., [1971] 2 
All ER 216 at 227 : [1971] 1 WLR 361 at 374. 
40  Bank Line Ltd. v. A Capel & Co., [1919] AC 435 at 159. 
41  Tramways Advertis ing Pty Ltd. v. Luna Park (NSW) Ltd. , 
(1939) 38 SRNSW 632 at 641; Associated Newspapers 
Ltd. v. Bancks, (1951) 83 CLR 322. 
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“The test of essent ial ity is whether it appears from the 
general nature of the contract considered as a whole, or 
from some part icular term or terms, that the promise is of 
such importance to the promise that he would not have 
entered into the contract unless he had been assured of a 
strict  or substantial performance of the promise, as the case 
may be, and that this ought to have been apparent to the 
promisor.” 
 
2.7 EFFECT OF REPUDIATION OR FUNDAMENTAL 
BREACH: 
 
I t  is pert inent to note that, even if one of the party 
wrongfully repudiate al l further l iabi li ty or has been guilty of 
a fundamental breach the contract will  not automatically 
come to an end. Since, i ts terminat ion is the converse of its 
creat ion principle demands that it  should not be recognized 
unless this is what both parties intend. The famil iar test of  
offer and acceptance serves to determine their common 
intention. Whether A and B  are parties to an executory 
contract and A  indicates that he is no longer able or wil l ing 
to perform his part  of outstanding obligat ions, he in effect 
makes an offer to be that the contract shall be discharged. 
Here in this situation, B  is presented with an opt ion he may 
either refuse or accept the offer.42 More precisely, he may 
either aff irm the contract by treating it st i l l in force, or 
completely contrary to this, on the other hand, he may treat 
it  as f inal ly and conclusively discharged. The consequences 
vary accordingly to the choice i.e. preferred by B  before 
whom the offer is made to get discharged.  
 
 
                                      
42  Denmark Productions ltd. v. Boscobel Productions Ltd., [1969] 1 QB 
699 at 731 : [1968] 3 All ER 513 at 527. 
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2.7.1 The innocent party treats the contract as still in 
force: 
 
I f  the innocent party chooses the f irst  avai lable option and, 
with full knowledge of the facts, makes it clear by his words 
or act or even by his si lence, that he refused to accept the 
breach as a discharge of contract the effect is that the 
status quo ante is preserved intact. The contract “remains 
in being for the future on both sides, each party has right to 
sue for the damages for past or future breaches.43 For 
example, a seller of goods who refuse to treat a 
fundamental breach as a discharge of the contract remains 
liable for delivery of possession to the default ing buyer, 
while the latter remains correspondingly l iable to accept 
delivery and to pay the contractual price.44  
 
The signif icance of the rule that the contract continues in 
existence is well i l lustrated by the case where a party has 
repudiated his obligat ions.  
 
In that case he keeps the contract alive for the benefit of 
the other party as well as his own; he remains subject to al l  
his own obligat ions and l iabi l i t ies under it,  and enables the 
other party not only to complete the contract,  if  so advised, 
notwithstanding his previous repudiation of it ,  but also to 
take advantage of any supervening circumstance which 
would just ify him in declining to complete.45  
 
 
                                      
43  Harbutt’s Plasticine Ltd. v. Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd., [1970] 1 
QB 447 at 464-465 : [1970] 1 All ER 225 at 233. 
44  R.V. Ward Ltd. v. Bignall, [1967] 1 QB 534 : [1967] 2 Al ER 449; White 
and Carter (Councils0 Ltd v. McGregor, [1962] AC 413 : [1961] 3 All 
ER 1178. 
45  First v. Knight, (1872 LR 7 Exch 111 at 112; Johnstone v. Milling, 
(1886) 16 QBD 460. 
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The case of Avery v. Bowden46 i l lustrates the way in which 
supervening circumstances may operate to rel ieve the party 
in default f rom all l iabi l ity. 
 
The defendant chartered the plaintif f ’s ship at a Russian 
port and agreed to load her with a cargo within forty- f ive 
days. Before this period had elapsed he repeatedly advised 
the plaint if f  to go away as i t would be impossible to provide 
him with a cargo. The plaintif f,  however, remained at the 
port in the hope that the defendant would fulf i l l  his promise, 
but the refusal to load was maintained, and then, before the 
forty-f ive days had elapsed, the Crimean war broke out 
between England and Russia. 
 
On the assumption that the refusal to load amounted to a 
complete repudiat ion of l iabi li ty by the defendant, the 
plaint if f  might have treated the contract as discharged; but 
his decision to ignore this repudiat ion resulted, as events 
turned out, in the defendant being provided with a good 
defence to an action for breach. He would have committed 
an i l legal act if  he had loaded a cargo at a host ile port af ter 
the declaration of war.  
 
2.7.2 The innocent party treats the contract as at an 
end: 
 
A party who treats the contract as discharged is often said 
to rescind the contract. However, to describe the legal  
posit ion in such a manner must inevitably mislead and 
confused unwary. In i ts pr imary and more correct sense, 
rescission means the retrospect ive cancellat ion of contract 
ab init io,  as for instance, where one of the part ies has been 
                                      
46  Avery v. Bowden, (1855) 5 E & B 714. 
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guilty of fraudulent misrepresentat ion. In such a case, the 
contract is destroyed as if  it  had never existed, but i t  
discharged by breach never impinges upon r ights and 
obligations that have already matured as per the terms of 
the contract. It  would be better, therefore, in this context,  to 
focus on terminat ion or discharge rather than recession. 
The said concept has recently been the subject of full  
authoritat ive words by the House of Lords in Johnson v. 
Agnew.47  
 
By a contract in writ ing the vendors agreed to sell a house 
and some grazing land to the purchase price agreed was 
suff icient to pay off  these mortgaged and the purchase price 
agreed was suff icient to pay of these mortgages and also a 
bank loan which the vendors had secured to by another 
property. The purchaser fai led to complete on the agreed 
completion date, and a fortnight later the vendors issued a 
notice making t ime of the essence,, and f ixing 21 January, 
1974 as the f inal completion date. The purchaser fai led to 
complete on this day and it is c lear that the venders were 
thereupon entit led to bring the contract to an end. They 
chose instead to sue for specif ic performance, which was 
obtained on 27 June 1974. Before the order was entered, 
however, both the mortgagees of  the house and the 
mortgagees of the grazing land had exercised their r ights to 
possession and had sold the properties. The vendors 
thereupon applied to the court for leave to proceed by way 
of an action for damages.  
 
The House of Lords held that by choosing to sue for specif ic 
performance the vendors had not made a f inal elect ion and 
that it  was open to the court to allow the vendors to sue for 
                                      
47  Johson v. Agnew, [1980] AC 367 : [1979] 1 All ER 883. 
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damages if  i t  appeared equitable to do so Lord Wilberforce 
said: 
 
“It is important to dissipate a fert i le source of confusion and 
to make clear that although sometimes the vendor is 
referred to … as `rescinding’ the contract, this so-called 
`rescission’ is quite different from rescission ab init io, such 
as may arise for example, in cases of mistake, fraud or lack 
of consent. In those cases the contract is treated in law as 
never having come into existence … In the case of an 
accepted repudiatory breach the contract has come into 
existence but has been put an end to, or discharged. 
Whatever contrary indicat ions may be disinterred from old 
authorit ies, it  is now quite clear, under the general law of 
contract, that acceptance of a repudiatory breach does not 
bring about `rescission ab init io’.48 
 
I f  the innocent party elects to treat the contract as 
discharged, he must make his decision known to the party 
in default.  Once this decision is conveyed to the party in 
default, his election is f inal and cannot be retracted.49 The 
effect is to terminate the contract for the future as from the 
moment when the acceptance is communicated to the party 
in default. The breach does not operate retrospectively. The 
previous existence of the contract is st i l l  relevant with 
regard to the past act and defaults of parties. Thus, the 
party in default is l iable in damages both for any earl ier 
                                      
48  Buckland v. Farmer and Moody, [1978] 3 All ER 929 : [1979] 1 WLR 
221; Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd., [1980] AC 827 
: [1980] 1 All Er 556. 
49  Scarf v. Jardine, (1882) 7 App Cas 345 at 361; Allen v. Robles, [1969] 
3 All ER 154 : [1969] 1 WLR 1193; Antaios Cia Naviera SA v Salen 
Rederiena AB, The Antaios, [1983] 3 All ER 777 : [1983] 1 WLR 1362; 
Vitol SA v. Norelf Ltd., The Santa Clara, [1994] 4 All ER 109; reversed 
by the Court of Appeal [1995] 3 All ER 971 and reversed in turn by the 
House of Lords [1996] 3 All ER 193. 
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breaches and also for the breach that has led to the 
discharged of the contract, but he is excused from further 
performance.50 However, this does not mean, in the case of 
an anticipatory breach, that the obligations, which would 
have matured after the elect ion, are to be completely 
disregarded. They may sti l l  be relevant to the assessment 
of damages.  
 
The defendant company agreed to pay ₤40,000 to the 
plaint if fs in seven weekly instal lments. X,  the managing 
director of the defendants, personally guaranteed the 
payment, of this debt. At the end of three weeks, the 
payments were so seriously in arrears as to amount to a 
repudiat ion of the contract by the defendants. On 22 
December, the plaint if f ’s accepted this repudiat ion and then 
sued the guarantor, X, for the recovery of ₤40,000, less 
what had already been paid. 
 
One of the defences raised by the guarantor was that he 
was not l iable in respect of installments fal l ing due after 22 
December. The House of Lords rejected this defence.51  
 
This decision is in line with the earl ier decision of the Court 
of Appeal in the case of The Mihalis Angelos.52 
 
By clause 11 of the charterparty, the owners stated that 
their ship was `expected ready to load at Haiphong under 
                                      
50  Mussen v. Van Diemen’s Land Co., [1938] Ch 253 at 260 : [1938] 1 All 
ER 210 at 216; Boston Deep Sea Fishing and Ice Co. v. Ansell, (1888) 
39 ChD 339 at 365; R.V. Ward Ltd. v. Bignall, [1967] 1 QB 534 at 548 
: [1967] 2 All ER 449 at 455. 
51  Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. Ltd. v. Papadopoulos, [1980] 2 All ER 
29 : [1980] 1 WLR 1129. 
52  Mihalis Angelos, The See Maredelanto Cia Naviera SA v. Bergbau-
Handel GmbH, The Mihalis Angelos, [1971] 1 QB 164 : [1970] 3 All 
ER 125. 
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this charter about July 1s t ,  1965’. Clause 11 provided that, i f  
the ship was not ready to load on or before 20 July 1965, 
the charters should have the opt ion of canceling the 
contract. On 17 July, the charters repudiated the contract 
and the owners accepted the repudiation. The majori ty of 
the Court of Appeal held that the option to cancel the 
contract was not exercisable before 20 July even though on 
the 17 t h it  was certain that the ship would not arr ive before 
20 July. The charters were thus guil ty of an `ant icipatory 
breach’.  
 
Here the quest ion that arose was whether the owners could 
recover substantial damages in respect of the wrongful 
repudiat ion on the ground that its acceptance by them had 
put an end to the contract, together with the right of 
cancellation. The Court of Appeal was pleased to grant only 
nominal damages to the owners.  
 
In case of an antic ipatory bail,  the innocent party is entit led 
to recover the true value of the contractual rights, which he 
has lost. If  these “were capable by the terms of the contract 
of being rendered either less valuable or valueless in 
certain events, and if , it  can be shown that those events 
were, at the date of acceptance of repudiat ion, predest ined 
to happen, then the damages which he can recover are not 
more than the true value, if  any, of the r ights which he has 
lost, having regard to those predest ined events”, so in that 
circumstances, as the charterers would certainly have 
lawfully cancelled on 20 July, the owners have suffered no 
loss and that is the reason that only nominal damages were 
granted.  
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2.8 THE EFFECT OF DISCHARGING THE CONTRACT 
FOR A BAD REASON, WHEN A GOOD REASON 
ALSO EXISTS: 
 
The discharge of a contract, based upon a reason that is in 
fact, inadequate, may nevertheless, “be supported i f there 
are at the t ime facts in existence be could have provided a 
good reason”. The best example of i t is, a sel ler of goods 
deliverable by installments makes a short delivery 
whereupon the buyer claims that the contract is discharged. 
However, this may be unwarranted, since an intent ion on 
the part of the seller to repudiate his obligat ions is not 
inferable from the circumstances that led to the short of 
delivery. It is than discovered that the goods already 
delivered do not comply with their contractual descript ion, 
this fundamental breach suffers to justi fy the discharge of 
contract.53  
 
I t  would seem that this principle requires some qualif icat ion 
in the l ight of the decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Panchaud Freres SA v. Establissements General Grain Co.54  
 
The plainti f f contracted to sell to the defendant 5,300 metric 
tons Brazil ian yellow maize cif  Antwerp, shipment to be 
June/July 1965. The bil l of  landing was dated 31 July 1965, 
but amongst the other shipping documents was a cert i f icate 
of quality,  which stated that the goods were loaded 10 
August to 12 August 1965. This would have entit led the 
defendant to reject the shipping documents but they were 
                                      
53  Cf Denmark Productions Ltd. v. Bosobel Productions Ltd., [1969] 1 QB 
699 at 722; The Mihalis Angelos, [1971] 1 QB 164 at 195-196; W. 
Devis & Sons Ltd. v. Atkins, [1977] Ac 931 : [1971] 2 All ER 321. 
54  Panchaud Freres SA v. Establ issements General Grain 
Co., [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 53; Carvi l l v . Ir ish Industrial  
Bank Ltd., [1968] IR 325; Cyril Leonards & Co. v. Simo 
Securit ies Trust Ltd., [1971] 3 Al l ER 1313 : [1972] 1 WLR 
80. 
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received without objection (presumably, though this is not 
explicit ly stated in the report, because the inconsistency 
was not detected). When the ship arr ived the defendant 
rejected the goods on another ground ult imately held 
insuff icient and only three years later sought to justify 
rejection on the ground that the goods had been shipped 
out of t ime.  
 
The Court of Appeal held that it  was too late for the 
defendant to rely on this ground since in the words of Winn 
LJ: 
 
“There may be an inchoate doctrine stemming from the 
manifest convenience of consistency in pragmatic af fairs, 
negativing any liberty to blow hot and cold in commercial  
conduct.”55  
 
2.9 CONTRACTUAL PROVISION FOR TERMINATION: 
 
In the aforesaid discussion, we have already considered the 
applicat ion of basic rules, which apply in the absence of 
contrary agreement. In pract ice the parties often do make 
provisions with substant ial ly alter the impact of these 
ordinary rules. So in commercial contracts for the sale of 
goods, i t  is not unusual, to f ind non-reject ion clauses, under 
which the buyer is not to reject non-conf irming goods, but to 
look only to his remedy in damages. It is common in many 
kinds of contract to f ind provisions which extend one party’s 
right of terminat ion outside the areas of repudiation and 
fundamental breach. We may divide such provisions into 
two broad sub groups. 
                                      
55  The Vladimir Ilich, [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 322; Glencore Grain 
Rotterdam BV v Lebanese Organisation for International Commerce, 
[1997] 4 All ER 514 : Carter 14 JCL 239. 
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2.9.1 Termination for “Minor” breach: 
 
The common law rules can operate indulgently to some 
classes of contract breakers, specially,  slow payers. In 
pract ice, those who make of habit of paying slowly seldom 
make repudiatory statements. More commonly their delays 
are accompanied by protestation of  goodwill  and a wide 
range of more or less plausible excuses. Creditors often 
f ind it prudent to insert contractual counter measures. This 
is part icularly so in the contracts which call for a series of  
periodic payments where it is common to have an 
“accelerat ion clause”, making all the payments due on 
failure of timely payments of any or of “withdrawal clause”, 
enabling one party to bring the contract to an end if  the 
other party does not pay promptly.  
 
In Mardorf Peach & Co. Ltd. v.  Att ica Sea Carriers Corpn of 
Liberia, The laconia,56 the plainti f f ship owners had time 
chartered a ship to the defendants. The charterparty 
provided for payment of hire ‘ in cash semi-monthly in 
advance’ into a named bank account and also provided that 
fail ing ‘punctual and regular payment of the hire’ the owners 
should be ent it led to withdraw the vessel.  The seventh and 
f inal installment was due on Sunday Apri l  12, 1970, when 
the banks were, of course, closed. The hire was paid over 
the counter of the owners’ bank for the credit of their 
account on Monday afternoon. The House of Lords upheld 
the owners’ claim to be entit led to withdraw the vessel for 
failure of punctual payment. The House did not consider 
that in a commercial contract using a wel l-known standard 
                                      
56  Mardorf Peach & Co. Ltd. v. Att ica Sea Carr iers Corpn of 
Liberia, The laconia, [1977] Ac 850 : [1977] 1 Al l  ER 545. 
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form, there was any need to develop doctr ines l imit ing the 
strict application of such contractual provisions.57  
 
2.9.2 Termination “without clause”: 
 
I t  is not unusual for contracts to contain provisions entit l ing 
one party to terminate without the other party having done 
anything wrong. At f irst s ight of this, it  seems strange, but 
there are many situations where it makes excellent sense. 
Let us try to understand it through an example. The 
common law says that if  contract is made on Monday and 
cancelled on Tuesday, before any work has been done, the 
contractor is entit led to his loss of profit on transact ion. 
This does not correspond with many businessmen’s 
expectation. Contracts often contain provisions permit t ing 
cancellation without charge where the contract wholly 
executory. Even where, work has been done, it  is not usual  
to f ind provisions for cancellat ion in written for payment of 
compensation. The most common examples are in the f ield 
of Government contracts, where the need to be able to 
cancel weapon projects, or motorway schemes makes such 
provisions easily understandable. The most routine and 
perhaps the best example is a long-term contract of  
indef inite duration such as contracts of employment. Here it  
is common to make express provision for termination by 
notice and usually easy to infer that the contract is 
terminable by not ice, even in the absence of any express 
provision. A diff icult case of Staffordshire Area Health 
                                      
57  China National Foreign Trade Transportation Corpn v. Eulogia 
Shipping Co SA of Panama, the Mihalis Xilas, [1979] 2 All ER 1044 : 
[1979] 1 WLR 1018; Awilco, A/s v. Fulvia SpA di Navigazione, The 
Chikuma, [1981] 1 All ER 652 : [1981] 1 WLr 314; Afovos Shipping 
Co. SA v. Pagnan, [1983] 1 All ER 449 : [1983] 1 WLr 195; Italmare 
Shipping Co. v. Ocean Tanker Co. Inc. (No. 2), [1982] 3 All ER 273. 
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Authority v. South Staffordshire Waterworks Co.58 dealt with 
the said concept in a very unique context.  
 
In 1908 the predecessors in t it le of the plaintif fs owned a 
hospital, which took its water from its own well. Under a 
private Act of 1909, the defendants were empowered to 
pump water from a well a mile away, subject to providing 
the hospital with any water, which it needed, if  the supply 
from the hospital ’s well was reduced. The rate was to be 
that which it would have cost the hospital to get the water 
from their own well and disputes were to be subject to 
arbitration. By 1918 there was a def iciency,  which was 
supplied by the defendants, and in 1927 the hospital  
decided to abandon their wel l. In 1929 a contract was then 
concluded under which `at al l t imes hereafter ’ the hospital  
was to receive 5,000 gallons of water a day free and all  the 
addit ional water i t  required at the rate of 7d (2.9p) per 
thousand gallons. By 1975 the normal rate was 45 p per 
1,000 gallons and the Water Company claimed to be 
entit led to terminate the agreement by giving six months’ 
notice.  
 
2.10 THE EFFECT OF MISREPRESENTATION AND 
DAMAGES: 
 
Would a person be l iable for damages if  he misrepresents 
under the Contract Act Sect ion 18? The effect of 
misrepresentat ion would ent it le a person to damages but i f  
the person is unable to show that there was 
misrepresentat ion, he would not be entit led to any damages 
and the suit based on misrepresentat ion not proved one to 
                                      
58  Staffordshire Area Heal th Authority v. South Staffordshire 
Waterworks Co., [1978] 3 Al l ER 769 : [1978] 1 WLR 1387; 
Tower hamlets London Borough Counci l v . Br i t ish Gas 
Corpn, [1984] CLY 393. 
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be fraud but at the most al l the omission to state the 
material fact would give following remedy to the plaintif f :  
 
  That the only remedy open to the plaintif f  was under 
Sect ion 19 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, on the 
ground of misrepresentat ion; 
  That assuming without deciding that there is a 
misrepresentat ion, the plainti f fs had two remedies 
open to them: (a) avoidance or rescission, and (b) 
completion and the enforcement of misrepresentation; 
  That i t was not open to the plaint i ff  to avoid contract, 
for which suit was brought after the expiry of the term 
of contract; 
  That even if  the plainti f fs were entit led to be put in the 
same posit ion in which they would have been, if  the 
representation made had been true, the plaint if fs 
failed to prove that their exceeded Rs. 3,000/- or 
which the government had already al lowed.59 
 
The provision of sect ion 73 and 74 can’t be read or 
interpreted in isolat ion. The concept of damages depends 
on several c ircumstances. There circumstances are not 
al ien or new interpretative aspects but those, which will  
have to be culled out from the agreement. The term 
agreement is in contraindicat ion to the term contract. The 
reason being all contract are agreements but it  is not vise-
versa. For an agreement to be an enforceable contract has 
to fulf i l l the def ini tion of the term contract as def ined in 
Section 2(e) of the Indian Contract Act.  
 
There have been numerous cases on unl iquidated damages 
for breach of contract. In Union of India v. Ms. Commercial 
                                      
59  Sorab Shah v. Secretary of State; 1927 BLR 1535. 
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Metal Corporat ion60 the problem was acute: Whether the 
plaint if f  could claim damages for breach without having 
bought the goods, and thereby, without having suffered any 
loss by the breach. In other words, the question was 
whether the damages under Sect ion 73 were to be awarded 
on the mere not ional assessment, i.e. the difference 
between the market price and the contract pr ice or on the 
loss incurred by the buyer on actual purchase.  
 
In this case, the Commercial Metal Corporation agreed to 
supply to the Union of India leaded bronze ingots in specif ic 
quantit ies at specif ic rates by a specif ic date part of the 
stores were supplied. The market shoot up and the 
corporation requested for higher price. There was, thus, 
breach of contract.  The matter was referred to the arbitrator 
who awarded Rs. 2,35,095/- to the Union. The corporat ion 
objected to the award, which was f i led in Court. Earl ier the 
Union had claimed higher amount before the arbitrator,  
representing that this was their loss on repurchase. Later, i t  
abandoned this claim and demanded reduced amount based 
on the corporation demanding higher rates. The corporat ion, 
therefore, objected to the award on the ground that there 
was no proof of repurchase. Also it was stressed that 
damages should not be awarded unless loss on repurchase 
was proved.  
 
The Court noted its own earl ier decision in Union of India v. 
Tribhuwan Das ,61 wherein it was clearly held that the 
damages could not be granted unless the plainti f f had 
purchased the like goods after breach and suffered actual  
loss. In that case, the Court dissented from the judgments 
                                      
60  Union of India v. Ms. Commercial Metal Corporat ion, AIR 
1982 Del. 267.  
61  Union of India v. Tribhuwan Das; AIR 1972 Del. 120. 
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of the Madhya Bharat62 and Madras High Courts.63 That 
decision rested on the ground that damages have to be 
granted by way of compensation for the loss sustained and 
not by way of punishment or punit ive action.  
 
The analysis of the law relating to damages propounded by 
Indian courts is that the law does not penalize the buyer’s 
inaction. Even if  the buyer does not go into the market he is 
entit led to damages al l the same if  he can show that the 
market had risen on the date of the breach. 
 
Other arguments, which can be culled out, form this 
judgment, in support of this view, are as fol lows: 
 
( i) “The decisive element is the date of breach and the 
market pr ice prevai ling on that date.” 
(i i)  “I l lustrat ion (a) to S.73 of the Contract Act… makes 
the matter quite clear …” 
(i i i )  Were the law to be otherwise, “people wil l be tempted 
not to honour their contracts.” 
( iv) Law protects the expectation interest. This would 
enable the plaintif f  to be put in the same posit ion in 
which he would have been had the contract been 
performed. 
(v) The case of Maula Bux v. Union of India,64 decided by 
the Supreme Court, is not an authority for the 
proposit ion canvassed by the corporation. For, in the 
case, the Union of India had actually purchased the 
goods from the market.  
                                      
62  Vishwanath v. Amarlal, AIR 1957 M.B. 190. 
63  Ismail Sait & Sons v. Wilson & Co., AIR 1919 Mad. 1053 (D.B.). 
64  Maula Bux v. Union of India; AIR 1970 SC 1955. 
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(vi)  “That market price on the date fol lowing the breach is 
the yardst ick by which the buyer’s claim for damage is 
evaluated and quantif ied.” 
(vii ) “There are decisional65 and textual authorit ies 
favouring the current established rule.  
 
In Mysore Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Manohar Metal Industr ies ,66 the 
defendant agreed to buy copper ingots and copper scraps. 
He l i f ted part  of the quantity and failed to l if t  the remaining 
quantity despite the plaintif f ’s not ice to the defendant to 
resell the goods in case the former did not take away that 
quantity. The plainti f f sold the goods three months after the 
date of not ice when the market was fall ing.  It was held that 
the resale price under the circumstances could not afford a 
valid measure of damages for breach of contract. The 
plaint if f  failed to prove the market rate on the date of  
breach. The trai l Court decreed the plaintif f ’s suit; but the 
civi l judge on the defendant’s appeal “dismissed the suit for 
damages as no relevant material was placed on record by 
the plaint if f to f ix the quantum of damages.” The High Court, 
on second appeal,  agreed with this view and the plaint i ff ’s 
suit and appeal fai led, although the defendant had 
committed breach of contract. On the question of 
unreasonable delay, which defeats the measure of 
damages, the instant Court followed Madras67 and Lahore68 
precedents. The Court omitted to refer to the cases of 
Jamal v. Moola Dawood & Sons Ltd. ,69 which had laid down 
                                      
65  Troll Markay v. Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1932 PC 196; Ismail Sait v. 
Wilson & Co.,; Vishwanath v. Amralal, AIR 1957 M.B. 190. 
66  Mysore Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Manohar Metal Industr ies , AIR 
1982 Kant. 283. 
67  Chetty v. T.M. Gajapathi Naidu and Co., AIR 1925 Mad. 1258. 
68  Nikku Mal Sardari Mal v. Gur Prasad and Brothers, AIR 1931 Lah. 
714. 
69  Jamal v. Moola Dawood & Sons Co., 31 I.C. 949 : I .L.R. 
43 Cal.  493. 
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the date of breach as the test for measurement of damages 
and M/s. Murlidhar v. M/s. Harish Chandra70 where the 
plaint if f  failed to get any damages because he did not 
adduce evidence of market rate on the date of breach. The 
Law on the subject is well settled. The case arose under 
section 54(2) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, which being 
specif ic prevailed over sect ion 73 of the Contract Act, which 
is of general nature. 
 
In State v. M/s. United Shippers & Dredgers Ltd. ,71 the 
Kerala High Court discussed the quest ion of payment of 
damages under Sect ion 73, 74 and 75. It held that the 
plaint if f  in all  these three sections could claim damages 
only where he had suffered any loss or damage. 
Etymologically, compensation means recompense for the 
loss suffered and hence, it  held that no damages were due 
where there was no loss. In the instant case, the arbitrator 
had said that the state government had not suffered any 
legal injury (loss or damages). The state, therefore, in the 
Court’s view had no right either to collect any amount in the 
nature of penalty or damages. The Court spelt out the 
situat ion as to payment of damages under Sect ion 74 and 
copiously quoted part of the judgment of Supreme Court in 
Fateh Chand v. Bal Kishan Dass.72 I t  clearly expressed that 
the words in section 74 “whether or not actual damage or 
loss is proved to have been caused thereby” refer to a case 
of payment of reasonable compensation on the basis of 
material or record where the actual loss or damage “is 
incapable of proof or not proved.”  
 
                                      
70  M/s.  Mur l idhar v. M/s. Harish Chandra, AIR 1962 SC 366. 
71  State vs. M/s. United Shippers & Dredgers Ltd., AIR 1981 
Ker. 281. 
72  Fateh Chand v. Bal Kishan Dass, AIR 1963 SC 1405. 
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This, no doubt, is the correct interpretation of sect ion 74 
and carries forward the intention of the legislature. It needs 
to be stressed, in support, that the emphasis of this section 
is on the word “proof” and not on the words “caused 
thereby.” Any other interpretat ion wil l  render the meaning of 
the words “reasonable compensation” in the section 
nugatory. Thus, the interpretation of the Court further 
cements and develops the law on the subject.73 
 
2.11 CONTRACT REMEDIES: DAMAGES 
 
The contract once entered and when there is a breach of 
the said contract,  there are specif ic remedies provided and 
there is dist inct difference between the l iquidated damages 
and penalty. The researcher has made an attempt to 
discuss al l these in detail in the up-coming chapters.74  
 
  Remedies for breach of contract: 
 
When a breach of contract occurs, the injured or the 
aggrieved party becomes ent it led to the following rel ieves.  
 
(1)  Rescissions of contract; 
(2)   Suit for remedies; 
(3)  Suit upon quantum merit;  
(4)   Suit for specif ic performance;  
(5)  Suit for injunct ion;  
(6)   Suit for rectif icat ion; 
(7)   Suit for restitut ion; and  
(8)   Suit for cancellat ion of contract. 
 
                                      
73  Annual Survey of the Indian Law, 1982, Vol. 18. 
74  Talchar Coalfields Ltd. v. Central Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1978 Cal. 449.; 
Birendra Nath Dhar v. Food Corporation of India, AIR 1978 Cal. 362 
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  Damages for breach: 
 
The party who is injured by the breach of a contract may 
bring an action for damages “Damages” means 
compensation in terms of money for the loss suffered by the 
injured party. Every action for damages raises two 
problems. The f irst is the problem of “remoteness of 
damages” and second is that of “Measure of damages.” 
 
Our concern is awarding damages by the breach of  
the contract, and therefore, the suit for damages both 
in the Indian law and England law, will have to be 
based on the principle enunciated by the Court from 
time to t ime. Namely Remoteness for breach and the 
Measure of Damages would have to be culled out from 
the fact that the damages are compensatory and not 
penal.75  
 
  S. 73 of the Indian Contract Act: 
 
The same principles are appl icable in India. The Privy 
Council, for example, observed in Jamal v. Moola Dawood 
Sons Co.76 that sect ion 73 is declaratory of the common law 
as to damages. The section clearly lays down two rules: 
 
Compensation is recoverable for any loss or damage: - 
 
(a) arising natural ly in the usual course of  things from the 
breach, or 
                                      
75  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Exch. 341; Horne v. Midland Rly. Co.; 
Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd., [1949] 2 
K.B. 528, C.A. at 537-538; S. 73 of the Indian Contract Act. 
76  Jamal v. Moola Dawood & Sons Co., 31 I.C. 949 : I .L.R. 
43 Cal.  493. 
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(b) which the part ies knew at the t ime of the contract as 
likely to result f rom the breach. 
  
The f irst rule is `object ive’ while the second rule is 
`subjective’. The section also provides that the same 
principles will apply where there has been a breach of 
Quasi-Contractual obligat ion. 
 
Thus, the extent of l iabil ity in ordinary cases is what may be 
foreseen by ‘the hypothet ical reasonable man’ one 
il lustration is the decision of the Madras High Court in 
Madras Rly Co. v. Govinda Rao.77  
 
The plaintif f ,  who was a tai lor, delivered a sewing machine 
and some cloth to the defendant Railway Company to be 
sent to a place where he expected to carry on his business 
with special prof it.  Through the fault  of the company the 
goods were delayed in transmission the plaintif f  had given 
no not ice to the company of his special purpose. 
 
He claimed as the damages of traveling expenses and loss 
of prof it. The Court held that the damages claimed were too 
remote. 
 
  Measure of damages: 
 
As far as the Indian law is concerned, it  has 
developed its law of damages merely on the Engl ish 
Law but now the courts have to interpret provisions of 
Sect ion 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act which 
are discussed and analyzed in extenso in the later 
                                      
77  Madras Rly Co. v. Govinda Rao, I.L.R. 21 Mad. 172. 
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chapter. The measure of damages is also being based 
on either l iquidated or unliquidated damages.78  
 
(a) Damages are compensatory not penal. 
(b) Incidence of Taxat ion. 
(c) Nominal damages in recognit ion of rights. 
 (d) Pre-contract expenditure. 
 (e) Mental pain and suffering. 
 (f) Duty to mitigate. 
 
Once the extent of recoverable loss is determined, it  has to 
be evaluated in terms of money. This is the problem of 
measure of damages and is governed by some fundamental 
principles.  
 
(a) Damages are compensatory not penal: 
 
In the words of ASQUITH J. “It is well sett led that the 
governing purpose of damages is go put the party whose 
rights have been violated in the same posit ion, so far as 
money can do so, as if his r ights have been observed. The 
primary aim or principle of the law of damages for a breach 
of contract is to place the plainti f fs in the same posit ion he 
would be in if  the contract had been fulf i l led or to place the 
plaint if fs in the posit ion. He would have occupied had the 
breaching contract not occurred.  
 
In Robinson v. Harman,79 the defendant, having agreed to 
grant a lease of certain property to the plaint if f ,  refused to 
do so, the Court allowed the plaintif f by way of damages. 
                                      
78  Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. New Garage & Motor Co. Ltd., 
[1915] A.C. 79; Ford Motor Co. v. Armstrong, (1915) 31 T.L.R. 267 : 
59 S.J. 362, C.A.; Bridge v. Cambell Discount Co.; S. 74 of the Indian 
Contract Act. 
79  Robinson v. Harman, (1848) 1 Exch. 850. 
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The expenses incurred by him on the prel iminary legal work 
and also for the prof its, which he would have earned, if  the 
lease had been granted to him. Thus, damages are given by 
way of compensation for the loss suffered by the plaintif f 
and not for the purpose of punishing the defendant for the 
breach.  
 
Inconvenience caused by breach may be taken into account.  
For example, the Hobbs v. London South Western Rly. 
Co.,80 where a train pulled its passengers to a wrong 
direction and consequently the plainti ff  and his wife, f inding 
no other conveyance, not a place to stay, had to walk home 
at midnight.  
 
The Jury allowed 8 P. as the damages for inconvenience 
and 20 P in respect of his wife’s i l lness caused by catching 
cold. On appeal the Court of Queen’s Bench had that the 8P 
was properly awarded but not 20P. 
 
(b) Incidence of taxation: 
 
Since the principle is that of compensation, and no more 
than compensation, the benefits received against the loss 
suffered on account of breach, is not to be reduced by 
imposing Income tax as earning. This principle was laid 
down by the House of Lords in Brit ish Transport Corporat ion 
v. Gourley81 and was followed by the Court of appeal in 
Parsons v. B.N.M. Laboratories Ltd.82 where HARMAN L. J. 
stated: 
 
                                      
80  Hobbs v. London South Western Rly. Co., (1875) L.R. 10 
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“ …. Where the sum of amount is to be awarded as 
damages, successful l i t igant will  have to suffer deduct ion of 
`tax’ in his hands …” 
  
(c) Pre-contract expenditure: 
 
Pre-contract Expenditure may be recovered as damages if  it  
was within the contemplat ion of parties. The Court of 
Appeal laid down this principle in Anglia Television Ltd. v. 
Reed.83 Here a television artist who having been engaged 
as a leading actor for a television f i lm repudiated the 
contract. The producer was unable to f ind substitute, and 
therefore, had to abandon the project.  The loss of profit was 
incapable of being estimated. The Court al lowed f irm as 
damages the money spent by him in engaging a director, a 
designer etc. as this kind of expenditure was within the 
contemplation of the part ies. LORD DENNING M.R. 
explained the principle thus: 
 
The plaint if f  in such a case has to elect either loss of profit 
or expenditure incurred. 
 
(d) Damages for mental pain and suffering: 
 
In ordinary cases damages for mental pain and suffer ing 
caused by the breach are not allowed. But they may be 
al lowed in special cases. An il lustrat ion is the case of 
Western v. Olathe State Bank.  The facts are:- 
 
The defendant a banking corporation, agreed to loan 
plaint if f  money for a trip to California by credit ing his 
account with such sums, as he might need after reaching 
                                      
83  Anglia Televis ion Ltd. v. Reed., [1972] 1 Q.B. 60 : [1971] 
3 WLR 528 : 115 S.J. 723. 
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his dest ination. The plaint if f  reached California, but the 
defendant refused to give him the promised credit.  
 
The Court allowed damages for humiliat ion and mental 
suffer ing. The House of Lords in Addis v. Gramophone Co. 
Ltd.84 l isted three situat ions in which mental pain and 
suffer ing can be taken into account.  
 
There are three well-known exceptions to the general rule… 
namely. Actions against a banker for refusing to pay a 
customer’s cheque when he has fund; Actions for breach of 
promise of marr iage (now abolished in England) and Actions 
like that in Flurean v. Thornf il l85 where the vendor of real 
estate, fails to make t it le. But now the principle is revolving 
round to this that in every proper case damages for mental 
distress can be recovered. For example, contract for a 
holiday. Distress caused by the loss of a pet due to a 
carrier’s negligence etc.  
 
  Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act: 
 
Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act lays down a sl ight ly 
different rule. The rule is that where a sum is named in a 
contract as the amount to be paid in case of breach, 
regardless whether it is a penalty or not, the party suffering 
from breach is ent it led to receive reasonable compensation 
not exceeding the amount so named. Thus the named sum 
constitutes the maximum limit of l iabil i ty. This has certain 
advantages over the English system. The sect ion dispenses 
with the necessity of laying down rules for distinguishing 
liquidated damages from penalty. Further, according to 
English Law, the Court must either accept the amount in 
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whole or reject it  in whole. In India, the Court need not 
reject the amount. It may either accept the amount or 
reduce it to what appears reasonable.86  
 
Yet the distinction between the l iquidated damages and 
penalt ies are not altogether irrelevant the section. Its 
relevance in the f irst place, arises from the fact that the 
amount contemplated by the parties wil l  be reduced only i f  i t  
appears to be by way of `penalty’ otherwise the whole of i t  
is recoverable as liquidated damages. Secondly, the f irst 
explanation to the sect ion uses the word `penalty’ . It  
provides that a st ipulation for increased interest from the 
date of default may be a stipulation by way of penalty”  
where for instance, money is borrowed at 12% interest 
payable six monthly and the agreement provides that in 
case of default an interest of 75% shall be payable. This is 
a stipulation by way of penalty.   
 
2.12 CONCLUSION: 
 
The def init ion of damages under the Indian Law is now well 
modif ied in contraindication to Indian Law which governed 
and which is in vogue.  The rules which governed discharge 
of contract by breach of various remedies which are 
available apart f rom the distinctive injunctions, the law of 
damages is now well def ined. The rule of law and the object 
of damages wil l also compensatory in nature. It would be 
seen that physical  loss are subject whereas damages arise 
out of breach of Contract. However, damage for breach of 
contract under the English Law is not necessari ly el iminated 
to compensate f inancial loss alone. Under the Indian Law, 
damage may also be awarded to compensate for physical  
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damage to the person or the property. Even if  there has 
been no affect of the value of the property, the English Law, 
as early as, 19th century has held that where there was 
diff iculty in assumption, it  would not bar or disent it led 
person from claiming damages. The English Law has been 
developed and the General and Special law of damage has 
developed in India and the English Law has been time and 
again fol lowed by the Indian courts but Indian courts are not 
bound to award compensate where no legal injury has 
resulted and the provisions of law applied to assumption, 
based on estimated value. The Indian Court has succinctly 
dist inguished when and where the l iquidated and 
unliquidated damages are permitted the comparative 
posit ion of nature of such claim has been succinctly def ined 
by Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Raman Iron 
Foundry.87    
 
The topics which have been discussed earl ier go to indicate 
that the Indian law is based on the English Law as 
developed but the Indian law has now been modif ied and 
the stipulations for damages and penalty have been 
el iminated as speci f ically dealt with by the Indian law under 
Sections 73 and 74 of the Contract Act whereas under the 
Common Law a genuine pre-est imate of damage by mutual 
agreement is recorded as st ipulat ions naming l iquidated 
damage, on which binding the part ies. Whereas the Indian 
legislat ion has sought to cut across the rules as were 
prevailing under the Indian Common Law and have enacted 
the uniform rule, which is applicable to al l ingredients which 
amount to breach of Contract and separate remedies are 
stipulated.  
 
                                      
87  Union of India v. Raman Iron Foundry, (1974) 2 SCC 231. 
CHAPTER - III 
 
BASIC DOCTRINE OF FRUSTRATION  OF  
CONTRACT 
 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION:   
 
What is frustration of contract?  This question can be 
replied by putt ing attent ion and searching reply of  two 
different quest ions.  First is, what is frustration?   Second, 
What is contract?   In order to ful ly comprehend the concept 
of contract, it  may be said that contractual obl igation is fully 
and truly founded on the consent of the part ies consensus 
ad idem that is meeting of the minds agreeing to the same 
thing in the same sense. 
 
It is pertinent to note that such consensus must be fol lowed 
by free consent of the part ies. Part ies, while entering into a 
contract by their f ree wil l,  share the risk attendant on the 
transaction, core of the contract, and while doing so, 
voluntari ly and wi l l ingly def ine their reciprocal obligations 
under the contract.   It  is up to the parties to incorporate in 
the contract any saving or restrict ive clauses regarding their 
defined obligations.  Such clauses have been termed as 
exemption clauses. 
 
Under the law, unforeseen or unforeseeable supervening 
events make the performance of the contract impossible for 
no fault  of the party concerned, contract may be frustrated.  
Frustrat ion is by operation of law.  I t results in automatic 
involuntary ext inct ion of the contract rel ieving both parties 
of their l iabil it ies form the point of t ime of occurrence of that 
event.  But this ext inct ion of contract may not suit the 
parties who as businessman want the continuity of business 
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to be maintained and avoid disrupt ion caused by extinct ion 
of that contract.  To achieve this object, a device has been 
invented in the shape of force majeure c lause, intended to 
keep the contract alive despite the occurrence of f rustrat ing 
event. 
 
What is the legal force of that c lause, i ts impact on the legal 
doctr ine of frustrat ion of contract, its interpretation, as any 
other term of the contract or as an exemption (exception) 
clause, etc., comprise a segment of law call ing for special  
study as this segment seems not to have received the 
attent ion it deserves both by the courts and the 
commentators and in the words of McKendrick1 “the law on 
the topic shrieks for attention”.  An endeavour has been 
made in this dissertat ion to respond to this shriek.    
 
3.2 MEANING, DEFINITION AND SCOPE: 
 
3.2.1 Dictionary meaning of word ‘Frustration’:  
 
As both the statute and the Courts have shied away from 
defining frustration, we may refer the dictionary meaning of 
“Frustration”.  Concise Oxford Dict ionary, 1990 edit ion, 
states, frustration to mean prevention from achieving a 
purpose. 
 
As to the basis of the doctrine: “The doctrine of discharge 
from l iabili ty by f rustrat ion has been explained in various 
ways-sometimes by speaking of the disappearance of a 
foundation which the parties assumed to be at the basis of 
their contract, sometimes as deduced from a rule ar ising 
                                      
1.   Ewan McKendrick, (1995) 2nd Edn., Force Majeure and Frustration of 
Contract, foreword, page (vi).  
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f rom impossibi l ity of performance, and sometimes as 
f lowing from the inference of an implied term.  Whichever 
way it is put, the legal consequence is the same” (per 
Viscount Simon L.C., Joseph Constant ine Steam Line Ltd v. 
Imperial Smelt ing Corporation ltd  and in Heyman v. Darwins 
Ltd.2 “What happens is that the contract is held on its true 
construction not to apply at al l  f rom the t ime when the 
frustrating circumstances supervene” (per Lord Wright,  in3 
Denny, Motl & Dickson v. Fraser (James B.) & Co. Ltd.   For 
an example of the theory that frustrat ion depends on the 
disappearance of the foundation of the contract rather than 
on an implied term,4 W.J. Tatem Ltd v. Gamboa: 
   
“If  there is an event or change of circumstances 
which is so fundamental as to be regarded by the law 
as striking at the root of the contract as a whole and 
beyond what was contemplated by the parties and 
such that to hold the parties to the contract would be 
to bind them to something to which they would not 
have agreed had they contemplated that event or 
those circumstances, the contract is frustrated by that 
even immediately and irrespective of the voli t ion or the 
intention or the knowledge of the parties as to that 
particular even, and even although they have 
cont inued for a t ime to treat the contract as sti l l  
subsisting”. (per Strati f ied J.)5 
 
                                      
2
  Joseph Constantine Steam Line Ltd v. Imper ial Smelt ing 
Corporat ion l td  [1942] A.C. 154, at p. 163.  and in Heyman 
v. Darwins Ltd  [1942] A.C. 356, at p. 363).   
3
  Denny, Motl  & Dickson v. Fraser (James B.) & Co. Ltd  
[1944] A.C. 265).   
4  W.J. Tatem Ltd v. Gamboa  [1939] 1 K. B. 132  
5  Morgan v. Manser  [1948] 1 K.B. 184, 191  
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A party to a contract who proves that the performance of a 
contract has been frustrated is not obliged to prove also 
that the frustrat ion was not due to his own neglect or 
default. Whether the defence of  “self-induced frustrat ion” 
(i.e. , a reply to an al legat ion of frustrat ion that the 
frustration was induced by the party so al leging) applied 
where the other party is merely negligent and does not 
deliberately make performance impossible, queer.6 
    
The lessee’s obligat ion under a lease cannot be repudiated 
on the ground that the purpose of the lease has been 
frustrated.7  
  
“The commercial f rustration of an adventure by 
delay means, as I understand it, the happening of 
some unforeseen delay without the fault of either party 
to a contract, of such character as that by it  the 
fulf i l lment of the contract in the way in which 
fulf i l lment is contemplated and pract icable is so 
inordinately postponed that its fulf i l lment when the 
delay is over wi l l not accomplish the only object or 
objects which both parties to the contract must have 
known that each of them had in view at the t ime they 
made the contract, and for the accomplishment of 
which object or objects the contract was made”.  (per 
Bailhache J.)8 
  
                                      
6  Joseph Constantine Stem Line Ltd. v. Imperial Smelt ing 
Corporat ion Ltd  [1942] A.C. 154)  
7  Leightons Investment Trust Ltd. v. Cricklewood Property, 
Investment Trust Ltd v. Leightons Investment Trust Ltd  
[1945] A.C. 221  
8  Admiral Shipping Co. v. Weidner, Hopkins & Co. (1916)] 1 
K.D. 436, approved, [1917] 1 K.B. 242, in the Court of 
Appeal  
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“The doctr ine of dissolut ion of a contract by the 
frustration of its commercial object rests on an 
implication arising from the presumed common 
intention of the parties.  If  the supervening events or 
circumstances are such that it  is impossible to hold 
that reasonable men could have contemplated that 
event or those circumstances and yet have entered 
into the bargain expressed in the document, a term 
should be implied dissolving the contract upon the 
happening of the event or circumstances.  The 
dissolution l ies not in the choice of one or other of the 
parties, but results automatically from a term of the 
contract.  The term to be implied must not be 
inconsistent with any express term of the contract” 
(per Russel J.  in Re Badische Co.9;  referred Horlock v. 
Beal  [1916] 1 A.C. 486; Tamplin Steamship Co. Ltd v. 
Anglo-Mexican Petroleum ,  etc.,  Co. Ltd [1916] 2 A.C. 
397; Phi ll ips v. Britannia, etc. Laundry [1923] 2 K.B. 
832; Bank Line Ltd v. Arthur Capel & Co.  [1922] 2 K.B. 
132, Herj i Mulj i v. Cheong Co. Yue Steamship Co.  
[1926] A.C. 497; French Marine v. Compagine 
Napolitaine D’Eclairage, etc.  [1921] 2 A.C. 494; 
Metthey v. Curl ing [1922] 2 A.C. 180; Brit ish 
Moveitonews Ltd v. London & Distr icts Cinemas Ltd 
[1951] 2 All  E.R. 617.10 
   
                                      
9  Re Badische Co.  [1921] 2 Ch. 331, at p. 379  
10  Horlock v. Beal [1916] 1 A.C. 486; Tamplin Steamship Co. 
Ltd v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum, etc., Co. Ltd  [1916] 2 
A.C. 397; Phil l ips v. Britannia, etc. Laundry  [1923] 2 K.B. 
832; Bank Line Ltd v. Arthur Capel & Co. [1922] 2 K.B. 
132, Herj i  Mulj i  v . Cheong Co. Yue Steamship Co. [1926] 
A.C. 497; French Mar ine v. Compagine Napoli taine 
D’Ecla irage, etc. [1921]2 A.C. 494; Metthey v. Curling  
[1922] 2 A.C. 180; Brit ish Movei tonews Ltd v. London & 
Distr ic ts Cinemas Ltd [1951] 2 Al l  E.R. 617  
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 “Where the entire performance of a contract becomes 
substantially impossible without any fault on either side, the 
contract is prima facie dissolved by the doctr ine of 
frustration.  For instance, where a person contracted to let 
a hall to the plaint i ff  for use for some concerts, and the hall  
was accidental ly destroyed by f ire before the date of the 
f irst concert, i t  was held that the contract was dissolved.”11   
 
Contract for manufacture of washing machines was not 
subject to cancellat ion for “frustration” because of 
prohibit ion of manufacture of washing machines.12   
 
Cancellation of lease of premises for holding benef it concert 
by Government was not “frustration” authorizing recovery of 
rent paid.13   
 
Doctrine of “frustration” did not rel ieve buyer from obligation 
to perform contract for purchase of Puerto Rican molasses 
on the ground that war condit ions prevented performance 
because shipping was unavailable.14   
 
The law recognizes the doctrine of “frustration”, which holds 
that under the implied condit ion of the continuance of a 
contract’s subject matter, contract is dissolved when subject 
matter is no longer available.15 
 
                                      
11  Atiyah, 4th ed. (1989), An Introduction to the Law of Contract.  
12  Patch v. Solar Corp., C.C.A. Wis., 149 F.2d 558, 560. 
13  United Societies Committee v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 59 
N.Y.S.2d. 475, 476, 186 Misc. 516. 
14  Baetjer v. New England Alcohol Co., 66 N.E. 2d 798,  803,  319  Mass,  
592. 
15  Greek Cathol ic Congregation of Borough of Olyphant v. 
Plummer ,  12 A.2d 435, 439, 338 Pa. 373, 127 A.L.R. 1008. 
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Where purpose of a contract is completely frustrated and 
rendered impossible of performance by a supervening event 
or circumstance, which was not within the contemplat ion of 
the parties and could not have been ant ic ipated and 
guarded against, the contract is discharged under doctr ine 
of “frustrat ion”. The doctrine of “frustration” applies where, 
since formation of contract, there has supervened an event 
or circumstance of such a character that reasonable men in 
the posit ion of the parties would not have made the 
contract, or would not have made it without insert ing some 
appropriate provision, if  they had known or ant ic ipated what 
was going to happen. The essential element in doctrine of 
“frustration” is impossibil ity of performance, either absolute, 
that is, where supervening event or circumstance absolutely 
prohibits performance of obl igation of contract, or relative, 
that is, impossibi l ity which so changes the nature of 
obligation of contract as to make it in fact a different 
obligation. 16  
 
One relying on defense of “frustrat ion” to excuse 
nonperformance of contract must not have been 
instrumental in bringing about intervening event either by 
posit ive action or acquiescence, and an act of government 
al leged to have frustrated performance must be one in its 
sovereign capacity. Where ship-owner voluntarily subjected 
ships to control of Marit ime Commission under Ship 
Warrants Act, and thereafter owner cancelled a contract of 
carriage with importer in accordance with request of 
Marit ime Commission in order to permit carriage of strategic 
war materials, breach of contract of carriage with importer 
could not be excused under doctr ine of “frustrat ion”, not 
only because order of Commission was foreseeable but also 
                                      
16  Fifth Ave. v. Taiyo Trading Co., 73 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776, 190 Misc. 123. 
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because act of Commission was not in a sovereign capacity 
and was merely exercise of contractual right granted by 
owner.17   
 
The principle of “ frustration” by supervening act of the 
sovereign excusing nonperformance of a contract applied 
only to legislat ive or executive acts which render 
performance impossible, and does not apply to a judicial  
decree in personam enjoining performance entered in an 
act ion to which promise is not a party.18   
 
Although the doctr ines of “frustration”,  and “ impossibi l i ty”  as 
excuse for non-performance of a contract are akin, 
frustration is not a form of impossibi l i ty of performance and 
more properly relates to consideration for performance.  
The doctrine of “frustrat ion” applies where performance of a 
contract remains possible, but the expected value of 
performance to the party seeking to be excused has been 
destroyed by a fortuitous event, which supervenes to cause 
an actual but not l iteral fai lure of considerat ion. Plaint i ff ’s 
contract to act for motion picture company was not 
terminated, under doctrine of “frustration”, because 
interrupted by plaint if f ’s mil itary service, where the 
company did not wish to terminate the contract and it  did 
not appear that performance of  the contract after 
completion of mil i tary service would impose any undue 
hardship on plainti ff .19   
 
                                      
17  L. N. Jackson & Co. v. Lorentzen , D.C.N.Y., 83 F.Supp. 
486, 490.  
18  General  Ani l ine & Film Corp. v. Bayer Co.,  64 N.Y.S.2d 
492, 501, 188 Misc.929.  
19  Autry v. Republic Productions, Cal . App. , 165 P.2d 688, 
692. 
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When “frustration” of a contract in the legal sense occurs, i t  
does not merely provide one party with a defense in an 
act ion brought by the other, but it  kil ls the contract and 
discharges both parties automatically.20   
 
The requisit ioning by federal government pursuant to 
Merchant Marine Act of a tug leased by plaint if f to 
defendant effectuated a “frustration” of the charter 
agreement and thereby rel ieved defendant of al l obl igat ions 
there under.21   
 
“Frustration” is explained in theory as a condit ion or term of 
the contract, implied by the law ab ini tio,  in order to supply 
what the parties would have inserted had the matter 
occurred to them, on the basis of what is fair and 
reasonable, having regard to the mutual interests concerned 
and of the main objects of the contract. Where contract is 
terminated thorough “frustrat ion” of the object thereof, the 
arbitration clause of contract is l ikewise thereby suspended 
as to al l matters and disputes, which have not already 
arisen, unless couched in such terms as wi ll except i t  out of 
the results that follow from frustration generally. Where the 
assumed possibi l i ty of a desired object or effect to be 
attained by either party to contract forms the basis on which 
both parties enter into i t, and such object or effect is,  or 
surely wil l be, frustrated, under the doctr ine of “frustration”, 
a promisor who is without fault in causing the frustrat ion 
and who is harmed thereby is discharged from the duty of 
performing his promise, unless a contrary intent ion appears. 
Where from the nature of the contract it  is evident that the 
                                      
20  West Street Warehouse v. American President Lines, 58 
N.Y.S.2d.  722, 726, 186 Misc. 238.  
21  Henjes Marine, Inc. v. White Const.  Co. ,  58 N.Y.S.2d. 
384, 387. 
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parties contracted on the basis of the continued existence 
of the person or thing, condit ion or state or things to which 
contract relates, under doctrine of “frustration”,  the 
subsequent perishing of person or thing, or cessation of 
existence of the condit ion wil l excuse the performance, a 
condit ion to such effect being impl ied, even though promise 
may have been unqualif ied. Where it was understood by 
parties to contract for the sale of copra for shipment to 
named ports in Colombia that purpose of adventure was the 
shipment of copra for resale to Colombian buyer and that 
such shipment could not be made without a permit f rom 
Colombian government, under doctrine of “frustration”, 
cancellation or denial of such permit without fault of the 
buyer terminated the contract, including the arbitrat ion 
clause thereof. Where, from nature of contract and 
surrounding circumstances, part ies from beginning must 
have known it could not be fulf i l led unless, when t ime 
thereof arr ived, some particular condit ion continued to 
exist,  under doctrine of “frustrat ion”,  in absence of warranty 
that such condit ion of things shall exist, contract is to be 
construed as subject to implied condition that part ies shall  
be excused in case, before breach, performance becomes 
impossible or purpose frustrated from such condit ion 
ceasing to exist without default of either.22   
 
Federal orders prohibiting the product ion and sale of 
automobiles, radios, refrigerators, and other electrical 
appliances did not justify tenant in terminating lease of 
premises to be used in sell ing such art ic les, or relieve 
tenant of obligat ion to pay rent provided under the lease, on 
theory of “frustration”.23   
                                      
22  Johnson v. Atk ins , 127 P.2d 1027, 1028, 1029, 1030, 53 
Cal.App.2d. 430 
23  Nickolopulos v. Lehrer ,  40 A.2d. 794, 796, 132 N.J.L. 461.  
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Where tenant, before commencement of lease but after its 
execution, was interned as an enemy alien, but there was 
no showing that tenant’s family could not have occupied 
demised premises, and there was nothing to prevent tenant 
from using premises other than his detent ion by federal  
authorit ies, there was no “frustration” of venture and 
tenant’s internment did not release him from obligat ion to 
pay stipulated rents.24   
 
Evidence that at t ime withdrawing partner lef t partnership 
he was classif ied 1-A under Selective Service Act, and 
subsequently joined Merchant Marine, did not establ ish, as 
a matter of law, a supervening fortuitous event rendering 
performance of co-partnership agreement impossible to 
excuse nonperformance under doctrine of “frustrat ion”,  so 
as to entit le withd4rawing partner to value of good wil l  of  
partnership in determining his interest therein.25   
 
Where parties contracted for future delivery of corn during 
war and contract was based on then ceil ing price which was 
subsequently increased at dif ferent t imes and later the 
ceil ing price was abolished and as result the open market 
price greatly increased, there was no “frustrat ion” of the 
contract by economic condit ions, neither was further 
performance made impossible so as to rel ieve the seller 
from l iabi lity for damages for breach of contract.26   
 
Frustrat ion is the prevention or hindering of the attainment 
of a goal, such as contractual performance. The doctrine 
                                      
24  Kollsman v. Detzel ,  55 N.Y.S.2d 491, 492, 184 Misc. 1048.  
25  Meherin v. Meherin ,  209 P.2d 36, 39, 93 Cal.App.2d 459.  
26  Ell is  Gray Mi l l.  Co. v. Sheppard , 222 S.W.2d 742, 747, 359 
Mo. 505  
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that,  if  the ent ire performance of a contract becomes 
fundamental ly changed without any fault by either party, the 
contract is considered terminated.-Also termed frustrat ion of 
purpose.27   
 
“Where the entire performance of contract becomes 
substantially impossible without any fault on either side, the 
contract is prima facie dissolved by the doctr ine of 
frustration.  For instance, where a person contracted to let 
a hall to the plaint i ff  for use for some concerts, and the hall  
was accidental ly destroyed by f ire before the date of the 
f irst concert, i t  was held that the contract was dissolved.”28   
 
The end of a contract because of the occurrence of 
something is prevent ing its fulf i l lment;  for example, war or a 
major condition makes it suddenly legally prohibited.  
 
Frustrat ion may be def ined as the premature determination, 
owing to the occurrence of an intervening event of change 
of circumstances so fundamental as to be regarded by the 
law both as strik ing at the root of the agreement and as 
entirely beyond what was contemplated by the parties when 
they entered into the agreement. Equally i f  the terms of the 
agreement show that the part ies contemplated the 
possibi l ity of such an intervening circumstances arising, 
frustration does not occur.  Neither does it arise when one 
of the part ies had deliberately brought about the 
supervening event by his own choice.  But where it does not 
arise frustration operates to bring the agreement to an end 
                                      
27  Black, 7 t h  Edn., 1999, Law of Contract.  
28  Atiyah. 4th ed., (1989), An Introduction to the Law of 
Contract .  
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as regards both parties forthwith and quite apart f rom 
voli t ion.29  
 
‘Frustration’ signif ies a certain set of circumstances arising 
after the formation of the contract, the occurrence of which 
is due to no fault of either party but which renders 
performance of the contract by one or both the part ies 
physically and commercially impossible.30  
 
The doctrine of frustration is the effect that when the 
performance or further performance of a contract has been 
rendered impossible or has been indefinitely postponed in 
consequence of the happening of an event which was not 
and could not have been, contemplated by the part ies to the 
contract when they made it, a Court will  consider what,  as 
fair and reasonable men, the parties would have agreed 
upon if  they had in fact foreseen and provided for the 
particular event, and if , in its opinion, they would have 
decided that the contract should be regarded as at an end 
would discharge the party who would otherwise be l iable to 
pay damages for non-performance. The applicabil ity of the 
doctr ine of frustrat ion of contracts depends upon the 
particular circumstances of the case in which it is sought to 
be invoked, where it has not become impossible for a party 
to discharge his obligat ion under the contract, but merely 
burdensome to him to do, the doctrine cannot be invoked.  
Before the doctrine can be invoked, it  must be shown that 
the cause, which produced frustration, was one, which the 
                                      
29
  Kalyani Spinning Mi lls  Ltd. v. Sudha Shashikant Shroff ,  
AIR 1995 Cal.  48,  61, para 29  
30  C.B.I.  Staff  Co-op. Bldg. Socy. Ltd. v. D.R. Koteswara 
Rao,  AIR 2004 AP 18, para 39.  
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parties to the contract did not foresee and could not, with 
reasonable di l igence, have foreseen.31   
 
This doctrine provides, generally, that where existence of a 
specif ic thing is,  either by terms of contract or in 
contemplation of parties, necessary for performance of  a 
promise in the contract, duty to perform promise is 
discharged if  thing is no longer in existence at t ime for 
performance.32   
 
3.2.2  Definition of frustration of contract:   
 
Frustrat ion of contract has not been def ined by statute, 
either in India or UK.  It has not been def ined judicially,  
either in India or UK.  It is an el l ipt ical expression, which 
fully stated would be “frustrat ion of the adventure or of the 
commercial or pract ical purpose of the contract”.   
“Frustration” is normally used as a short-hand for the 
technical term (almost qualifying as a term of art) , 
connoting frustration of a contract by a supervening event,  
which without default of either party,  renders the 
contractual obligation incapable of being performed, 
because the circumstances in which the performance is 
called for would render it a thing radically dif ferent from that 
which was undertaken by the contract.  In other words, it  
would mean that without default of either party the very 
object for which the contract was entered into is defeated 
by a subsequent uncontemplated turn of events. 
 
                                      
31  (1945) PWN 106 :     AIR 1945 Pat 300. 
 
32  Glidden Co. v. Hellenic Lines Limited, CA’ny 275 F . 2d 
253, 255.   
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Having fai led to catch in the straight jacket of a statutory 
definit ion, section 56 of the Indian Contract Act sets out 
impossibil ity of performance of contract, that expression is 
interchangeable with the expression “frustration”. 
 
English Common Law also sets out to explain rather than 
define frustrat ion of contract, using both phrases, 
‘f rustrat ion of contract ’ and ‘impossibi l ity of performance of 
contract’ as interchangeable.  The judges in both India and 
UK have explained rather than def ined these two 
expressions. 
 
In UK, for the f irst t ime, the word ‘frustrated’ was al lowed to 
appear in statute when Law Reforms (frustrated contracts) 
Act, 1943 was passed.  Even then frustrat ion was not 
defined, but reference was made to it in section 1 as an 
interchangeable expression with ‘ impossibi l ity of 
performance’.  This act ion reads as “Where a contract 
governed by English law has become impossible of 
performance or been otherwise frustrated and the part ies 
thereto have for that reason been discharged from the 
further performance of the contract, the fol lowing provisions 
shall,  subject to the provisions of section 2 of this Act, have 
effect in relation thereto.  
 
3.2.3  Scope:   
 
The scope of frustration is a l imited doctr ine of f rustrat ion.  
The scope of frustration is basical ly l imited. Doctrine of 
frustration can only refer to executory contract, where 
performance is yet to be made, wholly or part ial ly, which 
becomes impossible of performance due to subsequent and 
supervening events for no fault  of any party. Such events 
may be conveniently catalogued as (1) destruct ion of the 
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subject matter of contract, (2) rendered i l legal by 
supervening law, (3) state of things forming the basis of 
contract cease to exist,  (4) prescribed mode of performance 
becoming unavailable, (5) if  t ime is of the essence of 
contract, indef inite or inordinate delay in performance. 
 
3.3 GENESIS OF DOCTRINE OF FRUSTRATION IN 
ENGLAND: 
 
Histor ically every contract was an adventure.  The t imes 
were so uncertain that a business transaction had to face 
either the perils of the sea or the hazards of the road 
journey.  It was a common occurrence that caravans 
carrying merchandise were robbed by bandits or ships 
carrying stores were raided by pirates and buccaneers.  It 
was, therefore, that the journey was started by invocat ion to 
God on an auspicious day and thanks giving ceremony 
performed on safe arrival.  Hence, the nomenclature of 
adventure every contract, therefore, had an inherent 
element of risk and the concept of contract upto today 
embodies the al locat ion or risk between the parties, only 
the nature of the risk has changed – from transit r isk to 
market f luctuations, government controls, international 
events relating to war and peace, etc., having their impact 
on commerce and industry – and performance of executory 
contract.  In every reciprocal promises, there is possibi l ity 
of a situat ion aris ing that a supervening event may be such 
as to frustrate the contract.  It  is conceivable that the 
contract itself  may contemplate some of such events and 
may even take care of them, but in actual practice i t is 
seldom that a contract deals with such events exhaust ively 
and, more often than not,  fai ls to take not ice of such events 
at all .   The parties at the t ime they entered into the contract 
are commonly concerned with the present rather than 
uncertain future.  I t is only when an uncontemplated turn of 
  
- 92 - 
events takes place which neither the part ies nor the 
Parl iament have envisaged either in the contract or in the 
law, that the situat ion demands that the court should 
determine the impact of such a situation on the contract and 
come to the conclusion whether the contract is frustrated or 
not.  While the old concept of contract engendered the 
associate concept of sanct ity of contract and consequent 
absolute liabi l ity of the modern concept of standard form 
contract has led to inroads into both these associate 
concepts of sancti ty of contract and absolute l iabi l ity.  This 
state of affairs has necessitated the courts to devise the 
doctr ine of “frustration” in order to do just ice between the 
parties in such a situation.  How this device has originated 
and developed is sought to be explained.  
 
Another author E. Allan Farnsworth has this to say on the 
subject in 2nd Edn.,  Contracts33 :  
 
One who is considering whether to make a contract  
ordinari ly makes a number of assumptions in assessing the 
benefits to be received and the burdens to be shouldered 
under the proposed exchange of performances? Some 
assumptions relate to facts that exist  at the t ime the 
contract is made. 
 
This chapter is concerned with the problems that ar ise when 
one of the parties seeks to be excused from performing on 
the ground that one of that party’s assumptions has turned 
out to be incorrect.  
 
One who seeks to be excused on this ground must contend, 
at the outset, with the general rule that duties imposed by 
                                      
33  E. Allan Farnsworth, 2nd  Edn., pp. 677-701, Law of  
Contract ,   
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contract are absolute.  The idea that f inal ity is desirable in 
consensual transactions, just if iable expectations to be 
disappointed, is expressed in the maxim, pacta sunt 
servanda i.e. agreements are to be observed.  
 
If  a man binds himself , by a posit ive, express contract, to 
do an act in itself  possible, he must perform his 
engagement.  Unless prevented by the act of God, the law, 
or the other party to the contract.  No hardship, no 
unforeseen hindrance, no dif f iculty short of absolute 
impossibil ity,  will  excuse him from doing what he has 
expressly agreed to do. This doctr ine may sometimes seem 
to bear heavily upon contractors; but in such cases, the 
hardship is attr ibutable, not to the law, but to the contractor 
himself , who has improvident ly assumed an absolute, when 
he might have undertaken only a qualif ied liabil i ty.   
 
As might be expected, parties faced with this strict rule 
have devised a variety of ways to qual ity their contractual 
obligation. A party that has not qualif ied i ts duty in some 
way such as these, however, must bring itself  within a 
limited number of judicially created doctrines if  it  would be 
excused on the ground that one of i ts basic assumptions 
has proved to be wrong. 
 
Conventional treatments of the law of contracts have 
conceptualized the quest ion of excuse under two distinct 
headings mistake, which deals with assumptions concerning 
facts that exists at the t ime the contract is made; and 
impract icabil i ty and frustrat ion, which deal largely with 
assumptions concerning circumstances that are expected to 
exist, including events that are expected to occur, after the 
contract is made.  This conceptual divis ion ref lects a sense 
that the allocat ion of the risk of error in an assumption 
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should depend on whether the assumption concerns the 
state of affairs at the t ime of agreement or at some later 
t ime.  
 
The word mistake is generally used in the law of contracts 
to refer to an erroneous belief  – “a belief that is not in 
accord with the facts”. 
 
Sometimes a contract ing party has an erroneous belief 
about a statute, regulation, or judicial  decision, or about the 
legal consequences of its acts.  Some courts have denied 
rel ief in such cases on the ground that the mistake is one of 
“law” other than “fact”, and everyone is supposed to know 
the law.  However, the modern view is that the exist ing law 
is part of the state of facts at the t ime of agreement.  
Therefore, most courts wil l grant rel ief  for such a mistake, 
as they would for any other mistake of fact.   
 
An erroneous belief is not a mistake unless it relates to the 
facts as they exist at the t ime the contract is made.  A poor 
prediction of events that are expected to occur or 
circumstances that are expected to exist after the contract 
is made is not a mistake. 
 
In some cases, however, this line between a mistake as to 
an existing fact and a poor predict ion as to a future event is 
less clear. The l ine between a mistake as to an exist ing fact 
and a poor predict ion as to the future is especially hard to 
draw when the part ies have extrapolated from existing facts 
to set their expectations as to the future. 
 
A mutual mistake occurs when both parties are under 
substantially the same erroneous belief  as to the facts.  The 
cases in which an adversely affected party ahs been 
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allowed to avoid the contract on this ground are not marked 
by their consistency in either reasoning or result. 
 
The common law has been less recept ive to claims of 
excuse bases on events occurring after the making of the 
contract than it has been to claims of excuse based on facts 
that existed at the t ime of the agreement. 
 
3.4 LEGAL THEORIES OF FRUSTRATION OF 
CONTRACT  IN ENGLAND:  
   
(i) The implied term theory:  
 
This theory suggests that from the very date, on which a 
contract is const ituted, it  is implied that a part icular state of 
things would cont inue to exist t i l l the date of performance, 
albeit not expressed in the contract.  This implied condit ion 
discharges the parties if  i ts performance has become 
impossible.  Although the idea underlying the implied term 
theory germinated in Taylor v. Caldwell , the theory emerged 
as an independent basis for the discharge of the contracts 
in F. A. Tamplin Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-Mexican 
Petroleum Products Co. Ltd. ,34 where Lord Loreburn 
observed: 
 
“A court can and ought to examine the contract 
and the circumstances in which it was made, not of 
course to vary but only to explain it,  in order to see 
whether or not from the nature of it  the part ies must 
have made their bargain on the foot ing that a 
particular thing or state of things would continue to 
exist.  And if they must have done so, then a term to 
                                      
34  F. A. Tampl in Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-Mexican 
Petroleum Products Co. Ltd.  (1916) 2 AC 397 at p.403  
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that effect wil l  be implied, though it be not expressed 
in the contract…” 
 
It is submitted that the theory purports to look into the 
surrounding circumstances only subjectively.  It may be 
noted that the essence of this theory is that although the 
parties have not expressed, the court reads into their 
contract in order to give effect to their real intention at the 
t ime of its constitution rather than to modify it.   The terms 
of a contract may comfortably be examined object ively in 
the l ight of the surrounding circumstances.  Lord Watson 
posits, “The meaning of the contract must be taken to be 
not what the part ies did intend (for they had neither thought 
nor intended regarding it), but that which the parties, as fair  
and sensible men, would presumably have agreed upon if , 
having such possibi l ity in view, they had made express 
provision as to their several rights and l iabi l it ies in the 
event of i ts occurrence.”35   
   
I t  appears from what has been said above, that the 
objective approach in the implied theory presupposes the 
existence of the changed surrounding circumstances’.    On 
the other hand, the subjective approach of this theory 
makes i t rather a generic term because it is dif f icult to 
explain ful ly the intention of the parties at the t ime of the 
constitut ion of the contract. 
 
Although the implied term theory has played a signif icant 
role in the development of law on frustration of contracts 
yet, it  has been criticized in many cases.  For example, i f  
used in a subjective sense, it  becomes dif f icult to see how 
the parties can be taken, even impl iedly, to have provided 
                                      
35  Dahi v. Nelson, Donkin & Co., (1881)  6 AC 38 at p. 59. 
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for something, which ex hypothesis they neither expected 
nor foresaw.36  Lord Wright also crit ic ized the theory on the 
same count and observed,  “I t is not possible, to my mind, 
to say that if  they had thought of it ,  they would have said, 
well, if  that happen, all  is over between us……….”37 I t  may 
be said, therefore, that if  the parties to a contract had 
foreseen the frustrat ion, even then it is dif f icult to infer that 
they would have simply agreed that the contract should 
come to an end.  Discharge of the contract is governed by 
law rather than the act of the part ies.  Similarly, when the 
term is used in subjective sense, it  s imply boils down to a 
f ict ion, because a ‘fair and sensible man’ has no real  
existence.  As a matter of fact, the opinion of a fair and 
sensible man is always exercised in the form of a judicial 
verdict.  However, if  the implied term theory is accepted, i t  
may be argued that if  the frustrating events were foreseen 
by the part ies no frustrat ion can effectively be pleaded; but 
it  is not so.   For example, in the Bank Line Case, 1919 AC 
435 the observations of the House of Lords clearly indicate 
that even if  the frustrat ing event has been contemplated by 
the parties, the court may hold them discharged.   
 
(ii)   Disappearance of the foundation theory:  
 
The Judges to whom the ‘ implied term theory’ did not suit  
were always busy in the l ine of discovering a new jur idical  
basis of the doctr ine of frustration.  Ult imately, the courts 
evolved the ‘disappearance of the foundation’ theory.  This 
theory starts with a premise that if  any subsequent event 
has washed away the foundation on which the parties 
rested their contract, a frustrat ion occurs.  Besides the 
                                      
36  Davis Contractor Ltd. v. Fareham U.D.C. ,  1956 AC 696.   
37  Denny, Mott & Dickson Ltd. v. Fraser (James, B) & Co. 
Ltd.  (1944) AC 265.  
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intention of the parties, there are many factors, which 
govern the whole creation, performance and dissolution of a 
contract, which are quite independent of the intention of the 
parties.38 This theory has got juridical recognit ion on sundry 
occasions.  For instance, in Tatem Ltd. v. Gamboa,39 the 
court held hat if  the foundation of the contract goes, either 
by destruct ion of the subject-matter or by reason of such 
long interrupt ion which brings forth a situat ion under which, 
if  the contract is enforced, i t  would be a dif ferent contract 
and the parties have not provided what in that s ituat ion is to 
happen, the performance of the contract is to be regarded 
as frustrated.  A remarkable feature of this theory is that the 
disappearance of the main basis of a contract must be 
examined in the l ight of new circumstances, which came 
into existence following the subsequent event.  But, is must  
be judged very careful ly as to which one factor, out of the 
several, constituting the contract, is to be regarded as its 
foundation, al leged to have disappeared. 
 
(iii )  The just and reasonable theory:  
 
This theory is total ly based on the well-known proposit ion 
that the task of a court, while disposing of a case, is to 
reach a just and reasonable solut ion.  Therefore, when a 
dispute regarding the frustration of a contract comes before 
a court, it  must be guided by al l the circumstances, which 
existed at the t ime of the constitut ion of contract and also 
after the happening of the event.  In the new situation, if  the 
court f inds that it  is not just and reasonable to enforce the 
contract, it  may declare the contract to stand frustrated. 
                                      
38  Russkoe Obsehestvo D’ l iar Iztstovleria Sharidav 
Ivoennick Pripassav v. John Stirk  & Sons Ltd., (1922) 10 
LL LR 214.  
39  Tatem Ltd. v. Gamboa ,  (1939) 1 KB 132 at p. 139.  
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Lord Wright40 may be regarded as the chief protagonist of 
this theory.  However, this theory was vehemently crit icized 
and rejected by the House of Lords in Brit ish Movietonews 
Ltd. v. London and District Cinemas Ltd.41.   Their Lordships 
were of the opinion that Lord Loreburn was right in holding 
that no court had an absolving power.  In applying this 
theory, the court gets an authority to vary the terms of a 
contract in the way it deems f i t,  whereas alteration of a 
contract is solely the matter which concerns the part ies.  
While accepting this theoretical premise, i t  can be argued 
that those contracts may also be discharged is which the 
court f inds that after happening of the subsequent event i t  
is just and reasonable not to enforce them. 
 
(iv) Change in obligation theory: 
 
This is the most acceptable theory in England.  In essence, 
the theory professes to explain that i f  an event happens 
beyond the control of either party and the event br ings forth 
a situat ion in which performance of the contract would 
change the obligat ions undertaken at the t ime of its 
formation, the contract frustrates.  The theory lays 
emphasis on the well-sett led judicial pr inciple, that while 
deciding a case on a contract, the primary function of a 
court of law is to construe it is accordance with its terms 
and condit ions.  However, the construct ion must be made in 
the light of the changed circumstances.  If , on construction 
it is found that the performance would change the init ial  
obligations of the parties, the frustration comes into effect 
and the obligat ions of the parties are dispensed with.  In 
                                      
40  Lord Wright -  Legal Essays and Addresses , p. 259. 
41  Brit ish Movietonews Ltd. v. London and Distr ic t Cinemas 
Ltd.  1952 AC 166.  
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Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham U.D.C. ,42 where the 
building works undertaken by the appellants took more time 
and money than agreed upon, the House of Lords, declaring 
no frustration, observed.  “Frustrat ion occurs whenever the 
law recognizes that without default of either party a 
contractual obligation has become incapable of being 
performed because the circumstances in which the 
performance is called for would render it a thing radically 
different from that which was undertaken by the contract.” 
 
3.5 VIABILITY OF ENGLISH THEORIES IN INDIA: 
 
The second paragraph of S. 56 of the Indian contract Act,  
1872, contains rules regulating the subsequent 
impossibil ity.  The law contained in this paragraph deals 
with the Indian approach on the doctrine of frustrat ion of 
contracts and runs as under: 
 
“A contract to do an act which, after the contract 
is made, becomes impossible, or by reason of some 
event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful,  
becomes void when the act becomes impossible or 
unlawful.” 
 
Under the abovementioned statutory provision, the doctrine 
of frustration in India operates in two ways.  First ly, where 
the performance of a contract becomes impossible by some 
external faults beyond the control of the promisor and 
secondly, where the performance of the contract becomes 
unlawful by reason of any subsequent change in law before 
its performance.  The situat ions in which either of the two 
impossibil it ies may occur are: (i)  destruction of  the 
                                      
42  Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham U.D.C. , 1956 AC 696 at 
p. 729.  
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subject-matter,  ( i i)  death of the promisor, ( i i)  fai lure of the 
ultimate object and (iv) change in law.  It may be noted that 
in England too the contracts frustrate on similar grounds but 
there is a basic difference between the Indian and English 
law on the approach to the grounds responsible for the 
frustration of a contract.  In England too the contracts 
frustrate on similar grounds but there is a basic difference 
between the Indian and English law on the approach to the 
grounds responsible for the frustrat ion of a contract.  In 
England the courts, just ify one of the grounds of frustrat ion 
on the basis of any of the self-evolved theories whereas, in 
India there is no room for such a judicial f iat.   Indian courts 
cannot openly justi fy a frustration on the basis of any other 
proposit ion except that which is given in the second 
paragraph of Sec. 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.  But,  
it  is s ignif icant to note that whether there is a frustration or 
not is one issue, and if  there is a frustration then how to 
just ify i t,  remains another issue to be decided.  In England, 
there may be a controversy on thy f irst issue i.e. whether a 
contract frustrated at al l .   The reason is that if  a contract is 
to frustrate in England, i t  must be backed by any of the 
prevalent theories.  On the other hand, there cannot be any 
controversy in India regarding the reason behind such a 
frustration.  If  the facts of a case come within the ambit of 
S. 56, there is a frustration whatever be the reason.  
Therefore, in India, there is no possibil ity of  any 
controversy regarding the judicial basis of the frustrat ion of 
a contract.  But i t is curious to note that although the Indian 
Courts confine themselves to the letters of second 
paragraph of S. 56 yet, they purport to justi fy the decision 
on grounds similar to any one of the judicial theories of 
England.  In Satyabarat Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & 
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Co. ,43 there was contract for the sale of piece of land.  
Because of the outbreak of Second World War the contract 
could not be performed as the stipulated land was acquired 
by the Government for mil itary purposes.  After the war, the 
plaint if f  insisted on the performance but the defendant 
refused to perform the contract on the ground that the 
contract frustrated.  It was held by the Supreme Court of 
India that under the circumstances there was no frustrat ion 
of the contract within the meaning of S. 56 of the Indian 
Contract Act 1872 and the defendant was bound to perform 
the contract.  But, curiously enough, for arr iv ing at this 
decision, the Court, has taken into account the 
‘disappearance of the foundation theory’ .  This is evident 
from the fol lowing remarks of Mukherj i ,  J.:    
 
“This much is clear that the word ‘ impossible’ has not been 
used in the sense of physical or l iteral impossibi l i ty.  The 
performance of an act may not be l i teral ly impossible, but i t 
may be impracticable and useless from the point of view of 
object and purpose which the parties had in view, and if  an 
untoward event or change or circumstance total ly upsets the 
very foundation upon which the parties rested their bargain, 
it  can very well be said that the promisor f inds it impossible 
to do the act which he promised to do.” 
 
Moreover, in most of the contracts in India, there is no 
express mention that the contract would frustrate if  its 
performance is prohibited on a later date.  But, it  may be 
contended that the court takes it to be an implied term in 
very contract that where performance of a contract is 
banned by law, the contract would frustrate.  Inadvertent ly 
though, it  amounts to the applicat ion of the ‘implied term 
                                      
43  Satyabarat Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., AIR 1954 
SC 44. 
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theory’.  For example, in recent case, Union of India v. C. 
Damani & Co. ,44 a dealer in export of silver, entered into an 
agreement with the State Trading Corporation for exporting 
silver to a foreign buyer and made all  arrangements to 
perform the contract.  In the meantime, the export of silver 
was banned by the Government, including previous 
contracts.  The Supreme Court held that the contract was 
frustrated and the State Trading Corporation was not 
al lowed to claim indemnity from the export dealer.  The 
court further observed that there is as implied condit ion in 
ordinary contracts that the parties shall be exonerated in 
case, before the breach, the performance becomes 
impossible on account of any legal prohibit ion. 
 
In the preceding lines, some examples have been given to 
vent ilate the proposit ion that despite a well coined statutory 
provision in respect of frustrat ion, the Indian courts have 
attempted to just ify their decisions on the basis of one 
theory or the other.  But,  as a matter of fact, the Indian 
courts need not take the cognizance of any of  the 
abovementioned theories.  The statutory provision in India 
has taken the essence of al l  the theories.  On a hair-
spli tt ing examination of al l the theories on frustrat ion in 
England, we f ind that the underlying principle in al l of  them 
is the impossibi l ity of performance.  Sect ion 56 of the Indian 
Contract Act, incorporates in its provision this essence.  
But, at the same t ime, Indian provision does not make this 
“impossibi l ity’ a subjective term.  In India the expression is 
interpreted is i ts practical sense with the result  that 
frustration is not dependent on surmises as it is in England.  
Mukherjee, J. r ight ly observes: 
   
                                      
44  Union of India v. C. Damani & Co.,  AIR 1980 SC 1149. 
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“In deciding cases in India the only doctrine that we have to 
go by is that of supervening impossibi l ity or i l legal ity as laid 
down in S. 56 of the Contract Act taking the word 
‘impossible’ in its pract ical and not l iteral sense.  It  must be 
borne in mind, however, that S. 56 lays down a rule of 
posit ive law and does not leave the matter to be determined 
according to the intention of the parties.”45   
   
3.6 JUDICIAL EXPOSITION OF THE PHRASE 
‘FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT’ IN ENGLISH 
LAW: 
 
 
In the words of Lord Radclif fe in Davis Contractors Ltd. v. 
Fareham,  46 f rustrat ion occurs whenever the law recognises 
that without default of either party a contractual obligation 
has become incapable of being performed because the 
circumstances in which performance is called for would 
render it a thing radically dif ferent from that which was 
undertaken by the contract.  Non haec in foe dera veni.   I t  
was not this that I promised to do …. There must be …. 
Such a change in the signif icance of the obl igation that the 
thing undertaken would, if  performed, be a dif ferent thing 
from that contracted for.” 
 
In the same ruling, as reported at page 721, Lord Reid put 
the test for frustration in a simi lar way.  “The question is 
whether the contract which they did make is,  on its true 
construction, wide enough to apply to the new situat ion; i f  i t  
is not, then it is at an end.”  Later in his speech, he 
approved the words of Asquith ,  L.J.,  that the question is 
whether the events alleged to frustrate the contract were 
“fundamental enough to transmute the job the contractor 
                                      
45  Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram  Bangur & Co. , AIR 1954 
SC 44 
46  Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham, U.D.C.(1956) 696. 
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had undertaken into a job of a dif ferent kind which the 
contract did not contemplate and to which it could not 
apply.”  It  is submitted that the test put forward by Lord 
Reid is substantially the same as that of Lord Radcli ffe.  
Lord Somervell agreed with Lord Reid on what is the proper 
basis of frustrat ion.47  
 
3.7 TEXT BOOK EXPOSITION: TRIETEL IN 
FRUSTRATION AND FORCE MAJEURE, 1994:   
 
 
Trietel,  in Frustration and Force Majeure  (1994), at pages 
57-61 has said:48 
 
The expression “frustration” is used in a variety of senses;  
as Lord Devlin has said, “We are very slovenly about the 
way in which we used expression l ike ‘f rustrat ion’.”   At least 
four usages are established: they refer respective to 
frustration of contract, f rustration of the adventure, 
frustration of purpose and frustrat ion breach. 
 
The expression “frustrat ion of contract” refers to the whole 
doctr ine of discharge by supervening events, i rrespect ive of 
the type of event, which brings about discharge. 
 
It is, however, submitted that the expression “frustration of 
adventure” refers to a particular type of event,  which may 
bring about discharge.  In this sense, it  is both narrower 
than “frustrat ion of contract”, which refers generally to 
discharge by supervening events, irrespect ive of their 
nature; and i t is also dif ferent in kind: “frustration of 
contract” refers to the legal effect of the supervening events 
                                      
47  Chit ty, 26 t h  Edn, Law of Contracts.  
48  Tr ietel ,  (1994), pp.57-61, Frustrat ion and Force Majeure . 
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(i.e. , to the discharge of the contract) while “frustrat ion of 
adventure” refers to one particular causes of discharge. 
 
In cases of frustration of purpose, there is no such 
prevention at all ,  but discharge may nevertheless occur 
because the literal performance of one party’s duty has 
become useless to the other.   
 
The expression refers to the type of breach, which is 
suff icient ly serious to justify the vict im’s rescission of the 
contract, in the sense that i t gives the vict im the opt ion of 
refusing, on account of the breach, to perform his own part 
of the contract, and to accept further performance from the 
party in breach. 
 
Obviously cases of “frustrat ion breach” are dist inct form the 
doctr ine of discharge by supervening events (the ‘doctr ine 
of frustrat ion)’ s ince that doctr ine cannot be invoked by a 
party whose ‘default ’ brings about,  or amounts to, the 
supervening event which interferes with performance; and 
for this purpose a ‘f rustrating breach’ clearly amounts to 
default. 
 
Most of the legal systems make provisions for the discharge 
of a contract, where, subsequent to i ts formation, a change 
of circumstances renders the contract legally or physically 
impossible of performance.  In English Law, such a situation 
is provided for by the doctrine of frustration.  Originally,  this 
term was conf ined to the discharge of marit ime contracts by 
the ‘f rustrat ion of the adventure’, but i t has not been 
extended to cover al l cases where an agreement has been 
terminated by supervening events beyond the control  of 
either party.  This development is not mere l inguistic 
accident,  for i t  is not strict ly necessary that performance 
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should have become li teral ly impossible, provided that i t  
cannot be properly demanded in the fundamental ly different 
situat ion which has unexpectedly occurred. 
 
3.8 TREITEL: LAW OF CONTRACT 
 
Under the doctrine of frustration a contract may be 
discharged if  af ter its formation events occur making its 
performance impossible or i l legal,  and in certain analogous 
situat ions. 
 
Impossibi l ity Considered: 
 
1. Destruction of a particular thing  
2. Death or incapacity  
3. Unavailabili ty  
4. Failure of a part icular source  
5. Method of performance impossible  
6. Statute  
7. Impossibi l ity and impracticabil ity  
8. Frustrat ion of purpose  49 
 
3.9 DEFINITION OF FRUSTRATION IN INDIAN LAW : 
 
(i) Statutory definition: 
 
Turning to Indian Law, we f ind that though Section 56 of the 
Indian Contract Act delineates the doctr ine of frustrat ion of 
contract in Para 2, (set out below for ready reference), i t  
does not mention the word frustration. While Engl ish statute 
of 1963 does mentioned “frustrat ion” i t  does not dare def ine 
it. 
 
                                      
49  Tr ietel ,  7 t h  Edn., p. 663, Law of Contract. :  
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56. “A contract to do an act which, after the contract is  
made, becomes impossible, or, by reason of some event 
which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes 
void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful.” 
 
(ii)  Judicial Definition: 
 
Turning to the Supreme Court decisions, mentioning the 
word frustration and explaining the doctr ine of frustrat ion of 
contract, reference may be made to Ganga Saran v. Firm 
Ram Charan,50 where mention is made of doctr ine of 
frustration of contract by observing that “c learly the doctrine 
of frustrat ion cannot avail a defendant when the non-
performance of a contract is attributable to his own default”,  
and also observed that “in these circumstances, this is 
obviously not a case in which the doctrine of frustration of 
contract can be invoked. It is further observed that: “It  
seems necessary for us to emphasize that so far as the 
Courts in the country are concerned, they must look 
primarily to the law as embodied in sections 32 and 56 of 
the Indian Contract Act.” 
 
Ganga Saran v. Firm Ram Charan has been fol lowed in 
Satyabrata v. Mugneeram,51 wherein Supreme Court has 
observed “The f irst argument advanced by the learned 
Attorney General raises a somewhat debatable point 
regarding the true scope and effect of Section 56 of the 
Indian Contract Act and to what extent, if  any, i t  
incorporates the Engl ish rule of frustrat ion of contract. 
……..The second paragraph enunciates the law relat ing to 
discharge of contract by reason of supervening impossibi l ity 
or i l legali ty of the act agreed to be done. The wording of 
                                      
50  Ganga Saran v. F irm Ram Charan , AIR 1952 SC 9.   
51  Satyabrata v. Mugneeram. AIR 1954 SC 44. 
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this paragraph is quite general, and though the i l lustrat ions 
attached to i t are not at al l happy, they cannot derogate 
from the general words used in the enactment. ….We hold, 
therefore, that the doctrine of frustrat ion is really an aspect 
or part of the law of discharge of contract by reason of 
supervening impossibi l ity or i l legality of the act agreed to 
be done and hence comes within the purview of section 56 
of the Indian Contract Act. It would be incorrect to say that 
section 56 of the Contract Act applies only to cases of 
physical impossibi l i ty and that where this section is not 
applicable, recourse can be hand to the principles of 
English law on the subject of frustrat ion. It must be held 
also, that, to the extent that the Indian Contract Act deals 
with a particular subject, i t  is exhaustive upon the same and 
it is not permissible to import the principles of Engl ish law 
‘dehors’ these statutory provisions. The decisions of the 
English courts possess only a persuasive value and may be 
helpful in showing how the courts in England have decided 
cases under circumstances similar to those, which have 
come before our courts. …..The law of frustration in 
England developed, as is well known, under the guise of 
reading implied terms and contracts. …..The English law 
passed through various stages of development since then 
and the principles enunciated in the various decided 
authorit ies cannot be said to be in any away uniform. In 
many of the pronouncements of the highest courts in 
England the doctrine of frustrat ion was held ‘to be a device 
by which the rules as to absolute contract are reconciled 
with a special except ion which justice demands’. …..”These 
differences in the way of formulating legal theories really do 
not concern us so long as we have a statutory provision in 
the Indian Contract Act. In deciding cases in India, the only 
doctr ine that we have to go by is that of supervening 
impossibil ity or i l legal ity as laid down in sect ion 56 of  the 
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Contract Act, taking the word ‘ impossible’ in its pract ical  
and not l i teral sense. It must be borne in mind, however that 
section 56 lays down a rule of posit ive law and does not 
leave the matter to be determined according to the intent ion 
of the part ies. ….When such an event or change of 
circumstance occurs which is not fundamental as to be 
regarded by law as str iking at the root of the contract as a 
whole, it  is the court which can pronounce the contract to 
be frustrated and at an end.  The court undoubtedly was to 
examine the contract and the circumstances under which it  
was made. The bel ief , knowledge and intent ion of the 
parties are evidence, but evidence only on which the court 
has to form its own conclusion whether the changed 
circumstances destroyed altogether the basis of  the 
adventure and its underlying object.52 This may be called a 
rule of construction, by English Judges but it  is certainly not 
a principle of giving effect to the intent ion of the part ies 
which underl ies al l  rules of construct ion.  This is really a 
rule posit ive law and as such comes within the purview of 
section 56 of the Indian Contract Act.” 
 
Again, Satyabarat Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co. ,53 has 
been fol lowed in Mugneeram Bangur & Co. v. Gurbachan 
Singh54 wherein Supreme Court has observed on Page 
1525, “Insofar as discharged of contract by reason of 
frustration is concerned there is no quest ion of implying a 
term in the contract a term fundamental for i ts performance, 
as is done by the Courts in England because we have here 
the provisions of sect ion 56 as well as those of section 32 
of the Contract Act. This is what was held by this Court in 
                                      
52  Vide Morgan v. Manser , 1947-2 AII ER 666 (L).  
53  Satyabarat Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co., AIR 1954 
SC 44.  
54  Mugneeram Bangur & Co. v. Gurbachan Singh , AIR 1965 
SC 1523. 
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the earlier case and that decision binds us. No doubt, a 
contract can be frustrated either because of supervening 
impossibil ity of performance or because performance has 
become unlawful by reason of circumstances for which 
neither of the part ies was responsible. In the earl ier case 
this Court has held that where the performance of an 
essential condit ion of the contract has become impossible 
due to supervening circumstances the contract would be 
discharged. This Court has further held that the 
impossibil ity need not be an absolute one but is suff icient i f  
further performance becomes impract icable by some cause 
for which neither of the parties was responsible. It, 
however, held that the performance of an essential term of 
the contract, that is to say, of undertaking development of 
the area under the scheme could not be undertaken 
because the land had been requisit ioned, did not have the 
effect of frustrating the contract.  For though the term 
regarding development was an essential term of the 
contract, the requisit ioning of the land was only for a 
temporary period.” 
 
Naihati Jute Mill’s case55 
 
As envisaged by section 56, impossibi l ity of performance 
would be inferred by the courts from the nature of the 
contract and the surrounding circumstances in which it  was 
made that the part ies must have made their bargain upon 
the basis that a particular thing or state of things would 
cont inue to exist and because of the altered circumstances 
the bargain should no longer be held binding. The courts 
would also infer that the foundation of the contract had 
                                      
55  Naihati  Jute Mil l ’s  case, AIR 1968 SC 522. 
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disappeared either by the destruct ion of the subject matter 
or by reason of such long interruption or delay that the 
performance would really in effect be that of a different 
contract for which the parties had not agreed.  Impossibi l ity 
of performance may also arise where without any default  of 
either party the contractual obl igat ion had become 
incapable of being performed because circumstances in 
which performance was called for was radically different 
from that undertaken by the contract. But the common law 
rule of contract is that a man is bound to perform the 
obligations, which he has undertaken and cannot claim to 
be excused by the mere fact that performance has 
subsequently become impossible. 
 
These theories have been evolved in the main to adopt a 
realist ic approach to the problem of performance of contract 
when it is found that owing to cause unforeseen and beyond 
the control of the parties intervening between the date of 
the contract and the date of i ts performance it would be 
unreasonable and unjust to exact i ts performance in the 
changed circumstances. 
 
The necessity of evolving one or the other theory was due 
to the common law rule that courts have no power to 
absolve a party to the contract from his obligat ion.  On the 
one hand, they were anxious to preserve intact that sanct ity 
of contract while on the other the courts could not shut their 
eyes to the harshness of the situat ion in cases where 
performance became impossible by causes which would not 
have been foreseen and which were beyond the control of 
parties. 
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Such a dif f iculty has, however, not to be faced by the courts 
in this country.  In Ganga Saran v. Ram Charan,56 this court 
emphasized that so far as the courts in this country are 
concerned they must look primari ly to the law as embodied 
in sect ions 32 and 56 of the Contract Act.  In Satyabrata 
Ghose v. Mugneeram,57 also, Mukherjee, J., stated that 
“sect ion 56 laid down a rule of posit ive law and did not 
leave the matter to be determined according to the intent ion 
of the parties.  Since under the Contract Act a promise may 
be express or implied in cases where the court gathers as a 
matter of construction that the contract itself  contains 
impliedly or expressly a term according to which it  would 
stand discharged on the happening of certain circumstances 
the dissolut ion of the contract would take place under the 
terms of the contract itself  and such cases would be outside 
the purview of section 56.  Although in English law such 
cases would be treated as cases of frustrat ion, in India they 
would be dealt with under sect ion 32.” 
 
Dhruv Dev v. Harmohinder Singh58 
 
I t  has been held by this court that the rule in sect ion 56 
exhaustively deals with the doctrine of frustration of 
contracts and it cannot be extended by analogies borrowed 
from the English common law.  In Satyabrata Ghose v. 
Mugneeram Bangure & Co. ,59 Mukherjea, J., observed that 
“The doctrine of frustrat ion is really an aspect or part of the 
law of discharge of contract by reason of supervening 
impossibil ity or i l legality of the act agreed to be done and 
                                      
56  Ganga Saran v. Ram Charan ,  AIR 1952 SC 9. 
57  Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram,  AIR 1954 SC 44.  
58  Dhruv Dev v. Harmohinder Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1024. 
59  Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangure & Co. ,  AIR 1954 
SC 44 
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hence comes within the preview of sect ion 56 of the Indian 
Contract Act. 
 
No useful purpose wil l be served by referr ing to the 
judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States of 
America and the Court of Session in Scot land to which our 
attent ion was invited. Section 56 of the Contract Act lays 
down a posit ive rule relat ing to frustrat ion of contracts and 
the Courts cannot travel outside the terms of that section.  
 
By its express terms sect ion 56 of the Contract Act does not 
apply to cases in which there is a completed transfer. 
 
Bhootalinga Agencies v. V.T.C. Poriaswami60 
 
In English law, therefore, the question of frustration of 
contract has been treated by courts as a quest ion of 
construction depending upon the true intent ion of the 
parties. In contrast, the statutory provisions contained in 
section 56 of the Indian Contract Act lay down a posit ive 
rule of law and Engl ish authorit ies cannot therefore be of 
direct assistance, though they have persuasive value in 
showing how Engl ish courts have approached and decided 
cases under similar circumstances. 
 
Sushila Devi v. Hari Singh61 
 
The impossibi l ity contemplated by sect ion 56 of the 
Contract Act is not conf ined to something, which is not 
humanly possible.   If  the performance of a contract 
becomes impracticable or useless having regard to the 
object and purpose the part ies had in view then it must be 
                                      
60  Bhootalinga Agencies v. V.T.C. Poriaswami, AIR 1969 SC 110. 
61
  Sushila Devi v. Har i Singh,  AIR 1971 SC 1756.  
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held that the performance of the contract has become 
impossible.  But the supervening events should take away 
the basis of the contract and it should be of such a 
character that i t  str ikes at the root of the contract. 
 
Govindbhai Gordhanbhai Patel v. Gulam Abbas Mulla 
Allibhai62 
 
This rul ing fol lows Mugneeram Bangur & Co. v. Gurbachan 
Singh ,63 and Sushila Devi v. Hari Singh.64 I t  has been 
observed that “The parties are, therefore, governed purely 
by section 56 of the Contract Act according to which a 
contract becomes void only if  something supervened after 
its execution which renders it impract icable.  On the 
content ion advanced on behalf  of the respondents, the 
question that ar ises is whether the above quoted order of 
the Prant Off icer, Thana Prant,  dated December 8, 1958, 
rendered the contract impracticable.  The answer to this 
question is obviously in the negative.  The said order,  i t  will  
be noted, was not of such a catastrophic character as can 
be said to have struck at the very root of the whole object 
and purpose for which the parties had entered into the 
bargain in question or to have rendered the contract 
impract icable or impossible or performance. ….We are, 
therefore, clearly of the opinion that no untoward event or 
change of circumstances supervened to make the 
agreement factually or legally impossible of performance so 
as to attract section 56 of the Contract Act.” 
 
 
                                      
62  Govindbhai Gordhanbhai Patel v. Gulam Abbas Mul la 
All ibhai ,  AIR 1977 SC 1019. 
63  Mugneeram Bangur & Co. v. Gurbachan Singh , AIR 1954 
SC 44 
64  Sushila Devi v. Har i Singh, AIR 1971 SC 1756. 
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3.9.1 Concept of supervening illegality has been taken 
into consideration: 
 
Where, however, a contract is affected by supervening 
il legality, the court has to take into account, not only the 
relat ive interests of the parties, but also the interests of the 
public in seeing that the law is observed; and this public 
interest may sometimes outweigh the importance of 
achieving a fair distribut ion of loss.  For this reason 
supervening il legali ty is a separate ground of discharge 
from supervening impossibil i ty, and is to some extent 
governed by special rules.  
 
 “After the part ies have made their agreement, unforeseen 
cont ingencies may occur which prevent the attainment of 
the purpose that they had in mind.  The quest ion is whether 
this discharges them from further l iabi lity.”65 
 
I t  is not possible to tabulate or to classify the circumstances 
to which the doctrine of frustrat ion applies. Upon proof that 
the continuing availabil ity of a physical thing or a given 
person is essential to the attainment of the fundamental 
object, which the parties had in view, the contract is 
discharged if , owing to some extraneous cause such thing 
or person is no longer available.  
 
Another cause of frustration is the non-occurrence of some 
event,  which must reasonably be regarded as the basis of 
the contract.  This is well i l lustrated by the coronation 
cases. The doctrine is certainly applicable if  the object,  
which is the foundation of the contract, becomes 
unobtainable. A common cause of frustrat ion, especially in 
                                      
65  Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston, 11 t h  Edn, pp. 554-560,  Law 
of Contract.  
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t ime of war, is interference by the government in the 
act iv it ies of one or both of the part ies.  
 
Whether the outbreak of war or an interference by the 
government discharge a contract depends upon the actual  
circumstances of each case.  The principle i tsel f is 
constant, but the dif f iculty of i ts appl icat ion remains.  
Discharge must be decreed only if  the result of what has 
happened is that, i f  the contract were to be resumed after 
the return of peace or the removal of interference, the 
parties would f ind themselves dealing with each other under 
condit ions completely dif ferent from those that obtained 
when they made their agreement.  The contract must be 
regarded as a whole and the quest ion answered whether its 
purpose as gathered from its term has been defeated.  
 
3.9.2 Frustration is a rule of construction of contract: 
 
Law relat ing to frustrat ion of contract makes a fascinat ing 
study.  Though technically a principle of posit ive law 
captured in the straight jacket of section 56 of the Indian 
Contract Act, i t  is in actual practice a rule of the 
construction of the contract.  There are st il l many dark 
areas relat ing to this branch of law, which await discovery 
and enlightenment.  Our system of law is based on Anglo-
Saxon jurisprudence.  The law of frustrat ion as codif ied in 
the Indian Contract Act, section 56, in 1872, ref lected the 
English Common Law obtaining at that time modif ied as 
considered suitable for condit ions in India.  While the 
English Common Law has moved with the t imes, the Indian 
Law has remained static.   
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3.9.3 Law of frustration tied up with law relating to 
breach: 
 
Law of frustration is t ied up with the law relat ing to breach.  
The quest ion of frustrat ion comes up only in the event of 
non-performance of the contract.  Non-performance would 
amount to breach if  there is no lawful justif iable excuse for 
such non-performance.  Many a t ime the default ing party 
while ferreting out for an excuse advances the plea of 
supervening event as frustrating the contract.  If  f rustrat ion 
can successfully be pleaded, the result is automatic 
dissolution of the contract and consequently rendering the 
question of breach irrelevant. 
 
3.9.4 Concept of frustration tied up with development 
of concept of contract: 
 
The concept of frustrat ion of a contract is inextricably t ied 
up with the development of concept of contract through the 
ages with part icular reference to the doctrine of absolute 
liabil i ty under the contract.  The development of law of 
contract runs parallel to the development of polit ical thought 
and economic advancement.  During eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, the philosophy of laissez faire and 
theory of natural law became popular.  “The judges of the 
eighteenth century interpreted the theory of natural law to 
mean that men had an inalienable right to make their own 
contract for themselves.  The judges of the nineteenth 
century, inf luenced by the philosophy of laissez faire, held 
the view that law should interfere with cit izens as li t t le as 
possible leaving it to them to enter into any contract which 
they l iked, unhampered by any interference either by the 
State or by the judiciary”66.   “It is that men of full  age and 
                                      
66.   Anson,  23rd Edn., p.23, Law of Cotnract, (quoted with approval by 
Supreme Court in AIR 1968 SC  599 at 604).  
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competent understanding, shall have the utmost l iberty in 
contracting, and that their contracts, when entered into 
freely and voluntarily,  shall be held sacred and enforced by 
Courts of Justice.”67 
 
3.9.5 Gradual changes in the Doctrine of Absolute 
Liability of the Contract in English Law:  
 
At one t ime the doctrine of absolute l iabi l ity of the contract 
held complete sway and if  the contract did not contain any 
clause providing for a cont ingency as absolving a party from 
performance, which was due to circumstances beyond 
control, the party was held l iable absolutely to perform the 
contract.  Slowly but steadily this doctrine has been 
undergoing changes in the English Law of Frustration 
il lustrated by judicial decisions and legislat ion (which may 
be characterized as landmarks) set out below in 
chronological order: 
 
1.    Paradine v. Jane,  (1647) Aleyn 26.  
2. Taylor  v. Caldwell,  (1863) 3 B & S 826.  
3. Baily v. De Crespigny ,  (1869) LR 4 QB 180. 
4. Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Co. Ltd,  (1874) LR 
10 CP 123. 
5. Dahl v. Nelson, Donkin and Co., (1881) 6 AC 38. 
6. Henre Bay Steam Boat Co. v. Hutton,  (1903) 2 KB 
683; 
7. Krell v. Henry ,  (1903) 2 KB 740. 
8. Tamplin SS Co. v. Anglo-Mexican & Co., (1916) 2 AC 
397.  
9. Bankline Ltd. v. Arthur Capel & Co., (1919) AC 434. 
10. Russokoe & Co. v.  John St irk and Sons Ltd., (1922) 
10 LR 214.  
                                      
67.    Chesire, Fifoot  & Furmston,  11th Edn., p.12, Law of Contract.  
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11. Larrinaga v. Societe Franco-Americaine, (1923) 39 
TLR 316 : 92 LJ KB 455.  
12. Hirj i Mulji  v. Cheong Yue SS Co. Ltd., (1926) AC 497.  
13. Marit ime National Fish Ltd. v. Ocean Traders Ltd., 
(1935) AC 524 –13.  
14. Joseph Constant ine SS Line Ltd. v. Imperial Smelt ing 
Corporation.,  (1942) AC 154.  
15. Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943. 
16. Denny Mott and Dickson Ltd. v. James B. Fraser & Co. 
Ltd., (1944) AC 265.  
17. Sir Lindsay Parkinson Ltd. v. Commissioner of Works.  
(1949) 2 KB 632. 
18. Brit ish Movietonews Ltd. v. London & Distr ict Cinemas 
Ltd., (1951) 1 KB 190.  
19. Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham,  (1956) AC 696. 
20. Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v.  Kawasaki Kisen 
Kaisha Ltd., (1962) 2 QB 26.  
21. Tsakiroglou & Co. v. Noblee Thorl GMBH., (1962) AC 
93.  
22. Ocean Tramp Tankers Corporat ion v. V/O Sovfracht 
(The Eugenia), (1964) 2 QB 226. 
23. Staffordshire Area Health Authority v.  South 
Staffordshire Waterworks Co. Ltd., (1978 2 All  ER 
769: (1978) 1 WLR 1387.  
24. National Carriers Ltd. v. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd., 
(1981) 1 All  ER 161.  
25. The Nema,  (1981) 2 All  ER 1030. 
26. BP Exploration v. Hunt), (1982) 1 Al l ER 925.  
27. Kodros Shipping Corpn. v.  Empresa Cubana de 
Fletes, (The Evia.),  (1982) 3 Al l ER 350.  
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Paradine v. Jane (1647)68 
 
In the classic case of Paradine v. Jane in (1647) the facts 
of the case were that Paradine sued Jane for rent due upon 
a lease.  Jane pleaded ‘that a certain German Prince, by 
name Prince Rupert, an al ien born, enemy to the king and 
kingdom, had invaded the realm with an hosti le army of 
men; and with the same force did enter upon the 
defendant’s possession, and had him expelled, and held out 
of possession. …Whereby he could not take the prof its’.  
This plea was in substance a plea that the rent was not due 
because the lessee had been deprived, by events beyond 
his control, of  the profits from which the rent should have 
come.  The Court held that this was no excuse: “but where 
the law creates a duty or charge and the party is disabled to 
perform it and hath no remedy over, there the law will  
excuse him…. When the party by his own contract creates a 
duty or charge upon himself , he is bound to make it  good, i f  
he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevi table 
necessity, because he might have provided against it  by his 
contract.  And therefore if  the lessee covenant to repair a 
house, though it be burnt by l ightning, or thrown down by 
enemies, yet he ought to repair i t. ”  The decision, though 
correct in itself  according to the law obtaining at that t ime, 
could not have sounded or seemed to be reasonable, as a 
cit izen had been prevented by an alien enemy from having 
use of the land leased out to him and earn prof its and yet 
made l iable to pay rent for the use of the land.  The state, 
while fai l ing to protect its cit izen against the onslaught of 
an al ien enemy, was there to enforce a contract regarding 
                                      
68.    Paradine v. Jane,  (1647)  Aleyn 26.  
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payment of rent, which liabil i ty can only arise if  the cit izen 
were permitted to reap the prof its of the use of the land.  
This inherent absurdi ty did send shock waves, which 
produced results, though it took couple of centuries to do 
so.  
 
Taylor v. Caldwell (1863)69 
 
The thinking at that t ime was that the contract is a result of  
laissez-faire,  free will  of the part ies competent to contract 
and intel l igent enough to understand the import of their 
obligations.  Yet curiously, though the contract was labeled 
as a piece of pr ivate legislation, yet a dist inction was drawn 
between a duty created by law and a duty created by 
contract.   While there was rel ied in the case of the former, 
no rel ief  as in the case of the latter.  Even in the absurd 
circumstances of an alien enemy depriving the lessee of the 
use of his land, he was held l iable to pay the rent stipulated 
because he had not provided for such a cont ingency giving 
him rel ief  in the contract.   However, in 1863 in Taylor v. 
Caldwell,  the reali ty of the situat ion was recognized by the 
court.   In this case, the defendants had agreed to permit  
the plaintif fs to use a music hall and gardens for concerts 
on four specif ied nights.  After the contract was made, but 
before the f irst night arrived, the hall was destroyed by f ire.  
Blackburn, J., giving the judgment of the Court of Queen’s 
Bench, held that the defendants were not l iable in damages, 
since the doctrine of the sanctity of contracts applied only 
to a promise which was posit ive and absolute, and not 
subject o any condit ion express or implied.   The learned 
judge employed the concept of an implied condit ion to 
introduce a doctrine of frustrat ion into English law, since he 
                                      
69  Taylor  v. Caldwell ,  32 LJ QB 164. 
  
- 123 - 
said that i t might appear from the nature of the contract that 
the parties must have known from the beginning that the 
fulf i l lment of the contract depended on the cont inuing 
existence of a part icular person or thing.   He held that the 
particular contract in quest ion was to be construed “as 
subject to an implied condit ion that the part ies shall be 
excused in case, before breach, performance becomes 
impossible from the perishing of the thing, without default of 
the contractor. …….The principle seems to us to be that, in 
contracts in which the performance depends on the 
cont inued existence of a given person or thing, a condit ion 
is impl ied that the impossibil ity of performance aris ing from 
the perishing of the person or thing shall excuse the 
performance.   In none of these cases is the promise other 
than posit ive, nor is there any express stipulation that the 
destruction of the person or thing shall excuse the 
performance; but that excuse is by law implied, because 
from the nature of the contract is apparent that the parties 
contracted on the basis of the continued existence of the 
particular person or chattel.  “The principle of Taylor v. 
Caldwell was soon applied in other cases and accepted by 
the legislature in relat ion to agreements for the sale of 
goods.  Though the doctrine of frustrat ion was f irst  
introduced into English law to cover situat ion where the 
physical subject matter of the contract had perused (as in 
Taylor v. Caldwell), it  was quickly extended to cases where, 
without any such physical destruction, the commercial  
adventure by the parties was frustrated.  
 
These two cases, (1) Paradin v. Jane,  (2) Taylor v. Caldwell  
are leading l ights on the horizon of contractual l iabi l ity.   
The f irst regarding legal f ict ion of absolute l iabil ity, the 
other regarding reality of supervening circumstances 
rendering performance impossible.    
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The pre-eminence of justice over law cannot be over 
emphasized.   While just ice in conformity with law is ideal, 
in case it is not possible and there is conf l ict between 
just ice and law, it is just ice, which wil l prevail .    The pre-
eminence of just ice has been recognized and pride of place 
accorded to just ice by our lawgivers by embodying in Article 
142 of the Constitution, supremacy of just ice. 
 
Justice expects the promisor to perform what is humanly 
possible and no more.  Ult imately, it  is just ice that tr iumphs 
and doctrine of frustration is born and cont inues to f lourish 
– developing from impossibil ity to impracticabil i ty – to 
failure of object of contract – purpose of contract.   But,  
t ime comes when the jur ists ponder over the rigors of the 
doctr ine of frustrat ion having the effect of automatic 
dissolution of the contract from the t ime of occurrence of 
the frustrating event – and then to mitigate such rigors the 
doctr ine of Force Majeure is born – by which the part ies can 
incorporate in the contract itself  that any specif ied 
frustrating event(s) will not frustrate the contract, but keep 
it al ive irrespect ive of occurrence of that event or in the 
alternat ive, keep it in suspended animation, to be 
react ivated when the temporary setback – the effect of that 
event passes off . But to draw up a complete and 
comprehensive Force Majeure Clause, cal ls for not only a 
good draftsman but an expert astrologer who can foresee 
the future and may be in the words of American writer, 
Corbin ‘wisdom of Solomon”. 
 
Having epitomized the development of doctrine of 
frustration, we may now proceed to have a detailed 
discussion of the two cases (1) Paradine v. Jane (2) Taylor 
v. Caldwell , their impact and analysis.  
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These two cases indicate conf lict between two principles; (i) 
sanctity of contract, ( i i) basis of contract being shared but 
unexpressed assumptions.  Both principles are covered by 
Latin expression (i) pacta sunt servanda,  ( i i ) rebus sic 
stant ibus.    As regards (i), this principle insists on the li teral  
performance of contracts in spite of the fact that events 
occurring after the contract was made have interfered with 
the performance of one party, or reduced its value to the 
other; it  is based on the view that one of the principal  
purposes of contract as a legal and commercial inst itution is 
precisely to al locate the risks of such events.  It  takes the 
posit ion that those risks, having been so al located by the 
parties, should, as a general rule, not be re-allocated in a 
different manner by the courts.   As regards (i i ), its effect is 
in certain cases to discharge contractual obligat ions 
because circumstances have changed since the conclusion 
of the contract so as to destroy a basic assumption which 
the part ies had made when they entered into the contract.   
I t  may be noticed that frustrat ion is concerned with 
subsequent supervening events and not antecedent events.   
The effect of antecedent events, i.e., those which had 
already taken place at the t ime of contract ing, is governed 
by principles which may in some respects be related to 
those which apply to supervening events, but i t  is submitted 
that the two sets of principles are nevertheless dist inct.  
The dist inct ion, in English terminology, can be summed up 
by saying that antecedent events may make the contract 
void for mistake while supervening events may discharge it 
by frustrat ion.   Nevertheless the analogy between init ial 
inval idity on the ground of mistake and discharge under the 
doctr ine of frustration is imperfect for a number of reasons.   
One can point, in particular, to three dist inct ions between 
the two doctr ines, and also make a point about their 
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historical development.   The f irst distinction relates to the 
state of mind of the part ies.   The type of mistake with 
which frustrat ion is said to be analogous is mistake, which 
null if ies consent (also described as “common” mistake) i .e.,  
a fundamental mistake of both parties as to the subject  
matter of the contract.   Inherent in the notion of “mistake” 
is the idea that the parties entertain an aff irmative belief  in 
the existence of a state of affairs when in fact that state of 
affairs does not exist, e.g., in the existence of the subject 
matter, when in fact it  has been destroyed.   If  the parties 
entertain no such belief , their state of mind cannot be 
described as mistake; the law relating to the effect of 
mistake on contracts distinguishes between indif ference and 
mistake.  In cases of mistake, it  is also a requirement for 
rel ief that the mistake must induce the contract.   Second 
dist inction relates to the legal effects of the two doctrines.   
Mistake makes a contract void ab-init io,  while frustration 
only discharges it  with effect from the occurrence of the 
frustrating event.   The third point is of a more practical  
nature.  It  is said to be a requirement of invalidity on the 
ground of mistake that the mistake must be “fundamental” 
and the same expression is used to make the point that it  is 
only a “fundamental” change of circumstances, which brings 
the doctr ine of discharge into play.   The dif ferences so far 
l isted appear to support the judicial ly expressed view that 
mistake and frustrat ion are “dif ferent juristic concepts” in 
that they are brought into operat ion by circumstances which 
differ signif icantly from each other (and dif fer not only in 
respect of the t ime at which the obstacle to performance 
arises), and in that they give rise to dif ferent legal effects.  
The same view is also supported by one curious aspect of 
the history of the matter.   The origin of the doctrine of 
discharge by supervening events is general ly traced back to 
the judgment of Blackburn, J., in Taylor v. Caldwell in 1863.  
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only four years later, Blackburn, J.,  delivered the judgment 
of the court in the leading case of  Kennedy v. Panama 
Royal Mail Co.  but that judgment contains no reference to 
Taylor v. Caldwell ,  even though that case was cited by 
counsel in the Kennedy case.  
 
Paradine v. Jane is generally regarded as the authority for 
the doctrine of absolute contracts.  Taylor and Caldwell , is 
generally considered to have established the doctr ine of 
discharge by supervening events, the doctrine of frustrat ion.   
In the case of Paradine v. Jane the court drew a dist inct ion 
between two situations and laid down two propositions of 
law pertaining to them, as fol lows: (1) Where the law 
creates a duty and the party is disabled to perform it 
without any default  in him, and hath no remedy over, there 
the law wil l  excuse him. …..(2) “But when the party by his 
own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is 
bound to make it  good if  he may, notwithstanding any 
accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have 
provided against i t  by his contract.   Quest ion arises what is 
meant by “if  he may”? Do they mean “ if  he physically can” 
or “ if  he is permit ted by law to do”?  It seems that they 
cannot have the former meaning, because the party is l iable 
in spite of the fact that what he promised became 
impossible.   The dist inct ion between cases “where the 
party by his own contract creates a duty” and those “where 
the law created a duty” is not the same as the modern 
dist inction between contractual duties and duties aris ing out 
of breach of contract.   The dist inction may be said to 
resemble the modern distinction between express terms and 
implied terms.   The implied terms in question are those,  
which the law implies in the absence of agreement to the 
contrary – to verbalise legal incidents of such contractual  
relat ionships.  Such terms are called “terms implied in law”.  
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The point of the dist inct ion between the two situat ions 
described in Paradine v. Jane is that “accident by inevitable 
necessity” is no defence to an action to an express 
contractual promise; but the judgment seems to recognize 
that such circumstances can be a defence to an act ion for 
breach of an implied term.   This is made plain by the 
contrast between the two examples given: a tenant is not 
l iable for waste “if  a house is destroyed by tempest” but is 
l iable for breach of an express covenant to repair a house  
“though it be burnt by l ightening”. 
 
A qualif ication of the doctrine of absolute contractual  
l iabil i ty was spelt  out by Blackburn, J., in Taylor v. 
Caldwell.  The example that he gives is that of a sale of 
“specif ic chattels” to be delivered on a future day, which 
perish without the fault of the seller after the property in 
them has passed to the buyer but before the day f ixed for 
delivery.   It  followed that the purchaser must pay the price 
and the vendor is excused from performing his contract to 
deliver, which has thus become impossible.  
 
Taylor v. Caldwell  is a turning point as the law moved away 
from the doctr ine of absolute contracts to the doctrine of 
discharge by supervening events.   The change was brought 
about by deducing a general principle from a series of 
particular situations.   Balckburn, J.,  rel ied on three such 
situat ions – cases in which death or permanent incapacity 
prevent performance of a contract for personal services, 
cases in which specif ic goods are sold and perish after the 
property in them has passed to the buyer, and cases in 
which the subject-matter of a bai lment was destroyed 
without any default  on the part of the bailee. From these, he 
deduces the general pr inciple “from the nature of the 
contract, it  appears that the parties must..  have known that 
  
- 129 - 
i t  could not be fulf i l led unless …… some particular specif ied 
thing continued to exist”.   The effect of the principle will  be 
that “the parties shall be excused in case, before breach, 
performance becomes impossible from the perishing of the 
thing without default of the contractor”.   The result  wil l be 
“both part ies are excused”.   
 
The “performance” which was excused was only that which 
had become impossible.   This was the only point,  which 
actually arose for decision in Taylor v. Caldwell.   But the 
court held ‘both parties are excused, the plaintif fs from 
taking the gardens and paying the money, the defendants 
from performing their promise to give the use of the Hall 
and Gardens and other things’. 
 
Referring to this conclusion, the modern doctrine of 
discharge, which has its roots in Taylor v.  Caldwell  is 
generally thought to provide a better solution to the problem 
of the effects of supervening events on contracts than that 
which had been provided by the doctr ine of absolute 
contract.   In explaining this view, i t  wil l be convenient to 
make use of a set of terminological dist inctions, which are 
familiar to civi l lawyers, though they have not in the past 
been commonly found in English discussions of the topic.   
We shall refer to the person who has undertaken the 
performance, which has become impossible as the debtor of 
that performance and the other party as the creditor of that 
performance (their roles as debtor and creditor are, of 
course, reversed in relation to the counter-performance for 
the now impossible performance). The effect of the doctr ine 
of discharge is that the debtor is excused from his duty to 
render the (now impossible) performance, while the creditor 
is excused from rendering the counter-performance, i .e., 
(usually) from having to pay a sum of money for the 
  
- 130 - 
performance, which had been promised by the debtor.   In 
the most common contractual s ituation, in which some 
performance other than a payment of money is to be 
exchanged for such a payment, i t can be said that the 
“performance risk” or the former performance is on the 
creditor of that performance (i.e. , he will  nei ther receive 
performance nor be entit led to damages for non-
performance) while the “payment risk”, or “counter-
performance risk” is on the debtor (i.e., he wil l not be 
entit led to claim the promised counter-performance, which 
is usually the money promised by the creditor for the 
debtor’s performance which has become impossible).   The 
statement in Taylor v. Caldwel l that “both parties are 
excused” has the effect that each party bears one of these 
two r isks.  
 
It  wil l be noted that in Paradine v. Jane the performance 
risk and the payment risk are united in one party (both 
being borne by the tenant) while in Taylor v. Caldwell they 
are divided, thus splitt ing the loss. 
 
The doctrine of discharge formulated in Taylor v. Caldwell  
was extended to cases in which performance had become 
impossible, otherwise than by reason of the perishing of a 
specif ic thing, e.g., to cases where a thing necessary for 
the performance of the contract was permanently or 
temporari ly requisit ioned, or in some other way became 
temporari ly unavailable for the purpose of performance, or 
where the impossibi l ity affected only the method of 
performance, or where the subject-matter was not a specif ic 
thing, but was one to be taken from a specif ic source which 
failed.   Further, the doctrine was extended to cases in 
which the supervening event had not made performance by 
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either party impossible at al l but had frustrated the purpose 
of the contract. 
 
The expression “purpose of contract” sets us thinking 
whether a bilateral contract has common purpose or each 
party to the contract has its own purpose.   To be able to 
answer this quest ion, we may refer to Corbin on Contracts 
Art. 1322, saying, “each of the two parties to a contract has 
an object or purpose for which he joins the transact ion.  
These purposes are not identical ………. There is ‘no 
purpose of the contract ’, instead there are the purposes of  
the part ies to the contract.” However, he ends by referr ing 
to “further an ult imate purpose“, which can be said to be 
common purpose of the contract.  
 
Further, in Austral ia, Latham, C.J. has said, “There is some 
diff iculty in specifying the ‘common object’ of  the parties to 
a contract ………contracting part ies are not partners.   They 
are engaged in a common venture only in a popular 
sense.”70 
 
This concept can well be il lustrated by a contract of sale of 
goods.  One party’s purpose is to supply, the other party’s 
purpose is to receive.  One sells, the other buys the goods, 
the subject matter of contract.  But the common purpose is 
availabil ity of the goods sold.   If  the availabil ity is affected 
by supervening circumstances, beyond the control  of  the 
parties, making it  impossible ( impracticable) to perform, the 
purpose of the contract is frustrated. 
 
This concept is also i l lustrated by “coronation cases” – 
considered under the heading of the leading case; Krell v. 
                                      
70  Scanlan’s New Neon Ltd. v. Tooheys Ltd. ,  (1943) 67 CLR 
169, 197. 
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Henry where though the room let out was physically 
available but the purpose of the contract v iewing the 
coronation procession was frustrated.  
 
Baily v. De Crespigny (1869)71 
 
Though there was no physical destruct ion of the subject-
matter, yet the doctrine of frustration was applied in 1869 in 
Baily v.  De Crespigny ,  as in that case the contractual  
obligation of the lessor became impossible of performance 
consequent on subsequent statute, under which a railway 
company compulsori ly acquired the land and erected a 
station on it, in respect of which land there was a covenant 
included in the contract that the lessor or his assigns would 
not build on that land which was adjoining the demised 
premises. I t was held that the rai lway company compulsori ly 
acquiring land would not be included in the connotat ion of 
the word assignee as the lessor had not chosen the railway 
company by his voli t ion but he was compelled by statute to 
part with the land to the railway company whom he cannot 
bind by any stipulation. 
 
Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Co. Ltd. (1874)72 
 
This development of the doctrine of frustrat ion is further 
il lustrate in 1874 in Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Co. 
Ltd.,  which propounded the theory of frustration of common 
ventures. The facts of the case were: “A ship was chartered 
in November, 1871 to proceed with all  possible dispatch, 
danger and accidents of navigat ion excepted, from 
Liverpool to Newport and there to load a cargo of iron rails  
                                      
71
  Baily v. De Crespigny, LR 4 QB 180.  
72
  Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Co. Ltd.,  LR 10 CP 
125.  
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for carriage to San Francisco.  She sailed on 2 January, but 
on the 3 rd ran aground in Carnarvon Bay.  She was got off 
by 18 February and was taken to Liverpool where she was 
sti l l under repair in August.   On 15 February the charterers 
repudiated the contract. 
 
The pivotal question for consideration was whether the 
charters just i f ied in throwing up their contract instead of 
wait ing unt il the ship was repaired and then loading her.    It  
was held that the delay (six weeks to refloat and six months 
to complete repairs) was so long as to put an end, in a 
commercial sense, to the commercial speculat ion.   This 
was so held despite the stipulation “dangers and accidents 
of navigat ion excepted”. 
 
Dahl v. Nelson, Donkin and Co. (1881)73 
 
The doctr ine of frustrat ion was carried a step forward by 
propounding the theory of implied term in 1881, Dahl v. 
Nelson, Donkin and Co.,  “The meaning of the contract must 
be taken to be, not what the parties did intend (for they had 
neither thought nor intended regarding it ), but that which 
the p[art ies, as fair and sensible men would presumably 
have agreed upon if , having such possibil ity in view, they 
have made express provision as to their several rights and 
liabil i t ies in the event of i ts occurrence…….” 
 
Herne Bay Steam Boat Co. v. Hutton (1903)74 
 
There was further development in what are commonly called 
coronation cases (relating to the coronat ion of King Edward 
                                      
73  Dahl v. Nelson, Donkin and Co., 6 AC 38. 
74  Herne Bay Steam Boat Co. v. Hut ton, (1903) 2 KB 683. 
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VII) in Krell v. Henry75 in 1903.  The facts of the case were: 
The defendant agreed to hire a f lat f rom the plainti f f for 
June 26 and 27, 1902; the contract contained no reference 
to the coronat ion processions, but they were to take place 
on those days and to pass the f lat.   The processions were 
cancelled.  Two-thirds of the rent had not been paid when 
the processions were abandoned and the Court of Appeal 
held that the plaint if f  could not recover it.    The Court 
considered that the procession and the relat ive posit ion of 
the f lat lay at the foundation of the agreement.   The 
contract was therefore discharged.   A contract may be 
discharged even though it has not become il legal or l i teral ly 
impossible to perform, i f later events destroy “some basic, 
though tacit assumption on which the part ies have 
contracted”.   This principle seems to be the basis of Krell  
v. Henry ,  and of some of the other coronation cases.   But 
these are the only cases in which this principle forms the 
sole ground of decision; and even they have been doubted 
in the House of Lords.   Normally a party cannot rely on 
frustration merely because supervening events prevent him 
from putt ing the subject matter to a use intended by him 
and contemplated by the other party.   These coronation 
cases may be contrasted with the case of Herne Bay 
Steamboat Co. v. Hutton of the same year 1903.  The facts 
of the case were: The defendant chartered from the plaint if f 
the S.S. Cynthia for June 28, 1902 for the express purpose 
of taking payment passengers to see the Coronation naval 
review at Spithead and to tour the f leet.  The review was 
cancelled, but the f leet remained. The Court of Appeal 
refused to hold the defendant discharged.   They did so, 
partly on the ground that a tour of the f leet was sti l l  
possible, but mainly because they considered that it  was 
                                      
75  Krell  v .  Henry, (1903)   2  KB  740. 
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the defendant’s own venture and it was at his risk.   The 
Court pointed out that i f  the existence of a particular state 
of things is merely the motive or inducement to one party to 
enter into the contract, as distinct from the basis on which 
both contract, the principle cannot be applied.   And the 
examples was given of one who hires a vehicle to take 
himself  and a party to Epsom to view the races on Derby 
day; he wil l not be discharged if  the races are cancelled, for 
his purpose is not the common foundation of the contract to 
hire the vehicle.   The dif f icult ies of construction which 
arise are il lustrated by contrast ing Krell v. Henry76 with 
Herne Bay Steamboat Co. v. Hutton77.    The same judges 
who decided Krell v. Henry  had already refused in Herne 
Bay Steamboat Co. v. Hutton to regard a somewhat similar 
contract as frustrated.   In that case an agreement was 
made that the plaint if fs’ ship should be ‘at the disposal of ’  
the defendant on 28 June to take passengers from Herne 
Bay ‘for the purpose of viewing the naval review and for a 
day’s cruise round the f leet’.  The review was later 
cancelled, but the f leet remained at Spithead on 28 June.   
It was held that the contract was not discharged.   The case 
is not easy to distinguish from Krell v. Henry ,  but perhaps 
the explanation is that the holding of the review was not the 
sole adventure contemplated. The cruise round the f leet, 
which formed an equally basic object of the contract, was 
sti l l capable of attainment. So f inally a distinction ref lects a 
diff iculty that frequently occurs when the doctrine of 
frustration fal ls to be appl ied to a contract that is not in fact  
capable of performance. The doctrine is certainly applicable 
if  the object, which is the foundation of the contract, 
becomes unobtainable, but the judges are equally insistent 
that the motive of the part ies is not subject of inquiry. That 
                                      
76  Krell  v .  Henry, (1903)   2  KB  740. 
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the distinction, however, between motive and object is not 
always clear is apparent from the Herne Bay’s  case: 
 
“Suppose, for example, that a car is hired in Oxford to go to 
Epsom on a future date which in fact is known by both 
parties to be Derby day.   If  the Derby is subsequently 
abandoned, the question whether the contract is discharged 
or not depends upon whether the court regards the race as 
the foundation of the contract, or merely as the motive, 
which induced the contract.  Must the case be equated with 
Krell v. Henry or with Herne Bay Steamboat Co. v. 
Hutton.“78 
 
 
Krell v. Henry (1903)79 
 
Lord Wright has said that the case of Krell v. Henry  is 
certainly not one to be extended: it  is particularly dif f icult  to 
apply where……… the possibil ity of the event rel ied on as 
constitut ing a frustration of the adventure …… was known 
to both part ies when the contract was made, but the 
contract entered into was absolute in terms as far as 
concerned that known possibi l ity”.80   
 
These cases arose when the coronation of King Edward VII  
was postponed because of the i l lness of the King. Many 
contracts had been made in anticipation of the coronat ion; 
e.g., for the hire of rooms, or of seats on stands, from which 
the hirers expected to be able to watch the processions 
which had been planned. 
 
                                      
78  Cheshire Fifoots and Furmston, 11th Edn., pp.559-560, Law of 
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79  Krell  v .  Henry, (1903)   2  KB  740. 
80  Maritime National Fish Ltd.  v.  Ocean Traders Ltd.,  1935 AC  524. 
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In December 1901, it  was announced that the coronat ion of 
King Edward VII was to take place on June 26, 1902.   On 
that day, there was to be procession from Buckingham 
Palace to Westminster Abbey and back; this was referred to 
as “the Coronation Procession”.  On the following day, there 
was to be a second procession called “the Royal Progress”,  
the highlight of which was to be a vis it to the City of 
London.  Maps showing the routes of both processions were 
published in the press. On the day after the Royal Progress 
there was to be a naval review at Spithead.  The king fell i l l  
on June 24, and at 10 a.m. on that day the decision was 
taken to operate on him for a form of appendicit is.   After 
recovering from the operation, the King was crowned on 
August 9, and the procession on that day fol lowed the same 
route as that which had originally been planned for June 26.   
Evidently, however, the King had not regained suff icient 
strength to take part in a second procession on that day 
following his coronat ion (which in any event was a Sunday); 
and for some time the fate of the Royal Progress was in 
doubt, it  was originally said to have been “abandoned”, 
though the same announcement added that the King 
“hope[d] to be able to drive through some of the streets 
South of the Thames in the autumn.   The date for this 
event was not f ixed unti l September 20, when it was 
announced that i t  would take place on October 25; this 
announcement added that “the precise route wil l  be 
announced later”.  It  was f inally announced on October 7, 
when it became clear that the route to be fol lowed on 
October 25 would cover much, but not all,  of the same 
ground as that which would have been covered by the Royal 
Progress as originally planned for June 27.  Of particular 
interest to readers of the coronat ion cases are the facts that 
both the original and the revised routes traversed Pal l Mall,  
but that, while the original route included St. James’s 
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Street, that street was omitted from the revised route.   The 
revised procession duly took place on October 25, but i t  
must have been a less colorful, and no doubt a less 
prof itable, occasion than the originally planned Royal  
Progress would have been in June; for by October many of 
the foreign dignitar ies who were to have participated in the 
event, as well as many of the foreign tourists who were 
expected to have paid to watch the Royal Progress, would 
have returned to their homes.   The quest ion was how the 
losses result ing from the postponement and curtailment of 
the planned celebrations were to be allocated. 
 
The cases on this subject fal l into two groups: those in 
which the procession had already been cancelled when the 
contracts were made, and those in which the cancellat ion of 
the procession came after the conclusion of the contracts.   
In the latter group of cases, no attempt was ever made to 
dist inguish between cases in which at the t ime of 
contracting the King may already have been i l l  but his 
il lness had not been diagnosed, and those in which he fell  
i l l  only after the contract was made.  Speculat ion on the 
former point could have given r ise to great uncertainty and 
it seems that lawyers took account only of the easily 
verif iable fact whether, when the contract was made the 
cancellation or postponement had already been announced. 
 
This (much larger) group of cases concerns contracts made 
before the cancellat ion or postponement of the planned 
festiv it ies.  Where the contract expressly provided for these 
possibi l it ies, the doctr ine of discharge was excluded.  
 
Where the contract contained no such express provisions,  
the question whether i t was discharged by frustration of 
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purpose gave r ise to more dif f iculty.  Krell v. Henry81 is 
usually regarded as the leading case, even though its facts 
present some highly unusual features.  Mr. Krell,  who had 
rooms at 56A, Pall Mall, overlooking the routes of both 
processions, had gone abroad in March 1902 and instructed 
his solicitor to let the rooms.  In June, Mr. Henry saw an 
announcement in the windows of the rooms, stat ing that 
they were to be let for viewing the coronation processions.  
By an exchange of letters between him and Mr. Krel l ’s 
solicitor on June 20, Mr. Henry agreed to take the rooms for 
“the days but not the nights” of June 26 and 27, for a price 
of £75; of this sum, £25 was paid on June 20, and the 
balance was to be paid on June 24.  These letters made no 
reference to the coronation, and in this respect Krell v.  
Henry is unique among the coronat ion cases.   It is also 
unique in its payment provisions in that part of the money 
promised by Mr. Krell was paid before the processions were 
cancelled, while the balance did not become due unt i l af ter 
that event: it  was due “on” June 24, and this meant that Mr. 
Henry was not bound to pay it t i l l midnight, while the 
cancellation occurred at 10 a.m., on that day.  It was held 
that the contract had been discharged by the cancellation of 
the processions, so that Mr. Krell  was not ent it led to the 
£50, which was to have been paid on June 24.   On the 
other hand, Mr. Henry abandoned his counterclaim for 
repayment of the £25 already paid, no doubt because the 
Court of Appeal had in the meantime decided that money 
paid before the procession had been cancelled could not be 
recovered back by the payer. 
 
The debate to which Krell v. Henry82 gave rise is however 
concerned, not with such detai ls of adjustment in 
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consequence of discharge, but with the more fundamental 
question whether the doctrine of discharge should have 
been applied at al l  in the circumstances of the coronat ion 
cases.   When those cases were decided, they stood for a 
new principle: namely that, even though performance had 
not become impossible, the contracts were discharged 
because their purpose, of enabling the hirers to watch the 
processions (or one of them) had been frustrated.  On the 
one hand, there were obvious dangers in such a rule since 
it was, in theory, capable of extension to many cases in 
which a contract had simply, as a result of supervening 
events become for one of the part ies a bad bargain. 
 
The most elaborate judicial discussion is in the American 
Northern Indiana case, where Posner, J., advances two 
principal arguments in support of Krell v. Henry.   These may 
be labeled the insurance argument and the postponement 
argument.   The insurance argument is that the owner of the 
rooms was in a better posit ion than the hirer to cover the 
risk by insurance and so should not be entit led to the 
promised payment. 
 
The essence of Posner, J, ’s second, or “postponement”,  
argument is that the owner of the rooms sti l l  had them at his 
disposal when the coronation eventually did take place; that 
he could make his anticipated point by again lett ing them 
room then, and that it  would therefore be unjust to allow him 
to recover, or to keep, money promised, or paid, to him in 
respect of the originally planned processions. 
 
Diff iculty ar ises in reconcil ing Krell v. Henry83 with a number 
of other cases, either actual or hypothet ical, in which it has 
                                      
83  Krell  v .  Henry, (1903)   2  KB  740. 
  
- 141 - 
been held or said that the contracts would not be 
discharged.   One such hypothetical  case is the example 
given in Krell v.  Henry i tself  of  a contract to take a cab to 
Epsom on Derby Day “at a suitably enhanced price.”  Such 
a contract, i t  is said, would not be discharged if  the Derby 
were cancel led. 
 
There are also many actual cases, which have rejected the 
argument of discharge by frustrat ion of purpose. But in the 
present context the most interesting contrast with Krell v. 
Henry  is provided by another of the coronation cases.   This 
was Herne Bay Steamboat Co. v. Hutton,84 where a contract 
had been made for the hire of a pleasure boat at Spit head 
on June 28, 1902, “for the purpose of viewing the naval 
review and for a day’s cruise around the f leet; also on 
Sunday, June 29 th , for similar purposes”.  The hirer had 
apparent ly intended to sell  seats on the boat to those who 
wished to see the naval review, and no doubt suffered loss 
in consequence of the cancellation of the review, even 
though the f leet remained at Spithead.  The court regarded 
the contract as one for the hire of a boat for sightseeing, 
and held that the fact that one of the ant icipated attract ions 
(the review) had failed to materialize was not a ground of 
discharge.  
 
Even if  i t  is accepted that there should be no discharge in 
any of the hypothet ical and actual examples considered 
above, Krell v. Henry85 is properly regarded as fall ing on the 
other side of the l ine. The contract in that case was not 
simply one, which granted license to use the rooms at an 
unusually high price. I t was a contract to provide faci l i t ies 
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for viewing the coronation processions would not take 
place, or that they could be viewed from the rooms.  In this 
respect, the contract dif fered from the contract that is made 
by buying a theatre or concert t icket; performance of such a 
contract would become impossible if  supervening events led 
to the cancellation, of the play or concert.  In Krell v. Henry 
there was no such impossibil i ty,  or (as the Restatement 2nd  
puts it ) “no impediment to performance by either party.”   
But it  was the common purpose of both the parties that 
faci l i t ies for viewing the processions should be provided: in 
the words of Vaughan Will iams, L.J., the provision of such 
faci li t ies was the crucial point “as much for the lesser as the 
hirer.” 
 
The naval review may have formed the hirer ’s principle 
inducement to enter into the contract, but the continued 
presence of the f leet at Spithead also provided a 
considerable and unusual attraction, and it was one of the 
purposes of the contract to give the hirer the opportunity of 
taking advantage of this attraction for commercial purposes.   
In Krell v. Henry ,  by contrast, it  was not part of the 
contractual purpose that Mr. Henry should be able to look 
out of the window to watch the ordinary London traff ic, 
which cont inued to pass down Pall Mall on the two days in 
question. Krell v.  Henry  seems, with respect, to have been 
correct ly decided on the basis that it  was the common 
purpose of both parties that faci l i t ies for watching the 
processions were to be provided under the contract, and the 
cancellation of the processions had prevented the 
achievement of that common purpose (though literal  
performance of the contract had not become impossible).  
 
In this sense, formulat ions of the doctrine in terms of the 
frustration of the purpose of both parties are preferable to 
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those (occasionally found), which refer to the frustration of 
the purpose of one party only.   The point can be i l lustrated 
by supposing that, in Krell v.  Henry ,86 the coronation had 
taken place as planned but Mr. Henry had fal len i l l  and so 
been unable to watch the processions. In that case, his 
purpose might have been frustrated, but the same could not 
have been said of Mr. Krel l ’s purpose: that purpose, being 
the provision of viewing faci li t ies, would have been 
accomplished.   Accordingly it  is submitted that, on such 
facts, the contract should not have been discharged. 
 
In the United States, there are of course no coronat ion 
cases.  A somewhat similar s ituation did, indeed, arise in 
January 1985, when a spell of  unusually cold weather led to 
the cancellation of the parade that was to have marked the 
inaugurat ion of President Reagan for his second term of 
off ice.   But no l it igation resulted as money which had been 
paid by would-be spectators was repaid voluntari ly.   I t  is 
not inconceivable that the draft ing of the relevant contracts 
was affected by the English coronation cases, which are 
widely discussed in American legal l i terature.  
 
In cases of frustration of purpose, there is no such 
prevention at all ,  but discharge may nevertheless occur 
because the l iteral performance of one part’s duty has 
become useless to the other. The fact that the coronat ion 
was merely postponed, not permanently cancelled, does not 
affect the point. 
 
In at least, most of the coronat ion cases the faci l it ies for 
viewings were to be provided on a single day or on two 
specif ied days.   The crucial fact in these cases was not the 
                                      
86  Krell  v .  Henry, (1903)   2  KB  740. 
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length of the delay (of about six weeks in relation to one of 
the processions and of about four months in relation to the 
other) but the fact that the processions did not take place 
on the only days on which the faci li t ies were to be made 
available.  
 
In the United States, the distinction between discharge by 
impossibil ity (or impract icabili ty) was at one time so sharply 
drawn that in the original version of the Restatement of the 
two concepts were discussed at widely separate points.   
The reason for this arrangement may have been that 
discharge by mere frustration of purpose was formerly 
viewed in the United States with some hosti l ity, when this 
host il ity subsided, the arrangement of dif ferences between 
the two grounds of discharge and to attach insuff icient 
signif icance to the features, which they had in common.   
The Restatement 2nd accordingly treats them in the same 
Chapter, while devot ing separate section to discharge by 
supervening “Impracticabil ity” and by “Frustration.”  English 
law, too regards them as il lustrations of a single principle of 
discharge by supervening events; but the distinction 
between them is nevertheless signif icant not only from an 
analytical, but also from a pract ical  point of view, for the 
rules which govern discharge are in some respects stricter 
in cases of supervening frustrat ion of purpose then they are 
in cases of supervening impossibi l i ty. 
 
The party that claims that a supervening event frustrated its 
purpose must meet four requirements, only the f irst of which 
is dif ferent from those of impract icabi lity.   First, the event 
must have “substant ial ly frustrated” that party’s “principal 
purpose”.  Second, it  must have been “a basic assumption 
on which the contract was made” that the event would not 
occur.  Third, the frustration must have resulted without the 
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fault of the party seeking to be excused.   Fourth, that party 
must not have assumed a greater obligat ion that the law 
imposes.  
 
Furthermore, despite the similar ity of the requirements for 
the two doctrines, courts have been much more reluctant to 
hold that a party has been excused on the ground of 
frustration than on the ground of impracticabil ity.   Parties 
seeking excuse on this ground have found that f irst and 
fourth requirement particularly troublesome.  
 
Under the f irst  requirement, a party must show that its 
principal purpose in contracting has been substant ial ly 
frustrated.   Courts have raised two obstacles to a party’s 
doing so.   First,  they have viewed the affected party’s 
principal purpose in broad terms.   The mere fact that some 
exceptional event has prevented a party from taking 
advantage of the transaction in the particular way expected 
may not suff ice to sat isfy the requirement of substant ial  
f rustration if the party can turn the bargain to its advantage 
in some other way.  Second, courts have insisted that the 
frustration be nearly total.  The mere fact that what was 
expected to be a prof itable transact ion has turned out to be 
a losing one is not enough. 
 
Under the fourth requirement, the party seeking to be 
excused on the ground of frustration must not have 
assumed a greater obligation than the law would impose.   
Even if  a party can show that its principal purpose has been 
frustrated, a court may refuse to excuse the party on the 
ground that the party assumed the r isk of the occurrence of 
the frustrating event.   Sometimes a court does this on the 
basis of contract language.  
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Sometimes a court concluded that a party assumed the risk 
of the occurrence of the frustrating event merely because 
the event was foreseeable.  In one case, an elderly man 
who l ived in a home for the aged on a trial basis paid a 
lump sum of $ 8,500 to be accepted as a permanent 
resident.   When he died only three days later, before his 
permanent status had begun, his executors unsuccessful ly 
sought return of the payment on the ground of frustration.   
“Frustration is no defense if  it  was reasonably 
foreseeable…. That death may at any unexpected time 
overcome a man of decedent’s age, 84 years, is by common 
observat ion readily classif ied as “reasonably foreseeable’.” 
 
The examples discussed in the preceding sections involve 
impract icabil i ty or frustration result ing from an even that 
occurs after the t ime of agreement.   However, there is no 
reason why a party should not also be excused on the 
ground of impract icabil ity or frustrat ion existing at the t ime 
of the agreement.  
 
Excuse on the ground of existing, as opposed to 
supervening, impracticabil ity,  is well recognized. For 
example, as the commentary to the Code explains, the rule 
that excuses the seller in the case of casualty to ident if ied 
goods ‘applies whether the goods were already destroyed at  
the t ime of contract ing without the knowledge of either 
party, or whether they are destroyed subsequently.   In 
order to be excused on the ground of existing 
impract icabil i ty,  a party must meet the four requirements 
that are imposed in cases of supervening impract icabil ity.   
In addit ion the party must show that it  neither knew nor had 
reason to know of the facts that made performance 
impract icable. 
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The effect of supervening impract icabil ity or frustration on 
the excused party is usually to discharge that party’s 
remaining duties of performance.   The effect of exist ing 
impract icabil i ty or frustration on the excused party is 
usually to prevent any duty of performance on that party’s 
side from arising. 
 
The excused party’s fai lure to perform because of 
impract icabil i ty or frustration affects the other party’s duties 
of performance in the same way as if  the excused party had 
broken the contract.  If  the failure is material, the other 
party can suspend performance.   If  an appropriate t ime for 
the excused party to cure has passed, the other party can 
terminate the contract. 
 
A prospective fai lure of performance due to impract icabi lity 
or frustrat ion has a similar effect. The fact that one party’s 
anticipated fai lure to perform will be excused on the ground 
of impract icabil ity or frustration does not prevent the other 
party from just if iably suspending performance and from 
terminating the contract.  But the other party cannot recover 
damages for breach. 
 
Diff icult questions arise when it  is clear that the 
impract icabil i ty or frustration wil l be only temporary. First, 
when is the other party justif ied in terminating the contract?  
Second, i f  the other party does not terminate the contract,  
when is the excused party justi f ied in refusing to perform 
after the impract icabil i ty or frustration has ceased? 
 
The subject matter of the contract may not be destroyed, 
yet the purpose of the contract may be frustrated.   
Conceivably, the subject matter may be physically intact, 
yet the purpose of the contract may become impossible of 
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performance, e.g., coronation cases.   Though the room to 
be let out was physically intact and available, yet the 
purpose of the contract – viewing the coronation procession 
on the specif ied date, was frustrated due to the supervening 
il lness of the King and consequent cancellat ion of the 
coronation procession on that date. 
 
This may also happen in a case where a contract relat ing to 
transfer of interest in immovable property, where the 
subject-matter of the contract – the specif ic immovable 
property, may be physically intact, but the purpose of the 
contract – transfer of interest therein, may be frustrated, 
consequent on subsequent requisit ion or compulsory 
acquisition of that property by the Government in exercise 
of its statutory powers. 
 
This may also happen in case of contract for sale of goods, 
where the sole source of product ion of the specif ied goods 
dries up for no fault of the seller. If  it  is possible for the 
seller to tap an alternative source of supply and perform the 
contract, plea of frustrat ion wil l not prevail . However, it  is 
the specif ic source of supply of the goods i.e.  the subject 
matter of the contract, is specif ied, and that dies up for no 
fault of the seller, the contract stands frustrated.  However, 
if  the source of supply is the part  of the descript ion of the 
goods i.e. the subject matter of the contract, and it dries up, 
it  wil l not result in frustration of contract.  Supreme Court of 
India in Ganga Saran v. Firm Ram Charan,87 “The defendant 
entered into contract with the plainti ff under which he was 
to supply 61 bales of cloth of  certain specif icat ion 
manufactured by the New Victoria Mil ls, Kanpur. The 
agreement ran as fol lows: ‘We shall cont inue sending goods 
                                      
87  Ganga Saran v. F irm Ram Charan, AIR 1952 SC 9. 
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as soon as they are prepared to you up to Magsar Badi 15 
Sambat 1998.  We shall go on supplying gods to you of the 
Victoria Mil ls as soon as they are supplied to us by the said 
Mill.   We shal l go on delivering the goods to you up to 
Magsar Badi 15 out of the goods noted above which will  be 
prepared by the Mil l.    As the bales were not suppl ied to the 
plaint if f  sent a telegraphic notice on 20-11-41 to the 
following effect: ‘give delivery of 61 bales, through Bank, 
otherwise suing within 3 days’.  The plaint if f did not receive 
any reply and therefore instituted the suit for recovery of 
loss sustained by him due to rise in market price.   The 
main defence was that the contract had been frustrated by 
circumstances beyond their control. 
 
Held that on a true construct ion of the contract the delivery 
of the goods was not made cont ingent on their being 
supplied to the defendant by the Victoria Mil ls. The parties 
never contemplated the possibil i ty of the goods not being 
supplied at al l .    The words “prepared by the Mil l” were only 
description of the goods to be supplied and the expressions 
“as soon as they are prepared” and “as soon as they are 
supplied to us by the said Mill ” s imply indicated the process 
of delivery. Even apart from the construction of the 
agreement the defendant having admitted in his evidence 
that he was in a posit ion to supply his bales of the 
contracted goods at the t ime when the breach of contract 
took place, i t  could not be held “that the performance of the 
contract had become impossible unless he proved that the 
failure on his part  was due to circumstances beyond his 
control.”    Commenting on this case, Trietel in Frustrat ion & 
Force Majeure,  88 says, “In an Indian case i.e. Ganga Saran 
                                      
88  Tr ietel ,  1994 edit ion, p. 133, Frustration & Force Majeure.   
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v. Ram Charam Ram Gopal89,  where the factory belonged to 
a third party who failed to make the agreed delivery.  For 
the situation where the contract contains no reference to 
the factory, a contract was made for the sale of cloth from 
the Victoria Mil ls,  a factory belonging to a third party.    
These words were said to be “purely descriptive” and, 
although the point did not arise for decision, it  seems that 
the destruct ion of the factory would not have discharged the 
contracts.” 
 
The point may be i l lustrated by reference to contracts for 
the sale of goods to be manufactured by the seller.   I f  the 
contract provides for the sale of goods to be manufactured 
by the seller in his factory, then the factory is essential for 
performance and its destruction will discharge the contract.  
On the other hand, the Turner v. Goldsmith90 a contract was 
made for the sale of goods to be “manufactured or sold” by 
the seller.  It  was held that the contract was not only as a 
manufacturer but also as a dealer in goods of the kind in 
question. 
 
The purpose of the contract can be frustrated by the order 
of the Court, e.g.,  permanent injunction to a party to the 
contracting preventing it  f rom performing the contract – 
even temporary injunct ion to that effect, lasting t i l l the f inal  
disposal of the suit – which takes a long time – so long as 
to render the performance of the contract radically different 
from what i t was, contemplated by the part ies at the 
inception of the contract.  
 
Conceivably, a situat ion may arise where the subject-matter 
of the contract is not destroyed, the purpose of the contract 
                                      
89  Ganga Saran v. F irm Ram Charan, AIR 1952 SC 9. 
90  Turner v. Goldsmith  [1891] 1 QB 544. 
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is not in jeopardy, but the ordinary and accepted method 
and manner of performing the contract is so affected by 
supervening events that performance becomes impossible, 
for no fault  of any party to the contract.  Take the example 
of contract of transport of goods by ship. The ship chartered 
for the purpose is available – ready to sail – having berthed 
at the port and readied itself  for the voyage, the goods to 
be transported are ready having been delivered at the 
dockyard for being loaded on the ship – but the loaders 
have gone on str ike – having the monopoly of loading ships 
at that port as union members, no outsiders or causal 
labour al lowed to do the job.  What happens in that 
situat ion?  The contract stands frustrated. 
 
To save such situations, as listed above, from the 
disastrous consequences of frustration – automatic 
dissolution of contracts – the doctrine of force majeure  
comes into play and the parties by specif ic stipulat ion 
incorporated in the contract, called force majeure Clause, 
can stipulate that such cont ingencies occurr ing by way of 
supervening events wil l  not result in frustration of contract.   
The part ies can device means of keeping contract in 
animated suspension to be react ivated when the obstruction 
caused by such events is removed at some future date, 
e.g.,  in coronation cases, the viewing of the coronation 
procession was possible when the procession did take place 
after the King recovered from his i l lness – the cancellat ion 
was transformed into postponement.   The parties could 
have stipulated that the contract would not be frustrated 
when the coronation procession was cancelled consequent 
on the i l lness of the King but kept in suspense and come 
back in operat ion on subsequent holding of the procession 
at a future date after recovery of the King from his i l lness.  
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 Tamplin SS Co. v. Anglo-Mexican Co. (1916)91 
 
1914 – 1918 War resulted in a crop of cases where the 
Court has to consider the applicabil ity of Law of Frustration 
of Contract such contracts affected by war condit ions. The 
dislocation of business caused by the war raised the same 
question as those raised by cases previously considered 
under the head of impossibi l i ty.  ‘When this quest ion arises 
in regard to commercial contracts’, said Lord Loreburn in 
the F.A. Tampl in Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-Mexican 
Petroleum Products, Ltd.,  ‘the principle is the same, and the 
language as to “frustrat ion of the adventure” merely adapts 
it to the class of cases in hand’.    The doctrine of frustrat ion 
is only a special case of the discharge of contract by an 
impossibil ity of performance arising after the contract was 
made. The facts of that case were: “the Steamship F.A. 
Tamplin was chartered by a t ime charter-party for f ive years 
from December 4, 1912 to December 4, 1917.  In February 
1915 the Government requisitioned the ship for use as a 
troopship and made certain structural al terat ions to her for 
this purpose.   The charterers were will ing to go on paying 
the agreed freight under the charter-party,  but the owners 
claimed that the contract had been frustrated by the 
requisit ion as they wished to obtain a larger amount of 
compensation from the Crown.”  On these facts, the House 
of Lords, by a bare majority, held that the contract stil l  
cont inued.  The interrupt ion was not of suff icient duration to 
make it unreasonable for the part ies to go on.   There might 
be many months during which the ship would be available 
for commercial purposes before the f ive years expired.   
The passage from the speech of Lord Loreburn in that case 
                                      
91  Tampl in Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum 
Products, Ltd. ,  [1916] 2 AC 397. 
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considered being the classic exposit ion of the basis of the 
doctr ine of frustration as an impl ied term was: 
 
“A Court can and ought to examined the contract and 
the circumstances in which it was made, not of course 
to vary, but only to explain it,  in order to see whether 
or not from the nature of it  the parties must have 
made their bargain on the foot ing that a particular 
thing or state of things would cont inue to exist.    And 
if  they must have done so, then a term to that effect 
will  be impl ied, thought i t  be not expressed in the 
contract …..” Sometimes it is put that performance 
has become impossible and that the party concerned 
did not promise to perform impossibi l i ty.   Sometimes 
it is put that the parties contemplated a certain state 
of things, which fell out otherwise.   In most of the 
cases it is said that there was an implied condit ion in 
the contract, which operated to release the parties 
from performing it,  and in al l of  them I think that was 
at bottom the principle upon which the Court 
proceeded.   It is in my opinion the true principle, for 
no Court has an absolving power, but it  can infer f rom 
the nature of the contract and the surrounding 
circumstances that a condit ion which was not 
expressed was a foundation on which the parties 
contracted……. Were the altered condit ions such that, 
had they though of them, they would have taken their 
chance of them, or such that as sensible men they 
would have said, ‘ I f  that happens, of course, i t  is all  
over between us’?” 
 
The fact that the charteres were stil l wil l ing to pay the 
freight (hoping to receive the higher rate of compensation 
paid by the Government) undoubtedly weighed with the 
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majority. Lord Parker of Waddington thought that the 
doctr ine of frustration could not apply to a t ime charter 
which ‘does not contemplate any def inite adventure or 
object to be performed or carried out ’, but this opinion was 
rejected in the Bank Line case. 
 
Bankline Ltd. v. Arthur Capel & Co. (1919)92 
 
Turning to the Bank Line case, the facts of that case were: 
“In February 1915, the appellants agreed to charter to the 
respondents the steamship Quito for a period of twelve 
months from the t ime the vessel should be delivered and 
placed at the disposal of the respondents.   It  was provided 
in the charter-party that (i) if  the steamer had not been 
delivered by Apri l 30, 1915, the charterers were to have the 
option to cancel the contract or to proceed with it , and (i i)  
‘Charterers to have opt ion of cancel ing this charter-party 
should steamer be commandeered by Government during 
this charter ’.   The steamer was not delivered by Apri l 30, 
and, on May 11, before delivery, she was commandeered by 
the Government and not released unt il September.   She 
was then sold by the appellants, and the respondents sued 
for non-delivery, having never exercised their opt ions” 
 
On these facts, “The House of Lords held that the contract 
had been frustrated.   The clauses in the charter-party were 
not intended to place the ship owner’s indefinitely at the 
charterers’ mercy, to obl ige them to deliver however long 
the delay”.  Lord Haldane, who dissented, was of the 
opinion that there was no frustration; the requisit ion was not 
of such a permanent character as to make the terms of the 
charter-party wholly inapplicable. These differences of 
                                      
92  Bankline Ltd. v. Arthur Capel & Co., (1919) AC 435.   
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opinion within the highest tr ibunal show that cases of 
frustration raise most dif f icult quest ions of fact and 
principle.   In part icular, where the execut ion of the contract 
is delayed by the happening of an external event, the tests 
to be applied have been stated by Lord Summer in diverse 
terms: 
 
“Delay even of considerable length and of wholly 
uncertain durat ion is an incident of mari time 
adventure, which is clearly within the contemplation of 
the part ies….. so much so as to be often the subject 
of express provision.   Delays such as these may very 
seriously affect the commercial object of the 
adventure, for the ship’s expenses and overhead 
charges are running on….. None the less this is not 
frustration. The delay must be such as ‘to render the 
adventure absolutely nugatory’93,  to make it  
unreasonable to require the parties to go on’94,  ‘to 
destroy the identity of the work or service when 
resumed with the work or service when interrupted, ’95 
‘to put an end in a commercial sense to the 
undertaking’.”96 
 
“The use of such phrases indicates that delay by itself  is 
insuff icient, and this is clearly shown in cases concerning 
building contracts, where a hold-up of work inevitably 
                                      
93  Bensuade & Co. v. Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co., (1897) 
1 QB 29, per Lord Esher M.R. at p. 31: (1897) AC 609, at pp.611, 612, 
614. 
94  Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick Kerr & Co. Ltd., (1918) AC  119,  per 
Lord Atkinson at p. 131. F.A. Tamplin Steamship Co.  Ltd.  v. Anglo 
Mexican  Petroleum Products Co.  Ltd., (1916) 2  AC  397  per Lord 
Loreburn at p. 405. 
95  Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick Kerr & Co. Ltd., (supra),  per Lord 
Dunedin at p.128; Bank Line Ltd. v. Capel (A) & Co. (1919) AC  435, 
per Lord Summer at p.460. 
96  Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Co. Ltd., (1874) LR 10 CP 125. 
  
- 156 - 
increases the builder’s costs.” ………….”Even though the 
occurrence of the frustrating event was contemplated by the 
parties, as in the Bank Line case, the Court may hold them 
discharged.   If  f rustrat ion were really dependent upon the 
intention of the parties, the natural inference would be that 
they took the risk of events, which were present to their 
minds at the t ime they made the contract.   But although it  
has been so held in some cases, in other it has been held 
that, i f  frustrat ion has occurred, it  is no bar that the event 
causing it was foreseen.”97 
 
While commenting on the Bank Line case, has this to say on 
the point: “…….The contract was in substance if  not in form, 
an April to Apri l charter; and to hold the parties to a 
September to September charter would be to impose 
substantially dif ferent obl igations from those undertaken.  
The normal inference that part ies take the risk of foreseen 
events was displaced by the special terms of the contract.98 
 
Chitty99 On Contracts, 25 th Edn., commenting on these two 
cases, Tamplin case and Bank Line case has stated: “The 
applicat ion of the doctrine of frustration wil l always depend 
on the part icular facts of each case, but i t  is dif f icult  to 
reconcile the two cases just discussed, except on the basis 
that in the Tamplin case the interrupt ion was of a t ime 
charter for f ive years, while in the Bank Line case the 
interruption had a more serious effect, s ince the t ime 
charter was for the must shorter period of one year.” 
……the main thing to be considered is the probable length 
of the total deprivat ion of the use of the chartered ship 
                                      
97  Tatem Ltd. v. Gamboa, (1939)  1 KB  132, at p. 138;  Ocean Tramp  
Tanker Corpn. V. V/o. Sovfracht (The ‘Eugenia’), (1964)  2  QB 226, at 
p. 239.   
98  Triete l,  7 t h  Edn., p. 699, The Law of Contract.   
99  Chit ty, 25 t h  Edn., Law of Contracts.   
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compared with the unexpired durat ion of the charter-party. 
…….The possibi l i t ies as to the length of the deprivat ion and 
not the certainty arrived at after the events are also 
material.   The question must be considered at the trial as i t  
had to be considered by the part ies, when they came to 
know of the cause and the probabil i t ies of the delay, and 
had to decide what to do.100   This approach to the problem 
of requisit ioning is supported by the case of Port Line Ltd. 
v. Ben Line Steamers Ltd.101 where Diplock, J., held that a 
t ime charter-party for 30 months (of which 17 had expired) 
was not frustrated by a government requisit ioning which 
was expected to last, only about three months; for 10 
months after the end of the requisit ioning the vessel was 
available to the charterer. In this case the ship was 
requisit ioned under the prerogative of the Crown, which 
meant that the Crown could retain the ship only for such a 
period as was necessary for the defence of the realm”.   
 
Russkoe & Co. v. John Stirk & Sons Ltd. (1922)102 
 
1922 saw the development of the doctrine that frustration 
may result if  the foundation of the contract disappeared, in 
Russkoe & Co. v. John St irk and Sons Ltd. ,  Lord Atkin said: 
“There are many posit ive rules of law imposed upon 
contracting parties which govern the whole creation, 
performance and dissolution of a contract which are quite 
independent of the intent ion of the parties.  For my part I  
see no reason why, in a certain set of circumstances which 
                                      
100
  The Bankline case, (1919)  AC  435, 454;  Court Line Ltd. v. Dant  & 
Russell Inc. (1939) 3  All. E.R.  314, 318.  It is a question of law 
whether the delay has frustrated the contract; Trade and Transport 
Inc. v. Iino Kaiun Kaisha Ltd., (1973)  1 WLR  210, 221. 
101  Port Line Ltd. v. Ben Line Steamers Ltd.,  (1958) 2  QB  146. 
102  Russkoe & Co. v. John Stirk & Sons Ltd., (1922) 10 L1 
214.   
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the Court f inds must have been contemplated by both 
parties as being of the essence of the contract and the 
cont inuance of which must have been deemed to have been 
essential to the performance of the contract, the Court 
should not say that when that set of circumstances ceases 
to exist , then the contract ceases to operate.” 
 
Larrinaga & Co. v. Societe Franco-Americaine (1923)103 
 
Krell v. Henry104 was crit icized in Larr inaga & Co. v. Societe 
Franco-Americaine  des Phosphates de Medul la, the facts of 
the case were: “A contract was made in 1913 for the 
carriage of six cargoes of phosphates between March 1918 
and November 1920.   After the end of the First World War, 
the carriers argued that the contract was frustrated because 
of the altered shipping condit ions then prevail ing.”  The 
House of Lords rejected this view.   A contract of this kind, 
not to be performed for many years, was essential ly 
speculative.   Each party deliberately took the r isk that 
condit ions might alter. It was a form of insurance.   
Cheshire and Fifoot in their Law of contract, 10 th  edit ion, 
page 513, refer to the cr it icism of the judicial decision of 
Krell v.  Henry  in the above case of Larr inaga.   So also 
Chitty On Contracts, 24 t h edit ion in para 1426: Lord Wright 
has said that the case of Krell v. Henry,  is certainly not one 
to be extended: it  is particularly dif f icult to apply 
where………. the possibil i ty of the event rel ied on as 
constitut ing a frustration of the adventure …… was known 
to both part ies when the contract was made, but the 
                                      
103  Larr inaga & Co. v. Societe Franco-Amer icaine  des 
Phosphates de Medulla (1923) 92 LJKB 455. 
104
  Krell  v .  Henry, (1903)   2  KB  740. 
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contract entered into was absolute in terms as far as 
concerned that know possibi l i ty”.105 
 
This extension of the doctr ine of discharge has not escaped 
crit icism since it could, i f  misapplied, lead to the situation in 
which a party would be entit led to rel ief  merely because a 
supervening change of circumstances had turned the 
contract, for that party, into a very bad bargain. But these 
crit icisms have not prevailed and the doctr ine of discharge 
is now generally thought to have been correct ly applied to 
coronation cases such as Krell v. Henry106;  for i t  can fairly 
be said that the hirer in that case would have suffered 
unacceptable hardship if  he had been held to his contract in 
the altered circumstances. But English cases provide few 
other i l lustrations of discharge on the ground of f rustration 
of purpose, and they seem to have rejected the converse 
notion of discharge on the ground of “impracticabil ity”: i .e.,  
on the ground that supervening events have made 
performance more expensive or otherwise more onerous for 
the party claiming discharge. Thus, in the Bri tish 
Movietonews  and Davis Contractors cases, pleas of 
discharge on such grounds were rejected; and a number of 
dicta in the House of Lords similar ly adopt a restricted 
approach to the doctrine.  In this vein it has, for example, 
been said that “an increase of expense is not a ground of 
frustration, that the doctrine of frustration was only to be 
applied “within very narrow l imits,” that “ it  by no means 
follows that disappointed expectations lead to frustrated 
contract, and that the doctr ine was “not l ight ly to be invoked 
                                      
105  Maritime National Fish Ltd. v. Ocean Traders Ltd., (1935)  AC  524, 
529; see also Lord Finlay’s observation on Krell v. Henry in Larrinaga 
& Co. Ltd.  v. Societe Franco-Americaine Des Phosphates,  (1923)  39 
TLR  316, 318. 
106
  Krell  v .  Henry, (1903)  2  KB  740. 
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to rel ieve contracting parties of the normal consequences of 
imprudent commercial bargains.107  
 
This approach to the doctrine of discharge ref lects the 
importance, which the English Courts have come, in the 
interests of commercial certainty, to attach to the principle 
of sanct ity of contract.   I t  can fairly be described as a trend 
to restr ict the operat ion of the doctr ine after its init ial period 
of growth; and in the English cases the trend is i l lustrated 
by an increasing amount of negative evidence.   The First 
World War did indeed given rise to a signif icant number of 
cases in which contracts were held to have been discharged 
by supervening impossibi l i ty.   By contrast, there were 
hardly any reported Second World War cases in which 
contracts were held to have been discharged by 
supervening impossibil ity,  as opposed to supervening 
il legality. 
 
There is now a marked judicial reluctance to apply the 
doctr ine in such circumstances.  It has been suggested 
above that this reluctance is primarily based on the 
importance now attached to the principle of sanct ity of 
contract. 
 
The tendency of contract ing part ies to “draft out” possible 
causes of frustrat ion by making express provisions either 
for specif ic obstacles to performance, or for such obstacles 
in general: for example, “Suez clauses” which began to 
make their appearance after the f irst Suez crisis,  and in the 
force majeure and similar clauses. 
 
                                      
107  Tr ietel ,  (1994) pp. 37-38, Frustrat ion and Force Majeure.   
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A contract could also by express provisions vary the normal 
consequences of discharge. The desire of contract ing 
parties to provide for compromise solut ions where 
supervening events disrupt performance has thus given a 
further impetus to the process of making express 
contractual provisions for such events, and this process has 
tended further to narrow the scope of doctr ine of f rustration 
since that doctrine is excluded where the parties have 
expressly provided for the effects on their contract of the 
event which has interfered with its performance. 
 
Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue Steamship Co. Ltd. (1926)108 
 
Next case in chronological order is the case of Hirji Mulj i v. 
Cheong Yue Steamship Co. Ltd. ,   the facts of that case 
case were: “By a charter-party made in November, 1916, 
shipowners agreed that their ship, the Singaporean, should 
be placed at the charterers’ disposal on March 1, 1917, for 
ten months. Shortly before the date the ship was 
requisit ioned by the Government.  The ship owners thought 
that she would soon be released, and asked the charterers 
if  they would be wil l ing to take up the charter. The 
charterers said that they would.   The vessel was, however, 
not released unti l February 1919, and the charterers 
refused to accept her.   It was contended by the shipowners 
that the charterers had so conducted themselves as to oust 
the doctr ine of frustrat ion.   But the House of Lords held 
that frustrat ion bring the contract to an end automatically,  
and could not be waived in this manner.   Secondly, the 
effect of frustrat ion at common law is to release both 
parties from any further performance of the contract, while 
leaving intact any legal rights already accrued, or money 
                                      
108  Hir j i Mulj i  v .  Cheong Yue Steamship Co. Ltd.,  (1926)  AC  
497. 
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already paid, before the frustrating event occurred. All  
obligations fal l ing due for performance after that t ime are 
discharged: al l those already due remain undisturbed.” 
 
Commenting on this case, Cheshire, Fitfoot and Furmston’s 
Law of Contract,  has said: “The rule established at common 
law is that the occurrence of the frustrat ing event ‘brings 
the contract to an end forthwith, without more and 
automatically’.”109 
 
Treitel in The Law of Contract referred that,  “Lord Summer 
once described the doctrine of frustration as ‘a device by 
which the rules as to absolute contracts are reconci led with 
a special exception which justice demands’.”110 
 
Maritime National Fish Ltd. v. Ocean Trawlers Ltd. 
(1935).111 
 
 
In the case of Marit ime National Fish Ltd. v. Ocean Trawlers 
Ltd., the facts of the case were as fol lows: 
 
Lord Wright. -  The appellants were charterers of a steam 
trawler the St. Cuthbert which was the property of the 
respondents.   The charter party, dated 25 t h October 1928, 
had originally been entered into between the respondents 
and the National Fish Company Ltd., but was later by 
agreement taken over by the appellants.   It  was for 12 
calendar months, but was to cont inue from year to year 
unless terminated by 3 months’ not ice from either party, the 
                                      
109  Cheshire, Fi tfoot and Furmston, 11 t h  Edn., p. 568, Law of 
Contract.   
110  Treite l,  7 t h  Edn.  p. 713, The Law of Contract. 
111  Marit ime National  Fish Ltd. v. Ocean Trawlers Ltd.  (1935) 
AC 524 : AIR 1935 PC 128. 
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notice to take effect at the end of one of the years.   it  was 
expressly agreed that the trawler should be employed in the 
f ishing industry only; the amount of monthly hire was to be 
f ixed on a basis to include a percentage of the purchase 
price, and also operating expenses. There was an option 
given to the charterers to purchase the trawler. 
 
By letters dated 6 t h and 8 th  July 1932, exchanged between 
the appellants and respondents, it  was agreed that the 
charter party as then exist ing should be renewed for one 
year from 25 th  October 1932, but at a rate of monthly hire 
which was 25 per cent, lower than that previously paid : the 
amount so agreed came to $ 590.97 per month.   It was also 
then agreed that in the event of the appel lants giving notice 
on or before 25 th  July in any year that they did not intend to 
renew, they should further give notice whether or not they 
intended to exercise the option to purchase. In fact the 
appellants gave notice on 27 t h January, 1933, that they did 
not intend to renew the charter or to purchase the vessel.  
 
When the part ies entered into the new agreement in July 
1932, they were well aware of certain legislat ion consisting 
of an amendment of the Fisheries Act (c. 73 Revised 
Statutes of Canada, 1927) by the addition of section 69-A, 
which in substance made it a punishable offence to leave or 
depart from any port in Canada with intent to f ish with a 
vessel that uses an otter or other similar trawl for catching 
f ish, except under licence from the Minister: i t was left to 
the Minister to determine the number of such vessels 
el igible to be licensed, and Regulat ions were to be made 
defining the condit ions in respect of l icences.   The date of 
this amending sect ion 69-A was 14 th June 1929.  
Regulat ions were publ ished on 14 t h  August 1931, former 
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Regulat ions having been declared invalid in an action in 
which the appellants had challenged their val idity. 
 
The St.  Cuthbert was a vessel,  which was f it ted with, and 
could only operate as a trawler with, an otter trawl.   The 
appellants, in addit ion to the St. Cuthbert, also operated 
four other trawlers, al l  f it ted with otter trawling gear.   On 
11 th March 1933, the appellants applied to the Minister of 
Fisheries for l icences for the trawlers they were operat ing, 
and in so doing compl ied with all  the requirements of the 
regulat ions, but on 5 t h Apri l 1933, the Act ing Minister 
replied that it  has been decided (as had shortly before been 
announced in the House of Commons) that l icences were 
only to be granted to three of the f ive trawlers operated by 
the appellants: he accordingly requested the appellants to 
advise the Department for which three of the f ive trawlers 
they desired to have licences.   The appellants thereupon 
give the names of three trawlers other than the St. 
Cuthbert, and for these three trawlers licences were issued, 
but no licence was granted for the St. Cuthbert.  
 
In consequence, as from 30 th Apri l 1933, it  was no longer 
lawful for the appellants to employ the St.  Cuthbert as a 
trawler in their business.   On 1s t May 1933, the appellants 
gave notice that the St. Cuthbert was available for re-
delivery to the respondents; they claimed they were no 
longer bound by the charter. 
 
On 19 t h  June 1933, the respondents commenced their action 
claiming $590.97 as being hire due under the charter for the 
month ending 25 t h May 1933: i t  is agreed that if  that c laim is 
just if ied, hire at the same rate is also recoverable for June, 
July, August, September and October 1933. 
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The main defence was that though no fault, act or omission 
on the part of the appellants, the charter party contract 
became impossible of performance on and after 30 t h Apri l  
1933, and thereupon the appellants were wholly rel ieved 
and discharged from the contract, including all obl igat ions 
to pay the monthly hire, which was st ipulated. 
 
The defence succeeded before the trial Judge, Doull,  J.   
His opinion was that there had been a change in the law, 
including the regulations, which completely changed the 
basis on which the parties were contracting. He though it :  
 
“not unreasonable to imply a condit ion to the effect 
that if  the law prohibits the operation of this boat as a 
trawler the obl igation to pay hire wil l cease.” 
 
He also thought that appellants were not bound to lay 
up another boat instead of the St.  Cuthbert.   I t  seems 
that the learned Judge proceeded on the footing that 
the change of law was subsequent to the making of 
the contract, whereas it was in fact anterior to the 
agreement of 1932 under which the trawler was being 
employed at the t ime the licence was refused.   This 
judgment was unanimously reversed by the Judges in 
the Supreme Court en banco.    The Judges of that 
court r ightly pointed out that the discharge of a 
contract by reason of the frustrat ion of the 
contemplated adventure fol lows automatically when 
the relevant event happens and does not depend on 
the volit ion or elect ion of either party.   They held that 
there was in this case no discharge of the contract for 
one or both of two reasons.   In the f irst place they 
thought that the appellants when they renewed the 
charter in 1932 were well informed of the legislation 
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and when they renewed the charter at a reduced rate 
and inserted no protecting clause in this regard, must 
be deemed to have taken the r isk that a licence would 
not be granted.   They also thought that if  there was 
frustration of the adventure, i t  resulted from the 
deliberate act of the appellants in selecting the three 
trawlers for which they desired l icences to be issued. 
 
Tatem Ltd. v. Gamboa (1939)112 
 
The next case in the chain is: Tatem Ltd. v. Gamboa .  The 
facts of the case were: “During the Spanish civil  war, the 
plaint if fs chartered to the defendant,  act ing on behalf  of the 
Republican Government of Spain, a steamship, for 30 days 
from July 1, 1937, the ship was to be used for the 
evacuation of the civi l ian populat ion from Northern Spain to 
French ports, and hire was to be at the rate of £250 per 
day.   On July 14, the ship was seized by the nationalists 
and detained in the port of Bi lbao until  September 11.   in 
answer to the plaintif fs’ claim for hire, the defendant 
pleaded that the contract had been frustrated.”   On these 
facts the court observed: “The high rate of hire clearly 
showed that possibi l ity of seizure of the vessel was 
contemplated by the part ies at the t ime they made the 
contract.   Nevertheless it was held that this action had 
discharged the contract ……Goddard, J., said …….. If  the 
foundation of the contract goes, ei ther by the destruct ion of 
the subject-matter or by reason of such long interruption or 
delay that the performance is really in effect that of a 
different contract, and the part ies have not provided what in 
that event is to happen, the performance of the contract is 
to be regarded as frustrated.” 
                                      
112  Tatem Ltd. v. Gamboa ,  [1939] 1 KB 132. 
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Chitty On Contracts,113 has said that,  “The fact that the 
parties to the contract actual ly foresaw the possibi l ity of the 
event in quest ion, but made no provision for it  in their 
contract, does not necessarily prevent the doctr ine of 
frustration from applying when that event takes place.   It is 
a quest ion of construct ion of the contract whether the 
parties intend their si lence to mean that the contract should 
cont inue to bind in that event, or whether they intend the 
effect of the event, if  it  occurs, to be determined by any 
relevant legal rules.114  I f  one party foresaw the risk, but the 
other did not, it  will  be dif f icult for the former to claim that 
the occurrence of that risk frustrates the contract.“115 
 
Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd. v. Imperial 
Smelting Corporation Ltd. (1942)116 
 
Next case which is a landmark case is Joseph Constantine 
Steamship Line Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting Corporation Ltd.   
The facts of the case were: 
 
“The appellants chartered to the respondents their 
steamship Kingswood to proceed to Australia and load a 
cargo there. Before this could be done, a violent explosion 
occurred in the boiler of the ship, which resulted in such a 
delay as would discharge the contract.   The cause of the 
explosion was never ascertained, but the respondents 
al leged that the appellants had f irst to establish that i t  
occurred without their fault before they could rely on the 
                                      
113  Chit ty, 25 t h  edi t ion, Law of Contracts . 
114  e.g.  an intention that if the event were to happen, the parties would 
“leave the lawyers to sort it out”; Ocean Tramp Tankers Corporation v. 
V/O Sovfracht (The Eugenia), (1964) 2 QB  226, 239.   
115  Walton Harvey Ltd.  v. Walter and Homfrays Ltd., (1931) 1 Ch. 274. 
116  Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd. v. Imperial  
Smelt ing Corporat ion Ltd. ,  (1942) AC 154. 
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doctr ine of frustration and so not be l iable for breach of 
contract.” 
 
On the facts Lord Wright observe: ……In more recent days, 
the phrase more commonly used is “frustration of the 
contract” or,  more short ly “frustration”.  “Frustrat ion of the 
contract”, however, is an el lipt ical expression.   The ful ler 
and more accurate phrase is “frustrat ion of the adventure or 
of the commercial or pract ical purpose of the contract”.    
This change in language corresponds to a wider conception 
of impossibi l i ty, which has extended the rule beyond 
contract which depends on the existence, at the relevant 
t ime, of a specif ic object, as in the instances given by 
Blackburn, J., to cases where the essential object does 
indeed exist, but is condit ion has by some casualty been so 
changed as to be not available for purpose of the contract, 
either at the contract date or, if  no date is f ixed, within any 
t ime consistent with the commercial or practical adventure.   
For the purposes of the contract the object is as good as 
lost.   Another case, often described as frustration, is 
whereby State interference or similar overriding 
intervention, the performance of the contract has been 
interrupted for so long a time as to make in unreasonable 
for the part ies to be required to go on with it.   Yet another 
il lustration is where the actual object sti l l exists and is 
available, but the object of the contract as contemplated by 
both parties was its employment for a particular purpose, 
which has become impossible, as in the Coronation cases.   
In these similar cases, where there is not, in the strict 
sense, impossibi l ity by some casual happening, there has 
been so vital a change in the circumstances as to defeat the 
contract.   What Willes, J. , in Inchbald’s  case117 described 
                                      
117  Inchbald’s  case, (1864)  17  CBNS  733. 
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as substant ial performance is no longer possible, the 
common object of the parties is frustrated.   The contract 
has perished any rights or l iabil it ies subsequent to the 
change. The same is true where there has been a vital  
change of the law, either statutory or common law, 
operating on the circumstances as, for instance, where the 
outbreak of war destroys a contract legally made before the 
war, but which, when war breaks out,  cannot be performed 
without trading with the enemy.   I have given this bare 
catalogue to i l lustrate the applicat ion in practice of the 
doctr ine of frustration, in order to show how wide and 
various is the range of c ircumstances to which it may 
extend, and how manifold are the complicat ions involved in 
the rule laid down by the Court of Appeal that there is an 
aff irmative onus of disproving fault on the party claiming to 
rely on frustration.” 
 
Anson in Law of Contract,118 said: “It was not necessary for 
the House of Lords to decide whether mere negligence 
would be suff icient, for i t  held that the burden of proving 
that the event which causes the frustrat ion is due to the act 
or default  of a party l ies on the party al leging it to be so.   
Since the respondents fai led to sat isfy the court on this 
point, the contract was discharged.”  “The rule, however, is 
not altogether clear when such an act was inadvertent and 
merely negligent. Although there have been frequent 
statements to the effect that the frustrating event must 
occur without the default of either party, this point has 
never been expressly decided.  
 
It was discussed by the House of Lords where Lord Russell,  
commenting on the kind or degree of fault which might 
                                      
118  Anson, 26 t h  edi t ion, p. 460, Law of Contract.   
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debar a party from relying on a self-induced frustration, 
said: 
 
“The possible variet ies are inf inite, and can range 
from the criminality of the scutt ler who opens the sea-
cocks and sinks his ship, to the thoughtlessness of 
the prima donna who sits in a draught and loses her 
voice.   I wish to guard against the supposit ion that 
every destruction of corpus for which a contractor can 
be said, to some extent or in some sense, to be 
responsible, necessarily involves that the resultant 
frustration is self-induced within the meaning of the 
phrase.”   
 
Chitty On Contracts,119 commenting on Constantine’s case 
has observed: “The quest ion of the onus of proof was 
sett led by the House of Lords where it  was laid down that 
the party relying on frustration need not prove aff irmatively 
that the frustrat ing event was not caused by his own fault.   
I f  he proves events which prima facie would frustrate the 
contract, the onus of proving that the frustrat ion was self-
induced is on the other party who denies that the contract 
has been frustrated: the latter must prove some default by 
the former which caused the allegedly frustrat ing event.” 
 
3.10 SUMMING UP OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS:    
 
 
In Paradine v. Jane120 (1947) the reason of the rule was that 
the party was not excused from the obligation, 
notwithstanding an accident by inevitable necessity because 
the might have provided against i t  by his contract.   In that 
                                      
119  Chit ty, 25 t h  edi t ion, para 1446, Law of Contracts.  
120  Paradine v. Jane, (1647) Aleyn 26. 
  
- 171 - 
case in spite of actual impossibi l ity, the party was not 
excused from performance. 
 
In 1863 in Taylor v. Caldwell,121 it  was observed that the 
doctr ine of sanct ity of contract applied only to a promise, 
which was posit ive and absolute, and not subject to any 
condit ion express or implied.   Applying this doctrine, it  was 
held that in this case from the nature of the contract is was 
apparent that the part ies contracted on the basis of the 
cont inued existence of the subject-matter of the contract,  
i.e., the music hal l,  etc.   Though the contract was silent on 
the point, it  was impl ied and therefore it was held that the 
contract was frustrated because of the destruct ion of the 
music hall, a case of physical impossibi l ity in which the plea 
of frustrat ion was upheld. 
 
Bailey’s  case (1869)122 propounded the proposit ion that 
though the contract may be absolute yet because of the 
supervening circumstance of compulsory acquisit ion under 
a statute an event un-contemplated by the parties, the 
contract would be frustrated. 
 
The doctr ine of frustration consequent on physical 
impossibil ity was enlarged to include frustration of the 
commercial adventure in the case of Jackson v. Union 
Marine Insurance Co. Ltd.  (1874).123  Time taken to repair 
the ship in this case was so long as to put an end, in a 
commercial sense, to the contract between the part ies, as 
the court held that the voyage undertaken after the ship was 
repaired would have been a dif ferent voyage, a different 
                                      
121  Taylor  v. Caldwell ,  (1863) 3 B&S 826.   
122  Baily v. De Crespigny, (1869) LR 4 QB 180. 
123  Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Co. Ltd . ,  (1874) LR 10 
CP 123. 
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adventure altogether.   Thus, the development was on the 
line that the contract may be frustrated even though it has 
not become i l legal or l iteral ly impossible to perform if the 
supervening events destroyed some basic, though tacit 
assumption on which the part ies have contracted. 
 
Dahl’s case (1881)124 propounded the implied term 
theory. 
 
This pr inciple propounded in Jackson’s case was 
emphasized in Krell v. Henry ,125 and the coronation cases.   
This case of Krel l  v. Henry is contrasted with the other 
case, Herne Bay Steamship Co. v. Hutton, which was 
decided li t t le earl ier wherein there was somewhat similar 
contract involved.   The contract in Herne Bay case was for 
the purpose of viewing the naval review and for a day’s 
cruise round the f leet.  Though the review was cancelled, 
the f leet remained.   Plea of frustrat ion was refused 
because it was considered that the holding of the review 
was not the sole adventure contemplated, but the cruise 
round the f leet was an equally basic object of the contract, 
which st i l l  remained capable of attainment.   Therefore, a 
dist inction is to be drawn between object and motive.   In 
the former case there would be frustrat ion but not in the 
latter case.   Krel l v. Henry was considered to be a case of 
object while Herneby’s case that of motive. 
  
SS Tamplin’s case (1916)126 is one of the crop of cases 
which were the result of 1914 – 1918 War.   This case held 
that t ime charter party for 5 years was not frustrated by 
requisit ion of the ship during the war as many more months 
remained for fulf i l l ing the charter after the requisit ion 
                                      
124  Dahl v. Nelson, Donkin and Co., (1881) 6 AC 38. 
125  Krell  v .  Henry, (1903) 2 KB 740.  
126  Tamplin SS Co. v. Anglo- Mexican & Co., (1916) 2 AC 397.  
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ended.   But this opinion was rejected in the Bank l ine case 
(1919) in which case the charter was one year.   Comparing 
the two cases it seems that the main thing to be considered 
is the probable length of the total deprivation of the use of 
the chartered ship compared with the unexpired durat ion of 
the charter party. 
 
Russokoe’s case (1922)127 focused attent ion on the contract 
being frustrated in the event of c ircumstances ceasing to 
exist  during the operation of the contract, which at the t ime 
of entering into were contemplated by the part ies to be of 
the essence of the contract. 
 
In Larr inaga’s case (1923)128 plea of frustration was rejected 
in the case of a contract of carriage of six cargos entered 
into in 1913 pertaining to the period of operation of the 
contract between March 1918 pertaining to the period of 
operation of the contract between March 1918 and 
November 1920.   It was pleaded that after the end of the 
1s t World War the contract was frustrated because of the 
altered shipping condit ions.   The House of Lords reject ing 
this plea observed that a contract of this kind not to be 
performed for many years was essential ly speculative.   
Each party deliberately took the risk that condit ions might 
alter.    Consequently alterat ion of condit ions did not qualify 
for a plea of frustration. 
 
Hirj i  Mulj i ’s case (1926)129 is an authority for the proposit ion 
that frustration brings the contract to an end automatically 
and could not be waived.   The effect of frustration is to 
                                      
127  Russokoe & Co. v. John Stirk and Sons Ltd., (1922) 10 LR  214. 
128  Larrinaga v. Societe Franco – Americaine, (1923) 39 TLR 316 : 92 LJ 
KB 455. 
129  Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue SS Co. Ltd., (1926) AC 497. 
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release both part ies from any further performance of the 
contract while leaving in tact any legal r ights already 
accrued or money already paid before the frustration event 
occurred.   In short al l obligat ions fal l ing due for 
performance after that t ime are discharged.   All  those 
already due remain undisturbed. 
 
Marit ime National Fish case (1935)130 re-emphasized that 
frustration of the contemplated adventure fol lows 
automatically when the relevant event happens and does 
not depend on the voli t ion or election of either party.  
 
In Tatem’s case (1939),  the plea of frustration was upheld 
in a case where during the Spanish Civil War plaint if fs 
chartered to the defendant a steamship for 30 days from 
July 1, 1937.   On July 14, the ship was seized by the 
Nationalists and detained t i l l September 11.   In answer to 
the plainti f fs claim for hire the defendant pleaded frustration 
of the contract.   The Court observed that i f  the foundation 
of the contract goes either by the destruct ion of the subject-
matter or by reason of such long interrupt ion or delay that 
the performance is really in effect that of a different 
contract, the performance of the contract is to be regarded 
as frustrated.  
 
In Joseph Constant ine case (1942),131 the appellants 
chartered to the respondents their steamship to proceed to 
Austral ia and load the cargo there.   Before this could be 
done a violent explosion occurred in the boiler, which 
resulted in delay. The cause of the explosion could not be 
ascertained.   It was held by the House of Lords that since 
                                      
130  Maritime National Fish Ltd. V. Ocean Traders Ltd., (1935) AC 524. 
131  Joseph Constantine SS Line Ltd., v. Imperial Smelting Corporation, 
(1942) AC 154. 
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the charterers were unable to prove that the explosion was 
caused by the fault of the owners, the defence of frustrat ion 
succeeded.   It  may be stated that a self-induced frustration 
cannot be relied on by a party as a justif icat ion for non-
performance of the contractual obligat ions. 
 
It may be not iced that the English Parl iament passed Law 
Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943 which regulated 
the r ights and obl igations of the parties to the contract 
consequent on frustration.  
 
Sir Lindsay Parkinson’s case (1949)132 is an authority for the 
proposit ion that if  some catastrophic event occurs for which 
neither party is responsible and if  the result of that event is 
to destroy the very basis of the contract then the contract is 
frustrated.   Frustration would be the result despite the 
clause in the contract contemplating delays not to result in 
dissolution of the contract.   Such a clause has been 
interpreted to mean normal moderate delay, not a delay 
which would result in making the performance of the 
contract radically different from the originally contemplated 
one. 
 
Brit ish Movietonews case (1951)133 is a landmark case.   
Lord Denning (Court of Appeal) held that even if  the 
contract was absolute in terms it was not absolute in intent 
and, therefore, i t  wil l not be held absolute in effect.   In that 
case, the plaint if fs were f i lm distributors and the defendants 
were owners of a chain of cinemas.   In 1941 the plaintif fs 
contracted to supply the defendants with f i lms.   The 
                                      
132  Sir Lindsay Parkinson Ltd. V. Commissioner of Works., (1949) 2 KB 
632. 
133  British Movietonews Ltd. V. London & District Cinemas Ltd., (1951) 1 
KB 190. 
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contract permitted either party to terminate by giving four 
weeks not ice.   In 1943, a Government order restr icted the 
supply of f i lms and the parties entered into supplementary 
agreement st ipulat ing that the principal agreement shall  
remain in ful l force and effect unt il such time as the order is 
cancelled.   On the termination of the war in 1945 the order 
was not cancelled but it  was continued in force for quite 
different reasons.   In 1948 the defendants gave four weeks’  
notice in accordance with the original agreement to 
terminate the contract.   The plaintif fs refused to accept the 
notice as valid and sued for breach of contract on the plea 
that the order was sti l l in force.   The Court of Appeal went 
outside the li teral words of the contract and read it in the 
light of the parties presumed intention that the 
supplementary agreement was to endure only as long as 
wart ime condit ions persisted.   The continuance of the order 
beyond the period was un-contemplated by the parties and 
the defendants were relieved from their l iabi l ity.   This view 
was promptly repudiated on appeal by the House of Lords 
re-aff irming the proposit ion that no Court has an absolving 
power and that it  was not possible to rel ieve the parties 
from their contractual obligations merely because it was just 
and reasonable to do so.   This gave a blow to the just and 
reasonable theory of frustrat ion of a contract. 
 
In Davis Contractor ’s case (1956)134 plea of frustration was 
rejected on the ground that the possibi l ity of enough labour 
and material not being available, must have been present 
before the eyes of the contracting parties when they 
entered into the contract but sti l l  as they did not make any 
specif ic stipulation about the same, this cannot be an 
implied term of the contract that the part ies contracted on 
                                      
134  Davis Contractors Ltd. V. Fareham, (1956) AC 696. 
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the tacit assumption of cont inued existence of availabil ity of 
labour and material in suff icient quantit ies at appropriate 
t ime as the basis of the contract. 
 
Actual performance being possible but the mode of 
performance becoming more onerous consequent on 
supervening events has not been considered to be a 
just ifying cause for holding that the contract is frustrated 
nor in such a case an implied term can be supplied by law 
that the mode of performance that was available at the t ime 
of the entering into the contract must be taken to be the 
basis of the contract so that the supervening event having 
adverse effect on that mode qualif ied for frustrat ion.   This 
was the l ine of thinking in the Suez Canal cases135 when the 
Suez Canal was closed in 1956 and again in 1957. 
[Tsakiroglou case (1962), Eugenia (1964)]. 
 
Tsakiroglou case (1962)136 emphasizes altered nature of the 
contractual obl igation as a pre-requisite for the attraction of 
the doctrine of frustrat ion.  What is meant by the altered 
nature of the obligat ion is considered therein.   Change in 
the manner or method of performance by itself  would not 
qualify for frustration. The ult imate question for 
consideration is whether the new method of performance is 
fundamental ly and radically dif ferent so as to make the 
contract a dif ferent contract from the contract entered into.  
 
Hong Kong Fir Shipping case (1962) took notice of the 
historical growth of the Doctrine of Frustration and also of 
the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943 and 
restated the rule that where the event occurs as a result  of 
                                      
135  Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. V. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., 
(1962) 2 QB 26. 
136  Tsakiroglou & Co. v. Noblee Thorl GMBH., (1962) AC 93. 
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the default of neither party which event results in 
impossibil ity of performance each is relieved of the further 
performance of his own undertaking and their right in 
respect of undertakings previously performed would be 
regulated by the Law Reforms (Frustrated Contracts) Act,  
1943. 
 
The Eugenia case (1954)137 has been referred to ante while 
discussing Suez Canal cases in which it was held that the 
owner of the ship cannot claim that the charter party has 
been frustrated by the closure of the Canal for this did not 
bring about the fundamentally dif ferent situat ion such as to 
frustrate the venture.   The alternat ive route around the 
Cape was not found dif ferent but merely longer and more 
expensive which does not qualify for frustration.   It  may be 
noticed that because of this legal posit ion later charter 
parties contained a Suez Canal clause, which was to apply 
to a future closing the canal. 
 
Staffordshire Area Health Authority case (1978)138 is an 
authority for the proposit ion that the contract can be 
frustrated by inf lat ion as it was outside the realm of the 
contemplation of the part ies when they entered into the 
contract. 
 
National Carr iers case (1981)139 and ‘The Nema’ (1981)140 
reaff irm the Doctrine of Frustrat ion and the principles laid 
down in the previous rulings summarized above. 
                                      
137  Ocean Tramp Tankers Corporation v. V/O Sovfracht (The Eugenia), 
(1964) 2 QB 226. 
138  Staffordshire Area Health Authority v. South Staffordshire 
Waterworks Co. Ltd., (1978) 2 ALL ER 769 : (1978) 1 
WLR. 1387. 
139  National Carriers Ltd. V. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd., (1981) 1 All ER 
161. 
140  The Nema, (1981) 2 All ER 2030. 
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BP Exploration case (1982)141 is a case of frustration due to 
expropriat ion by a governmental act ion – in this case Libyan 
Government. While holding that the contract was frustrated, 
the quest ion for decision was whether the r ights and 
obligations of the parties were to be governed by Law 
Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act,  1943 or to be modif ied 
in view of the contractual stipulations.   This case contains 
a ful l exposit ion and analysis of the Act while construing i t 
and is a valuable guide on the point.    While reaff irming the 
proposit ion that 1943 Act would be modif ied by contractual  
stipulations, such stipulations have to be reasonably 
construed.   On the facts of that case, the House of Lords 
held that sect ion 2(3) of the 1943 Act did not apply because 
of the contractual stipulations.  The Evia case (1982) is an 
il lustration of the crop up cases, which came up as a 
consequence of Iran Iraq War, which broke out on 22nd  
September 1980. It  was reaff irmed in this case that Doctr ine 
of Frustration would have to be modif ied by reason of the 
contractual st ipulations.  Care must be taken to consider 
that the clauses in the contract exhaust the operat ion of the 
Doctrine of Frustration or partial ly deal with it.   The ult imate 
conclusion would depend upon the construction of these 
clauses.   This rul ing applies to the principles established 
by the House of Lords in National Carriers case (1981) and 
‘The Nema’ case (1981). 
 
Kodros case (1982)142 is an instance of contractual 
frustration clause and is more concerned with the 
interpretation of that c lause rather than general law of 
frustration, except its importance for determination of  the 
                                      
141  BP Exploration v. Hunt, (1982) 1 All ER 925. 
142  Kodros Shipping Corporation v. Empresa Cubana de Fletes, (The 
Evia), (1982) 3 All ER 350. 
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date of frustration in the case of a prospect ive frustration 
contemplated by the parties and provided for part ly or 
wholly in the contract i tself .   I f  supervening event is such 
that i t  is quite clear that it  is highly probable that there will  
be serious interference with performance, law does not 
permit such a situation where contractual rights and 
obligations are left indef initely in suspense.   The event 
may be such that a reasonable view of its effect on the 
contract can be taken as soon as it occurs; or it  may be 
such that i t  may cause sl ight or serious interference 
depending on the length of i ts continuat ion, e.g., str ike or 
war.  In such contingency, it  is necessary to wait on events, 
particularly to determine the day of frustrat ion.  As regards 
the durat ion, the forecast may be optimist ic or pessimistic 
and future events may belie the forecast but the court will  
be just if ied in holding that the contract is frustrated on the 
basis of sensible commercial prognosis of the event. 
 
3.11 CONCLUSION:    
 
I t  is an interesting and fascinating study to trace the 
development of the doctrine of frustration of contract as an 
inroad into the old doctrine of absolute l iabi li ty of the 
contract. There was a t ime when contract was considered 
as a piece of pr ivate legislat ion, sacred, sacrosanct,  to 
which man was required to do obeisance from afar but not 
to go near the sanctum sanctorum.  Parties stood in awe of 
the sacred pact as it were placed on par with Holy Scripture 
so sanct if ied as no to be defi led by human touch. Even the 
judges shied from touching the contract by supplying an 
obvious gap or implying a term, by pleading helplessness in 
the matter. It was repeatedly averred by the courts that i t  
was for the parties to make the contract and for the courts 
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to enforce it. Like al l human institutions, nothing is stat ic 
but the change is so impercept ible that i t is diff icult to 
pinpoint any point of t ime when the old doctrine was 
discarded and the new doctr ine evolved. When the courts 
pleaded impotence and proceeded to enforce the contract 
as worded, despite the fact that the enforcement 
perpetrated injust ice, there was certain amount of 
resentment in the minds not only of the lawyers but the 
judges themselves apart from the li t igating public and a 
search was made for a solut ion. It was unthinkable to take it  
lying down that the courts were instruments of doing 
injust ice by enforcing such an atrocious covenant. It was 
very strongly felt that the court should do its duty as an 
instrument of doing justice and find a way out how to go 
about i t . English ingenuity did not fai l  to meet the situation 
and a doctrine of implied term was resorted to by courts. 
Once the courts assumed the role of interfering with the 
contract in order to do justice between the part ies by 
introducing implied terms as fair  and reasonable, the old 
and impregnable fort if icat ion of absolute liabil ity crumbled.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER - IV 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE OF  
FRUSTRATION  OF  CONTRACT 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION: 
Law Reform (Frustrated Contract) Act, 1943 : 
 
 
The situation created by Common Law regarding effect of 
frustration cal led for some remedial action, which eventually 
had to be done by legislation in the shape of Law Reform 
(Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943.  In Hirj i Mulj i ’s case,1 it  
was observed that the effect of frustration at common law is 
to release both parties from any further performance while 
leaving intact any legal rights already accrued.   That was 
the posit ion aff irmed by the Courts in earl ier rulings – 
 
 (1) Appleby v. Myers2  
 
 (2) Chandler v. Webster3 – (1904) 1 KB 493. 
 
In Appleby v. Myers ,  the plaint if fs undertook to erect some 
machinery upon the premises of the defendants, the 
contract specif ical ly stipulat ing that plainti f f  was to be paid 
for on completion of the work.   While the work was in 
progress and before complet ion the premises with the 
machinery part ly erected were entirely destroyed by f ire.   
The court whi le holding that the contract was frustrated held 
that the plaintif fs could recover nothing for the part work 
done as the contractual st ipulat ion was that payment was to 
be made only on complet ion. 
 
                                      
1  Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue SS Co. Ltd., (1926) AC 497. 
2  Appleby v. Myers ,  (1867) LR 2 CP 651. 
3  Chandler v. Webster,  (1904) 1 KB 493. 
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In Chandler v. Webster the plainti ff  agreed to hire a room in 
Pall Mall to watch the Coronation Procession.  The agreed 
price was £141 payable immediately.  The plaint if f  paid 
£100 to be defendants but before he paid the balance of 
£41 the procession was cancelled.   The plainti f f claimed 
the restitut ion of the £100.   The Court held that not only he 
could not recover the £100 but also he was l iable to pay the 
balance of £41 as the obligat ion to pay under the contract 
had fal len due before the occurrence of the frustrating 
event.  The decision was sought to be just if ied on the 
strength of the proposit ion that the effect of frustration is to 
release the party from further performance while leaving in 
tact any legal r ights already accrued.   The harshness of 
these decisions natural ly provoked considerable crit icism 
and called for a remedy.  Chandler’s case was subsequently 
over-ruled by House of Lords in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyina v. 
Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd.4 The facts of the 
case were: “The respondents contracted with the 
appellants, a Polish company, to manufacture certain 
machinery and deliver it  to Gdynia.  Part of the price was to 
be paid in advance, and the appellants accordingly paid £ 
1,000.  The contract was frustrated by the occupation of 
Gdynia by host ile German forces in September, 1939.   The 
appellants thereupon requested the return of the £ 1,000, 
which they had paid.  One these facts applying the rul ing in 
Chandler v.  Webster ’s  case5,  this money would have been 
irrecoverable but the House of Lords overruled that decision 
and held that the appellants could recover.   The decision 
was sought to be just i f ied on the ground that an act ion for 
the recovery of the sum paid was not an action on the 
contract but an action in rest itut ion to recover money paid 
                                      
4  Fibrosa Spolka Akcyina v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe 
Barbour Ltd.,  (1943) AC 32. 
5
  Chandler v. Webster,  (1904) 1 KB 493.  
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on a consideration, which had wholly fai led.  This decision 
though welcomed as a departure from the hardship of the 
rule of Common Law set out above, did not have the effect 
of rendering the situat ion total ly sat isfactory, because it  
may be that the party who had to return the pre-payment 
might have incurred expenses or as a result of the 
frustration of the contract he may be left high and dry with 
the goods (in case of sale of goods) valueless to him. 
Moreover, if  the party claiming recovery, of the pre-payment 
had received part performance of the contract, there could 
be no total fai lure of consideration and the rule in Fibrosa 
case would not apply. It was to remedy this situat ion that 
the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943 was 
passed on 5 th  August, 1943.  
 
4.2 ADJUSTMENT OF RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF 
PARTIES TO FRUSTRATED CONTRACTS: 
 
(1)   Where a contract governed by English law has 
become impossible of performance or been otherwise 
frustrated and the parties thereto have for that reason 
been discharged from the further performance of the 
contract, the fol lowing provisions of this section shall,  
subject to the provisions of sect ion 2 of this Act, have 
effect in relation thereto. 
 
(2) All sums paid or payable to any party in pursuance of 
the contract before the t ime when the parties were so 
discharged ( in this Act referred to as “the t ime of 
discharge”) shall , in the case of sums so paid, be 
recoverable from him as money received by him for 
the use of the party by whom the sums were paid, 
and, in the case of sums so payable, cease to be so 
payable: Provided that i f  the party to whom sums were 
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so paid or payable incurred expenses before the t ime 
of discharge in, or for the purpose of, the performance 
of the contract, the court may, if  i t  considers i t just to 
do so having regard to al l the circumstances of the 
case, al low him to retain or, as the case may be, 
recover the whole or any part of the sums so paid or 
payable, not being an amount in excess of the 
expenses so incurred. 
 
(3) Where any party to the contract has, by reason of 
anything done by any other party thereto in, or for the 
purpose of, the performance of the contract, obtained 
a valuable benefit (other than a payment of money to 
which the last foregoing sub-sect ion applies) before 
the t ime of discharge, there shall be recoverable the 
value of the said other party such sum (if  any), not 
exceeding the value of the said benefit to the party 
obtaining it, as the court considers just, having regard 
to all the circumstances of the case and, in part icular,  
 
(a) the amount of any expense incurred before the 
t ime of discharge by the benefited party in, for 
the purpose of, the performance of the contract, 
including any sums paid or payable by him to 
any other party in pursuance of the contract and 
retained or recoverable by that party under the 
last foregoing sub-section, and 
 
(b) the effect, in relation to the said benefit, of  the 
circumstances giving rise to the frustrat ion of 
the contract. 
 
(4) In est imating, for the purpose of the foregoing 
provision of this section, the amount of any expenses 
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incurred by any party to the contract,  the court may, 
without prejudice to the general i ty of the said 
provisions, include such sums as appears to be 
reasonable in respect of overhead expenses and in 
respect of any work or services performed personally 
by the said party. 
 
(5) In considering whether any sum ought to be recovered 
or retained under the foregoing provisions of this 
section by any party to the contract, the court shall  
not take into account any sums which have, by reason 
of the circumstances giving r ise to the frustrat ion of  
the contract, become payable to the party under any 
contract of insurance unless there was an obligation 
to insure imposed by an express term of the frustrated 
contract or by or under any enactment. 
 
(6) Where any person has assumed obligat ion under the 
contract in consideration of the conferring of a benefit 
by any other party to the contract upon any other 
person, whether a party to the contract or not, the 
court may, if  in al l the circumstance of the case it  
considers it just to do so, treat for the purposes of 
sub-section (3) of this section any benefit so 
conferred as a benefit obtained by the person who has 
assumed the obligations as aforesaid.  
 
4.3 APPLICATION OF THE ACT:  
 
 
(1) This Act shall apply to contracts, whether made before 
or after the commencement of this Act, as respects 
which the t ime of discharge is on or after the f irst day 
of July, nineteen hundred and forty- three, but not to 
  
- 187 - 
contracts as respects which the t ime of discharge is 
before the said date. 
 
(2) This Act shall apply to contracts to which the Crown is 
a party in like manner as to contracts between 
subjects. 
 
(3) Where any contract to which this Act appl ies contains 
any provision which, upon the true construct ion of the 
contract, is intended to have effect in the event of 
circumstances aris ing which operate, or would but for 
the said provision operate, to frustrate the contract, or 
is intended to have effect whether such circumstances 
arise or not, the court shall give effect to the said 
provision and shall only give effect to the said 
provision and shall only give effect to the foregoing 
section of this Act to such extent,  if  any, as appears 
to the court to be consistent with the said provision.  
 
(4) Where it appears to the court that a party of any 
contract to which this Act applies can properly be 
severed from the remainder of the contract, being a 
part wholly performed before the t ime of discharge, or 
so performed except for the payment in respect of that 
part of the contract of sums which are or can be 
ascertained under the contract, the court shall  t reat 
that part  of the contract as if  i t  were a separate 
contract and had not been frustrated and shall t reat 
the foregoing section of this Act as only applicable to 
the remainder of that contract. 
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(5) This Act shall not apply: 
 
(a) to any charter-party, except a time charter-party or a charter-
party by way of demise; or to any contract (other than a charter-
party) for the carriage of goods by sea; or 
 
(b) to any contract of insurance, save as is provided 
by sub-sect ion (5) of the foregoing section; or 
 
(c) to any contract to which section 7 of the Sale of Goods Act, 
1893 (which avoids contracts for the sale of specified goods which 
perish before the risk has passed to the buyer) applies, or to any 
other contract for the sale, or for the sale and delivery of specified 
goods, where the contract is frustrated by reason of the fact that the 
goods have perished. 
 
4.4 INTRODUCTION OF THE ACT: 
 
 
(1) This Act may be cited as the Law Reforms (Frustrated 
Contracts) Act, 1943. 
 
(2) In this Act the expression “court” means, in relation to 
any matter, the court or arbitrator by or before whom 
the matter fal ls to be determined. 
 
The Act neither covers all contracts nor al l contingencies. 
While striving to suggest the solution of the problem 
regarding alleviat ion of the hardship of the Common Law it 
has also succeeded in focusing attention on the glaring gap 
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between the problem and the solution highlighting the area 
which is sti l l uncovered and yet to be tackled. 
 
Although the Act provides for some of the legal  
consequences of frustration, i t is sti l l necessary to turn to 
the Common Law in case of contracts and cont ingencies 
uncovered and the interpretation of the Act itself  demands 
knowledge of the Common Law. 
 
Section 1(2) goes beyond the decision in Fibrosa case as it  
permits the recovery of an advance payment even in the 
case of a partial failure of consideration.   Under this sub-
section advance payment is recoverable as money received 
to the plaintif fs use and not as moneys recoverable on a 
consideration, which has failed. The proviso to this sect ion 
permits the recipient of the advance payment to apply for a 
sum in respect of his expenses incurred before the 
frustration.   Subject to the pre-requisites that one advance 
payment was made by or due from the other party before 
the date of the frustrat ing event to the amount al lowed for 
expenses must not exceed the amount of such advance 
payment. 
 
Section 1(3) reverses the rule in Appleby v. Myers case,6 
that is, in the case of a frustration of a lump sum contract 
nothing is recoverable since the work has not been 
completed.   Unl ike sub-sect ion 2 it is not conf ined to cases 
where advance payment has been made before the date of  
frustration but extends to all cases where a party by partial 
performance has conferred a valuable benefit on the other 
party. 
 
                                      
6  Appleby v. Myers case,  (1867) LR 2 CP 651. 
  
- 190 - 
Section 1(3) has been considered in depth in the judgment 
of Robert Goff , J., in the case of B.P. Explorat ion Co. 
(Libya) v. Hunt ,7 discussed later in this book.   Sect ion 2(5) 
gives the l ist of contracts to which the Act does not apply.   
Amongst the l ist is any contract to which section 7 of the 
Sale of Goods Act, 1893 applies……. this sub-section is 
clumsi ly drafted and is dif f icult to understand.   The problem 
is to discover what type of contract is covered by these 
words.   It is not quite clear why an arbitrary distinction 
should have been made between dif ferent contracts for the 
sale of goods or why it was considered necessary to 
exclude any such contract from the operation of the Act.    
There seems to be no reason why the provision for the 
apportionment should not have embraced al l  contracts for 
the sale of goods.  The only reason it  seems, which can be 
given for not applying the Act to al l  contracts for the sale of 
goods possibly can be that in such contracts certainty is 
more important than justice.   The rules on r isk are meant to 
provide this required certainty and any judicial interference 
with them may result in disrupt ion of that certainty but the 
logical extension of this reasoning would be that al l  
contracts for sale of goods should have been excluded from 
the operat ion of the Act.   Partial exclusion does not sat isfy 
the requirements of either convenience or justice.   The Act 
excludes where the goods are specif ic.   What are specif ic 
goods may present a problem. As an il lustration if  a farmer 
sells a specif ied quantity of crop to be grown on a land and 
the crop is destroyed by some unforeseen events, which 
result in frustration.  As the goods are not specif ic, he can 
set al l his expenses of growing the crop against the 
advance payment made by the buyer but if  the crop has 
been l i f ted and stored in the go-down and described as 
                                      
7  B.P. Explorat ion Co. (L ibya) v. Hunt, (1982) 1 All  ER 925. 
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such in the contract the goods may be stated to be specif ic 
and the Act would not apply.   In such an event the farmer 
would have to return the whole of the advance payment 
made by the buyer.  One may well ask, is this just ice?   Like 
al l  steps in the progress of development in dif ferent f ields, 
the Act though not perfect in itself  was a step in the r ight 
direction and l ike any other similar step while seeking to 
remedy a wrong, attent ion is focused on uncovered areas 
for further and future development. 
 
4.5 LANDMARK DECISIONS OF ENGLISH COURTS: 
 
Denny, Mott & Dickson Ltd. v. James B. Fraser & Co. 
Ltd. (1944).8 
 
 
In the case of Denny, Mott  & Dickson Ltd. v. James B. 
Fraser & Co. Ltd. ,  the facts of the case were: “A contract for 
the sale and purchase of t imber contained an opt ion for the 
appellants to purchase a timber-yard (which was meanwhile 
let to them) if  the contract was terminated on not ice given 
by either party.   But the Control of Timber Order, 1939 
further trading transactions under the contract became 
il legal,  but in 1941 the appellants gave notice to terminate 
the contract, and also to exercise their option to purchase 
the t imber-yard.”  On these facts, “the House of Lords held 
that the opinion to purchase was dependant on the trading 
agreement, that the 1939 Order had operated to frustrate 
the contract, and that, consequently, the opt ion to purchase 
lapsed upon the frustration since it arose only if  the 
contract was terminated by not ice.”   Commenting in this 
case: Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 11 th  
                                      
8  Denny, Mott & Dickson Ltd. v. James B. Fraser & Co. Ltd . 
(1944) AC 265. 
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edit ion at p. 557 has this to say – “Perhaps the most careful  
analysis of this theory has been made by Lord Wright, and 
the fol lowing two passages from his speech in a leading 
case i l lustrate his view that the doctr ine of frustrat ion has 
been invented by the courts in order to supplement the 
defects of the actual contract.9   
 
In the f i rst passage he said: 
 
“Where, as generally happens, and actually happened 
in the present case, one party claims that there had 
been frustrat ion and the other party contests it ,  the 
court decides the issue and decides it  ex post facto on 
the actual circumstances of the case.   The data for 
decision are, on the one hand the terms and 
construction of the contract, read in the l ight of the 
then existing circumstances, and on the other hand, 
the events which have occurred.   It is the court which 
has to decide what is the true posit ion between the 
parties.” 
 
The second passage is as fol lows: 
 
“The event is something which happens in the world of 
fact, and has to be found as a fact by the judge.   Its 
effect on the contract depends on the meaning of the 
contract, which is matter of law.  Whether there is 
frustration or not in any case depends on the view 
taken of the event and of its relation to the express 
contract by ‘ informed and experienced minds’.” 
 
                                      
9  Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, 11 t h  edition, p. 557, Law of 
Contract. 
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Anson on the aforesaid aspect said that “Moreover, had (the 
possibi l ity of the frustrating event actually) it  occurred to 
them, it is unlikely that they would have agreed that the 
contract was to come to an end: “It is not possible, to my 
mind (said Lord Wright),  to say that if  they had thought of it ,  
they would have said: ‘Well, if  that happens, al l  is over 
between us’.   On the contrary, they would almost certainly 
on the one side or the other have sought to introduce 
reservations or qualif icat ions or compensations.”10 
 
Sir Lindsay Parkinson Ltd. v. Commissioner of Works 
(1949).11 
 
Chronologically, the next case is in 1949, Sir Lindsay 
Parkinson & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of works,  in which 
Asquith, L.J., observed: “The question is whether the events 
al leged to frustrate the contract were ‘fundamental enough 
to transmute the job the contractor had undertaken into a 
job of a dif ferent kind, which the contract did not 
contemplate and to which it could not apply’.”   These 
observat ions have been quoted with approval subsequently 
in Davis Contractor’s case discussed later in this book.   
The f inding of frustration was handed down despite a clause 
in the contract that in the case of certain contingencies, the 
contract would only be suspended. Considering this,  
Asquith, L.J. observed: “A contract often provides that in 
the event of ‘delay’ through specif ied causes, the contract 
is not to be dissolved, but merely suspended, yet such a 
provision has been held not to apply where the delay was 
so abnormal,  so pre-emptive, as to fal l outside what the 
parties could possibly have contemplated in the suspension 
clause.   In other words ‘delay’ though l iteral ly describing 
                                      
10  Anson, 26 t h  edit ion, p. 457, Law of Contract. : 
11  Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of 
works , (1949) 2 KB 632, 665. 
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what has occurred, has been read as l imited to normal,  
moderate delay, and as not extending to an interrupt ion so 
differing in degree and magnitude from anything which 
could have been contemplated as to differ from it in kind.” 
 
British Movietonews Ltd. v. London and District 
Cinemas Ltd. (1951).12 
 
The next case in chronological order which is a landmark 
case in the development of Law on the Frustration of 
Contract, is the case of Brit ish Movietonews Ltd. v. London 
and Distr ict Cinemas Ltd. ,  in which the Court of Appeal,  
Lord Denning, who spoke for the Court, held that the Court 
could go outside the l iteral words of the contract and read it  
in the l ight to the parties presumed intent ion.   I t  would be 
helpful to set out the facts of the case, which were –  “The 
plaint if fs were f i lm distributors and the defendants were 
owners of a chain of cinemas.  In 1941 the plaint if fs 
contracted to supply the defendants with f i lms, the contract 
permitt ing either party to terminate the contract by giving 
four weeks notice.  In 1943, a government order restricted 
the supply of f i lm, and, in order to safeguard their posit ion, 
the part ies entered into a supplementary agreement in 
which it was provided that ‘the principal agreement shall  
remain in ful l force and effect unt il such time as the order is 
cancelled’.   I t  might have been expected that, when the war 
came to an end in 1945, the order would have been 
abrogated immediately, but this was not the case and it was 
cont inued in force for quite dif ferent reasons than those of 
national safety.   In 1948, the defendants gave four weeks 
notice, in accordance with the original agreement, to 
terminate the contract.  The plaintif fs refused to accept this 
notice as val id, and sued for breach of contract, the order 
                                      
12  Brit ish Movietonews Ltd. v. London and Distr ic t Cinemas 
Ltd.,  (1951) I  KB 190 (202) :  (1952) AC 166. 
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sti l l being in force.”  On these facts Lord Denning observed 
– “Even if  the contract is absolute in its terms, nevertheless 
it is not absolute in intent, it  wil l  not be held absolute in 
effect.   The day is gone when we can excuse an 
unforeseen injustice by saying to the sufferer.”   It  is your 
own folly.  You ought not to have passed that form of words.  
You ought to have put in a clause to protect yourself .  We 
no longer credit a party with the foresight of a prophet or 
his lawyer with the draftsmanship of a Chalmers.  We 
realize that they have their l imitat ions and make al lowances 
accordingly.” The Court held that the supplementary 
agreement was to endure only as long as wartime 
condit ions persisted.  The cont inuance of the order beyond 
that period was quite un-contemplated by the parties and 
the defendants should be relieved from liabil ity.   This view 
was promptly repudiated on appeal by the House of Lords.13   
Their Lordships reiterated the statement of Lord Loreburn 
that ‘No court has an absolving power’. Viscount Simon 
pointed that it  is not possible to release parties from the 
contractual obligations merely because it  is just and 
reasonable to do so, for this might well be the case when 
the only effect of the subsequent event had been to render 
the contract f inancial ly more onerous than the parties had 
anticipated.   A situat ion must arise to which it can be said 
that the contract no longer applies.  In the House of Lords, 
however the orthodox principle of construct ion was 
restated.  I t was the duty of the Courts to ascertain the 
intention of the parties from the documents i tself and not to 
re-write i t in the l ight of what the parties might (or might 
not) have had in mind at the t ime they made a contract.   
The words of agreement were clear and unequivocal and 
the defendants were bound by them. 
                                      
13   British Movietonews Ltd. v. London and Distr ic t Cinemas 
Ltd.,  (1951) I  KB 190 (202) :  1952 AC 166 
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Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urban District 
Council (1956).14 
 
 
Legal connotations of the word ‘f rustrat ion’, its implicat ions 
and its historical development have been considered in 
Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urban District Council .  
The facts of the case were: 
 
“Early in 1946 the respondents, in contemplat ion of a 
building scheme invited tenders by March 19, 1946.  On 
March 18 the appellants sent in a signed tender on the 
appropriate form undertaking the erection of (inter al ia) 78 
houses at Gudgeheath Lane, Fareham, in the country of 
Southampton, at a price of £ 92,425 and within the l imits 
specif ied.  With it went a covering letter of the same date 
and there was nothing in the appendix except a clause 
limit ing to some extent the contractor’s right to vary the 
contract sum in respect of price variat ions of materials and 
goods. Negotiations fol lowed and between March 18 and the 
date when the formal agreement was entered into the 
appellants in fact supplied the respondents with a detailed 
schedule of prices which was intended to constitute the list 
of materials and goods cal led for by appendix I, and was 
accepted.   No further reference was apparent ly made to the 
letter of March 18. 
 
The building contract was contained in a short agreement 
under seal dated July 9, 1946, and its main purpose was to 
identify several documents, which had come into existence 
during or for the purpose of the preceding negotiat ions.  
                                      
14  Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urban Distr ic t Counci l ,  
1956 AC 696. 
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By the general condit ions the appel lants agreed to build 78 
houses at Gudgeheath Lane within a period of eight months, 
completing 40 houses in six months and 70 houses in seven 
months.  There was a penalty clause of £ 5 a week of every 
house uncompleted after the contract period.  
 
The work started on June 20, 1946, for various reasons, the 
chief of them, the lack of ski l led labour, the work took not 
eight but 22 months.  The appellants were in due course 
paid the contract price, which, together with stipulated 
increases and adjustment, amounted to £ 94,424.  They 
contended, however, that owing to the long delay the 
contract pr ice had ceased to be applicable, and that they 
were ent it led to a payment on a quantum meruit  basis.  
 
The arbitrator set out the content ions of the appellants as 
follows: 
 
“(1) That the letter of March 18, 1946, become a 
term and condit ion of the contract.     (2) That in 
any event the contract was entered into on the basis 
that adequate supplies of labour and materials would 
be available at the t imes required.   (3)   That 
because adequate supplies of labour and materials 
were not available the footing of the contract was 
removed and the claimants were ent itled to be paid on 
the basis of a quantum meruit .” 
 
The arbitrator stated the question of law, which he was 
requested to state for the decision of the court: 
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“(a)  Whether the st ipulation as to availabil ity of  
labour and materials made in the claimants’ letter of 
March 18, 1946, became a term of the contract.   
 
(b) Whether the claimants are entit led to be paid 
any sum in excess of £ 94,424 17s. 0d. already paid 
to them.” 
 
Upon the matter coming before the court, Lord Goddar, 
C.J.,  was of the opinion that the letter of March 18, 1946, 
was incorporated in the contract, and upon that basis was 
further of opinion that there was an impl ied promise by the 
respondents to pay a further reasonable sum if  the 
condit ions of the letter were not sat isfied.   (On appeal, the 
Court of Appeal referred the case back to the arbitrator for 
further f indings of fact.) 
 
The arbitrator in his supplemental award dated October 22, 
1954, stated that content ions of the appellants, which 
repeated their previous contentions.  The content ions of the 
respondents included the following: 
 
“(4)  That in any event the footing on which the 
contract was agreed was not so changed that the 
contract could be declared or treated as void or the 
claimants be entit led to payment on quantum meruit. 
 
(5) That any claim on a quantum meruit  basis was 
precluded by reason of the conduct of the parties after 
a claim for addit ional payment was f irst intimated by 
the claimants.  That the respondents so far from 
allowing the claimants to cont inue to work on a 
dif ferent basis consistent ly maintained that the 
contract was st i l l applicable.” 
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The arbitrator then stated the question of law for the 
opinion of the Court: 
 
“(1) Whether this stipulation as to the availabil ity of 
labour and materials made in the claimants’ letter of 
March 18, 1946 became a terms of the contract.  
 
(2)   Whether the claimants are entit led to be paid 
any sum in excess of £ 94,424 17s. 9d. already paid 
to them, namely, on quantum meruit, by reason of (a) 
the foot ing upon which the contract was made having 
been so changed in the course of i ts execution that is 
provisions no longer appl ied, or (b) an implied term in 
the contract that i t  ceases to bind in the 
circumstances as found. (3) Whether, i f  the claimants 
became entit led to be paid any sum in excess of that 
already paid to them by the respondents, such a claim 
was barred by the conduct of the parties………” 
 
That arbitrator found that both parties entered into the 
contract on the basis that adequate supplies of labour and 
material would be available at the t imes required, that such 
supplies were not so available, and that, as the durat ion of 
the work was unavoidably extended f rom a period of eight 
months to one of 22 months, the footing of the contract was 
removed. 
 
The Court of Appeal held that the letter of March 18, 1946 
was not incorporated in the contract and that the contract 
was not frustrated.  Davis Contractors Ltd. appealed to the 
House of Lords.  The appeal was dismissed. 
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The judgment recorded by Lord Reid is i l luminating.  Some 
passages there from are reproduced below for ready 
reference : Lord Reid : I think it is necessary to consider 
what is the true basis of the law of frustration.  
 
Lord Porter said in Denny, Mott & Dickson Ltd. v. James B. 
Fraser & Co. Ltd.15 :  “Whether this result fol lows from a true 
construction of the contract or whether it is necessary to 
imply a term or whether again it  is more accurate to say that 
the result fol lows because the basis of the contract is 
overthrown, i t  is not necessary to decide.”   These are the 
three grounds of frustration, which have been suggested 
from time to t ime, and I think that it  may make a difference 
in two respects, which is chosen.   Construction of a 
contract and the implicat ion of a term are quest ions of law, 
whereas the quest ion whether the basis of a contract is 
overthrown, if  not dependent on the construction of the 
contract, might seem to be largely a matter for the judgment 
of a skil led man comparing what was contemplated with 
what has happened.  And if  the quest ion is truly one of 
construction, I f ind it dif f icult to see why he should not 
apply the ordinary rules regarding the admissibi l ity of 
extrinsic evidence whereas, if  it  is only a matter of 
comparing the contemplated with the actual posit ion, 
evidence might be admissible on a wider basis. 
 
Further, I am not sat isf ied that the result in necessari ly the 
same whether frustration is regarded as depending on the 
addit ion to the contract of an implied term or an depending 
on the construction of the contract as it stands. 
 
                                      
15  Denny, Mott & Dickson Ltd. v. James B. Fraser & Co. Ltd.,  
(1944) AC 265 : (1944) 1 Al l  ER 678.  
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Frustrat ion has often been said to depend on adding a term 
to be contract by implication: for example, Lord Loreburn in 
F.A. Tamplin Steamshihp Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-Mexican 
Petroleum Products Co. Ltd. ,16 af ter quoting language of 
Lord Blackburn said: “That seems to me another way of  
saying that from the nature of the contract it  cannot be 
supposed the part ies as reasonable men, intended it  to be 
binding on them under such altered condit ions.   Were the 
altered condit ions such that,  had they thought of them, they 
would have taken their chance of them, or such that as 
sensible men they would have said, ‘ i f  that happens of 
course, i t  is al l over between us’?  What, in fact, was the 
true meaning of the contract?  Since the parties have not 
provided for the cont ingency ought a Court to say i t is 
obvious they would have treated the thing as at an end`?” 
 
I f ind great dif f iculty in accepting this as the correct 
approach because it seems to me hard to account for 
certain decisions of this House in this way.   I cannot think 
that a reasonable man in the posit ion of the seaman in 
Horlock v. Beal17 would readily have agreed that the wages 
payable to his wife should stop if  his ship was caught in 
Germany at the outbreak of war, and I  doubt whether the 
charterers in the Bank Line case could have been said to be 
unreasonable if they refused to agree to a term that the 
contract was to come to an end in the circumstances which 
occurred.   These are not the only cases where I think it  
would be dif f icult  to say that a reasonable man in the 
posit ion of the party who opposes unsuccessful ly a f inding 
of frustrat ion would certainly have agreed to an implied term 
bringing it about.   
                                      
16  F.A. Tamplin Steamshihp Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-Mexican 
Petroleum Products Co. Ltd., (1916) 2 AC 397. 
17  Horlock v. Beal,  (1916) 1 AC 486.  
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I  may be al lowed to note an example of the artif icial ity of  
the theory of an implied term given by Lord Sands in James 
Scott & Sons Ltd. v. Del Sel18 :  “A t iger has escaped from a 
traveling menagerie.  The milk girl fails to deliver the milk.  
Possibly the milkman may be exonerated from any breach of 
contract; but even so it would seem hardly reasonable to 
base that exonerat ion on the ground that ‘t iger days 
excepted’ must be held as if  written into the milk contract.” 
 
I think that there is much force in Lord Wright’s crit icism in 
Denny, Mott and Dickson Ltd. v. James B. Fraser & Co. 
Ltd.19:  “The parties did not ant icipate ful ly and completely, i f  
at al l,  or provide for what actually happened.  It is not 
possible to my mind, to say that, if  they had thought of it ,  
they would have said: “Well if  that happens, al l is over 
between us.”   On the contrary they would almost certainly 
on the one side or the other have sought to introduce 
reservations or qualif icat ion or compensations.” 
 
It appears to me that frustrat ion depends, at least in most 
cases, not on adding any implied term, but on the true 
construction of the terms, which are in the contract read in 
light of the nature of the contract and of the relevant 
surrounding circumstances when the contract was made.   
There is much authority for this view. In British 
Movietonews Ltd. v. London and Distr ict Cinemas Ltd.20 
Viscount Simon said: “If, on the other hand, a considerat ion 
of the terms of the contract, in the l ight of the 
circumstances existing when it was made, shows that they 
                                      
18  James Scott & Sons Ltd. v. Del Sel,  1922 AC 592.  
19  Denny, Mott and Dickson Ltd. v. James B. Fraser & Co. 
Ltd.,  1944 AC 265 : (1944) 1 Al l  ER 678.  
20  Brit ish Movietonews Ltd. v. London and Distr ic t  Cinemas 
Ltd. ,  (1951) I  KB 190 (202 : 1952 Ac 166.  
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never agreed to be bound in a fundamentally different 
situat ion which has now unexpectedly emerged, the contract 
ceases to bind at that point – not because the Court in its 
discretion thinks it  just and reasonable to qualify the terms 
of the contract, but because on its true construct ion it does 
not apply in that s ituat ion.”  In Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. 
Ltd. v. Commissioners of Words Asquith,21 L.J., said: “In 
each case a delay or interruption was fundamental enough 
to transmute the job the contractor had undertaken into a 
job of a dif ferent kind, which the contract did not 
contemplate and to which it could not apply, although there 
was nothing in the express language of either contract to 
limit  i ts operat ions in this way.”  I need not mult iply 
citat ions, but I  might note a reference by Lord Cairns so 
long ago as 1876 to “addit ional or varied work, so pecul iar, 
so unexpected, and so different from what any person 
reckoned or calculated upon.”  On this view there is no 
need to consider what the part ies thought or how they or 
reasonable men in their shoes would have dealt with the 
new situat ion if  they had foreseen it.   The quest ion is 
whether the contract which they did make is,  on its true 
construction, wide enough to apply to the new situat ion: i f  i t  
is not, then it is at an end.” 
 
I do not think that there has been a better expression of 
that general idea than the one offered by Lord Loreburn in 
F.A. Tampl in Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-Mexican 
Petroleum Products Co. Ltd.22 I t  is shorter to quote than to 
try to paraphrase it:  “…………a court can and ought to 
examine the contract and circumstances in which it  was 
                                      
21  Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioners of 
Words Asquith, (1949) 2 KB 632, 665.  
22  F.A. Tamplin Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-Mexican 
Petroleum Products Co. Ltd., (1916) 2 AC 397.  
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made, not of course to vary, but only to explain i t , in order 
to see whether or not from the nature of it  the part ies must 
have made their bargain on the foot ing that a particular 
thing or state of things would continue to exist.  And if  they 
must have done so, then a term to that effect wil l  be 
implied, though it is not expressed in the contract.   No 
court has an absolving power, but it  can infer from the 
nature of the contract and the surrounding circumstances 
that a condit ion which is not expressed was a foundation on 
which the parties contracted.”   So express, the principle of 
frustration, the origin of which seems to lie in the 
development of commercial law, is seen to be branch of a 
wider principle, which forms part of the English law of  
contract as a whole.   But, in my opinion, ful l weight ought 
to be given to the requirement that the parties “must have 
made” their bargain on the part icular foot ing.   Frustration is 
not to be light ly invoked as the dissolvent of a contract.  
 
Lord Loreburn ascribes the dissolut ion to an implied term of 
the contract that was actually made.   This approach is in 
line with the tendency of English courts to refer al l the 
consequences of a contract to t wil l of those who made it.    
But there is something of a logical diff iculty in seeing how 
the part ies could even impliedly have provided for 
something which ex hypothesis they neither expected nor 
foresaw; and the ascription of frustration to an implied term 
of the contract has been crit icized as obscuring the true 
act ion of the Court which consists in applying an object ive 
rule of the law of contract to the contractual obligation that 
the parties have imposed upon themselves.   So long as 
each theory produces the same result as the other, as 
normally i t  does, i t  matters l it t le which theory is avowed 
(see Brit ish Movietonews Ltd. v. London and Distr ict  
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Cinemas Ltd.23,  per Viscount Simon).   But it  may sti l l  be of 
some importance to recall that, i f  the matter is to be 
approached by way of implied term, the solution of any 
particular case is not to be found by inquiring what the 
parties themselves would have agreed on had they been, as 
they were not, forewarned.   It is not merely that no one can 
answer that hypothet ical quest ion: it  is also that the 
decision must be given “irrespective of the individuals 
concerned, their temperaments and fail ings, their interest 
and circumstances.”   The legal effect of frustrat ion “does 
not depend on their intention or their opinion, or even 
knowledge, as to the event.   On the contrary, i t  seems that 
when the event occurs “the meaning of the contract must be 
taken to be, not what the parties did intend (for they had 
neither thought nor intention regarding it), but that which 
the part ies, as fair  and reasonable men, would presumably 
have agreed upon if , having such possibil ity in view, they 
had made express provision as to their several rights and 
liabil i t ies in the event of i ts occurrence.” 
 
By this t ime it might seem that the parties themselves have 
become so far disembodied spirits that their actual persons 
should be al lowed to rest in peace. In their place there r ises 
the f igure of the fair and reasonable man.  And the 
spokesman of the fair and reasonable man, who represents 
after al l no more than the anthropomorphic conception of 
just ice, is and must be the Court itself .   So perhaps it  
would be simpler to say at the outset that frustration occurs 
whenever the law recognizes that without default of  either 
party a contractual obligation has become incapable of 
being performed because the circumstances in which 
performance is called for would render it a thing radically 
                                      
23  Brit ish Movietonews Ltd. v. London and Distr ic t Cinemas 
Ltd . ,  (1951) I  KB 190 (202 : 1952 Ac 166.  
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different from that which was undertaken by the contract.   
Non haec in foedera veni.    I t  was not this that I promised to 
do. 
 
There is, however, no uncertainty as to the materials upon 
which the Court must proceed.  “The data for decision are, 
on the one hand, the terms and condit ions of the contract,  
read in the light of the then existing circumstances, and on 
the other hand the events which have occurred.  In the 
nature of things there is often no room for any elaborate 
inquiry.   The Court must act upon a general impression of 
what i ts rule requires.   It  is for that reason that special 
importance is necessarily attached to the occurrence of any 
unexpected event that, as it were, changes the face of 
things.  But,  even so, it  is not hardship or “ inconvenience or 
material loss itself  which calls the principle of f rustrat ion 
into play.   There must be as wel l such a change in the 
signif icance of the obligat ion that the things undertaken 
would, if  performed, be a dif ferent thing from that 
contracted for.” 
 
I am bound to say that, if  this is the law, the appellants’  
case seems to me a long way from a case of frustration. 
 
VISCOUNT SIMONDS, LORD MORTON OF HENRYTON 
AND LORD SOMERVELL OF HARROW also delivered 
judgment dismissing the appeal. 
 
Davis Contractors case is a landmark and a very important 
one in the development of law of frustration.  The judgment, 
though negative in its result as having rejected the plea of  
frustration, is valuable in as much as while clearly and 
concisely stating the test by reference to which supervening 
events have to be considered as qual ifying for frustration, i t  
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sounds a warning that frustration is not to be lightly 
invoked.   It is not every involuntary supervening event 
adversely affecting the performance of the contract 
competing for acceptance as frustration can be judicially 
approved for conferment of that qualif icat ion.   In every 
contract there is an element of risk involved, as a contract, 
in ult imate analysis, is an arrangement for allocation of risk 
between the part ies.   Having agreed to that arrangement, 
the contract is sacred and sacrosanct and binding on the 
parties.   No party can be permitted to wriggle out of this by 
pleading supervening circumstances, which were 
foreseeable and could be provided for.   
 
In every building contract, i t  is assumed by the part ies that 
the contract can only be performed if labour and material is 
available in adequate quantit ies at the required t ime.  But 
the quest ion is whether this is a term of the contract?  Mere 
mention of this fact in the covering letter does not make it 
an express term of the contract as held in this rul ing.   
Further, this rul ing is an authority for the proposit ion that 
this also would not be an implied term of the contract.    
Signif icant ly, there has been some dif ference in judicial 
opinions on this point as the High Court in U.K. held it to be 
a term of the contract whi le the Appellate Court held i t 
otherwise, with which the House of Lords concurred.   The 
reason of the rule seems to be, in the words of the House of 
Lords, “the possibi l ity of enough labour and materials not 
being available was before of the eyes of the part ies and 
could have been subject of special contractual st ipulat ion.  
It was not made so.” 
 
The covering letter specif ically stated, “our tender is subject 
adequate supplies of material and labour being available as 
and when required to carry out the work within the t ime 
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specif ied”.   But yet this part of the covering letter was not 
held to be incorporated in the contract, despite the fact that 
Appendix I did make a mention of this covering letter dated 
18-3-46.   As the mention was limited to the price variation 
of materials and wages of labour as Appendix I only 
referred to these two topics, its scope was restricted to 
these two items.  Signif icant ly, though the High Court, Lord 
Goddar, C.J., was of the opinion that the ent ire letter of 18-
3-46 was incorporated, the Court of Appeal restricted the 
scope to the subject matter of Appendix I with which House 
of Lords agreed.  This il lustrates the importance of the 
interpretation of contract.   I f  the opinion of Lord Goddard 
that the enti re let ter of 18-3-46 was incorporated in the 
contract had held the f i led, this statement about the 
availabil ity of adequate supplies of material and labour at 
the t ime required would have formed the basis of the 
contract and its non-availabil i ty at the required time and 
consequent delay in execut ion of the contract from 8 
months st ipulated period to 22 months of the actual  
execution perhaps with the far-reaching consequences of 
the claim of the contractor for being paid at quantum meruit  
basis accepted. 
 
The builder, having taken the risk of non-availabil i ty of 
labour and material in adequate quantit ies at the required 
t ime, cannot complain if  he is unable to get labour and 
material in adequate quantit ies at the proper t ime which 
results in delay in completion and consequent increase in 
the cost due to inf lation.   Inf lation, in modern t imes, is a 
fact of l ife and accepted as a recurrent, economic 
phenomenon.   It is for prudent businessmen to provide a 
cushion for i t  in the price quoted in the contract.  One 
cannot help having a feeling that every prudent builder does 
make an al lowance for the inf lat ionary element in his quoted 
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price and also keeps a margin for delay in complet ion due 
to various causes, including scarcity of labour and material 
in adequate quantit ies at the required t ime.  If  f rustrat ion 
were permitted on such a plea, it  may become possible to 
plead frustrat ion in almost every contract.   Frustrat ion is 
not to be l ightly invoked as has been observed repeatedly 
by judicial  authorit ies in a catena of cases, e.g.,  Lord 
Radclif f  in Davis Contractors’ case.  
 
This rul ing emphasizes that the effect of the doctrine of 
frustration is the termination of the contract by operation of 
law on the emergence of a fundamentally dif ferent situat ion.  
To use the language of Asquith, L.J., in Sir Lindsays 
Parkinson and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Works24:   The 
question is to be decided by a reference to whether the 
change was “fundamental enough to transmute the job the 
contractor had undertaken into a job of a dif ferent kind 
which the contract did not contemplate and to which it could 
not apply”.  In certain given situations, the change in the 
basis of the contract and the new situation is clearly 
demarcated and can easi ly be ascertained.  In certain other 
situat ions, the change is gradual and imperceptible and not 
that easy of ascertainment. The quest ion in such a situat ion 
arises when the f rustration occurred. Incidentally, in the 
present case the point of t ime when the frustration occurred 
was not considered to be of importance because it was 
assumed that whatever the point of t ime when it did occur, 
the contractor would be paid for the whole of the work on 
quantum meruit basis.   That is why it  has been observed by 
the House of Lords (Lord Reid):  “I did not pursue this 
matter because the respondents have admitted that if  there 
was frustrat ion at any t ime, the appellants are entit led to 
                                      
24  Sir Lindsays Parkinson and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of 
Works, (1949) 2 KB 632.  
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the sum awarded.”  However, this point assumes importance 
because of the present posit ion of law of apportionment 
between the part ies consequent on frustration of the 
contract as embodied in Law Reforms (Frustrated 
Contracts) Act, 1943 of U.K.   Apart from that, the real  
knotty problem is what events would qualify for frustrat ion.   
Non-availabil ity of labour and material in adequate 
quantit ies at the required t ime is an ordinary feature of a 
building contract and every prudent contractor is expected 
to be ready for such a contingency.   This, no doubt, results 
in delay and increases the cost.   But the quest ion arises; 
does it make the contract radically dif ferent so as to attract 
the doctr ine of frustrat ion?  Merely because the job may 
become more onerous would not, by itself , be suff icient to 
sustain a plea of frustration. In the words of House of Lords 
(Lord Reid): “In a contract, of this kind the contractor 
undertakes to do the work for a def inite sum and he takes 
the risk of the cost being greater or less than he expected.   
If  delays occur through no one’s fault that may be in the 
contemplation of the contract, and there may be provision 
for extra t ime being given: to that extent the other party 
takes the risk of delay.   But he does not take the r isk of the 
cost being increased by such delay.  It may be that delay 
could be of a character so dif ferent from anything 
contemplated that the contract was at an end, but in this 
case, in my opinion, the most that could be said is that the 
delay was greater in degree than was to be expected.   It 
was not caused by any new and unforeseeable factor or 
event: the job proved to be more onerous but it  never 
became a job of a dif ferent kind from that contemplated in 
the contract.” 
 
The factor of delay is only one of the causes of frustration.   
The categories of cases, which could qual ify for frustrat ion, 
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are not closed.  An anthology of such cases would only be 
il lustrative and cannot be exhaustive. The test whether a 
particular case qualif ies for frustration or not, has been laid 
down by Lord Loreburn which has been quoted with 
approval by House of Lords (Lord Radclif fe in this case). 
 
There was a tendency to ascribe frustrat ion to an implied 
term of the contract because of the judicial weakness of 
ascribing every consequence or the contract to a term of 
the contract,  whether express or implied, so as to bring it  
within the ambit of the theory of consensus ad idem and to 
feed to the doctr ine of helplessness of the court to make or 
modify the contract and restr ict its power to interpret ing and 
enforcing the contract as made by the part ies.   But,  
subsequently,  this att i tude was discarded and the Courts 
took upon themselves the function of doing what was 
considered to be just and reasonable under the 
circumstances. 
 
The problem crystall izes itself  into as to what was the basis 
of the contract and what is the new supervening situation, 
which makes it radically dif ferent?  How is the court to 
address itself to this task?  This is what Lord Radclif fe has 
to say on the point:  “There is, however, no uncertainty as 
to the materials upon which the court must proceed.  “The 
data for decision are, on the one hand, the terms and 
condit ions of the contract, read in the l ight of the then 
exist ing circumstances, and on the other hand the events 
which have occurred.”  In the nature of things there is often 
no room for any elaborate inquiry.  The Court must act upon 
a general impression of what its rule requires.   I t is for that 
reason that special importance is necessari ly attached to 
the occurrence of any unexpected event that, as it were, 
changes the face of things.   But, even so, it  is not hardship 
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or inconvenience or material loss itself , which cal ls the 
principle of frustrat ion into play. There must be as well such 
a change in the signif icance of the obligation that thing 
undertaken would, if  performed be a dif ferent thing from 
that contracted for.”  The expressions “radically dif ferent” 
and “signif icance of the obligat ion” have been judicially 
considered and cr it ically analysed in the catena of cases 
collectively called Suez Canal Closure Cases. 
 
Tsakiroglou & Co. v. Noblee Thorl GMBH25 
 
The consequences of the closure of the Suez Canal in 1956 
on contracts were l it igated in two English cases in which the 
plea of frustration was upheld by the original Court but they 
were over-ruled subsequently.   The Suez Canal was closed 
again in 1967 and the plea of frustration was again rejected. 
 
The popular react ion to the closure of the Suez Canal was 
that this was an event unforeseen and unforeseeable when 
the contract was entered into.  Nobody could predict that 
Nasser Government in Egypt would take such a drastic 
act ion as to close the Suez Canal and thus compel the 
ships to make the voyage via Cape of Good Hope.   This 
popular reaction was ref lected in the init ial judicial  
decisions of the original court but when the matter was 
considered by the House of Lords, they over-ruled those 
decisions and, came to the conclusion that such contracts 
were not frustrated. 
 
Closure of the Suez Canal and taking the ship on its voyage 
via Cape of Good Hope entailed that the voyage, instead of 
                                      
25  Tsakiroglou & Co. v. Noblee Thor l GMBH ,  1962 AC 93. 
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4386 miles and taking three weeks, was 11,137 miles and 
took seven weeks and the freight per ton, instead of £ 7.10 
increased to £ 15 per ton. One would have thought this 
involuntary supervening circumstance had consequences of  
such dimensions that their impact on the signif icance of the 
obligation would make the contract radically dif ferent and 
qualify for frustrat ion, but i t was not to be.   It would be 
helpful to consider the case of Tsakiroglou.  The judgment 
in this case is again a negative judgment but i ts value l ies 
in i ts incisive analysis of the facts by reference to the tests 
for qualifying for frustration.  We may say that in this 
context hard cases make good law.  The contract in the 
case of Tsakiroglou’s case was entered into on 4 t h October 
1956 and the shipment was to be made during November – 
December 1956 but as the Canal was blocked on 2nd  
November, 1956, and remained blocked ti l l  Apri l 1957, i t  
could not be done via the Suez but it  was feasible to make 
the voyage via Cape of Good Hope. It was argued that i t  
was an impl ied term of the contract that shipment was to be 
via the Suez, though nothing was expressly mentioned in 
the contract.  The ordinary rule is that a shipper must ship 
by the scheduled and customary route.   If  there is no such 
route, then by a pract icable and reasonable route but the 
question arises at what point of t ime this has to be 
considered at the date of entering into the contract or at the 
t ime of performance?  To this query, the answer has been 
given in Tsakiroglou’s case in the fol lowing words: “There 
appears to be no decided case about this and, perhaps, that 
is not surprising because the point cannot often ar ise.   
Apart from the opinion of MacNair, J., in Carapanayoti & 
Co. Ltd. v. E.T. Green Ltd.26,  and the Court of Appeal in this 
case, which are against the appellants, there are a few 
                                      
26  Carapanayoti  & Co. Ltd. v. E.T. Green Ltd. ,  (1959) 1 QB 
131 : (1958) 3 Al l  ER 115.  
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expressions of opinion of this matter, but I shall  not 
examine them as the precise point may not have been in the 
minds of their authors, and I am doing no injustice to the 
appellants because on the whole, these opinions favour the 
respondent’s content ion. Regarding the quest ion as an open 
one, I would ask, which is the more reasonable 
interpretation of the rule?  
 
If  the appellants are right, the quest ion whether the contract 
is ended does not depend on the extent to which the part ies 
or their r ights and obl igations are affected by the 
substitut ion of the new route for the old.   If  the new route, 
made necessary by the closing of the old, is substant ially 
different, the contract would be at an end, however slight 
the effect of the change might be on the parties. That 
appears to me to be quite unreasonable; in effect, it  means 
writ ing the old route into the contract, although the part ies 
have chosen not to say anything about the matter.   On the 
other hand, if  the rule is to ascertain the route at the t ime of 
performance, then the question whether the seller is sti l l  
bound to ship the goods by the new route does depend on 
the circumstances as they affect him and the buyer, whether 
or not they are such as to infer frustration of the contract.   
That appears to me much more just and reasonable and, in 
my opinion, that should be held to be the proper 
interpretation of the rule.” 
 
As regards the increase in the rate of the freight from £ 
7.10 to £ 15 per ton consequent on the change of the route, 
it  has been signif icant ly remarked in this judgment: “I  need 
not consider what the result might be if  the increase had 
reached an astronomical f igure.”   Perhaps it was suggested 
that the increase from £ 7.10 to £ 15 was not such an 
increase and therefore could be absorbed by the risk taken 
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by the seller in entering into the contract. If  it  had been 
astronomical, perhaps dif ferent considerat ion would have 
arisen. 
 
In this case, the stores shipped were groundnuts and the 
voyage was to begin at Port Sudan and to end at Hamburg.   
The increase of the durat ion of the voyage from three weeks 
to seven weeks and the ship on its voyage via the Cape of 
Good Hope having to cross the Equator twice did not have 
the effect of damaging the cargo of groundnuts.  It  has been 
observed in this judgment: “There might be cases where 
damage to the goods was l ikely result  of the longer voyage 
which twice crossed the Equator or perhaps the buyer would 
be prejudiced by the fact that the normal durat ion of the 
voyage viz. Suez was about three weeks whereas the 
normal duration via the Cape was seven weeks.  But there 
is not such thing in this case that the longer voyage could 
damage the groundnuts or that the delay could have caused 
loss to those buyers of which they could complaint.”    
Perhaps if  the cargo was perishable and if  the price of the 
stores shipped were fal l ing in the market, the situat ion 
would have been different.  
 
The Court has considered the altered nature of the voyage 
and addressed itself  to the task of analyzing as to what was 
the dif ference between the two so as to take a decision 
whether there was change in the signif icance of the 
obligation and the difference was radical enough as to 
qualify for frustrat ion. 
 
The obligation of the seller was to f ind a ship proceeding to 
the destination by a practicable and a reasonable route.   
There may be a commercial  difference between paying £ 
7.10 and paying £ 15 per ton freight, but the performance 
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was not fundamentally dif ferent.    It  must be held that the 
performance was fundamentally dif ferent in a legal sense, 
not merely in a commercial sense.   Lord Radclif fe in this 
case has considered the question of the obligat ion of the 
seller and stated: “The real issue as I see it, is to determine 
how to def ine the obligat ion of the appellants, the vendors, 
under the sale contract of October 4, 1956, so far as it  
related to shipment of the goods sold and the provision of 
shipping documents.   Once it is sett led what that def init ion 
should be, there is not much dif f iculty in seeing what are 
the legal consequences that should follow, having regard to 
the facts found for us by the Special Case. 
 
“This is a sale of goods on c. i.f .  terms.  Such a sale 
involves a variety of obligat ions, both those written out in 
the contract itself  and those supplied by impl icat ion of law 
for the business eff icacy of the transaction.   The only 
sector of these obligations that is relevant for the purpose 
of this case is the vendor’s duty “to procure a contract of 
affreightment, under which the goods wil l be delivered at 
the destination contemplated by the contract.”  (Biddell 
Brothers v. E. Clemens Horst Co.27 per Hamilton, J.).    Even 
within this sector, however, there are gaps, which the law 
has to f i l l in; for instance, what form of contract of 
affreightment wi l l meet the needs of the transact ion, and 
route or routes are permissible for the carrying vessel 
selected?   In the present case, nothing turns on the form of 
the bil l of  lading, which is not in evidence; everything turns 
on the quest ion of route.   The written contract makes no 
condit ion about this, its only st ipulation being that shipment 
is to be from an East African port,  by which we are asked to 
assume that the parties in fact meant Port Sudan.   So the 
                                      
27  Biddel l Brothers v. E. Clemens Horst Co .  
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voyage was to begin at Port Sudan and to end at Hamburg.   
The primary duty under this part of the contract was to 
dispatch the groundnuts by sea from one port to dest ination 
of the other.   At the date when the contract was entered 
into, the usual and normal route for the shipment of 
Sudanese groundnuts from Port Sudan to Europe was to be 
shipped via the Suez Canal.   It  would be unusual and rare 
for any substant ial parcel  of Sudanese groundnuts from Port 
Sudan to Europe to be shipped via the Cape at any time 
when the Suez Canal was open.   The Suez Canal was 
blocked on November 2, 1956, and remained blocked unt il  
Apri l 1957.   Nevertheless during the months of November /  
December, 1956 the period in which the vendors had to ship 
under the contract, it  was feasible for them to transport the 
goods via the Cape of Good Hope.   It would have invoked a 
voyage of some 11,137 miles as against 4,386 miles by way 
of Suez, and it would have meant a rise in freight rate of 
twenty-f ive per cent (and, in the last two weeks of 
December, one hundred per cent), above that rul ing when 
the sale contract was made.   These dif ferences did not,  
however, in the opinion of the Board of Appeal of the 
Incorporated Oil Seed Associat ion who state the Case, 
render transport by the Cape route commercially or 
fundamental ly dif ferent from transport by way of the Suez 
Canal.” 
 
Lord Simon while agreeing with the above conclusion 
observed : “………….the Courts refuse to apply the doctrine 
of frustrat ion unless they consider that to hold the parties to 
further performance would, in the l ight of the changed 
circumstances, alter the fundamental nature of the contract.    
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Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen 
Kaisha Ltd. (1962).28 
 
  
Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha 
Ltd.,  Diplock, L.J.: Every synal lagmatic contract contains in 
it the seeds of the problem; in what event wil l  a party be 
rel ieved of his undertaking to do that which he has agreed 
to do but has not yet done? The contract may itself  
expressly def ine some of these events, as in the 
cancellation clause in a charter-party, but human 
prescience being l imited, i t seldom does so exhaustively 
and often fails to do so at al l.   In some classes of contracts, 
such as sale of goods, marine insurance, contracts of 
affreightment evidenced by bi l ls of lading and those 
between parties to bi l ls of exchange, Parl iament has 
defined by statute some of the events not provided for 
expressly in individual contracts of that class; but, where an 
event occurs the occurrence of which neither the part ies nor 
Parl iament have expressly stated wil l discharge one of the 
parties from further performance of his undertakings, i t  is 
for the court to determine whether the event has had this 
effect or not.   The test whether an event has this effect or 
not has been stated in a number of metaphors al l of  which I  
think amount to the same thing; does the occurrence of the 
event deprive the party who has further undertakings sti l l  to 
perform of substantial ly the whole benefit which it  was the 
intention of the parties as expressed in the contract that he 
should obtain as the consideration for performing those 
undertakings?  This test is applicable whether or not the 
event occurs as a result of the default of one of the part ies 
to the contract but the consequences of the event are 
                                      
28  Hong Kong Fir  Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha 
Ltd. (1962)  2 QB 26 : (1962) 1 Al l  ER 474.  
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different in the two cases. Where the event occurs as a 
result of the default of one party, the party in default cannot 
rely on it  as rel ieving himself  of the performance of any 
further undertakings on his part, and the innocent party,  
although entit led to, need not treat the event as rel ieving 
him of the performance of his own undertakings.  This is 
only a specif ic applicat ion of the fundamental legal and 
moral rule that a man should not be al lowed to take 
advantage of his own wrong.   Where the event occurs as a 
result of the default of neither party, each is rel ieved of the 
further performance of his own undertakings, and their 
r ights in respect of undertakings previously are now 
regulated by the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 
1943.  
 
The problem is this; when wil l a party to a contract be 
rel ieved of his undertaking to do that which he has agreed 
to do but has not yet done?   This has exercised the Engl ish 
Courts for centuries, probably ever since assumpsit  
emerged as a form of action distinct from covenant and 
debt, and long before even the earl iest cases which we 
have been invited to examine; but unt i l the r igour of the rule 
in Paradine v. Jane29 was mitigated in the middle of the last 
century by the class judgment of Blackburn, J., in Taylor v. 
Caldwell,30 and in Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Co.,31 
it  was in general only events result ing from one party failure 
to perform his contractual obligat ions which were regarded 
as capable of rel ieving the other party from continuing to 
perform that which he had undertaken to do.   It was not,  
however, unt i l  Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Co. that 
                                      
29  Paradine v. Jane, 1647 Aleyn 26.  
30  Taylor  v. Caldwell ,  (1863) 3 B & S 826.  
31  Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Co.,  (1874) LR 4 QB 
180.  
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i t  was f inally recognized that i t  was the happening of the 
event and not the fact that the event was the result of a 
breach by one party of his contractual obligations that 
rel ieved the other party from further performance of his 
obligations. 
 
In 1874, when the doctrine of frustration was being foaled 
by “ impossibi l i ty of performance” out of “condit ion 
precedent”, it  is not surprising that the explanat ion given by 
Bramwell, B., should give ful l  credit to the idea by 
suggesting that in addition to the express warranty to sail  
with al l possible dispatch there was an implied condit ion 
precedent that the ship should arrive at the named port in 
t ime for the voyage contemplated.  In Jackson v. Union 
Marine Insurance Co.  there was no breach of the express 
warranty; but, if  there had been, to engraft the implied 
condit ion on the express warranty would have been merely 
a more complicated way of saying that a breach of a 
shipowner’s undertaking to sail  with al l  possible dispatch 
may, but wil l not necessari ly, give r ise to an event which 
wi ll deprive the charterer of substantially the whole benefit  
which it was intended that he should obtain from the 
charter.   Now that the doctrine of frustrat ion has matured 
and f lourished for nearly a century and the old technicali ties 
of pleading “condit ion precedent” are more than a century 
out of date, it  does not clar ify, but on the contrary obscures, 
the modern principle of law where such an event has 
occurred as a result of a breach of an express stipulat ion in 
a contract, to cont inue to add the now unnecessary 
colophon, “therefore it was an implied condit ion of the 
contract that part icular kind of breach of an express 
warranty should not occur.” 
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The common law evolves not merely by breeding new 
principles but also, when they are ful ly grown, by burying 
their ancestors. 
 
Sellers L.J. and Upjohn L.J. delivered judgment to the same 
effect, dismissing the appeal. 
 
Ocean Tramp Tanker Corporation v. V/O Sovfracht (The 
‘Eugenia’) (1964).32 
 
 
Ocean Tramp Tanker Corporation v. V/O Sovfracht  (The 
‘Eugenia’) is the case marking a milestone in the 
development of Law of Frustration of Contract.   The facts 
of that case were: “The plaintif fs chartered to the 
defendants the m.v. Eugenia then at Genoa on a time 
charter for a ‘ t rip out to India via the Black Sea’ and back.   
The charter provided that the vessel was ‘not to be ordered 
to, nor continue in, any place which would bring her within a 
zone which was dangerous as the result of any actual or 
threatened host il it ies’. In breach of this provision, the 
defendants al lowed the Eugenia to enter the Suez Canal 
when hosti l it ies had already commenced and she was 
trapped there when the canal was blocked.   The plaintif fs 
claimed that the defendants had repudiated the charter by 
their conduct.  The defendants resisted their claim on the 
ground inter al ia that the charter-party was frustrated by 
what took place.”  On these facts the Court of Appeal, Lord 
Denning upheld the plaint if f ’s contention observing: “The 
defendants could not rely on the fact that the ship was 
trapped, for this was due to their own default.   Nor could 
they claim that the charter-party had been frustrated by the 
                                      
32  Ocean Tramp Tanker Corporat ion v. V/O Sovfracht (The 
‘Eugenia’)  (1964) 2 QB 226.  
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closure of the canal, for this did not bring about a 
fundamental ly dif ferent situat ion such as to frustrate the 
venture.   The alternative route avai lable around the Cape 
was not fundamentally dif ferent, but merely longer and more 
expensive; and the cargo was not of such a nature as to be 
adversely affected by the longer voyage.   In any event, the 
extra t ime taken could not be considered excessive when 
matched with the duration of the whole journey out to India 
and back.   So the defendants were l iable for breach.” 
 
Staffordshire Area Health Authority v. South 
Staffordshire Waterworks Co. (1978).33 
 
In 1908 the predecessors in t it le of the plaintif fs owned a 
hospital, which took its water from its own well. Under a 
private Act of 1909, the defendants were empowered to 
pump water from a well a mile away, subject to providing 
the hospital with any water, which it needed, if  the supply 
from the hospital ’s well was reduced.   The rate was to be 
that which it would have cost the hospital to get the water 
from their own well and disputes were to be subject to 
arbitration.  By 1918 there was a def iciency, which was 
supplied by the defendants, and in 1927 the hospital  
decided to abandon their wel l. In 1929 a contract was then 
concluded under which ‘at all  t imes hereafter ’ the hospital 
was receive 5,000 gallons of water a day free and al l  the 
addit ional water i t  required at the rate of 7d (2.9p) per 
thousand gallons.  By 1975 the normal rate was 45p per 
1,000 gallons and the Water Company claimed to be 
entit led to terminate the agreement by giving six months’ 
notice.” 
                                      
33  Staffordshire Area Health Authority v. South Staffordshire 
Waterworks Co., (1978) 3 Al l  ER 769 : (1978) 1 WLR 
1387. 
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On these facts the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning held that 
– “the contract had been frustrated by inf lation ‘outside the 
realm of their speculations altogether,  or of any reasonable 
person sitt ing in their chairs’.” Commenting on this 
Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s have said34: “It is c lear law 
that frustration brings the contract to an end automatically 
but in this case Lord Denning, M.R. held that the effect of 
inflat ion was to render the contract terminable by 
reasonable notice.   Presumably this is because this was al l  
that the Water Authority were claiming but it  rel ieved him 
from the onerous task of deciding when the inf lat ion rate 
became suff icient ly great to frustrate the contract”. 
…………”With respect, however, this view, which was not 
concurred in by the other members of the Court is either 
wrong or involves a massive change in the law as 
previously understood.   There are thousands, i f  not 
mill ions, of contracts potential ly within the scope of this 
principle, for example, long leases for 99 years or more at 
f ixed ground rents or long-term policies of l i fe insurance.   
Furthermore, the facts of the case would not appear to 
sat isfy Lord Denning, M.R.’s own test since in 1929 hyper-
inflat ion was a wel l-known phenomenon which had recent ly 
devastated the economies of several European countries.”  
 
National Carriers Ltd. v. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd. 
(1981).35 
 
The facts of the case were that there was a lease of a 
warehouse between the part ies.   Subsequent to the 
execution of the lease, access to the warehouse was closed 
                                      
34  Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, 11 t h  edition, p. 563, Law of 
Contract. 
35  National Carr iers Ltd. v. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd . , (1981) 
1 Al l  ER 161  
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by Local Authority. The question arose whether the lease 
was frustrated?  House of Lords observed: “Although by the 
t ime access to warehouse was restored, the appellants 
would have lost two out of 10 years’ use of the warehouse 
and their business would have been severely disrupted, but 
closure of the access to the warehouse would have been 
suff icient ly grave to amount to a frustrat ing event since 
there would be further three years of the lease remaining 
after access was re-established. 
 
 “The actual decision in the National Carriers case was that 
events which prevented one of the parties from putt ing the 
subject-matter to its intended use were not suff iciently 
serious to frustrate the contract.   In this respect, the case,  
so far from depart ing from, actually i l lustrates, the approach 
adopted in the Brit ish Movietonews case. It is pertinent to 
note that in the National Carr iers case Lord Roskil l  has 
referred to inf lat ion as one of the circumstances in which 
doctr ine of frustrat ion may be invoked sometimes with 
success, sometime without.” 36 
 
Case of ‘The Nema’ (1981).37 
 
The facts of the case were that by a charter party dated 
02.11.1978, the owners of a vessel chartered her for six or 
seven consecut ive voyages from Sorel in Canada to ports in 
Europe between Apri l and December 1979.   The charterers 
were entit led to cancel for any voyage for which the vessel 
was not ready for loading by 5 t h  December 1979 and were 
not l iable to pay freight in respect of t ime lost in loading on 
account of strikes.   A str ike broke out at Sorel when the 
vessel was away on the f irst voyage and was st il l  in 
                                      
36  Tr ietel ,  (1987), 7 t h  edi t ion, p. 665, Law of Contract. 
37  ‘The Nema’, (1981) 2 Al l  ER 1030.    
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progress when she arrived back at Sorel  on 20 t h June 1979, 
preventing her from being loaded for second voyage.   
Owners claimed that the charter party was at an end 
because of frustrat ion. The Arbitrator held that it  was 
frustrated.   The award was upheld ultimately by House of 
Lords observing: “Although the question of frustrat ion is 
never a pure quest ion of fact and ult imately always, 
involves a question of law, whether the frustrat ing event has 
made performance of the contract something which is 
radically dif ferent from that which was undertaken by the 
contract, that is not, in i tself, suff icient to just ify the court in 
granting leave to appeal from the Arbitrator’s decision or in 
imposing its own view in place of that of the Arbitrator 
……………….There is no reason, in principle, why a strike 
should not be capable of causing frustration of an adventure 
by delay.   It  cannot be r ight to divide causes of delay into 
classes and then to say that one class can and another 
class cannot bring about frustrat ion.  It is not the nature of 
the cause of delay which matters so much, as the effect of 
that cause on performance of the obl igat ions.” 
 
BP Exploration v. Hunt (1982).38 
 
The defendant had received from the Libyan government a 
concession to explore for and extract oi l in the Libyan 
Desert.  He entered into an arrangement with the plaint if fs 
under which he agreed to transfer a half-share in the 
concession to them and they agreed to explore, develop 
and operate the concession at their own expense.  If  oi l  was 
discovered in commercial quantities and exploited the 
plaint if fs would be able to recover this init ial expenditure 
                                      
38  BP Exploration v. Hunt, (1982) 1 Al l ER 925. 
 
  
- 226 - 
f rom the defendant’s share of the revenues from the oil .    In 
effect if  al l worked well and oi l  was discovered in 
commercial quantit ies, the plaintif fs would recover their 
exploration costs and thereafter have a half-share in the oi l;  
if  oil was discovered the defendant would not have to bear 
any part of the cost of exploring for it .  
 
In fact oi l was discovered in very large quantit ies on the 
concession and the parties began to exploit  the concession, 
but before al l  the costs could be recovered by the plaint if fs 
there was a change of regime in Libya and the plaintif fs, 
and then later the defendants, were expelled from the 
country.  The Libyan Government expropriated the plaint if f ’s 
half-share in the concession in December 1971 and the 
defendant’s half-share in 1973.   The plaint if fs claimed that 
the contract was frustrated and that under the Law Reform 
(Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943 they were entit led to 
recover. 
 
Kodros Shipping Corpn. v. Empresa Cubana de Fletes, 
the Evia (1982).39 
 
The Evia was on an eighteen-month charter in Balt imore 
due to expire on 20 May 1981.  In mid-March 1980 
charterers ordered her to Basrah.   She arrived, discharged 
her cargo and was ready to leave at 1000 hours on 22nd  
September 1980.  War broke out and she was unable to 
leave.   Hire had been paid up to 4 th  October 1980 but 
charterers refused further hire, claiming that the contract 
was frustrated.   The matter was referred to arbitration and 
decided by Mr. Basil Eckersley Q.C. as umpire.   From his 
decision an appeal was taken to the Commercial Court 
                                      
39  Kodros Shipping Corpn. v. Empresa Cubana de Fletes, the 
Evia (1982) 3 All  ER 350. 
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(Robert Goff  [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 613), thence to the Court 
of Appeal (Lord Denning, M.R., Sir Sebag Shaw and Ackner, 
L.J. [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 334) and final ly to the House of 
Lords. 
 
The charter-party contained two relevant clauses.  Clause 2 
required that the vessel be employed only ‘between good 
and safe ports’.  Clause 21 prohibited the sending of the 
vessel into a war zone without prior consent of the owners 
and obliged the charterers to pay the costs of insurance and 
modified the ‘off-hire’ c lause, so that, if  delayed in a war 
zone in circumstances under which hire would under that 
clause generally cease to be payable, i t  should 
nevertheless remain payable.   It  was (eventually) common 
ground that Basrah was safe when the Evia was ordered 
thither and safe when she entered the port.   I t  was also the 
fact that the shipowners had agreed to the order that she 
proceed to Basrah, which was admittedly a war zone within 
the meaning of Clause 21 at al l  relevant t imes. 
 
In arbitration, the umpire found that Basrah was a safe port 
when the vessel was ordered to proceed there and when 
she got there and that it  did not become unsafe unti l 22nd  
September by which t ime it was impossible to leave -.   
Therefore, charter party was frustrated on 4 t h  October 1980.   
On appeal by owners, the judge reversed the decision 
holding that clause 2 – stipulated safe port – i.e. port 
warranted by the charterers to be safe throughout the 
period of the vessel’s contractual service there and the 
frustration was self  induced. 
 
The Court of Appeal held that Basrah was a safe port when 
the vessel was ordered there – and outbreak of host i l i t ies 
was an event contemplated by part ies.  
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House of Lords dismissed the appeal of the owner, holding, 
“A port was not safe unless in the relevant period the ship 
could reach it, use it and return from it, in the absence of 
abnormal occurrence – There was no breach of Clause 2 -.” 
 
4.8 SYSTEMATIC AND SUITABLE DEVELOPMENT OF 
DOCTRINE OF FRUSTRATION:   
 
Review of the chronological catalogue of cases reveals that 
while developing the Law of Frustrat ion, judges have been 
propounding proposit ions halt ingly and hesitat ingly as it  
was an in-road into the previous proposit ion of law 
regarding absolute liabi l ity of the party under the contract.  
While the proposit ion that supervening events could qualify 
for frustration which rendered the performance of the 
contract impossible, has been f irmly established, judicial  
just if ication for the doctr ine has been varying with the 
different judges.   It would be interest ing to analyse the 
various approached and the justifying theories propounded 
from time to t ime in support of the doctr ine.   This doctrine 
meant dif ferent things to dif ferent persons from different 
angles, though substant ial ly and basically it  is the same.   
Curiously even the jur istic pr inciples propounded in respect 
of this doctrine have dif fered, but its pract ical applicat ion 
has been the same.   It would make an interesting study as 
to how dif ferent authors have treated the subject.   Different 
authors have considered the development of the doctrine in 
their own fashion but substantial ly, in ult imate analysis it  is 
the same.   Perhaps a brief running summary of different 
authors would be of interest.  
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In the words of Anson:40 
 
“Before 1863 it was a general rule of contract that a man 
was absolutely bound to perform any obligat ion which he 
had undertaken and could not claim to be excused by the 
mere fact that performance had subsequently become 
impossible …….. So in Paradine v. Jane41 in 1647 the Court 
held that “when the party by his own contract creates a duty 
or charge upon himself , he is bound to make it good if  he 
may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity,  
because he might have provided against i t by his contract.”  
…….It has always, however been open to the parties to 
introduce an express provision into their agreement that the 
fulf i l lment of a condition or the occurrence of an event 
should discharge one or both of them from some or al l  of 
their obligations under it and just as the parties may 
expressly discharge their obligat ions to perform a contract,  
so there are cases in which a contract, though containing 
no express provision, wil l be interpreted by the courts as 
containing such a provision by implicat ion.  An implicat ion 
of this nature would, it  might be thought, readily be made 
where, without the fault of either party, an event occurs 
which renders the contract not merely more onerous but 
completely impossible of performance.   This was the device 
used in the case of Taylor v. Caldwell42 in 1863 in order to 
introduce an exception to the existing law.   It was held in 
that case “the contract is not to be construed as a posi tive 
contract, but as subject to an implied condit ion that the 
parties shall be excused in case, before breach, 
performance becomes impossible from the perishing of the 
thing without default of the contractor.” From this time 
                                      
40  Anson, 26 t h  edit ion, p. 440, Law of Contracts.  
41  Paradine v. Jane, (1647) Aleyn 26.  
42  Taylor  v. Caldwell ,  (1863) 3 B & S 826.  
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onwards the courts showed themselves prepared to hold 
that unless a contrary intent ion appears the cont inuance of 
a contract is condit ional upon the possibi l i ty of its 
performance.  
 
It was not long, however, before the new doctr ine was 
extended outside the sphere of l i teral impossibil ity to 
situat ions where there had been a ‘f rustration of the 
adventure’.    Most of the early frustrat ion cases arose out of 
delay, attributable to the fault  of neither party, in the 
carrying out of charter-parties; and they seem at f irst  to 
have been treated as raising a question, which was 
regarded as connected, rather than ident ical, with that 
raised by the cases of impossibi l ity.43   
 
From the aforesaid analysis the judicial basis of the 
doctr ine has been catalogued as under: - 
 
 (a) The Implied Term. 
 (b) Disappearance of the foundation of the contract. 
 (c) The Just and Reasonable Solut ion. 
 (d) Change in the obligat ion. 
 
While the English law has developed and above, it  is for 
consideration whether the Indian law has developed or 
remained stat ic. Sect ion 56 of the Indian Contract Act 
embodies the doctr ine of frustration as obtained in India: 
 
Section 56: An agreement to do an act impossible in 
itself is void. 
 
                                      
43  Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Co. Ltd., (1874) LR 10 
CP 125. 
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A contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, 
becomes impossible, or by reason of some event which the 
promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes void when 
the act becomes impossible or where one person has 
promised to do something which he knew, or, with 
reasonable di l igence, might have known, and which the 
promise did not know to be impossible or unlawful, such 
promisor must make a compensation to such promise for 
any loss which such promise sustains through the non-
performance of the promise. 
 
Though the English Law had taken not ice of the changed 
circumstances in 1863, the courts while interpret ing the 
Indian Contract Act of 1872 sti l l seem to st ick to the idea of 
absolute liabil i ty,  as the series of rulings, e.g., Ganga Saran 
v. Firm Ram Charan Ram Gopal and M/s. Alopi Parshad and 
Sons Ltd. v. Union of India,44 would indicate.   However, it  
must be not iced that in al l these rul ings it has been 
emphasized that i f  the parties have undertaken absolute 
liabil i ty under the contract, they have to thank themselves 
and court cannot absolve them.  But i f  the contract is not in 
absolute terms, but si lent on the point of change of 
circumstances, which have an impact on the performance, 
would the promisor be rel ieved of his promise?   No rul ing 
seems to give a specif ic answer to this question, but the 
general impression one gathers from the Indian rul ing is 
that they sti l l  st ick to the doctrine of absolute l iabi l ity 
embodied in the classis English ruling of Paradine v. Jane.45 
While the English Common Law traveled a long way, the 
Indian Law seems to be static.  
                                      
44  Ganga Saran v. Firm Ram Charan Ram Gopal , AIR 1952 
SC 9 and M/s. Alopi Parshad and Sons Ltd. v. Union of 
India  AIR 1960 SC 588.  
45  Paradine v. Jane, (1647) Aleyn 26.  
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4.9 PRIVY COUNCIL DECISIONS: 
 
 
Categories of frustration are never closed. It  has meant 
different things to dif ferent persons.   After considering the 
Supreme Court decisions, which constitute the law of the 
land, it  may be of interest to consider some of rul ings of 
Privy Council  to get an idea as to how the doctrine of  
frustration has been considered. 
 
“Where a contract stated that certain condit ions therein 
would be void, if  there wil l be any f luctuat ion in the rates 
issued by a certain syndicate. Held, that the non-issue of 
the rates by the Syndicate due to i ts ceasing to exist did not 
bring into operation the condit ion rendering the contract  
void.”46 
 
Huranandrai Fulchand v. Pragdar Budhsen, (1923)47 
 
In Huranandrai Fulchand v. Pragdar Budhsen,  Privy Council  
has observed: “To interpret a business bargain, expressed 
in the language of commerce, it  is no doubt important to 
appreciate the methods and the point of view of business 
men, but this is merely a prudent way of qualifying the mind 
to construe their words and so to determine their meaning, 
and is a very dif ferent thing from postulat ing that 
reasonable men would have been l ikely to agree to one kind 
of l iabi li ty and not to another, and form this concluding that,  
whatever the words of the contract say, that kind of l iabi li ty,  
and that alone, is the obligat ion of the contract. As a matter 
of fact there is nothing surprising in a merchant’s binding 
                                      
46  Toolsidas v. Venkatachallapathy, AIR 1921 PC 46.  
47  Huranandrai Fulchand v. Pragdar Budhsen, AIR 1923 PC 
54 .  
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himself  to procure certain goods at al l  events.  It  is a matter 
of price and of market expectations.   No doubt it  is a 
speculation, but many dealings even in cotton goods are of 
that character. 
 
Where the vendor performed subsequent contract with Govt. 
during war after breaking the contract with plainti ff  to supply 
goods as and when they may be received from mills.   Held 
the adventure, of which the commercial purpose is 
suggested to have been frustrated, is, of course, the 
purchase and sale of these goods between the parties to 
this contract and this adventure was not frustrated.   All that 
happened was, that the defendants fai led to perform their 
contract. When they have paid the damages, one 
commercial purpose, at any rate, wil l,  so far from being 
frustrated, have been fulf i l led. The Mi lls, f rom which the 
goods were to come, no doubt were contemplated as 
cont inuing to exist, though it does not fol low that in a 
bargain and sale the closing or even the destruct ion of the 
Mills would affect a contract between third part ies, which is 
in terms absolute, but in this case the Mil ls did cont inue to 
exist and did cont inue to manufacture the goods in 
question, only they were made for and delivered to 
somebody else.    
 
This is completely outside the principle of Taylor v. 
Caldwell48 or of the Coronation case Krell v. Henry49, where 
the contract provided that goods are to be del ivered as and 
when the same may be delivered from the mills. Held this 
should not be construed to mean ‘ if  and when the same may 
be received from the mil ls, to construe in this way is to 
convert words, which f ix the quantit ies and times for 
                                      
48  Taylor  v. Caldwell ,  (1863) 3 B & S 826. 
49  Krell  v .  Henry) , (1903) 2 KB 740 
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deliveries by instal lments into a condit ion precedent to the 
obligation to deliver at all,  and vir tually makes a new 
contract.   The words certainly regulate the manner of 
performance, but they do not reduce the f ixed quant ity sold 
to a mere maximum or l imit the sale to such goods not 
exceeding the agreed bales, as the Mills might deliver to 
the defendants during the agreed period.” 
 
T.O.T. Co. v. Uganda Sugar Factory,  (1945)50 
 
In T.O.T. Co. v. Uganda Sugar Factory ,  Privy Council has 
observed: “The doctr ine of frustration may apply to a 
contract for unascertained goods.   T Company contracted 
to supply steel rails Krupp sect ion to U company.   A 
carefully drawn specif icat ion denied precisely what were the 
goods called for by the contract.   That specif ication did not 
define what was to be the source of the goods.    
 
The contract was silent on the point: Held that to introduce 
into the specif icat ion the term that the goods should be the 
manufacture of Ferrosteel would be to vary the contract by 
defining what the contract had left open.   The contract was 
not frustrated because only one of the many possible ways 
of performing it  had become il legal and impossible.   The 
parties to the contract did not contract on the foot ing or 
common assumption that the goods sold would come only 
from Germany.” 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
50  T.O.T. Co. v. Uganda Sugar Factory ,  AIR 1945 PC 144. 
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4.8 LANDMARK DECISIONS OF SUPREME COURT 
AND HIGH COURTS: 
 
Jagatjit Distilling and All ied Industries v. Bharat Nidhi 
Ltd., (1978)51 
 
The ghost of absolute l iabi lity of contract haunts the Indian 
Courts.   While the English Courts have been able to shake 
off  the shackles of absolute liabil ity and come to grips with 
the real it ies of commercial t ransactions and taken note of 
change of circumstances result ing in making the contract 
commercially steri le and therefore discharged by frustrat ion, 
Indian Courts have not yet been bold enough to do so 
except perhaps Delhi High Court in a rul ing of Jagatji t  
Disti l l ing and Allied Industr ies v. Bharat Nidhi Ltd.   
 
Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur and Co., 
(1954)52 
 
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram 
Bangur and Co.,  has observed that the English Law of 
frustration does not apply to India and yet have referred to 
the English rul ings 12 in number, (out of a total of 14 
referred, only two being Indian), and that too referred with 
approval and not just referred and dismissed as 
inapplicable.  Supreme Court has stated in para 9 at page 
46, column 1 that the f irst paragraph of section 56 lays 
down the law in the same way as in England. The second 
paragraph enunciates the law relat ing to discharge of 
contract by reason the supervening impossibil ity or i l legality 
of the Act agreed to be done.  The wording of this 
paragraph is quite general. The Supreme Court has not 
                                      
51  Jagatj i t Dist i l l ing and All ied Industr ies v. Bharat Nidhi 
Ltd. ILR 1978 I Delhi 526. 
52  Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur and Co. AIR 1954 
SC 44. 
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observed as to how the second paragraph of section 56 
differs from the English Law of Frustrat ion nor have they 
conf irmed that i t  is the same.  While discussing the 
connotat ion of the word “impossible” occurring in second 
paragraph, Supreme Court has drawn on the Engl ish 
rul ings, which have been quoted with approval.  This would 
lead one to the inference that the Indian Law of Frustrat ion 
embodied in second paragraph of section 56 is not different 
from the English Law. 
 
The Supreme Court has observed in Para 9 that “that word 
‘impossible’ has not been sued here in the sense of 
physical or l i teral impossibi l i ty.   The performance of an act 
may not be literal ly impossible but it  may be impract icable 
and useless from the point of view of the object and 
purpose which the parties had in view and if  an untoward 
event or change of circumstances totally upsets the very 
foundation upon which the parties rested their bargain, i t  
can very well be said that the promisor f inds it  impossible to 
do the act which he promised to do.” These very words have 
been lif ted from English rulings.  Supreme Court goes so far 
as to observe in Para 17 at page 49, column 1: “A 
content ion in the extreme form that the doctrine of  
frustration as recognized in English Law does not come at 
al l within the purview of sect ion 56 of the Indian Contract 
Act cannot be accepted.” This would only mean that the 
English Law of Frustration is materially the same as the 
Indian Law of Frustrat ion embodied in sect ion 56 of the 
Indian Contract Act.  Yet the hesitancy on the part of the 
Supreme Court to say so in simple and categorical words is 
not understandable.   It  would seem that the decision turned 
on the fact that the disturbing factor, requisit ioning of the 
property in question during the war, was not an unforeseen 
or uncontemplated event as the contract was entered into 
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during the war. Therefore, on facts section 56 was not 
attracted, but as Supreme Court has made observations on 
the legal aspect of the doctr ine of frustration and 
interpretation of sect ion 56 of the Contract Act, this ruling 
has almost become a classic ruling on the point.  
 
Kesari Chand v. Governor-General in Council,  (1949)53 
 
The quest ion was considered and discussed by a Division 
Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Kesari Chand v. 
Governor-General in Council,  and it was held that the 
doctr ine of frustration comes into play when a contract 
becomes impossible of performance, after i t  is made, on 
account of circumstances beyond the control of the part ies.   
The doctrine is a special case of impossibil ity and as such 
comes under section 56 of the Indian Contract Act.    
 
We are in enti re agreement with this view which is fort i f ied 
by a recent pronouncement of this Court in Ganga Saran v. 
Firm Ram Charan Ram Gopal,54 Fazi Ali, J., in speaking 
about frustration observed in his judgment as follows : 
 
‘I t  seems necessary for us to emphasize that so far as 
the courts in this country are concerned, they must 
look primari ly to the law as embodied in sect ions 32 
and 56 of the Indian Contract Act,  1872’.” 
 
 
 
                                      
53  Kesari Chand v. Governor-General in Counci l, ILR (1949) 
Nag 718 (C). 
54  Ganga Saran v. Firm Ram Charan Ram Gopal , AIR 1952 
SC 9. 
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M/s. Alopi Parshad and Sons Ltd. v. Union of India , 
(1960)55 
 
The next Hon’ble Supreme Court rul ing is, M/s. Alopi  
Parshad and Sons Ltd. v. Union of India:  
  
”Parties to an executory contract are often faced in 
the course of carrying it out with a turn of events 
which they did not at al l ant ic ipate.   Yet this does not 
in itself  af fect the bargain they have made.” 
 
It may be not iced that the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme 
Court reported in AIR 1960 SC 588 is in the context of the 
point whether the Arbitrator can ignore the express terms of  
the contract and award to the contractor a rate higher than 
stipulated on grounds of equity or on the plea of quantum 
meruit ,  the measure of the charges being the actual  
expenditure incurred.   The Hon’ble Supreme Court decision 
on the point was that the Arbitrator cannot ignore the 
express terms of the contract and award rates dif fer from 
the stipulated rates on some vague plea of equity and that 
compensation quantum merui t  cannot be awarded when the 
rate is f ixed by the contract for services rendered in 
pursuance of the terms of the contract. In deciding this 
question the Supreme Court has observed that part ies to an 
executory contract are often faced in the court of carrying it  
out with a turn of events which they did not ant ic ipate and 
they have i l lustrated the same by saying that there may be 
abnormal r ise or fal l in prices, sudden depreciation of 
currency, etc. 
 
                                      
55  M/s. Alopi Parshad and Sons Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 
1960 SC 588. 
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The above general proposit ion is unexceptionable, but i t  is  
the exception made to it by the Supreme Court that requires 
careful consideration.  To quote the words of the Supreme 
Court, “If, on the other hand, a consideration of the terms of 
the contract in the light of circumstances exist ing when it 
was made, shows that they never agreed to be bound in a 
fundamental ly different situation which has unexpectedly 
emerged, the contract ceases to bind at that point – not 
because the court in its discretion thinks it just and 
reasonable to quali fy the terms of the contract but because 
on the true construction it does not apply in that s ituation.”   
The change of c ircumstances pleaded has to be analysed 
against the background of the circumstances obtained at 
the t ime of entering into the contract and contrasted with 
the impact of the change of circumstances on the 
performance of the contract with a view to determine 
whether the obligation after the changed circumstances is 
radically (fundamentally) dif ferent and whether the change 
of circumstances strikes at the root of the contract.   I f  the 
answer is in the aff irmative, the result  is that the contracted 
is frustrated. 
 
It is signif icant that the plea of change of c ircumstances 
(increased charges for establ ishment and cont ingencies, 
etc. due to World War II) in Alopi  Prashad’s case was 
negatived by the Supreme Court on the ground that the 
parties had modif ied the agreement by increasing the rates 
by mutual consent on June 20, 1942 with retrospective 
effect, 11 t h  September, 1940, and, therefore, the modif ied 
agreement was entered into against the background of the 
World War II and therefore the plea of change of 
circumstances as frustrat ing the contract was factually 
incorrect.   Supreme Court has gone so far as to observe at 
page 593, column two of the Report: “This argument is 
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untrue in fact and unsupportable in law.  The contract was 
modif ied on June 20, 1942 by mutual consent and the 
modif icat ion was made nearly three years after the 
commencement of the host il it ies. The agents were fully 
aware of the altered circumstances at the date when the 
modif ied schedule for payment of overhead charges, 
cont ingencies buying remuneration was agreed upon.   
Again, a contract is not frustrated merely because the 
circumstances in which the contract was made are altered.” 
 
It is submitted that this is the crux of the rul ing of  the 
Supreme Court. Mere alteration of circumstances is not 
enough.  In this case the alterat ion was further increased in 
the rates due to war condit ions. It was not an unexpected 
event vis-à-vis the modif ied agreement of 20 t h June, 1942.  
But i f  the agreement had not been modif ied and the plea of 
altered circumstances was advanced vis-à-vis the original  
agreement of 3 rd  May, 1937, when the war had intervened in 
September, 1939, it  was quite possible that the exception 
propounded by the Supreme Court would have been made 
applicable and the plea accepted.  
 
It may be not iced that the rel ief  given is not on the basis 
that the court has absolving power. But while construing the 
contract v is-à-vis the changed circumstances court comes 
to the conclusion that it  does not apply in the changed 
situat ion so that the promise can well say, “i t  was not this 
that I  promised to do (Non haec in foedera veni). 
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Mugneeram Bangur and Co. (P) Ltd. v. Gurbachan Singh,  
(1965)56   
 
The rul ing of AIR 1959 Calcutta 576 has been aff irmed by 
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mugneeram Bangur and Co. 
(P) Ltd. v. Gurbachan Singh .   In that case it has been held: 
 
“If t ime is of essence of the contract or if  t ime for 
performance is set out in the contract i t may be that the 
contract would stand discharged even though its 
performance may have been rendered unlawful for an 
indeterminate t ime provided unlawfulness attached to the 
performance of the contract at the t ime when the contract  
ought to have been performed. Thus, where the 
performance of a contract had been rendered unlawful by 
reason of some subsequent event the contract would stand 
discharged but such discharge will take place not 
necessari ly from the date on which the further performance 
was rendered unlawful, unless further performance was 
rendered unlawful for al l  time.   If  the performance of the 
contract is rendered unlawful, either for a determinate 
period of t ime or for an indeterminate period of time, the 
contract would not stand discharged unless the ban on its 
performance existed on the day or during the t ime in which 
it has to be performed.”  
 
Naihati Jute Mills Ltd. v. Khyaliram Jagannath, (1968)57 
 
Subsequently,  Hon’ble Supreme Court in The Naihati Jute 
Mills Ltd. v.  Khyali ram Jagannath:  
 
                                      
56  Mugneeram Bangur and Co. (P) Ltd. v. Gurbachan Singh, 
AIR 1965 SC 1523. 
57  The Naihati Jute Mills Ltd. v. Khyal iram Jagannath, AIR 
1968 SC 522 
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“Section 56 lays down a rule of posit ive law and does 
not leave the matter to be determined according to the 
intention of the parties.  Since under the Contract Act 
a promise may be expressed or implied, in cases 
where the court gathers as a matter of construction 
that the contract itself  contains impliedly or expressly 
a term according to which it would stand discharged 
on the happening of certain circumstances, the 
dissolution of the contract would take place under the 
terms of the contract itself  and such cases would be 
outside the purview of sect ion 56.   Although in 
English Law such cases would be treated as cases of 
frustration, in India they would be dealt with under 
section 32.” 
 
In a majority of case, however, the doctrine of frustration is 
not applied on the ground that the part ies themselves 
agreed to an implied term, which operated to release them 
from performance of the contract.  The court can grant relief  
on the ground of subsequent impossibil ity when it f inds that 
the whole purpose or the basis of the contract was 
frustrated by the intrusion or occurrence of an unexpected 
event or change of circumstances which was not 
contemplated by the part ies at the date of the contract.  
There would in such a case be no question of f inding out an 
implied term agreed to by the parties embodying a provision 
for discharge.  When such an event or change of 
circumstances which is so fundamental as to be regarded 
by law as strik ing at the root of the contract as a whole 
occurs it is the court which can pronounce the contract to 
be frustrated and at an end.   This is really a posit ive rule 
enacted in Sect ion 56, which governs such situations.    
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The doctr ine of discharge by frustration cannot be available 
where the contract makes ful l and complete provision, so 
intended, for a given cont ingency.  The reason is that where 
there is an express term the court cannot f ind, on 
construction of the contract, an implied term inconsistent 
with such express term.  
 
Seth Mohan Lal v. Grain Chambers Ltd., Muzaffarnagar 
(1968)58 
 
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Seth Mohan Lal v. Grain 
Chambers Ltd., Muzaffarnagar has held: 
  
Since the promulgat ion of Sugar and Gur (Futures and 
Options) Prohibit ion Order (1950), fresh contracts in future 
transactions were prohibited, but sett lement of the 
outstanding contracts by payment of dif ferences was not 
prohibited, nor was delivery of Gur in pursuance of the 
contract and acceptance thereof at the due date by the 
Company prohibited. Imposit ion of restraint on transport of  
Gur except with the permission of the Government does not 
amount to an impossibil i ty contemplated by section 56 
leading to frustrat ion of the contracts. 
 
Raja Dhruv Dev Chand v. Raja Harmohinder Singh 
(1968)59 
 
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raja Dhruv Dev Chand v. Raja 
Harmohinder Singh  has held: 
 
Under sect ion 56, where an event, which could not 
reasonably have been in the contemplation of the parties 
                                      
58  Seth Mohan Lal v. Grain Chambers Ltd.,  Muzaffarnagar, 
AIR 1968 SC 772. 
59  Raja Dhruv Dev Chand v. Raja Harmohinder Singh, AIR 
1968 SC 1024. 
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when the contract was made, renders performance 
impossible or unlawful, the contract is rendered void, and 
the part ies are excused from performance of their 
respect ive obligations.  Therefore, where performance is 
rendered by intervent ion of law invalid,  or the subject-
matter assumed by the part ies to continue to exist is 
destroyed, or a state of things assumed to be the 
foundation of the contract fai ls,  or does not happen, or 
where the performance is to be rendered personally and the 
person does or is disabled, the contract stands discharged. 
 
No useful purpose wil l be served by referr ing to the 
judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States of 
America and the Court of Session in Scot land to which our 
attent ion was invited.  Sect ion 56 of the Contract Act lays 
down a posit ive rule relat ing to frustrat ion of contracts and 
the courts cannot travel outside the terms of that section.   
The view expressed by the East Punjab High Court in 
Parshotam Das Shankar Das v. Municipal Committee, 
Batala,60 that section 56 of the Contract Act is not 
exhaustive of the law relating to frustration of the contracts 
in India must be deemed not to be good law to that extent.  
 
Bhoothalinga Agencies, v. V.T.C. Poriaswami Nadar 
(1969)61 
 
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhoothalinga Agencies, v. V.T.C. 
Poriaswami Nadar has held: 
 
The doctr ine of frustrat ion of contract is really an aspect or 
part of the law of discharge of contract by reason of 
                                      
60  Parshotam Das Shankar Das v. Munic ipal Committee, 
Batala, AIR 1949 EP 301. 
61  Bhoothalinga Agencies, v. V.T.C. Poriaswami Nadar, AIR 
1969 SC 110.  
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supervening impossibi l ity or i l legality of the act agreed to 
be done and hence comes within the purview of the sect ion 
56 of the Contract Act. 
 
In English Law the quest ion of frustration of contract has 
been treated by courts as a question of construct ion 
depending upon the true intention of the parties.  In 
contrast, the statutory provisions contained in section 56 of 
the Contract Act lay down a posit ive rule of law and English 
authorit ies cannot therefore be of direct assistance though 
they have persuasive value in showing how English Courts 
have approached and decided cases under similar 
circumstances. 
 
The provisions of sect ion 56 of the Contract Act cannot 
apply to a case of “self-induced frustration”.   In other words, 
the doctr ine of frustrat ion of contract cannot apply where 
the event, which is al leged to have frustrated the contract, 
arises from the act or election of a party. 
 
The disposal of imported chicory, which arr ived at Madras 
pot on December 13, 1955, was governed by the provisions 
of the Imports (Control) Order, 1955 which came into force 
on December 7, 1955.  Clause 5(4) of the 1955 Order 
expressly provided that the licensee shal l comply with all  
the condit ions imposed or deemed to be imposed under that 
clause one of which was that the goods will  not be sold.   
Therefore, the sale of the imported goods would be a direct 
contravent ion of clause 5(4) and under sect ion 5 of the 
Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 any contravention 
of the Act or any order made or deemed to have been made 
under the Act was punishable with imprisonment upto one 
year or f ine or both.   In consequence, even though the 
contract was enforceable on November 26, 1955 when it  
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was entered into, the performance of the contract became 
impossible or unlawful after December 7, 1955 and so the 
contract became void under sect ion 56 of the Contract Act 
after the coming into force of the Imports (Control) Order, 
1955.  This was not a case of ‘self-induced frustration’ .  
There was no choice or election left to the party to supply 
chicory other than under the terms of the contract.   On the 
other hand, there was a posit ive prohibit ion imposed by the 
licence upon the party not to sell the imported chicory to 
any other party but he was permitted to ut il ize it only for 
consumption as raw material in his own factory. 
 
Smt. Sushila Devi v. Hari Singh, (1756)62 
 
The next ruling for consideration is Smt. Sushi la Devi v.  
Hari Singh :  
 
The supervening event need not render the contract 
physically impossible. The impossibi l ity contemplated by 
section 56 of the Contract Act is not conf ined to something, 
which is not humanly possible.  But i f  the performance of a 
contract become impracticable or useless having regard to 
the object and purpose, the parties had in view, then it must 
be held that the performance of the contract has become 
impossible.   But the supervening events should take away 
the basis of the contract and it should be of such a 
character that i t  str ikes at the root of the contract.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
62  Smt. Sushila Devi v. Hari Singh,  AIR 1971 SC 1756. 
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Govindbhai Gordhanbhai Patel v. Gulam Abbas Mulla 
Allibhai, (1977)63 
 
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Govindbhai Gordhanbhai Patel v.  
Gulam Abbas Mulla All ibhai has held that: 
 
 “The part ies are, therefore, governed purely by sect ion 56 
of the Contract Act according to which a contract becomes 
void only if  something supervened after its execut ion which 
renders i t impracticable.  On the contention advanced on 
behalf  of the respondents, the quest ion that ar ises is 
whether the above quoted order of the Prant Officer, Thana 
Prant, dated December 8, 1958, rendered the contract  
impract icable.   The answer to this quest ion is obviously in 
the negative.  The said order, it  wil l  be noted, was not of 
such a catastrophic character as can be said to have struck 
at the very root of the whole object and purpose for which 
the part ies had entered into the bargain in quest ion or to 
have rendered the contract impracticable or impossible of 
performance ……… We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion 
that no untoward event or change of circumstances 
supervened to make the agreement factually or legally 
impossible of performance so as to attract sect ion 56 of the 
Contract Act. 
 
M/s. Shanti Vijay & Co. v. Princess Fatima Fouzia, 
(1980)64 
 
Hon’ble Supreme Court  in M/s. Shanti Vi jay & Co. v. 
Princess Fatima Fouzia has held that: 
  
                                      
63  Govindbhai Gordhanbhai Patel v. Gulam Abbas Mul la 
All ibhai, AIR 1977 SC 1019. fol lowed; AIR 1954 SC 44 and 
AIR 1972 SC 1756. 
64  M/s. Shanti  V i jay & Co. v. Princess Fatima Fouzia, AIR 
1980 SC 17.  
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In this rul ing, reference made to the doctr ine of f rustrat ion 
where a contract was held to be frustrated because of ad 
interim injunction by the court.  It  has been observed that 
where the clauses in a contract for sale of certain i tems of 
trust property made the passing of property dependent on 
tender of balance of the price by successful bidders and 
taking del ivery of goods upon such payment and the court, 
in the meanwhi le, restrained the trustees by ad interim 
injunct ion from f inalizing the sale and even after vacating of 
the injunction, the High Court ordered restoration of status 
quo ante before any of such bidders paid the balance of 
price as st ipulated, the contract relating to sale of trust 
property must be deemed to be frustrated. 
 
Union of India v. Damani & Co.,(1980)65 
 
Honb’le Supreme Court in Union of India v. Damani & Co.  in 
passing reference to the doctrine of  frustrat ion of foreign 
contract.  
 
“Most legal systems make provision for the discharge 
of a contract where, subsequent to its formation, a 
change of circumstances renders the contract legally 
or physically impossible of performance.” 
 
And indeed, it  is part of the statutory law of India.  Of 
course, 
 
“……….. Where a man specif ically undertakes an 
absolute obligation, he cannot claim to be absolved 
from l iabi lity by the fact that his fai lure to perform the 
                                      
65  Union of India v. Damani & Co., AIR 1980 SC 1149.  
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obligat ion is due to the occurrence of an event over 
which he has no control”. 
 
Asstt. Excise Commissioner v. Issac Peter,  (1994)66 
 
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Asstt. Excise Commissioner v. 
Issac Peter,67 has considered a case of Works Contract 
between the State and a private contractor in which the 
State suppl ied the minimum guaranteed quota of goods to 
the contractor in compl iance with i ts contractual obligat ions, 
but fai led to supply the whole of addit ional quantity of 
goods demanded by the contractor,  which was discretionary 
under the contract.   In that case, sect ion 56 of the Contract 
Act was sought to be invoked by the Contractor.   The Court 
held that section 56 of the Contract Act, in the 
circumstances of the case, cannot be invoked. 
 
Ganga Saran v. Santosh Kumar, (1963)68 
 
Allahabad High Court has in Ganga Saran v. Santosh Kumar 
observed that: “The word ‘ impossible’ in section 56 of the 
Contract Act has not been used in th sense of physical  or 
l i teral impossibil i ty.   The sanctity of contract is the 
foundation of the law of contract and the doctr ine of 
impossibil ity does not displace that principle, but merely 
enables the court to enforce it  equitably.  It releases a party 
from its obligat ions to perform a contract where 
performance has become impossible as a result of events 
out of the control of that party.   However, the plea of 
impossibil ity wil l not be entertained by the court if  in spite 
                                      
66  Asstt.  Excise Commissioner v. Issac Peter, (1994) 4 SCC 
104.  
67  Asstt.  Excise Commissioner v. Issac Peter, (1994) 4 SCC 
104.  
68  Ganga Saran v. Santosh Kumar, AIR 1963 All  201. 
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of supervening events, the object and purpose of the part ies 
is not rendered useless and the contract can be performed 
substantially in accordance with the original intent ion of the 
parties though not l i teral ly in accordance with the original  
intention of the parties though not l iteral ly in accordance 
with the language of the agreement.  The court wil l not 
apply the doctrine of impossibil ity to assist a party, which 
does not want to fulf i l l i ts obligat ions under the contract, 
and rel ies on l iteral impossibil ity to back out of i t.    The 
doctr ine of impossibi l i ty, which is based on equality and 
common sense, cannot be permitted to become a device for 
destroying the sanctity of contract.   
 
Karl Ettl inger & Co. v. Chagandas & Co., (1915)69 
 
Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Karl Ett l inger & Co. v.  
Chagandas & Co.  has observed, “Section 56 deals with two 
grounds upon which executory contracts become absolutely 
void, the f irst is that the act to be done should, after the 
contract has been made, become impossible, and the 
second that the acts necessary to be done in order to carry 
out the contract should, after the contract has been made 
and through no fault of the part ies to the contract, become 
unlawful. The latter part of the section deals with case 
where the acts to be done were at the t ime the contract was 
made lawful but a legal prohibit ion has supervened after the 
making, but before the performance of the contract and 
extends to such cases the general pr inciple of  law 
applicable to al l  contracts and expressed in section 23. 
Before a contract can be broken on the ground that the acts 
to be done have become impossible, the courts must be 
very sure that they are physically impossible.  The physical  
                                      
69  Karl Ett l inger  & Co. v. Chagandas & Co., AIR 1915 Bom 
232. 
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impossibil ity must go much further than mere diff iculty or 
the need to pay exorbitant pr ices.” 
 
Marshal & Co. v. Naginchand.70 
 
In Marshal & Co. v. Naginchand the Hon’ble Bombay High 
Court has held that   
 
“The ratio decidendi in al l cases of that k ind is a rule of 
common sense rather than law and is referable to this 
dominat ing consideration that if  the contract is of  a kind 
requiring continuous performance of mutual duties by the 
parties to i t and such dut ies cannot be so mutually 
performed during the continuance of a war and further 
suspension of such mutual r ights and obligation for an 
indef inite period going much beyond merely placing the 
contract in abeyance, the result, in the eye of the law would 
be that the original  contract is void in as much as taking it 
upon cessation of host il it ies would be something more than 
renewing it, would, in fact be substitut ing for i t  an entirely 
new contract.” 
 
G.C. Sett v. Madhoram, (1917)71 
 
Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in the aforesaid landmark 
decision has held that: 
 
“An executory contract concluded before the outbreak of the 
war even the al ien enemy is merely suspended during the 
war as regards the right to performance and right of action, 
and is avoided or dissolved only in certain circumstances, 
                                      
70  Marshal & Co. v. Naginchand , AIR 1917 Bom 182. 
71  G.C. Sett v. Madhoram, AIR 1917 Cal 411. 
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among them, if its performance necessitates intercourse 
with the enemy during the war: 
 
……….. Uncondit ional contracts are, as a general  
rule, not dissolved by their performance becoming 
impossible owing to war.” 
 
Kunjilal v. Durga Prasad, (1920)72 
 
Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in Kunji lal v. Durga Prasad has 
held that: 
 
“The parties will  full knowledge of the restrict ions imposed 
by Government as regards the affreightment of goods by 
rai l,  and that i t  was impossible without a prior ity certif icate 
to get goods sent by rai l,  entered into a contract for the 
purchase and forward delivery of l inseed, assuming that by 
the t ime of the performance of the agreement the normal 
state of affairs would have returned.  When, however, the 
t ime for performance of the contract arrived, the restrict ions 
had not been removed and it was impossible for the seller 
to make delivery.  In these circumstances a case was stated 
for the opinion of the court upon the rights of the buyer and 
seller under the contract: Held that in the circumstances, 
the contract had become void before breach and the seller 
was excused from the performance thereof and that 
consequently the buyer was not entit led to recover any 
compensation from the seller.” 
 
 
 
 
                                      
72  Kunjilal  v. Durga Prasad, AIR 1920 Cal 1021. 
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E.A. Gubray v. Ramjusory Golabroy, (1921)73 
 
In 1921 Hon’ble Calcutta High Court has once again 
declared its landmark words in the case of E.A. Gubray v. 
Ramjusory Golabroy,  “(a) “There must be proof of an 
embargo on shipping, so as to make applicable the principle 
of suspension or discharge of a contract is recognized in 
well-known judicial decisions such as those in Hadley v. 
Clarks ,74 and Geipel Smith’s case,75 if  the seller has no 
goods at al l ready for shipment, he cannot take advantage 
of the circumstances that shipment was impossible: that 
defence should be available, only to a person who, but for 
the impossibil ity of shipment by reason of circumstances 
beyond his control was in fact in a posit ion to fulf i l l  his 
engagement. Impossibil ity as an excuse for non-
performance must,  as a general rule, be a physical or legal 
impossibil ity and not merely with reference to the abil ity and 
circumstances of the promisor.   “Commercial impossibi l i ty”,  
that is, extreme and unforeseen cost or diff iculty of  
performance is not excuse for performance.   But the r igidity 
of the rule that an express uncondit ional contract is not 
generally dissolved by its performance being or becoming 
quite impossible in fact, by reason of particular 
circumstances has been relaxed and exceptions have been 
engrafted thereon.   The doctrine of frustrat ion of adventure 
has become a gloss on the older theory of impossibil ity of 
performance, which it has great ly developed under the 
guise of reading “implied terms” into contracts.  In matters 
of business, a thing is said to be impossible when it is not 
pract icable; and a thing is impracticable when it can only be 
done at an excessive or unreasonable cost. The Expression 
                                      
73  E.A. Gubray v. Ramjusory Golabroy,  AIR 1921 Cal 305.  
74  Hadley v. Clarks, (1799) STR 259. 
75  Geipel Smith ’s case, (1872) 7 QB 494. 
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“force majeure” is taken from the Code Napoleon and has a 
more extensive meaning than “act of God” or “vis major” 
though it may be doubtful whether i t  includes al l “causes 
you cannot prevent and for which you are not responsible.” 
 
Bhuwalka Bros. Ltd. v. Fatehchand Murlidhar,  (1952)76 
 
Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in Bhuwalka Bros. Ltd. v.  
Fatehchand Murl idhar,  has observed that “I venture to think 
that in the nature of things change is inevitable in al l human 
affairs.  When the part ies enter into a contract they do so 
on the basis that a change may happen.   If changes which 
are within the reasonable contemplation of part ies at the 
t ime of making the contract takes place, the part ies cannot 
get r id of their bargain on the plea that changes have taken 
place which in fact they did not contemplate; but if  the 
changes that take place are so great as to be beyond the 
possibi l ity of any human contemplat ion, the court has 
certainly to consider whether i t would, be just and equitable 
to enforce the contract, which may result in ‘unjust  
enrichment’.” 
 
Mahadeo Prosad v. Calcutta D. & Co., (1961)77 
 
In the landmark decision of Mahadeo Prosad v. Calcutta D. 
& Co., the Hon’ lbe Calcutta High Court has given “a true 
test of frustration”:  
 
                                      
76  Bhuwalka Bros. Ltd. v. Fatehchand Murl idhar, AIR 1952 
Cal 294.  
77  Mahadeo Prosad v. Calcutta D. & Co., AIR 1961 Cal  70. 
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“In order that the doctrine of frustrat ion as embodied in 
section 56, Contract Act may apply the fol lowing three 
condit ions must be sat isf ied, viz : - 
 
(a) a valid and subsist ing contract between the 
parties; 
(b) there must be some part of the contract yet to 
be performed; 
(c) the contract after i t  is made become impossible. 
 
If  these three condit ions are sat isf ied, then the contract 
becomes void when the act becomes impossible.” 
 
M/s. Basanti Bastralaya v. River Steam Navigation Co. 
Ltd., (1987)78  
 
The facts of this case is that the defendant a common 
carrier entered into an agreement to deliver goods to 
plaint if f  by inland navigation. The said contract was 
exempting defendant from al l l iabil it ies due to delay, 
damage or loss on account of any act of State’s enemy 
during transit.  The Vessel and its cargo whi le in transit,  
seized and detained by Pakistan Government due to 
host il ity broken out between India and Pakistan. It  was held 
by the Hon’ble Court that the contract of carriage was 
frustrated due to impossibi l i ty of performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
78  M/s. Basanti Bastra laya v. River Steam Navigation Co. 
Ltd., AIR 1987 Cal  271 followed AIR 1961 Cal 70 and 
Air1975 Cal 92.  
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Govindbhai Gordhanbhai Patel v. Gulam Abbas Mulla 
Allibhai, (1977)79 
 
In Govindbhai Gordhanbhai Patel v.  Gulam Abbas Mulla 
All ibhai,  the Hon’ble Apex Court, whi le construing the 
expression ‘ impossible of performance’ has held that the 
parties shal l be excused if  substantially the whole contract 
becomes impossible of performance or in other words 
impract icable by some cause for which neither was 
responsible.  
 
While delivering this landmark decision the Hon’ble Apex 
Court has also referred the Halsbury’s Laws of England,80 
which states that a contract is not discharged merely 
because it turn out to be dif f icult  to perform or onerous. 
 
Continental Construction Co. Ltd. v. State of Madhya 
Pradesh, (1988)81 
 
 
In Continental Construct ion Co. Ltd. v. State of Madhya 
Pradesh,  the Hon’ble Supreme Court while examining its 
earl ier decision in M/s. Alopi Parshad and Sons Ltd. v.  
Union of India,82 held that a contract is not frustrated merely 
because the circumstances in which the contract was made 
underwent a change.  It was further held that there is no 
general l iberty reserved to the courts to absolve a party 
from l iabil ity to perform his part of the contract merely on 
account of an uncontemplated turn of events, which 
                                      
79  Govindbhai Gordhanbhai Patel v. Gulam Abbas Mul la 
All ibhai,  (1977) 3 SCC 179 : AIR 1977 SC 1019.  
80  Halsbury ’s Laws of England , Fourth Edit ion, Volume 9, 
para 455.  
81  Continental  Construction Co. Ltd. v. State of Madhya 
Pradesh,  (1988) 3 SCC 82 : AIR 1988 SC 1166 fol lowed 
AIR 1968 SC 522.  
82  M/s. Alopi Parshad and Sons Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 
1960 SC 558.  
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rendered the performance of the contract onerous, l ike an 
abnormal r ise or fall  in prices, a sudden depreciation of 
currency or unexpected obstacle to the execution of the 
contract.  
 
Habibullah v. G.M. Distilleries, (1956)83 
 
Hon’ble Hyderabad High Court in Habibullah v. G.M. 
Disti l leries  has observed, “Where the law casts a duty upon 
a man which through no default  of his is unable to perform, 
he is excused for non-performance.   A party to a contract 
can always guard against unforeseen cont ingencies by 
express st ipulation but if  he voluntari ly undertakes an 
absolute and unconditional obligat ion, he cannot complain 
merely because events turned out to his disadvantage. 
Some t imes although there may not be a term absolving one 
of the parties to a contract, f rom performance of his part of 
the contract, the court can infer from the nature of  the 
contract and the surrounding circumstances that a condit ion 
which was not expressed was the foundation upon which the 
parties contracted and rel ieved the party from the obligat ion 
to perform the obligat ion of the contract if  the party from the 
obligation to perform the obl igation of the contract if  the 
condit ion cannot be fulf i l led.   Mere dif f iculty or the need to 
pay abnormal prices cannot exonerate a party from carrying 
out his part of the contract and such a case would not be 
governed by section 56 of the Contract Act. Will law allow 
discharge of a contract,  if  the act to be performed is 
rendered i l legal or impossible of performance?  The answer 
is that there should be a total impossibi l ity. A clear line of 
dist inction should be drawn between cases of physical or 
legal impossibil ity and mere diff icul ty in carrying out the 
                                      
83  Habibul lah v. G.M. Disti l ler ies, AIR 1956 AP 190.  
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contract.   When the defendant entered into contract for 
carriage of coal for the plaintif f  f rom one place to another, 
the plaintif f  had agreed to supply the defendant petrol  
coupons for running a lorry for the carriage of coal.  There 
was however no st ipulation that coal was to be carried only 
by a lorry and not by any other vehicle.   In fact the 
defendant had for some time used bullock carts for carrying 
the coal. Held, in the circumstances it  could not be said that 
the contract had become impossible of performance merely 
because the plainti ff  had fai led to supply petrol coupons for 
running a lorry.  The transport of coal by lorry alone was not 
the foundation of the contract and it was open to him to 
have arranged for transport of coal by other means although 
the transport charges may have been prohibit ive.” 
 
Gurdit Singh v. Secy. of State, (1931)84 
 
Hon’ble Lahore High Court in Gurdit Singh v. Secy. of State 
has observed: “A clear distinction has to be drawn between 
cases of physical impossibi l ity and mere dif f iculty in 
carrying out a contract.   Where certain persons enter into a 
contract to supply ghee to Off icer Commanding F. Supply 
Depot and in spite of the fact that a part of the source of 
supply is cut off by the action of the Government they elect 
to make tenders to the Supply Depot, and do not at the time 
suggest that the contract is void, any opt ion that they might 
have had of declaring that the contract had come to an end 
is waived, and are not entit led to a refund of money 
deposited by then under the terms of contract. 
 
 
 
                                      
84  Gurdit S ingh v. Secy. of State, AIR 1931 Lah 347.  
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Firm Bachhraj Amolakchand v. Firm Nandlal Sitaram 
(1966)85 
 
Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in its landmark 
decision of Firm Bachhraj Amolakchand v. Firm Nandlal  
Sitaram has held: “When persons enter into a contract the 
performance of which is dependant on the cont inued 
availabil ity of a specif ic thing and by reason of 
circumstances beyond the control  of the parties, that 
availabil ity comes to an end, the contract stands dissolved. 
 
…………. The commercial or pract ical purpose of the instant 
contract was defeated or overthrown by the restrict ions and 
embargoes on export outside the State put by the 
Government.   The foundation of the instant bi l t icut contract 
was and must be taken to have been the availabil ity of the 
wagons.  But the non-availabili ty of wagons in the instant 
case prevented the performance of the contract.    The 
parties had not contemplated the non-availabil ity of wagons 
when the contract was entered into.   The uncertainties of 
future, no doubt, were there when the contract was made, 
but when those uncertainties became reali t ies the 
commercial venture frustrated and excused the performance 
of the contract for both the parties.” 
 
Narasu v. P.S.V. Iyer, (1953)86 
 
In Narasu v. P.S.V. Iyer, Hon’ble Madras High Court has 
held: “A contract may be in wri t ing and embody the terms 
agreed to by the parties and may not obtain a condit ion 
excusing non-performance under certain cont ingencies; but 
                                      
85  Firm Bachhraj Amolakchand v. Firm Nandlal Si taram, AIR 
1966 MP 145,  
86  Narasu v. P.S.V. Iyer, AIR 1953 Mad 300.  
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sti l l  in the absence of anything to indicate a contrary 
intention there is an implied condit ion that the contract wil l  
cease to operate if the basis on which it rests disappears or 
becomes fundamentally altered. 
 
……… The change, however, must be of a fundamental and 
sweeping character, which ki l ls the contract itself  and not 
merely one of a temporary nature, which leaves the contract 
al ive and capable of being performed at a future date.   
That quest ion is a question of fact to be determined on a 
consideration of al l  the fact………… 
 
G. A. Galia Kotwala and Co. Ltd. v. K.R.L. Narasimhan 
and Brothers (1954)87 
 
In the immediate next year the Hon’ble Madras High Court 
has once again conf irmed its own previous view in G. A. 
Galia Kotwala and Co. Ltd. v. K.R.L. Narasimhan and 
Brothers and observed the fol lowing: 
 
“In commercial contracts, where the contract becomes 
impossible of performance by reason of a state of war or by 
an act of the execut ive Government, or the contract which 
would otherwise be expected to be ordinari ly performed, is 
delayed by reason of certain regulat ions imposed by the 
Government making the performance of such contract  
dependent upon the grant of l icence or permit,  the parties 
need not wait for an indef inite period in the hope of the 
relaxing of the control orders or the granting of l icence and 
permit…………. 
 
                                      
87  G. A. Galia Kotwala and Co. Ltd. v. K.R.L. Narasimhan 
and Brothers  
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………The doctrine of frustrat ion is not a rule of posit ive or 
substantive law, but a rule which is made appl icable to 
interpretation of contracts to f ind out whether the contract 
has become frustrated, that it  has either become impossible 
of performance, or though possible of performance, has 
become useless and ineffective.    
 
Sri Mahalingaswami Devasthanam v. A.T. Sambanda 
Mudaliar, (1962)88 
 
 
After considerable long time also, the Hon’ble Madras High 
Court consistent ly followed the previous views even in Sri 
Mahalingaswami Devasthanam v. A.T. Sambanda Mudal iar,  
and held that an absolute contract involving uncondit ional 
terms by way of obligation undertaken by one of the 
contracting parties may, if  enforced, result in hardship, 
prejudice, loss or detriment to the promisor.   But, surely, 
the loss or damage suffered by the promisor in the course 
of fulf i l l ing the obligat ions cannot absolve him from l iabi l ity 
in the least degree.  The mere fact that a contract has been 
rendered more onerous does not of i tself r ise to frustrat ion. 
 
S.A.P. Devasthanam v. Sabapathi Pil lai (1962)89  
 
Aforesaid decisions are once again fol lowed in S.A.P. 
Devasthanam v. Sabapathi Pil lai.  I t  has been observed by 
the Hon’ble Madras High Court that before applying the 
doctr ine of frustration, the f irst duty of the court is to 
ascertain the facts forming the basis of the contract and to 
see how far the change in the circumstances is such as 
                                      
88  Sri Mahalingaswami Devasthanam v. A.T. Sambanda 
Mudaliar ,  AIR 1962 Mad 122.  
89  S.A.P. Devasthanam v. Sabapathi Pi l lai , AIR 1962 Mad 
132. 
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would remove the very foundation of the contract i tself .   
The court must in fact determine whether the circumstances 
did exist  and if  so, whether they are suff icient to hold that 
the part ies are absolved from their obligations under the 
contract.   I t  is the essence of the doctrine that the event,  
which causes frustration, must have occurred without the 
fault of either party.   Therefore, the court ought to see 
whether it is a case of self-induced frustration in which case 
there wi ll be no breach at al l.    Held on facts that the theory 
of frustrat ion could not be applied in the case as there was 
no destruct ion of the specif ic thing necessary for the 
performance of the contract; nor had the performance 
become impossible by reason of the incapacity of a party on 
account of the promulgat ion of Ordinance IV of 1952 or of 
the Madras Act 14 of 1952, as the defendants were already 
aware of the promulgat ion of the Ordinance when they 
entered into the agreement.   Plea of frustrat ion in such a 
case should fai l.  
 
Surpat Singh v. Sheo Prasad (1945)90  
 
In Surpat Singh v. Sheo Prasad,   Hon’ble Patna High Court 
has observed that the doctrine of frustrat ion is that, when 
the performance or further performance of a contract has 
been rendered impossible or has been indef initely 
postponed in consequence of the happening of an event 
which was not and could not have been contemplated by the 
parties to the contract when they made it, a court will  
consider what, as fair and reasonable men, the parties 
would have agreed upon if  they had in fact foreseen and 
provided for the particular event, and if , in its opinion, they 
would have decided that the contract should be regarded as 
                                      
90  Surpat Singh v. Sheo Prasad, AIR 1945 Pat 300. 
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at an end, wil l discharge the party who would otherwise be 
liable to pay damages for non-performance of the contract.   
Before the doctrine of frustrat ion can be invoked, it  must be 
shown that the event, which has produced frustrat ion, was 
an event,  which the parties to the contract did not foresee 
and could not, with a reasonable di l igence, have foreseen.   
When it has not become impossible for the patnidar to 
discharge his obl igation under the lease, but merely 
burdensome to him to do so, the doctr ine can have no 
applicat ion whatever. 
 
A.F. Ferguson & Co. v. Lalit Mohan Ghosh (1954)91 
 
In A.F. Ferguson & Co. v. Lali t Mohan Ghosh,  the effect of 
frustration has been considered by Hon’ble Patna High 
Court by observing that where due to the outbreak of war on 
3 r d September, 1939, the performance of the contract by the 
insured by making payments of the premium to the enemy 
Insurance Co. with whom the insured was insured became 
impossible and i l legal under rule 104 of the Defence of  
India Rules, the contract became frustrated and void.   
Section 56 of the Contract Act is perfect ly clear on the 
point, and if  the performance of the contract after the 
outbreak of war became impossible or unlawful, the contract  
of insurance became void……….. 
 
………..If  and when there is frustrat ion, the dissolut ion of 
the contract occurs automatically.   I t does not depend, as 
does rescission of a contract, on the ground of repudiat ion 
or breach, or on the choice of either party.   I t  depends on 
the effect of what has actually happened on the possibi l ity 
of performing the contract.   Therefore, the moment the war 
                                      
91  A.F. Ferguson & Co. v. Lal i t Mohan Ghosh, AIR 1954 Pat 
596.  
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broke out, any further performance of  the contract became 
unlawful and the result was that the contract stood 
dissolved on the very date the declaration of war was made 
absolving both the parties from its performance. 
 
Suresh Narain v. Akhauri,  (1957)92 
 
Even in Suresh Narain v. Akhauri,  the Hon’ble Patna High 
Court has fol lowed the same legacy of the views taken by 
its predecessor. The plaintif f  had deposited a sum of money 
in Jehanabad branch of bank, which had its head off ice at 
Dacca.  The branch at Jehanabad was closed in September, 
1947 because of the polit ical partit ion of India and 
payments were not made to the depositors at that branch 
from that date.   The head off ice of the bank being located 
at Dacca within the boundaries of Pakistan, communicat ion 
between India and Pakistan was dangerous and dif f icult.    
The defendant who had give a personal undertaking that he 
would be personal ly l iable for any loss that the plaintiff 
might sustain, argued that the parti t ion of India and 
Pakistan was not an event in the contemplation of the 
parties at the t ime of the contract of guarantee was entered 
into and therefore the contract had become impossible of 
performance and therefore section 56 appl ied to the case.   
Held, that in the circumstances, the doctrine of frustrat ion 
did not apply and the defendant could not be absolved from 
performance under section 56. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
92  Suresh Narain v. Akhaur i, AIR 1957 Pat 256.  
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H.R. & K. Industries v. State of Rajasthan, (1964)93 
 
In H.R. & K. Industries v. State of Rajasthan, the Hon’ble 
Rajasthan High Court has observed: “The doctrine of 
frustration is embodied in section 56 of the Contract Act.   
The essential pr inciple upon which it is based is the 
impossibil ity; or rather the impracticabil ity in law or fact of 
the performance of a contract brought about by an 
unforeseen and unforeseeable sweeping change in the 
circumstances intervening after the contract was made.   In 
other words, while the contract was properly entered into in 
the context of certain circumstances which existed at the 
t ime it  fell  to be made, the situation becomes so radically 
changed subsequently that the very foundation which 
subsisted underneath the contract as it gets shaken, nay, 
the change of circumstances is so fundamental that i t  
strikes at the very root of the contract then the principle of 
frustration steps in and the parties are excused from or 
rel ieved of the responsibil ity of performing the contract 
which otherwise lay upon them.” 
 
T.V. Kochuvareed v. P. Mariappa Gounder  (1954)94  
 
 
The aforesaid question has also been considered in T.V. 
Kochuvareed v. P. Mariappa Gounder,  where the court 
observed: “The doctrine of frustration known to the Engl ish 
Law has been statutori ly recognized under the Indian Law, 
in this section (sect ion 56).  For the application of the 
doctr ine,  it   is  essential  to ascertain the facts assumed by  
                                      
93  H.R. & K. Industr ies v. State of Rajasthan , AIR 1964 Raj  
205. Relied AIR 1954 SC 44 and AIR 1960 Raj  138.  
94  T.V. Kochuvareed v. P. Mariappa Gounder, AIR 1954 
Travancore Cochin 10.  
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the part ies as forming the fundamental basis of their 
contract and then to see how far the subsequent 
development have resulted in the determination of the very 
basis of the contract, thereby rendering its performance 
impossible.    
 
Union of India v. Dass (1955)95 
 
In Union of India v. Dass ,  the Hon’ble Pepsu High Court has 
dealt with the most sensit ive issue in the history of 
frustration as far as Indian Law of Frustrat ion is concerned.  
 
On 11-8-1947, i t  was unquestionably common knowledge 
that India was being divided into two Dominions on 14-8-
1947.   Only three days before that date the railway 
accepted the consignment at the Lahore rai lway station for 
carriage to Nabha railway station. There was wholesale 
evacuation of non-Muslim population beyond Lahore and 
passenger train service was anything but satisfactory and 
there could be no quest ion of there being normal goods 
train service in those days.   The disturbances were already 
on, in Lahore on 11 th  August and the rai lway administration 
could not possibly ignore what was going on not only 
around and in the railway stat ion.   The rai lway administrate 
was, therefore, aware of the state of circumstances in which 
it accepted the consignment and the disturbances had 
already started when the accepted was made. The 
consignment never reached Nabha.  In a suit against the 
Railway for loss, i t  was contended that the doctrine could 
not be performed, the performance having become 
impossible due to frustration and that the contract had thus 
become void. 
                                      
95  Union of India v. Dass, AIR 1955 Pepsu 51. 
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Held that it  did not l ie with the defendant Railway to say 
that what happened was something that could not be 
foreseen by reasonable men. The tempo that the 
disturbances were to reach was too apparent by 11th 
August and the defendant could not say that what happened 
could not be foreseen and, therefore, an implied term in the 
contract between the part ies must be read that the state of 
things, i.e., the peaceful atmosphere necessary for eff icient 
running of the railways, the continuance of which they 
expected at the t ime of the making of the contract, ceased 
to exist because of the disturbances thus rendering the 
purpose of the contract impossible and that the supervening 
events could not be contemplated or foreseen by the 
parties.  Thus there was no substance in the contention of 
the defendant. 
 
It is further held that the fact that the goods had gone to 
Karachi and the fact that they would not leave Karachi for 
India without an export permit also did not help the 
defendant. When the goods were accepted for consignment 
there was no such law and no legal obstruction in the 
carriage of the goods.   Even if  it  be taken that such a law 
requiring permit came into force on the day Pakistan came 
into being, st il l  that would not provide an effective defence 
to the defendant because when the defendant accepted the 
goods, there was no such legal, impediment, and sine the 
date of part it ion was known at that t ime, such a cont ingency 
could not be said to be outside the contemplation and 
foresight of the parties.   Therefore, this argument did not 
bring the case within the scope of doctrine of frustrat ion. 
 
In this ruling not ice is taken of AIR 1951 Sim 189 and AIR 
1952 Pun 34. 
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Parti t ion of the country was undoubtedly an event the 
impact of which on the contract between the part ies was 
neither foreseen nor foreseeable. Travel and trade between 
the two Dominions became impracticable and hazardous.   
The times were so abnormal that normal movements of men 
and material was not possible.   It  can well be argued that i f  
the contract envisaged such movement of men and 
materials, the contract was impossible of performance 
within the meaning of section 56 of the Contract Act but i f  
the contract could be performed without such movement, 
the plea of frustration may not be sustainable.  
 
Hari Chand Madan Gopal. V. State of Punjab, (1973)96 
 
Another aspect of the impact of the partit ion on contracts 
with undivided provinces was whether such contracts could 
be legal ly enforced by the divided province after the 
partit ion? In Hari Chand Madan Gopal.  V. State of Punjab, i t  
was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that i f  a contract 
was entered into with undivided Punjab, could East Punjab 
enforce such a contract against a third party after the 
partit ion.   To meet this legal dif f iculty a provision was 
made by issue of Governor’s orders which had the legal 
effect of bifurcat ing a single and indivisible contract with 
Punjab into two separate contracts enforceable wither by 
West Punjab or East Punjab depending upon the subject-
matter. If  the subject matters pertained to East Punjab such 
a contract was enforceable by East Punjab. A plea taken in 
such a case that,  as the assets of undivided Punjab were 
divided between West Punjab and East Punjab in the 
proport ion of 60: 40 East Punjab could only claim from the 
                                      
96  Hari Chand Madan Gopal. V. State of Punjab,  AIR 1973 
SC 381.  
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third party 40 per cent of the total dues on the foot of that 
that contract.  This plea was repel led by the Supreme Court 
holding that 60 :  40 was for the purpose of f inancial  
adjustment of the assets between the two provinces West 
Punjab and East Punjab and did not affect the contractual  
l iabil i ty of a third party.  Well it  has been said that drastic 
wrongs require drastic remedies and abnormal situations 
call  for handling with care. 
 
  Connotation of the word “Impossible” 
considered. 
 
I t  has now been general ly accepted as correct that the 
doctr ine of frustration of contract would apply to cases 
where the very foundation of a contract disappears by virtue 
of circumstances coming into existence, which were not 
within the contemplation of the parties to the contract.   
“The word ‘ impossible’ should be constructed in a l iberal  
sense so as to embrace within i ts purview act which become 
impract icable or extremely hazardous and cannot be said to 
have been used, in a physical or l iteral sense.   I t  is 
suff icient for the act to be impossible that it  becomes 
impract icable or useless from the view of the object and 
purpose, which the part ies had in view.   In the present 
case, i t  is clear that the plaintif fs were to derive benefit 
f rom the produce of the lands and this object was totally 
upset by the change of circumstances coming into existence 
due to the creat ion of the two Dominions of India and 
Pakistan”.97   
 
I t  is sett led law that before the court applies the principle 
that the contract has become impossible of performance, 
the f irst  duty is to ascertain the facts forming the basis of 
                                      
97  Hari Singh v. Dewani Vidyawati , AIR 1960 J & K 91.  
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the contract and see how far the change in the 
circumstances is such as to remove the very foundation of 
the contract i tself . The court must as a fact determine 
whether the circumstances did exist and if  so whether they 
are suff icient to hold that the parties are absolved from their 
obligation under the contract.   I t  is the essence of the 
doctr ine that the event, which causes frustrat ion, must have 
occurred without the fault of either party.   Therefore the 
court ought to see whether i t is a case of self-induced 
frustration in which case there could be no defence at al l” .98   
 
In Gundayya v. Subayya,99 i t was held: “The law does not 
apply an absolute obligation to do that which the law 
forbids, and the reasonable view to take of the contract  
would be that the seller agreed to supply the promised 
number of bags of rice if , af ter using his best endeavour he 
was able to secure the necessary number of wagons. The 
obligation to perform the contract was not therefore 
absolute, but impliedly condit ional.” 
 
To attract the doctr ine of frustration of contract the 
performance of the contract must become absolutely 
impossible due to the supervening event, legislat ive or 
otherwise.   Where in spite of intervent ion of events 
subsequent to the making of the agreements which were not 
in contemplation of the parties and which could not be 
foreseen with reasonable di l igence, the contract st i l l  be 
performed in substance and it cannot be said that the 
contract has become impossible of performance within the 
meaning of sect ion 56 of the Act.  In the case of Ramkumar 
                                      
98  D.R. Mehta v. T in Plate Dealers Associat ion Ltd., AIR 
1965 Mad 400.  
99  Gundayya v. Subayya, AIR 1927 Mad 89.  
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v. P.C. Roy & Co. (India) Ltd.,100 the principle of frustrat ion 
came up for consideration of the court in the context of the 
facts that certain goods were contracted to be transshipped. 
Their Lordship lay down:  
 
“The main object of the contract was the transshipment of 
the goods from Bihar to Bengal by railway and in my opinion 
having regard to the events that have happened the basis of 
the contract has been overthrown. In the absence of 
express intention of the parties I have to determine what is 
just and reasonable in view of the non-availabil ity of 
wagons for transport and the dif f icult ies created by the 
restrict ions or emergency orders.   It  may be now accepted 
as sett led law that when people enter into a contract which 
is dependent for its performance on the cont inued 
availabil ity of a specif ic thing and that availabil i ty comes to 
an end by reason of c ircumstances beyond the control of 
the part ies, the contract is dissolved.   According to Lord 
Wright the expression ‘f rustrat ion of the contract ’ is an 
el l iptical expression. The fuller and more accurate 
expression is ‘f rustration of the adventure or the commercial  
or pract ical purpose of this contract’. In my view, the 
commercial or practical purpose of this contract was 
defeated or overthrown by the refusal on the part of the 
Government to issue permit and by the non-availabil ity of 
the transport faci l i t ies and the restrict ions and embargoes 
put by the Government and ult imately by requisit ion of the 
stock of the plaint if f .   The real object of the contract as 
contemplated by the part ies was the purchase or 
employment of the goods for a particular purpose and 
therefore the doctrine of frustration can be imported and, i f  
                                      
100  Ramkumar v. P.C. Roy & Co. ( India) Ltd .,  AIR 1952 Cal 
335.  
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necessary, the requisite terms can be implied.”  Test of 
impossibil ity is whether it was practically impossible for 
party to perform the contract within specif ic t ime.  
 
In Ganga Singh v. Santosh Kumar,101 it  was held: The word 
‘impossible’ in section 56 of the Contract Act has not been 
used in the sense of physical or l i teral impossibi l ity. The 
sanctity of contract is the foundation of the law of contract 
and the doctrine of impossibi l ity does not displace that 
principle, but merely enables the court to enforce it 
equitably. It releases a party from its obligations to perform 
a contract where performance has become impossible as a 
result of events out of the control of that party.  However, 
the plea of impossibil ity will  not be entertained by the Court 
if ,  in spite of supervening events, the object and purpose of 
the parties is not rendered useless and the contract can be 
performed substant ial ly in accordance with the original  
intention of the parties though not l iteral ly in accordance 
with the language of the agreement. The court wil l not apply 
the doctrine of impossibil ity to assist a party, which does 
not want to fulf i l l  its obligations under the contract, and 
rel ies on l i teral impossibi l ity to back out of it .  The doctr ine 
of impossibil i ty,  which is based on equity and common 
sense, cannot be permit ted to become a device for 
destroying the sanctity of contract.  
 
Doctrine of ‘f rustration of venture’ is based not upon 
existence of any actual impossibi l ity in fact but upon 
existence in it ci rcumstances of the case, of an implied 
condit ion, which must be absolutely necessary to give effect 
to the transaction which parties must have intended.  Where 
at the t ime contract was entered into there were in fact  
                                      
101  Ganga Singh v. Santosh Kumar, AIR 1963 All  201.  
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some uncertainties and subsequently those uncertainties 
become real it ies, the commercial venture gets frustrated 
and both parties are excused from performing the contract.  
 
In commercial contracts, where the contract becomes 
impossible of performance by reason of a state of war or by 
an act of the execut ive Government, or the contract which 
would otherwise be expected to be ordinari ly performed, is 
delayed by reason of certain regulat ions imposed by the 
Government making the performance of such contract  
dependent upon the grant of l icence or permit,  the parties 
need not wait for an indef inite period in the hope of relaxing 
of the control orders or the grant of l icence and permit.  
 
The doctrine of frustrat ion is applicable only where the 
frustrating event is outside the contemplat ion of the 
contracting part ies. It  is not applicable to an express 
contract to repay money in case of supervening 
impossibil ity of performance of a major obligation.   
 
“The expression ‘ f rustration’ is now generally used to 
denote cases of subsequent physical or legal impossibi l ity 
as wel l as cases of frustrat ion of the commercial venture.”   
 
I f  the promisor knew the impossibi l ity of performance at the 
t ime when the contract was made but was not known to the 
promise, the former wi ll be taken to have made an absolute 
promise. It f requently happens that a contract is si lent as to 
the posit ion of the parties in the event of performance 
becoming literally impossible or only possible in a very 
different way from that or iginally contemplated.  In such 
cases, the law excuses further performance under the 
doctr ine of impossibi l ity of frustration.  
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The doctrine of frustration has been variously stated to 
depend on an implied condition, the disappearance of the 
foundation of the contract, the intervent ion of the law to 
impose a just and reasonable solution, or the fact of a 
radical change in the character of the obligat ion; but the 
last v iew is now the predominant one.  
 
A party will  not escape l iabi l ity for non-performance by 
showing an impossibi l ity referable solely to his individual 
abil ity or circumstances or that he f ind the contract unduly 
diff icult or onerous to perform. 
 
Whatever the al leged source of frustration, a contract is not 
discharged under this doctrine merely because it turns out 
to be dif f icult  to perform or onerous.   Thus the parties will  
not generally be released from their bargain on account of  
rises or falls in pr ice, depreciat ion of currency or 
unexpected obstacles to the execution of the contract, for 
these are ordinary risk of business.102  
 
  Can Inflation be accepted as a plea for 
frustration of contract.  
 
 
The contract normally stipulated obligat ion on the part  of 
one party to render services or to supply stores in return for 
the obligation on the other party to pay for the same.   
Payment is f ixed considering the price for such stores or 
services at an est imate made at the t ime of making the 
contract taking into consideration normal f luctuat ions of the 
market and the money in which payment is to be made.   
                                      
102  Halsburys’ Laws of England, (1974), 4 t h  edi t ion, Vol.  9, 
Para 442. 
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There was a t ime when money was stable when it was 
hitched to gold standard and one could predict with 
certainty that there would be no violent f luctuations in the 
value of money between the date of entering into the 
contract and the date when payment is due or actually paid.   
But gone are those days of stabili ty and predictabil i ty.   
Money is no longer hitched to gold standard.  It f luctuates 
violent ly and frequently if  not cont inuously and nobody can 
predict with any amount of certainty or even approximation, 
the f luctuations, which would intervene between the date of 
entering into the contract and the date of receiving 
payment.   Inf lation has come to stay.   Init ial ly, it  was 
considered to be a temporary phenomenon, which would 
disappear in course of t ime when the market sett les down.   
Similarly, devaluation was considered to be an 
extraordinary phenomenon to be considered as an 
exception and not a factor to be taken into consideration in 
commercial transactions.   But, now a day, both inflat ion 
and devaluation, which are in fact twin aspects of the same 
process, are factors, which cannot be ignored, in 
commercial transactions.   Due to inf lation prices have 
increased and are increasing, the situation having been 
aggravated by precipitate hike in petroleum prices.   Rupee 
was devalued on 6-6-1966 and has been revalued and 
devalued number of times.   Similarly, the currencies of 
other countr ies have been repeatedly revalued. Inf lat ion is a 
worldwide phenomena and al l at tempts to el iminate it have 
failed.   I t is only the percentage of the increase, which is 
sought to be kep under control.   To an extent, this 
phenomena is the consequence of the change in the role of 
the State in modern t imes.   The State is no longer 
concerned with law and order and taxation alone but plays a 
vital role in the economic f ield because of control and 
distribut ion of scare materials and f ixation of price of 
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essential commodit ies l ike steel, cement, etc.  Cost of l iv ing 
index has been steadily r ising.   It  got a jump in 1973 – 74 
with the hike in petroleum prices by approximately 250%.  
These factors have introduced an element of uncertainty in 
commercial transactions and the quest ion arises whether 
inflat ion or devaluation of the currency can be pleaded as 
frustration of the contract. 
 
The impact of inf lation on the performance of the contract 
vis-à-vis the doctrine of frustration has been judicially 
considered in U.K. in fol lowing words:103  
 
“Lord Denning MR reached an interesting and controversial 
decision in Staffordshire Area Health Authority v. South 
Staffordshire Waterworks Co.104 The facts of which have 
already been stated.   In this case Lord Denning MR held 
that the contract had been frustrated by inf lation ‘outside 
the realm of their speculation altogether, or of any 
reasonable person sitt ing in their chairs’.  With respect,  
however, this view; which was not concurred in by the other 
members of the court is either wrong or involves a massive 
change in the law as previously understood.   There are 
thousands if  not mil l ions, of contracts potential ly within the 
scope of this pr inciple, for example, long leases for 99 
years or more at f ixed ground rents or long term  policies of 
l i fe insurance.  Furthermore, the facts of the case would not 
appear to satisfy Lord Denning MR’s own test since in 1929 
hyper- inf lation was well-known phenomenon which had 
recent ly devastated the economics of several European 
countr ies.” 
                                      
103  Cheshire, Fifoot and Fumston’s, 10th edition, p. 520, Law of 
Contract.  
104  Health Author ity v. South Staffordshire Waterworks Co., 
(1978) 2 Al l  ER 769 : (1978) 1 WLR 1387.  
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“Where the loss is a money loss, the fact that a change in 
the value of money is involved is unmasked: it  is no longer 
latent as in the cases of loss of property and of services.   
It  is submitted that there is a good argument for basing the 
award to the plaint if f  on the value of the money at the time 
of breach in the case of contract. This f its the general rule 
of damages that they are to be assessed as at the date of  
when wrong rather than the date of tr ial and judgment, is 
consistent with the established rule where foreign currency 
is involved, and provides for the plaintif f  a hedge against 
the inf lat ionary dangers of the law’s delays to which he 
ought to be entit led, always provided that he is not 
responsible himself  for culpable delay in suing.    
 
Lord Wilberforce found that there had and the key to such 
consideration was undoubtedly the monetary uncertaint ies 
which have aff l icted the world in the 1970’s.  He said: 
 
“The situation as regards currency stabil ity has 
substantially changed ever since 1961.  Instead of the main 
world currencies being f ixed and fair ly stable in value, 
subject to the r isk of periodic re – or devaluations, many of 
them are now ‘f loating’, i.e., they have no f ixed exchange 
value even from day-to-day.   This is true of ster ling.   This 
means that instead of a situat ion in which changes of 
relat ive value occurred between the ‘breach date’ and the 
date of judgment or payment being the exception, so that a 
rule, which did not provide for this case could be generally 
fair,  this situation is now the rule. So the search for a 
formula to deal with it becomes urgent in the interest of 
just ice.”105 
                                      
105
  (1976) AC 436. 
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Inf lation is a supervening circumstance, over which part ies 
have no control, the causation of which is not attr ibutable to 
the part ies but it  is not just a visit ing misfortune l ike f loods, 
cyclone, earthquake, f ire, etc., which, from its very nature, 
is temporary.   Inf lation is a class by itself ; i t  is a 
misfortune, which has come to stay.   It  cannot be entirely 
el iminated but it  can only be contained. The utmost that can 
be achieved is that its intensity may be diminished from 
double digits to single digit. It  is a phenomenon,  which 
cannot be said to be unforeseen.  I t is for the parties to 
provide for it  in the contract.  Not having done so, can it be 
said that they intended that the loss wil l be lie where it falls 
or that they leave it to the lawyers to sort i t  out.  The 
question arises “Wil l law take care of such a situat ion by 
coming to the rescue of the suffering party by holding that 
the contract is frustrated?”  If  there is run-away-inf lat ion, 
the burden of the contract on the promissory wil l be so 
heavy that justice demands that he be rel ieved as held by 
the Brit ish court in Straffordshire case106 or as contemplated 
by American law in Restatement of Law, art icle 454 which 
contemplates increase of expense as a just ifying cause for 
frustration.  Time may come when Supreme Court of India 
may be persuaded to take this view though the present view 
which has been taken in Alopi Parshad’s  case107,  is that 
increase in expenditure of f luctuat ion in currency wil l  not 
affect the contractual obligation following the Brit ish Rulings 
in Joseph Constantine Steam Ship case and Bri t ish 
Movietonews case.   Though the Brit ish courts have moved 
forward as in Straffordshire case, the Indian Courts have 
                                      
106  Staffordshire Area Health Authority v. South Staffordshire 
Waterworks Co., (1978) 3 Al l  ER 769 : (1978) 1 WLR 
1387.   
107  M/s. Alopi Parshad and Sons Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 
1960 SC 588.  
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remained static. It  may be safely predicted that the hope 
expressed by Lord Wilberfore in the case 1976 AC 463 that 
search for a just solution for such a situat ion is called for,  
wi ll eventually be real ized. Perhaps a formula wi l l  be 
evolved that if  the burden of the contract increases manifold 
due to causes not attributable to any party, the parties may 
be relieved but not when there are marginal increases.  
What is marginal increase and what quantum jump may 
qualify as manifold increase will  be a knotty problem for the 
courts to sett le,  which may well be lawyer’s delight and 
judge’s despair. 
 
Contract is an arrangement arrived at by the part ies for 
sharing the risk and the bargain contained therein is arrived 
at by maintaining equil ibr ium.  This equil ibrium which is of 
the essence of the contract is disturbed by inf lat ion and this 
disturbance goes to the root of the contract as what the 
parties assumed as the basis of the contract no longer 
exists.   The result would be that the contract as now is, 
becomes radically dif ferent from the contract as it  was.  
Such a situat ion would attract the doctrine of frustrat ion.  At 
any rate i t would qualify as a justifying cause of non-
performance,  which will not amount to breach.  
 
Justice, equity and fair-play demand that the aggrieved 
party must be paid in terms of the real value of money (and 
not the nominal value) with reference to the due date; i f  we 
have to sat isfy the requirement of the principle of 
restitution, i .e., the aggrieved party to be placed in the 
same posit ion as it  would have been if the other party had 
performed the contract.  No doubt i t  is not easy to f ind a 
formula to sat isfy the requirement of this principle but a 
beginning has to be made t il l  a satisfactory formula is drawn 
and accepted. Consumer index may be a guide for the 
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purpose though the items i t includes, are limited and may 
not fairly represent the real value of money as a whole on a 
particular date but t i l l  such time when the required data is 
available ref lecting the f luctuat ions of money f rom time to 
t ime in the domestic market, (apart f rom the exchange rate 
in the international market).   This may be the data to work 
upon.   To be content with payment in terms of nominal 
money is by no means a satisfactory solution. It may wel l be 
that in the absence of a satisfactory formula, a plea of 
frustration can be raised as the f luctuat ion are certainly 
events beyond the control the parties; not in contemplat ion 
of the part ies at the t ime of entering into the contract and 
events which destroy the foundation of the contract and 
make the performance of the contract radically dif ferent.   
 
  Endeavour to list frustrating events.  
 
While i t may be possible to l ist the class of contracts in 
respect of which frustrat ing events call for consideration, i t  
may not be possible to compile a complete catalogue of 
frustrating events, as the categories of such events are not  
closed and therefore such a l ist  can only be il lustrat ive but 
not exhaustive. 
 
  Class of contracts. 
 
(1) Contract for sale of  goods. 
(2) Contract for carr iage of goods. 
(3) Charter-part ies. 
(4) Personal contracts. 
(5) Building contracts. 
(6) Leases. 
(7) Contracts for sale of land. 
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  List of frustrating events. 
 
1.  Destruction of the subject matter of the contract,  
e.g., by f ire or other causes. 
2. Requisit ioning of the subject matter of the 
contract by the Government. 
3. Delay, suff icient ly long to have the effect of 
frustrating the commercial adventure embodied 
in the contract. 
4. Seizure of the ship by foreign Government. 
5. Explosion causing the disabling of the ship. 
6. Incapacity or death of the promisor under a 
personal contract. 
 
While the above l ist contemplates supervening events have 
adverse effect on the performance of the contract 
conceivably there can be a case where supervening events 
may have benefic ial effect on the performance of the 
contract.  Such a case would be a case of operation of the 
doctr ine of frustrat ion in reverse.  When the part ies contract 
not on the continuance but on a change in the 
circumstances on the assumption that despite the exist ing 
adverse state of affairs the normal state of affairs beneficial  
to the performance would return by the t ime performance is 
due, as the existing state of affairs were abnormal and 
temporary, such a contract is not void ab init io.    But in 
such a case if  the expected normal state of affairs does not 
material ize the contract would be frustrated.   The reason 
being throwing of the risk on one of the part ies in such a 
case would be doing something, which the other party 
himself  did not intend.  An i l lustrat ion of such a case can be 
entering into a contract for supply of goods from the place 
of manufacture to i ts dest ination, which was banned by the 
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then prevalent war restrict ions but as the armist ice were 
signed it  was only an intel l igent ant icipat ion that war 
restrict ions would be l i f ted by the due date but due to 
inevitable departmental delays such expectat ions did not 
material ize by the due date, the contract would be 
frustrated. 
 
Partial f rustration can take place when there is destruction 
of small separable parts of the subject matter of the 
contract leaving the funct ional integrity of such subject 
matter in tact.   Decision in any given case whether there is 
partial f rustrat ion or not would depend on the facts of that 
case.  
 
While a supervening event may be accepted as frustrat ing 
or rejected as non-frustrating in between the two lays a grey 
area. 
 
  Situation though Short of Frustration may 
qualify as justifiable excuse for non-
performance.  
 
Law is sett led that a supervening event may make the 
contract more onerous or entail extra expenditure but that 
by itself  would not frustrate the contract unless there is 
change in the signif icance of the obligat ion or the contract 
becomes radical ly dif ferent or the foundation disappears.   
The problem, which presents i tself, is where do you draw 
the l ine that the supervening event frustrates the contract or 
makes it merely onerous, fal l ing short of frustrat ion?   What 
are the guidelines on the point?   I t has been said that in 
some cases the supervening event may not qualify as 
frustration and yet it  may excuse non-performance. This 
contemplates that some supervening even fail ing to qualify 
as frustrat ion may be just if icat ion or an excuse for non-
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performance while other supervening event may also fall  
short of justif icat ion and excuse for non-performance.    
Where do you draw the l ine between justif iable excuse for 
non-performance and untenable content ion for the same?   
What are the guidelines to be followed in separating one 
from the other?  Somehow or the other, this interesting and 
important point has not received the considerat ion which it 
deserves.  Both the courts and the text book writers have 
not considered this aspect of the matter in any depth except 
perhaps one writer, Trietel in Frustrat ion and Force 
Majeure,108 says referr ing to events qualifying as justi f iable 
excuses for non-performance though fal l ing short of 
frustrating events. “The preceding discussion concerns the 
borderl ine between str ict l iabi l ity and discharge; but is also 
necessary to refer to the relationship between the doctrine 
of discharge and cases in which contractual l iabi l ity is 
based on fault.   These are cases in which a party who has 
undertaken to perform service or to achieve some result is  
not l iable i f he has exercised reasonable care in rendering 
the service, or if  he has used due dil igence to bring about 
the result.   I f  that party complies with that standard, but the 
result specif ied or expected by the other party is not 
achieved, then former party is not in breach. ……….If the 
party who was required by the contract to make the 
reasonable efforts does make them and nevertheless fails 
to obtain the requisite consent, he is under no liabil ity.  But 
the reason for this is not that the supervening event has 
discharged him from this duty of di l igence; i t  is rather that 
he has performed that duty.” 
 
                                      
108  Tr ietel ,  (1994), p. 5, Frustrat ion and Force Majeure.   
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Cheshire, Fifoot and Fumston’s Law of Contract,109 has 
stated that unusually fai lure to perform wil l amount to 
breach. This is true but i t  is important to recognize that in 
certain circumstances fai lure to perform is excusable.  In 
some cases unforeseeable events, although not br inging the 
contract to an end, may provide an excuse for non-
performance. 
 
Calcutta High Court in Ramkumar v. P.C. Roy & Co.,110 have 
observed that “Frustrat ion is a developing concept; l ike 
negligence, i ts categories are never closed but are as wide 
as the categories of human conduct.  Its effect is 
immediate, automatic; it  guil lotines a contract and the 
contract, without the option of either party – accrued rights 
subsisting – is dissolved.   If  the part ies later purport to act 
under it they are real ly making a new contract.   The court 
supplying enlightened common sense to do just ice, decided 
whether the contract is at an end.”    
 
Orissa High Court has also considered this quest ion in 
Utkal Automobiles (P) Ltd. v. B.P. Roy ,111 “In a case of 
contract for supply of trucks on priority basis, no supply of 
truck was made by manufacturer to defendant (dealer) 
during relevant period. It  was held that there was no breach 
of contract on part  of the defendant”.    
 
Patna High Court has also observed in Firm Rampratap v. 
S.S. Works Ltd.,112 “Where gunny bags manufactured by a 
                                      
109  Cheshire, Fifoot and Fumston, 11 t h  edit ion, p. 516, Law of 
Contract ,   
110  Ramkumar v. P.C. Roy & Co., AIR 1952 Cal 335.  
111  Utkal Automobiles (P) Ltd. v. B.P. Roy,  AIR 1976 Or i 15.  
112  Firm Rampratap v. S.S. Works Ltd., AIR 1964 Pat 250. ILR 
1952(2) Cal 458., AIR 1923 PC 54(2) and AIR 1941 Pat 
429, Relied on. 
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particular mill were agreed to be supplied during a specif ied 
period and the agreement was entered into with the full  
knowledge of the fact that the mil ls were closed during the 
relevant period due to labour strike, the fai lure to supply 
gunny bags as per agreement cannot be attributed to the 
closure of the mil ls and the doctrine of frustrat ion cannot be 
made applicable to such a case even by implicat ion.   
 
Commercial contracts are entered into with the object of 
performing them, but the parties do not always succeed in 
doing so and are sometimes thwarted by events beyond 
their control , which supervene during the performance.   It 
is not unknown that poli t ical,  economic and social  
upheavals overtake the performance of commercial  
contracts. The result is that the contract may be held to be 
frustrated as a consequence of such supervening events.   
In such a case while one party may seek to enforce the 
contract or claim damages for breach, the other may 
advance the defence of frustrat ion and claim immunity from 
the l iabi li ty for damages.   Lit igation is both expensive and 
time-consuming and the commercial community being 
al lergic to such a situat ion has taken to draft ing a buil t- in 
clause in the contract providing for the consequences of 
such cont ingencies, which clause has been convenient ly 
called force majeure c lause.   Parties may foresee a future 
supervening event,  which may make the performance of the 
contract impossible or may affect the foundation of the 
contract.   Having foreseen such an event parties may make 
a provision in the contract itself  regarding the 
consequences of such an event.   They may agree that in 
such an eventuality ei ther the contract will stand terminated 
or provide that the party affected may have option of 
terminating it by giving not ice to the other party or that the 
contract wil l not be terminated but extended for the purpose 
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of performance when the effect of such an eventual ity is 
l i f ted or varied so as to make the performance of the 
contract possible despite the delay or the change in the 
mode, method or manner of performance.   Such a clause is 
termed as a force majeure clause for sake of convenience.   
Force majeure clause is not synonymous with vise major.    
Force majeure is a term of wider import.  While vise major 
may refer to acts of God, force majeure may refer to acts of 
man as well,  etc.,  etc.   The intent ion of st ipulat ion of force 
majeure clause into the contract is to save the performing 
party from the consequences of an event over which he has 
no control.   Such a clause would st ipulate what would be 
effect of the catalogued contingencies, normally al lowing for 
the suspension of performance for a reasonable period of 
t ime coupled with the right to terminate the contract if  the 
consequent delay persists beyond that reasonable l imit.  
The catalogued cont ingencies generally are the events, 
which are beyond the control of the parties. 
 
The expression force majeure has been judicially def ined to 
cover “al l c ircumstances beyond the will  of  man which i t is 
not in his power to control”.   A party who has no force 
majeure protection can f ind himself  in the posit ion of not 
being able to fulf i l l  his contract, and in act ion against him 
for breach can f ine that the court rejects his plea of 
frustration. He will then have to pay damages to the 
plaint if f .  
 
Justice Hidayatul lah, in M/s. D. Gobindram v. M/s. Shamji  
K. & Co.,113 while interpret ing the expression “usual force 
majeure clause”, have quoted with approval the English 
                                      
113  M/s. D. Gobindram v. M/s. Shamj i K. & Co., AIR 1961 SC 
1285.  
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rul ing of McCardie, J., in Lebeaupin v. Crispin,114 and 
observed: “The expression ‘force majeure’ is not a mere 
French version of the Latin expression ‘v is major ’.   I t  is 
undoubtedly a term of wider import.   Diff icult ies have arisen 
in the past as to what could legit imately be included in 
‘force majeure’.  Judges have agreed that str ikes, 
breakdown of machinery, which though normally not 
included in ‘vis major’ are included in ‘force majeure’.    An 
analysis of rulings on the subject into which it  is not 
necessary in this case to go, shows that where reference is 
made to ‘ force majeure’,  the intent ion is to save the 
performing party from the consequences of anything over 
which has to control.   This is the widest meaning that can 
be given to ‘ force majeure’ and even if  this be the meaning, 
it  is obvious that the condit ion about ‘ force majeure’ in the 
agreement was not vague.  The use of the word ‘usual’  
makes all the dif ference and the meaning of the condit ion 
may be made certain by evidence about a force majeure 
clause, which was in contemplation of parties.” 
 
In Serajuddin v. State of Orissa,115 the Hon’ble Orissa High 
Court has fol lowed the view taken in M/s. D. Gobindram v. 
M/s. Shamji K. & Co.116  In the above rul ing, it  has been 
observed that: “The expression ‘ force majeure’ is not a 
mere French version of the Latin expression ‘vis major ’,  and 
strikes, break down of machinery and such things which, 
though normally not included in ‘v is major ’,  are included in 
‘force majeure’. Where reference is made to ‘ force majeure’,  
the intent ion is to save the performing party form the 
                                      
114  Lebeaupin v. Crispin ,  (1920) 2 KB 714.  
115  Serajuddin v. State of Orissa,  AIR 1961 SC 1285. (1920) 2 
KB 714. Referred.  
116  M/s. D. Gobindram v. M/s. Shamj i K. & Co., AIR 1961 SC 
1285. 
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consequences of anything of the nature stated above or 
over which he has no control. 
 
‘Further, the ‘ force majeure’ clause should be construed 
with a close attention to words which precede or fol low it,  
and with due regard to the nature and the general terms of 
the contract.   Therefore, the words ‘any other happening’ in 
such a clause must be given ejusdem generic  construction 
so as to engulf  within i ts fold only such happenings and 
eventualit ies which are of the nature and type il lustrated in 
the same clause with close attent ion to the nature and 
terms of the contract and would not reasonably be within 
the power and control of the party.” 
 
Calcutta High Court in E.A. Gubray v. Ramjusroy 
Golabroy,117,  commenting on the expression ‘ force majeure’,  
has observed: “The expression ‘ force majeure’ is taken from 
the Code Napoleon and has a more extensive meaning than 
‘act of God’ or ‘vis major ’,  though it may be doubtful 
whether it  includes al l ‘causes you cannot prevent and for 
which you are not responsible’. 
 
  CARDINAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ENGLISH 
LAW OF FRUSTRATION AND INDIAN LAW OF 
FRUSTRATION. 
 
 
The cardinal dif ference between English Law of Frustrat ion 
and Indian Law of Frustrat ion is that while the former is 
common law, the latter is statute law.  English Law being a 
judge-made law has lacked in uniformity and certainty but 
has f lexibil ity while the Indian Law being codif ied law can 
claim uniformity and certainty but because of i ts rigidity i t  is 
                                      
117  E.A. Gubray v. Ramjusroy Golabroy,  AIR 1921 Cal 305.  
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f rozen at the point of t ime when it was enacted in 1872.   
While the English Law has moved with the times, Indian 
Law has remained static. 
 
English Law passed through various stages of development 
and the proposit ions propounded in various judicial  
decisions were not uniform.  In some the Doctrine of 
Frustrat ion was held to be a device by which the rule as to 
absolute contract is reconciled with a special except ion 
which just ice demands (Hir ji Mulji ’s case).118  When an 
unexpected event or change of circumstances occurred the 
possibi l ity of which the part ies did not contemplate the 
meaning of the contract is taken to be not what the parties 
actually intended but what they as fair and reasonable men 
would presumably have intended and agreed upon if  having 
such possibi l i ty in view they had made express provision as 
to their r ights and l iabi lit ies in the event of such occurrence.   
This is the theory of implied term (Dahl ’s case).119  Lord 
Wright has observed: “The court personif ies for this purpose 
the reasonable man………..the doctrine is invented by the 
court in order to supplement the defects of the actual 
contract. To my mind the theory of impl ied condit ion is not 
really consistent with the true theory of frustrat ion.   I t  has 
never been acted upon as a ground of decision but is 
merely stated as a theoretical explanat ion.” (Denny, Mott 
and Dickensaion Ltd. case) .120 
 
English decisions have thrown up three theories in 
just if ication of the Doctrine of Frustration: 
 
                                      
118  Hirji Mulji v. Cheong Yue SS Co. Ltd., (1926) AC 497. 
119  Dahl v. Nelson, Donkin and Co., (1881) 6 AC 38. 
120  Denny, Mott and Dickensaion Ltd. v. James B. Fraser & 
Co. Ltd., (1944) AC 265. 
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(1) Implied Term Theory. 
(2) Theory of disappearance of the foundation of the 
contract. 
 
(3) Theory of the court exercising power to qualify 
the absolutely binding nature of the contract in 
order to do what is just and reasonable in the 
new si tuation. 
 
These theories have been evolved to adopt a realist ic 
approach to the problem of performance of contract.  When 
it is found that owing to causes unforeseen and beyond the 
control of the part ies intervening between the date of the 
contract and the date of performance it would be both 
unreasonable and unjust to exact i ts performance in the 
changed circumstances.   The necessity of evolving one or 
the other theory was due to the common law rule that courts 
have no power to absolve a party to the contract from his 
obligation.   On the other hand, the courts were anxious to 
preserve intact the sanct ity of contract yet the courts could 
not shut their eyes to the harshness of the situat ion 
consequent on supervening unforeseen events.   While the 
situat ion above stated is the result of the common law in 
England such a situat ion is not to be faced by courts in 
India because of sect ions 32 and 56 of the Indian Contract 
Act.   So far as the courts in Indian are concerned, they 
must look primari ly to the law as embodied in sect ions 32 
and 56 of the contract act in Ganga Saran v. Firm Ram 
Charan Ram Gopal ,121 and in Satyabrata Ghose v. 
Mugneeram Bangur and Co.122 While under the English Law 
                                      
121  Ganga Saran v. Firm Ram Charan Ram Gopal , AIR 1952 
SC 9.  
122  Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur and Co., AIR 
1954 SC 44. 
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the question of frustrat ion is a quest ion of construct ion of 
contracts, under the Indian Law it  is a question of posi t ive 
law contained in sect ions 32 and 56 of the Contract Act.    
Where the court as a matter of construct ion comes to the 
conclusion that the contract i tself  contains a term express 
or implied to the effect that the contract would stand 
discharged on the happening of certain circumstances, the 
dissolution of the contract would take place under the terms 
of the contract itself  and such cases would be outside the 
purview of sect ion 56.   In English Law such cases would be 
treated as cases of frustration.  In India, they would be 
dealt with under sect ion 32 and the matter is not left to be 
determined according to the intent ions of the part ies. 
 
The scope of the Doctrine of Frustrat ion in England is rather 
wide.  “ It seems necessary however to clear up some mis-
conceptions which are likely to arise because of the 
complexit ies of the English Law on the subject.   The Law of 
Frustrat ion in England developed as is well known, under 
the guise of reading implied terms into the contract.  The 
court,  imply a term and treated that as part  of the contract.   
In deciding cases in India we have to go by the doctrine of 
supervening impossibil ity or i l legali ty as laid down in 
section 56 of the Contract Act which lays down a rule of 
posit ive law and does not leave the matter to be determined 
according to the intent ion of the parties.  The court can 
grant relief  on the ground of subsequent impossibil i ty when 
it f inds that the purpose or the basis of the contract was 
frustrated by the intrusion or occurrence of an unexpected 
event or change of circumstances, which were not 
contemplated by the part ies at the date of the contract.  
There would in such a case be no question of f inding 
inference of implied term agreed to by the parties 
embodying a provision for discharge because the part ies did 
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not think about the matter at all nor could possibly have any 
intention regarding it.  When such an event or change of 
circumstances which is so fundamental has to be regarded 
by law as strik ing at the root of the contract as a whole 
occurs, it  is the court which can pronounce the contract to 
be frustrated and at an end.  This is really a posit ive rule 
enacted in section 56 which governs such situat ions.”123 
 
In Engl ish Law Doctrine of Frustrat ion being dependent on 
the construct ion of a contract permits itself  to be affected 
by a st ipulation in the contract excluding its applicabil ity in 
stated circumstances.  Part ies can thus contract themselves 
out from the ambit of the legal consequences of the 
Doctrine of Frustration if  they so choose.  As an i l lustration 
in a chartered party, if  there is inordinate delay according to 
law, Doctrine of Frustration is applicable and the contract is 
automatically dissolved irrespect ive of the intent ion of the 
parties but there is nothing to prevent the part ies from 
stipulating in the contract that in such a situat ion the 
contract wil l not stand dissolved because of the Doctrine of 
Frustrat ion.   While in India, it  is doubtful i f  parties can 
stipulate that frustration wil l not apply because of certain 
supervening circumstances, which the court would consider 
as qualifying for frustrat ion.   Though even in India parties 
can incorporate a Force Majeure clause but i ts operat ion is 
restricted and it would not deprive the court of its power to 
pronounce a contract as frustrated if  i t  comes within the 
ambit of section 56 of the Contract Act.  What are the 
permissible categories of cont ingencies for incorporation in 
a force majeure clause is an interest ing subject of study but 
generally speaking cont ingencies of delay due to 
circumstances beyond the control of  the performing party 
                                      
123
  Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur and Co., AIR 
1954 SC 44.  
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unforeseen at the t ime of entering into the contract could be 
so incorporated and would be valid and binding.  If  the 
parties are interested in continuing the contract and avoid 
frustrated in such a situation they can do so.  But if  the 
supervening event destroys the very foundation of the 
contract and goes to the root of it  even though the parties 
may stipulate that such an event would not frustrate the 
contract yet court can hold that the contract stands 
frustrated. 
 
4.9 CONCLUSION: 
 
 
The simplest way of frustrat ion is where the event 
interfering with performance is total ly,  unexpected and such 
as the parties could not reasonably have foreseen, but the 
doctr ine is wider in scope that it  is c lear that prima facie a 
contract may be discharged by frustration even though the 
parties foresaw or ought to have foreseen the frustrat ing 
event; but where, by reason of special knowledge, one party 
foresees the possibil ity of the event and conceals this f rom 
the other, the party with the special knowledge wil l  not be 
discharged.   Where the parties have made provision for the 
foreseen event the doctr ine of frustrat ion wil l as a rule have 
no application, except in cases of frustration by supervening 
il legality; but in certain cases the parties may not be taken 
to have envisaged the extent of the circumstances which in 
fact interfered with performance, and in such cases the 
doctr ine of frustrat ion, and not the express provision, will  
govern their posit ion. 
 
The object of the doctrine of frustration is to f ind a 
sat isfactory way of allocating the risk of supervening 
events.  The doctrine does not prevent the part ies from 
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making their own provision for this purpose.  They can 
expressly provide that the risk shall  be borne by one of 
them, not by the other, or they can apportion it or deal with 
it in any other way they l ike or let it  l ie where it falls. 
 
Two general proposit ions must be considered as vital to the 
doctr ine of frustrat ion: (1) contract should not be frustrated 
by an event expressly provided for in the contract; (2) 
contract should not be frustrated by an event which was or 
clearly should have been foreseen by the parties.  In the 
f irst, the part ies have al located the risk, in the second; they 
have consciously accepted the risk so that the obvious 
inference would be that they intended the loss to l ie where 
it might fal l.  
 
One of the knott iest problems which has to be tackled in the 
realm of the law of frustration is when can a supervening 
event be said to have been foreseen or should have been 
foreseen or foreseeable by the parties?  While the factum of 
the event having been foreseen can be proved by actual  
evidence, the real diff iculty arises when we have to embark 
on an enquiry whether the event should have been foreseen 
or was foreseeable.  The standard to be adopted has 
necessari ly the capacity of the human beings to foresee 
events cannot be uniform.  Though the capacity may vary 
from man to man, the test by which any man is to be judged 
is the object ive test applicable to every man.   
 
One of the dif f icult questions in the law relating to 
frustration is whether a contract can be frustrated by an 
event,  which was or should have been foresee by the 
parties? When we talk of cont ingency foreseen or 
foreseeable, it  can only mean foreseen or foreseeable by a 
person of ordinary intel l igence, not a soothsayer.  This 
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question has to be considered against the background of 
the concept of the executory contract as an arrangement for 
al locat ion of al l  r isk including that of supervening event.   
Parties to a mercant ile contract can only contemplate risks 
of ordinary uncertainties,  which exist when a contract is 
concluded.  Such a contract cannot be insurance against all  
future r isks.  
 
What are the tests to be adopted to determine whether an 
event can be said to be foreseeable at the t ime of entering 
into the contract?  With the advance of science and the 
immediate avai labi lity of information throughout the globe 
by modern methods of communicat ion, what may not be 
foreseeable in yesteryears would be considered to be 
foreseeable in modern t imes.   
 
It  is not unknown that modern business, particularly in 
internat ional sphere by multinational concerns, is conducted 
after due consultat ion with the agencies which specialize in 
furnishing advice about predictable pattern of the future 
events in any part icular country in any special sphere based 
on available information and by applying their latest 
methods to that information.   This end is achieved not only 
by using human talent but computers also.  Day is not far 
off  when even in domestic contracts, business house may 
take advice of consultants regarding future condit ions that 
may be prevalent not only in f inancial market but commodity 
market, labour and regarding al l other factors which would 
go into the decision making process.  As the area of 
foreseeabili ty increases, correspondingly the area of 
frustration of contract would diminish.   
 
Even the predictabil ity of  occurrence of acts of   
god is made possible by modern technology as f loods, 
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heavy rains, storms at sea, typhoons, cyclones can be 
predicted by meteorologists correct ly because of 
information col lected by satel l ites and fed to the computers.  
With the advance of knowledge in this sphere, even the 
scope allowed by law to acts of God as the just ifying excuse 
for non-performance of the contract is being rapidly 
reduced.   While area of predictabil ity is enlarged, 
inevitabil i ty of a supervening circumstances result ing in 
impossibil ity remains unaffected. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER - V 
 
FOUNDATION OF LIABILITY FOR  
BERACH OF CONTRACT 
 
5.1 INTORDUCTION: 
 
The basic foundation of every action of damages In the 
case of contract is a result  or outcome of breach of 
contract. It  is but obvious that such breach of contract is 
always a wrongful act in the eye of law and subject matter 
of dif ferent remedies. Damage for breach of contract is one 
of them. Therefore, whenever a breach of contract is proved 
or the case is made out that the breach is committed, law 
infers some damages to the plainti ff ,  and according to 
maxim ubi jus ibi remedium the common law of England as 
well as India considers that there is no wrong without a 
remedy, and the remedy is by way of an act ion for 
damages, is one of the most important amongst others.  
There are dif ferent ways in which l iabi lity in breach of 
contract may arise.  
 
(I) Liability may be imposed as a legal consequence of a 
person’s act,  or of his omission if  he is under a legal duty to 
act. Liabili ty may also be imposed upon one person as the 
legal consequence of the Act or the omission of another 
person with whom he stands in some special relationship 
such as the contract between the employer and employee.  
 
(II)  In some cases, l iabi l ity based upon fault; some t imes 
an intention to injure is required but more often negligence 
is suff icient. In other cases, which are called cases of strict 
l iabil i ty, l iabil i ty is in varying degrees independent of fault .  
 
  
- 298 - 
(III )  Whereas, most of the breach require damage result ing 
to the plaint if f  which is not to remote a consequence of the 
defendant’s conduct, a few, do not require proof of actual  
damage.  
 
5.2 INJURY IMPORTS DAMAGE: 
 
The Chief Justice Holt puts the aforesaid concept in a very 
remarkable way in the following manner: 
 
“Every injury”, said Chief Justice Holt in Ashby v. White1,  
“ imports a damage, through it does not cost the party one 
farthing, and it is impossible to prove the contrary: for a 
damage is not merely pecuniary, but an injury imports a 
damage, when a man is thereby hindered of his right. As in 
an act ion for slanderous words, though a man does not lose 
a penny by reason of the speaking them, yet he shal l have 
an action. So if a man gives another a cuff  on the ear 
though it costs him nothing, yet he shall have an act ion, for 
it  is personal injury. So a man shall have an action against 
another for riding over his ground though it does him no 
damage; for it  is an invasion of his property and the other 
has no r ight to come there; and in these cases the act ion is 
brought vi et armis .” This was a case in which a person who 
had a right to vote at a Parliamentary elect ion, was held 
entit led to maintain an action for damages against the 
returning off icer for malic iously refusing to register his vote 
though person for whom he offered to vote were elected.  
                                      
1  Ashby v. White, (1703) 2 Ld. Raym. 938 ; Smith L.C. Edn. 
264; The Munic ipal Board of Agra v. Ashraf A li , AIR 1922 
All . 1 at pp. 3,4; Draviyam Pil la i v. Cruz Fernandex, 26 
M.L.J. 704; Chunilal v. Kripashankar, 8 Bom. L.R. 838,  
Sartolhama Rao v. Chairman, M.C. Saidpt, AIR 1923 Mad. 
475 at pp. 477, 478.  
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The Chief Justice Holt said that “Every injury imports 
damage, though it does not cost the party one farthing, and 
it is impossible to prove the contrary: for damage, when a 
man is thereby hindered of his r ight”.  
 
5.2.1 Infraction of Rights, Actionable: 
 
The subject of the cause of action for recovery of damages 
is wide and varied, and it is beyond the scope of this work 
to def ine the precise limits within which an act ion for 
damages lies. W ith the increasing complexity of modern 
civi l izat ion, confl ict of rights must inevitably become more 
frequent and consequently new infractions of establ ished 
rights are bound to occur. It is proposed to give here certain 
well-established rules, which determine the relat ion 
between cause of action and damages.  
 
5.2.2 Cause of action defined: 
 
The precise def init ion of cause of act ion was laid down by 
the Court of Appeal in England in the case of Read v. 
Brown.2 Lord Esher, M. R. Said: “Every fact which it would 
be necessary for the plaint if f  to prove, if  traversed, in order 
to support his r ight to the judgment of the Court, is the 
cause of action.” Fry, L.J. in the same case said: 
“Everything which if  not proved, gives the defendant an 
immediate right to judgment must be part of the cause of 
act ion.” This def init ion of the meaning of cause of action 
has been adopted by the various High Courts in India3,  and 
it may be taken as well sett led that the expression “cause of 
                                      
2  Read v. Brown, (1889) 22 Q.B.D. 128 : 58 L.J.Q.B. 120. 
3  Muhammad Zakariya v. Muhammad Hafiz, 41 I.C. 233; Rajabhai 
Narain v. Haji Karim Mamood, 35 M.L.J. 189; Manjamma v. Sattiraju, 
31 M.L.J. 816. 
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act ion” means “that bundle of essential facts which it is 
necessary for the plaint if f  to prove before he can succeed in 
the case”.4 I t  can have no relation whatever to the defence 
which may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend 
upon the character of the rel ief  prayed for by the plaint if f .  I t 
has reference ent irely to the grounds set up in the plaint as 
the cause of act ion, in other words, to the media upon 
which the plaint if f  asks the Court to arr ive at a conclusion in 
his favour.5 The plainti f f ’s al leged cause of act ion is to be 
sought for within the four corners of the plaint,6 but the 
plaint if f  cannot be t ied down to the date of the accrual of 
the cause of act ion mentioned in the plaint,  for the Court is 
entit led to determine the date on which the cause of action 
arose from the facts al leged and proved.7 
 
5.2.3 Cause of action, when arises: 
 
Speaking generally, a cause of act ion may be said to arise 
when and as soon as the party has the right to apply to the 
proper Tribunals for rel ief  and an infr ingement of the 
plaint if f ’s right gives him a right so to apply for rel ief . 
However, in order to make out a cause of act ion it  is 
essential to al lege an prove the facts necessary to establish 
a right and the condit ions and circumstances in which the 
infringement of the r ight took place. Whenever, therefore, a 
plaint if f  establishes a perfect, as opposed to an imperfect,  
r ight and that r ight has been violated by the defendant, a 
cause of act ion arises in his favour, to enforce which he is 
entit led to bring an action. In other words, the plaint if f  has 
                                      
4  Muza Yaqub v. Manilal, I.L.R. 29 Bom. 368; Raghoonath v. 
Govindnarain, I.L.R. 12 Cal. 45. 
5  Chand Kuar v. Partap Singh, I.L.R. 16 Cal. 98. 
6  Jibunti v. Shibnath, I.L.R. 8 Cal. 819; Namoo v. Anand, I.L.R. 12 Cal. 
291. 
7  Fateh Ali v. Muhammad Bakhsh, AIR 1928 Lah. 516 at p. 523. 
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to state the facts upon which the right is based and the 
manner in which it has been infringed.  
 
It is, however, essent ial that the contract must be a legally 
enforceable contract. A contract i l legal at the incept ion, as 
where the consideration is unlawful, is not an enforceable 
contract; and a breach of such a contract does not afford a 
cause of action for damages. Even a subsequent promise 
based upon such a transact ion cannot emerge into a valid 
contract. Thus, where a forward contract in groundnut oi l is 
entered in face of the Oil and Oil-cakes Prohibit ion Order, 
and the part ies thereto subsequently mutually agreed to pay 
and receive damages for breach of such il legal contract, a 
suit to recover on the basis of such subsequent agreement 
is not maintainable.8  
 
5.3 BASIC PRINCIPLES: 
 
5.3.1 Injuria abseque damnum: 
 
This case i l lustrates the principle underlying the maxim ex  
injuria shine demno oritur actio,  that is, an act ion arises 
from a wrongful act though no pecuniary loss has taken 
place. This is more compendiously expressed as injuria 
absque damnum.  In this as well as in the correlative maxim, 
which will be considerable later on, the word in juria is used 
to signify a wrongful act and damnum,  the invasion of a 
legal private r ight, however, tr iv ial the inf l ict ion of actual  
loss or damage.  
 
                                      
8  Sadasivayya v. Venkatanarayana & Co., AIR 1953 Mad. 845, 846 : 
(1953) 1 M.L.J. 811 : 1953 M.W.N. 561 : Contra Maheshwari Metals 
and Metals Refinery v. Tamil Nadu Small Industries Corporation 
Limited. (1982) 1 M.L.J. 35 at pp. 48, 49. 
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5.3.2 Infringement of legal right actionable:  
 
Therefore, as Broom puts it , injur ia absque damnum  may be 
said to be unknown to our law,9 in other words, wherever 
there is an act or omission, which the law deems an injury, 
it  is presumed that some damage has been suffered by the 
party injured.10 In other words, therefore, to maintain an 
act ion upon an infringement of a r ight,  it  is not necessary to 
show any injury result ing from the infringement,11 and a 
plaint if f ,  whose right has been invaded, is entit led to a 
remedy, whether any damage accrued or not,12 so much so 
that, as the Privy Council has observed “there may be, 
where a right is interfered with, injuria sine damnum ,  
suff icient to found an act ion.”13 
 
Again in well-known cases also though there were no actual  
damages suffered by the part ies to the contract, the Courts 
took dif ferent views keeping in mind the concept of  breach 
of contract. In a well-known case of Marzett i v. Will iams,14 it  
was held that a customer is entit i led to maintain an act ion 
against his banker, who, having suff icient funds of the 
constituent in his hands, wrongfully refused to cash his 
cheque. On the same principle, it  was held that a riparian 
proprietor is entit led to maintain an act ion against the 
owner on the opposite bank who had bui lt an obstruct ion 
into the stream, so as to interfere with the f low of water,  
though no actual or immediate damage was proved to have 
                                      
9  Broom’s Legal Maxims, 8th Edn. p. 182. 
10  Marzetti v. Williams, (1830) 1 B. & Ad. 415; Williams v. Peel river Land 
and Mineral Co., (1985) 55 L.T. 689; Ashby v. White, 1 Sm. I.C. 264. 
11  Ramchand v. Nuddiar Ghose, 23 W.R. 230. 
12  Rampal Sahu v. Misree Lall, 24 W.R. 97; Hari v. Hari, 15 I.C. 541. 
13  Kali Kisen Tagore v. Jadoo Lalmullick, 5 C.L.R. 97 at p. 101. 
14  Marzett i  v .  Wil l iams, (1830) 1 B. & Ad. 415. 
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ensued.15  Where the plainti ff  had been enjoying the 
exclusive right of breaking, on a certain day, a curd pot in a 
temple, i t  was held that the defendant’s act in breaking their 
own curd pot on that day, was a violation of a legal r ight 
entit l ing the plainti ff  to recover damages.16 Again a refusal 
to deliver up an idol, whereby the person demanding it was 
prevented from performing his turn of worship on specif ied 
date, gives him a right to sue for damages.17  
 
So also, where the manager of a hotel refused to provide 
board and lodging to a guest without just cause or excuse it  
is a violation of a right founded upon common law and is 
act ionable without proof of damage.18 
 
In these and several other cases, which the Court shall  
have, occasion to refer to in the succeeding chapters; 
nominal damages only were awarded for want of proof of 
special damage, on the broad principle that their recovery 
would suff iciently vindicate plaintif f ’s r ight. 
 
5.3.3 Damnum Absque Injuria: 
 
Every contract has always at least two persons to it, the 
promisor and the promise, between whom there is 
necessari ly privity.  The essence of a contract being that 
either party is bound to perform his part in i ts entirety,  i t 
follows that non-performance by one gives other a r ight to 
sue either for specif ic performance, or for damages, or for 
                                      
15  Bickett v. Morris, (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. Sc. 47; Ramchand v. Nuddiar 
Ghose, 23 W.R. 230; Maung Bya v. Maung Kyi Nyo, AIR 1925 P.C. 
236 at pp. 238, 239; Harrop v. Hurst, (1968) L.R. 4 Exch. 43; Madhav 
Shivram v. Rakma Bhaushet, 9 Bom. L.R. 864. 
16  Narayan v. Balakrishnan, 9 Bom. H.C.R. (A.C.) 413. 
17  Debendranath v. Odit Churn, I.L.R. 3 Cal. 390. 
18  Constantine v. Imperial London Hotels Ltd., (1944) 2 All. E.R. 171 
(Q.B.D.) 
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both according to the nature and subject-matter of the 
contract, not by reason of any express st ipulat ion in the 
contract i tself but by reason of law.19  
 
That is the reason that whi le asking for a damage, the relief  
cannot be asked for every species of loss which individuals 
might sustain by the acts of others. One may say that by the 
act of others with whom the claimant does not have privi t ies 
of contract. A man cannot be held liable merely because his 
act has caused loss or damage to another under the head of 
“Damages for Breach of Contract”. There must be a 
corresponding right in that other, the infract ion of which is 
made actionable by the law. Where though, actual damages 
sustained it is not occasioned by anything which law deems 
an injury. Such damage is termed Damnum Absque Injuria  
and maxim Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium has no application in such 
a case.  
 
The very landmark decision is of the school master who 
established a r ival inst itution which draw away the scholars 
from the plaintif f ’s school which previously establ ished may 
be mentioned and put here as a best example of this 
principle.20 Every man has undoubted right to pursue a 
call ing best sui ted to his tastes, and if  in the legit imate 
exercise of that right another person suffer damage, the 
damage so sustain is called Damnum Absque Injuria.  So 
also, if  in the prudent and reasonable exercise by an owner 
of a property of his r ight dominion another sustains 
damage, it is Damnum Absque Injuria.   
 
Thus in an act ion against a person who by lawful means 
induced a servant to determine lawfully his conduct of 
                                      
19  Rajeshwar Prasad v. Chunilal, AIR 1942 Pat. 269 at p. 270. 
20
  Gloucester, Grammar School, (1411) Y.B. 11. 
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service or not to enter into a contract of service, it  was held 
that there was no injur ia.21 Similar ly, in case of traders, who 
by concerted action but i l legal means, acquired the 
business enjoyed by other traders, though the actual 
damage may be considerable, no rel ief wi l l be given 
because the damage occurs in the course of the legit imate 
exercise of a right recognized and protected by the law.22  
 
Again where a land-owner on one side of a t idal and non-
navigable khal,  which was the property of the Government, 
complained of the obstruct ion caused by the defendant 
constructing a wal l in encroachment of the stream, on the 
ground that damage might result the f low of the stream had 
been percept ibly altered, it  would be a case of Damnum 
Absque Injur ia and that no act ion is maintainable where 
there is neither damnum nor injuria.23  
 
Where in a case the appellants had proposed to celebrate a 
ceremony in honour of their grandfather’s death in 
accordance with the custom of their community and they 
al leged that the defendants had decided to prevent the 
performance of the ceremony and with that view they had 
distributed handbil ls in the town to dissuade the persons 
invited to the function from accepting the invitat ion and also 
to prevent them from attending it by means of picketing. It  
was held that the plaint if fs could have no cause of action 
for an order of injunct ion.24 So again persons, who accepted 
an invitation to an entertainment at the plaint if f ’s house, 
failed to attend, through no concerted action, were held not 
l iable for damages caused to the plainti f f on account of the 
                                      
21  Allen v. Flood, (1899) A.C. 1. 
22  Moghul Steamship Co. v. Mc Gregor, (1892) A.C. 25. 
23  Kali Kishen Tagore v. Jadoo Lal Mullick, 5 C.L.R. 97 : 6 I.A. 190. 
24  Dip Chand v. Manak Chand, AIR 1959 Nag. 154 at pp. 155-156. 
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price of the food unconsumed because of their absence.25 
So also a pleader was held not ent it led to sue a Magistrate 
for damages for not allowing him to appear for a 
complainant in an inquiry under Sec. 180 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure of 1861, because a pleader has no right 
ot appear in such an inquiry and, therefore, by reason of the 
refusal of permission, he suffered no injuria .26 Similar ly, 
where a plaintif f ,  who was entit led as a member of a 
particular caste, to receive certain presents on the occasion 
of a funeral ceremony, was omitted from the recipients, he 
was held not entit led to sue for damages for the loss of 
those presents, or even for an injury to his character and 
reputation, on the ground that there is no in jur ia damnum .27 
So also in a suit by the plaintif f ,  who was prevented from 
parading a bull on a certain day,28 so again accidental ly 
infl ict ing personal injur ies without negligence or intention is 
not actionable.29 Again a landowner who buil t upon his own 
land in such manner as to obstruct his neighbour’s light30 or 
air31 or erected barriers against f loods causing them to f low 
on to his neighbour’s land was held not l iable in an action 
for damages.32  
 
Again a landlord, upon whom there is no duty to maintain a 
dam with a sluice, was held not l iable for damage caused to 
the neighbour’s lands, when there is no proof of wrongful 
act or omission.33 Where statutory bodies acting in the 
                                      
25  Kalai Haidar v. Shaik Kyamuddi, 23 W.R. 417. 
26  Bindachari v. Dracup, 8 Bom. H.C.R. (A.C.) 202. 
27  Maya Shankar v. Hari Shankar, I.L.R. 10 Bom. 661. 
28  Rama v. Shivram, I.L.R. 6 Bom. 116. 
29  Stanley v. Powell, (1891) 1 Q.B. 86; Fowler v. Zamming, (1959) 1 All. 
E.R. 290 : (1959) 2 W.L.R. 241. 
30  Tappling v. Jones, (1895) 11 H.L.C. 290. 
31  Chasteby v. Auckland, (1897) App. Cas. 155. 
32  Rex v. Pagham Commissioners,  (1828) 8 B. & C. 355. 
33  Kadar Baksh v. Ram Nag, 47 W.R. 48; Anand Singh v. Ramchandra, 
AIR 1963 M.P. 28 at pp. 28,29. 
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exercise of powers conferred upon them by statute, cause 
damage to others it is a case of damnum sine injur ia  for 
which no act ion lies unless there is proof of negligence.34 
But against the damage done in breach of that duty they 
have no protect ion.35  
 
But when the defendant was not in know of the discoverable 
defect or danger and it caused the damage by accident l ike 
sudden fall  of  the tree, it  would be dif f icult to visualize that 
the defendant had knowledge of the danger and he omitted 
to perform the duty of care to prevent its fal l .  There would 
be no special relationship between the statutory authority 
and the plaintif f who is a remote user of the footpath or the 
street by the side of which the trees were planted. Unless 
the defendant is aware of the condit ion of the tree that it  is 
l ikely to fal l on the footpath on which the plaint i ff /class of 
persons to which he belongs frequents it.  The defendant by 
his non-feasance is not responsible for the accident or 
cause of the death since admittedly there was no visible 
sign that the tree was affected by disease. It had fal len in a 
sti l l condit ion of weather.36  
 
5.3.4 Special damages are also required to be proved: 
 
But, apart f rom the legal damage, which the law presumes 
in every case of violation of r ight, the plainti ff  may aver and 
prove substantial actual pecuniary or other loss or damage, 
which may have resulted from any wrongful act. As Bowen, 
                                      
34  Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, (1864) L.R.J. H.L. 93; Vaughan v. Taff Valley 
Rly. Co., (1860) 5 H. & N. 679; Madras Rly. Co. v. Zamindar of 
Carvetnagar, 22 W.R. 279 (P.C.). 
35  Geddis v. Bann Reservoir, (1978) 3 A.C. 430; Gaekwad of Baroda v. 
G.I.O. Rly., 27 Bom. 344. 
36  Rajkot Municipal corporation v. Manjulben Jayantilal Nakum, 1997 (2) 
T.A.C. 461 at p. 497 (S.C.). 
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L.J., observed in Williams v. Peel River Land and Mineral  
Co. Ltd.37 “If  there be no substantial loss sustained, but the 
mere denial of the r ight, which rights is vindicated in the 
act ion, in such a case, there being no pecuniary damage, 
sustained, no pecuniary compensation is given and nominal 
damages wi ll  be enough; but if  a substant ial loss has been 
suffered in consequence of the wrongful act, what those 
who have to redress the wrong ought to do is to give 
compensation for the loss.  
 
Thus, it  has been held that a plaint if f,  who has an exclusive 
right to collect weighment fees in a bazaar, is ent it led to 
sue for damages for being wrongful ly obstructed in the 
exercise of the right and in making the collect ions.38 The 
refusal by the master of a ship to sign the bi l l of  lading 
otherwise than with an endorsement as to the damage 
claimed is a wrong that may be fully compensated in 
damages.39 
 
But the mere fact that the plaintif f ,  who al leges substantial  
damage, fails to prove the same, is no ground for 
dismissing the sui t  in toto, for in such a case the plaint if f  is 
a least entit led to recover nominal damages,40 and the same 
result fol lows in cases where there is no evidence at all  
given in proof of actual damage.41 For, the principle 
ordinari ly applicable to actions of breach of contract is that 
the plainti f f is never precluded from recovering ordinary 
damages, which, as has been already observed, includes 
                                      
37  Williams v. Peel River Land and Mineral Co. Ltd. (1886) 
55 L.T. 689 : 3 T.L.R. 76 (C.A.). 
38  Bhankno Oujiah v. Harkjh Kandu, 9 A.W.N. 89. 
39  Grasseman v. Littlepage, 3 W.r. (Refer Reedr. Moulmein) 1. 
40
  Feize v. Thompson, (1808) 1 Taunt 121. 
41  Dixam v. Deveridge, (1852) 2 C. & P. 109 N.P.; Twyman v. Knowles, 
(1853) 13 C.B. 222. 
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nominal damages by reason of his fai l ing to prove the 
special damage he has laid unless the special damage is 
the gist of the action.42  
 
I f ,  however, special damage is the gist of the action, fai lure 
to prove the same disent it les a person to recover any 
damages.43 For instance, in cases where an interference 
with the contractual relations of parties is actionable, 
substantial damage must be proved for damage is the gist 
of such an act ion. In order, therefore, to succeed and make 
a good case for either damages or an injunction, damage 
must be proved, not indeed, damage in detai l or special  
damage in the narrow sense of that epithet,  but actual  
damage.44 
 
5.4 REQUIREMENT OF ACT OF INTERFERENCE WITH 
A CONTRACT OR BUSINESS: 
 
The Act of interference with a contract or business requires 
the defendant to act in such a manner as would result in the 
plaint if f  being prevented from performing his contract. 
Quest ions pertaining to this act ion normally arise in the 
case of industrial disputes. In the present case, defendant 
no.2 has not done anything as a result of which the plaintif f 
is prevented from performing his contract. He has been 
prevented, not from performing his contract but from 
reaping any benefit  under the contractual right,  which exists 
in his favour. What is more important, the plaint if f  has not 
been so prevented on account of any action, of defendant 
No.2 merely f i led a suit for obtaining certain rel ief ’s. In this 
suit, the Court passed certain orders. It was as a result  of 
                                      
42  Madhum Mohum Dass v. Gokhul Dass, 10 M.I.A. 563 at p. 575. 
43  Edward Wilson v. Kanhaya Sahoo, 11 W.R. 143 at p. 144. 
44  National Photograph Co. v. Edison Bull Consolidated Photograph Co. 
Ltd., (1908) 1 Ch. 335, per Kennedy, L.J. 
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the orders passed by the Court that the plaint i ff  was 
prevented from reaping the benefit of his contract. Hence 
defendant No.2 cannot be held guil ty of prevent ing the 
plaint if f  f rom performing his contract.  
 
5.5 PROCURING BREACH OF CONTRACT: 
 
The principle of law governing the breach of contract has 
been reviewed by the Court of appeal in England in the 
case of Thompson (D.C.) v. Deakin.45 That intent ionally and 
without lawful excuse to induce a person to break his 
contract with another is a specif ic breach has been held by 
the Court of Queen’s Bench in Lumley v. Gye,46 more than a 
century ago; subsequently the rule has been aff irmed by the 
House of Lords in Quim v. Leathem,47 and in South Wales 
Miners ’ Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co.48 In the former of 
these two cases Lord Macnaghten has stated the principle 
in the following terms: “ a violation of legal r ight committed 
knowingly is a cause of action .. ..  . . I t  is a violation of legal 
right to interference with contractual relations recognized by 
law, if  there be not suff icient just if ication for the 
intereference.”49 
 
This rule, which was at f irst applied to contracts of personal 
service, has now been extended to contracts of other kinds, 
unless the contract i tself  is void and unenforceable or 
where the contract is determinable at pleasure.  
 
                                      
45  Thompson (D.C.) v. Deakin.  (1952) 2 All. E.R. 161 : (1952) Ch. 
646; Yarlagadda China Ramayya v. Donepur Venkata Ramayya, AIR 
1959 A.P. 552. 
46  Lumley v. Gye,  (1853) 2 E.&B. 216. 
47  Quim v. Leathem,  (1901) A.C. 495. 
48  South Wales Miners ’ Federat ion v. Glamorgan Coal Co., (1904) 
2 All. E.R. 361. 
49  Quim v. Leathem, (1901) A.C. 495 at p. 510. 
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The occasion for review of the entire case-law on the point 
arose out of a motion for an interlocutory injunct ion under 
the following circumstances: The plaint if fs in Thompson 
(D.C.) v. Deakin,50 a f irm of printers and publishers, 
required al l their employees to sign an undertaking that they 
would not become members of any trade union. But in 
disregard of the undertaking some of the employees joined 
the National Society of Operat ive Printers and Assistants. 
The plainti ffs thereupon determined to terminate the 
employment of one of those who broke the undertaking, and 
who in consequence appealed to the union. As a kind of 
reprisal the union called out on strike those of its members 
who were in the employ of the plainti f fs, and also sought the 
help of other unions concerned in the supply of raw 
materials to plaint if fs. The employees of Bowaters Sales 
Ltd., who were suppliers of raw materials to the plaint if fs 
having consequently expressed their unwil l ingness to 
deliver any material to the plaint if f ,  the company resolved 
not to press their employees to co-operate in the deliveries, 
with the result that the suppl ies from that company ceased 
to go to the plainti ffs in breach of the contract between the 
company and the plaint if fs. The company also wrote to the 
plaint if fs “We are prevented from performing our contract by 
the action of the trade unions which has put a stop to any of  
your paper being loaded at and del ivered from Bowaters 
Mersey Paper Mil ls, Ellesmere Port.  
 
We anticipate that this pressure wil l continue and may 
increase, and unti l  withdrawn we shall be unable to make 
deliveries under the contract.” The plaint if fs thereupon 
sought an injunct ion against the off icials of the union 
restraining them from causing or procuring a breach or 
                                      
50  Thompson (D.C.) v. Deakin,  (1952) 2 Al l .  E.R. 361. 
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breaches of the contract between the plainti f fs and 
Bowaters Sales Ltd., and for damages, and applied for 
interlocutory relief . The Trial Judge, Upjohn, J., refused to 
grant an injunct ion by holding that there never had been 
any direct action by the defendants or their agents with the 
object of persuading or causing Bowaters Company to break 
their existing contracts with the plaint if fs. The action of the 
trade unions in causing the employees of the company to 
break their contract of employment by refusing to load 
supplies to the plaintif fs, was a lawful act, although the 
natural consequence thereof might be to compel the 
Bowaters Company to break their contract with the 
plaint if fs, such an action was, therefore, insuff icient to 
constitute or inducing a breach of contract.  The Court of 
Appeal consist ing of Sir Raymond Evershed, M.R. Jenkins 
and Morris, L.J.J.,  in upholding the order of Upjohn, J.,  
reviewed the case-law on the quest ion and laid down the 
following principles: 
 
Apart from a conspiracy to injure acts of a third party which 
are lawful in themselves do not const itute an actionable 
interference with contractual r ights, even if done with the 
object and intent ion of br inging about such a breach.51 I t  
makes no dif ference that such acts were done out of spite, 
malice or i l l -will . Acts which are lawful in themselves are 
not rendered unlawful merely because the doer of them was 
actuated by malice or bad motive. The essential ingredients 
of the breach of obligat ion procuring a breach of contract 
are:   
 
(a) Where a third party,  with knowledge of the contract 
and with the intent to procure the breach of it  directly 
                                      
51  Croffer Handwoven Harris Tweed Co. Ltd. v. Veitch, (1962) 1 All. E.R. 
148; Gangiah v. Gangadharan, AIR Mys. 170 at p. 181. 
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persuades or procures or induces one of the parties to the 
contract or break it. This rule is i l lustrated by Lumley v. 
Gye.52 
 
(b) Where a third party instead of acting on the mind of 
the contract breaker, physically detains him or otherwise 
renders it impossible for him to perform his contract, e.g. by 
breaking his essential tools or machinery. These acts must, 
of course, be done with knowledge of the contract and with 
intent to bring its breach.  
 
(c) Where a third party and the contract breaker deal 
together in a manner which the third party knows to be 
inconsistent with the contract, e.g. when A pays for and 
takes delivery of a new car from B, knowing that it  is offered 
to him in breach of a covenant against the re-sale of a new 
car.53  
 
The inconsistent deal ing between the third party and the 
contract breaker may be commenced without knowledge by 
the third party of  the contract thus broken, but if  it  i f  
cont inued after the third party has not ice of the contract,  he 
has committed an actionable interference.54  
    
(d) Again so far from persuading or inducing or procuring 
one of the part ies to the contract to break it , the third party 
may commit an actionable interference with the contract 
against the will  of both and without the knowledge of either, 
                                      
52  Lumley v. Gye, (1853) 2 E.&B. 216; The judgment of 
Jenkins, L.J. in Thomson v. Deakins, (1952) 2 Al l .E.R. 366 
at 378. 
53  British Industrial Plastics Ltd. v. Freguson, (1938) 1 All. E.R. 863 afid. 
In (1940) All. E.R. 479 and British Motor Trade Association v. 
Salvadore, (1949) All. E.R. 208. 
54  De Francesco v. Barnum, (1890) 45 Ch.D. 430. 
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i f  with the knowledge of the contract, he does an act which, 
if  done by one of the parties, it  would have been a breach.55 
 
(e) Where a third party,  with knowledge of the contract 
and intent to break it, def initely and unequivocally 
persuades, induces or procures the servant of one of the 
parties to break his contract of employment, provided that 
the breach of the contract forming the al leged subject of 
interference in fact ensues as a necessary consequence of  
the breach of contract of employment. 56   
 
The emphasis laid here by the Court of Appeal is on the 
casual connect ion between the defendants’ conduct and the 
interference with the contract where the contract breaker is 
a servant under a contract of employment. There must be 
clear proof that: 
 
1) the defendant, A, knew of the contract between B and 
C, and intended its breach; 
2) that he definitely and unequivocally induced or 
procured the employee to break his contract with 
intent to procure the breach; 
3) that he did in fact to break his contract of 
employment; 
4) that the breach of the contract forming the alleged 
subject of interference ensued as a necessary 
consequence of the breach of contract of employment, 
in the sense, that by reason of the withdrawal of the 
services it was a matter of practical impossibi l i ty for B 
or C to perform their contract.57 
 
                                      
55  G.W.K. Ltd. v. Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd. (1926) 42 T.L.R. 376. 
56  Thomson v. Deakins,  (1952) 2 Al l.E.R. 366 at p.  379. 
57  Canden-Nominees v. Fore, (1940) 2 Ch. 352. 
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There is one topic which, however, requires mention, and 
which is a statutory exception of procuring a breach of 
contract. The exception relates to trade disputes and forms 
the subject matter of Sec.18 of the Trade Unions Act, 
1926.58 Section 18 lays down: 
 
(1) “No suit  or other legal proceeding shall be 
maintainable in any Civil  Court against any Trade 
Union or any off icer or member thereof in respect of 
any act done in contemplation or furtherance of a 
trade dispute to which a member of the Trade Union is 
a party on the ground only that such act induces some 
other person to break a contract of employment, or 
that it  is an interference with the trade, business or 
employment of some other person or with the right of 
some other person to dispose of his capital or of his 
labour as he wil ls.” 
 
(2) “A registered Trade Union shall not be liable in any 
suit or other legal proceeding in any Civi l Court or in 
respect of any act done in contemplation or 
furtherance of a trade dispute by an agent of the 
Trade Union if  it  is proved that such person acted 
without the knowledge of, or contract to express 
instruct ions given by, the Executive of the Trade 
Union.” 
 
The object of this provision seems to be to give immunity to 
a Trade union and its off icers, members if  they bring about 
a strike in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute 
even though it results in bringing about a breach of 
employment of any of the strikers. It would, however, seem 
                                      
58  Act XVI of 1926. 
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that there is no protect ion against any act which induces a 
breach of any contract other than that of a contract of 
employment.59 So also, i t would seem that, if ,  in 
contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, a procures 
or induces B to break his contract of employment with C, so 
as to render it impossible, as he intends, for C to perform 
his contract with D, the sect ion gives protect ion to A vis-à-
vis C and not vis-à-vis D as well.60  
 
5.6 LIABILITY OF MANAGING AGENT OR MANAGING 
DIRECTOR FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT: 
 
The managing agents or managing director are not l iable for 
the breach of contract with the managed company. The 
posit ion of the managing agents or managing director in 
relat ion to the managed company is that of an agent. It is 
true that in Lumley v. Gye,61 i t  was held that: 
 
“A person who, during the continuance of a contract of 
personal service whether, it  be executory or not, wrongfully 
interrupts the relation subsisting between the part ies to the 
contract by procuring one of them to commit a breach of the 
contract, whereby the one party to the contract suffers 
damages and other is l iable to the injured party in 
damages.” 
 
Reference in this connect ion may also be made to Scammell  
G. and Nephew Ltd. v. Hurley62 and D. C. Thompson & Co. 
                                      
59  Bents Brewery Co. Ltd. v. Hogan, (1945) 2 All E.R. 570. 
60  Thompson, D.C. Ltd. v. Deakin, (1952) All. E.R. 361 at p. 374, per Sri 
Raymond Evershed. 
61  Lumley v. Gye, (1853) 2 E.& B. 216. 
62  Scammell G. and Nephew Ltd. v. Hurley, (1928) 1 K.B. 
419. 
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Ltd. v. Deakin,63 where Said v. Butt64 was appl ied and 
approved. The result may be different where the servant or 
agent acts mala f ide and outside the course or scope of 
employment or authority.65 
 
5.7 MALICE IMMATERIAL IN CONTRACTS: 
 
Again, in the case of damage arising out of a breach of 
contract, the motive or conduct of the party guil ty of the 
breach except in the case of breach of contract of marr iage 
as noted above, is absolutely immaterial.  
 
For, if  A breaks his contract with B to deliver certain goods 
or i f  A fai ls to pay B the money due under a bond executed 
by him, the consequence is the same, whether the fai lure to 
deliver or pay be the result of an accident or a deliberate 
intention or design.  
 
The animus of the default ing party is ent irely disregarded in 
such case and as it wil l be seen hereafter, the amount of 
damages is l imited to the direct pecuniary loss f lowing from 
the breach of the agreement.  
  
  Malice not admitted in breach of contract: 
 
But in act ions for breach of contract, evidence of the 
malic ious motives of the party gui lty of the breach is 
entirely irrelevant and the existence of misconduct on the 
part of the defendant cannot alter the rule of law by which 
                                      
63  D. C. Thompson & Co. Ltd. v. Deakin, ((1952) 2 Al l .E.R. 
361 at p. 370. 
64
  Said v. Butt.(1920) All .  E.R. 240 at p. 241.  
65  Parasharsingh v. Hindustan Managanese Mines Ltd., 1968 M.P. L.J. 
846 at p. 853. 
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damages for breach of contract are to be assessed.66 As 
Baron Alderson observed in Hamlin v. Great Northern Rly. 
Co.67  “The damages in act ions for breach of contract are 
ordinari ly conf ined to losses which are capable of being 
appreciated in money, with the exception of the case of  
breach of promise of marriage; damages that are not 
capable of being so est imated, such as, injury to feeling or  
vexation are not al lowed. The principle is, that if  the party 
does not perform his contract, the other may do so for him 
as near as may be and charge him for the expense incurred 
in doing so”. But where the elements of fraud, violence or 
malice exist,  the alternat ive remedy of suit ing in tort  is 
always open to the injured party and he may then adduce 
evidence of those matters, which ent it led him to claim 
damages on a dif ferent footing.68  
 
5.8 POSITION IN ENGLISH RULE AS TO NOMINAL 
DAMAGES: 
 
The rule that every injury imports damages is under Engl ish 
law and it is str ict ly applicable when the action is based 
upon a contract. It was repeatedly said that every breach of 
duty arising out of a contract gives rise to an act ion for 
damages without proof of actual loss. As Thesiger, L.J., 
observed in Hiort  v. London and North Western Rly. Co.,69 
“the unauthorized act, whether i t  be a conversion or 
whether it be a breach of contract or breach of duty did vest 
a right of act ion and for this reason, that the law presumes 
a damages in respect of that unlawful act.” So, in an act ion 
a surety where the creditor was found to have made 
                                      
66  Sikes v. Wild, (1863) 1 B. & S. 587. 
67  Hamlin v. Great Northern Rly. Co., (1856) 1 H.  & N. 408. 
68  Para. 12 Supra. 
69  Hiort v. London and North Western Rly. Co., (1879) 4 
Exch. D. 188. 
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advances to the principal debtor, which he was not bound to 
mark, i t  was held, that the creditor was not entit led to 
anything more than nominal damages. So also in an action 
on the case against the secretary of an insurance company,  
for false representat ion as to the management and affairs of 
the company, whereby the plaint if fs was induced to effect 
an insurance with it the Court awarded nominal damages 
though it did not appear that he had sustained any posi t ive 
loss.70  
 
5.9 ESSENTIALS OF THE FOUNDATION OF LIABILITY FOR 
BREACH OF CONTRACT: 
 
Where there is a duty to take care, as specif ic condit ion in a 
contract i tself  and not simply as an element in some more 
complex relationship the part ies to contract are duty bound 
to fulf i l l the part  of their obligation. In a str ict legal analysis,  
breach of contract means more than heedless or careless 
conduct, whether in the nature of omission or commission; i t  
properly connotes the complex concept of duty, breach and 
damage thereby suffered by the person to whom the duty 
was owing. The Privy Council was loud and clear about the 
said concept in the view taken in the matter of Grant v. 
Austral ian Knitt ing Mi lls .71  
 
The three essential ingredients of the foundation of l iabi lity 
for breach of contract are as fol lows: 
 
(I) A legal duty on the part of defendant towards the 
plaint if f  to exercise care in his conduct within the 
scope of that duty provided under the contract;  
                                      
70  Warren v. Calvert, (1837) 7 Ad. & El. 143. 
71  Grant v. Austral ian Knit t ing Mi l ls , AIR 1936 P.C. 34 at pp. 
41-42. 
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(II)  Breach of that duty which is agreed upon by the 
parties;  
(III )  Consequential damages to the plaintif f .   
 
5.9.1 Scope of the duty of care: 
 
There is no l iabi li ty for breach of contract unless in the 
particular case, there is a legal duty to take care to the 
plaint if f  himself, and not to any other. The duty must be a 
legal duty and not merely a moral or religious duty. It is not 
owed to the world at large, because there is no general duty 
to be careful.72 Al l that is necessary as a step to establish 
the breach of act ionable claim is to def ine the precise 
relat ionship from which the duty to care is to be deduced.  
 
5.9.2 Rule of proximity in relation to duty to take 
care: 
 
I t  is the case of Donoghue73,  which has done much to clar ify 
the law and also got a far-reaching effect in the law of 
breach. It  extends the sphere of l iabi l i ty to some imaginary 
persons who may not be in the contemplation of the 
defendant, and requires him to be careful so as not to 
cause harm or legal injury to any of them. The aforesaid 
concept is put by Lord Atkin during the course of his speech 
referred to the observation of A.L. Smith, L.J. in Le Lievre 
v. Gould74:  “A duty to take care does arise when the person 
or property of one was in such proximity to take person or 
property of another that, i f  due care was not taken, damage 
might be done by one to the other,” and said, “I think this 
suff icient ly states the truth if  proximity be not conf ined to 
                                      
72  Best v. Samuel Fox & Co., (1952) 2 All ER 394 
73  Donoghue’s (1932) A.C. 562. 
74  Le Lievre v. Gould, (1893) 1 Q.B. 49 at p. 50; Candler v. 
Christmas ,  91951) 1 All  ER 426. 
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mere physical proximity, but be used, as I think it was 
intended, to extend to such close and direct relat ions that 
the act complained of direct ly affects a person whom the 
person alleged to be bound to take care would know would 
be directly affected by the careless act.” The reference to 
proximity in the above passage is open to crit icisms and 
Lord Wright stated that i t  is apt to “mislead”. He says,75 “the 
word `proximity’ is open to ……… objection: if  the term 
`proximity’ is to be applied at al l,  it  can only be in the sense 
that want of care and the injury are in essence directly and 
intimately connected; `proximity’ can only properly be used 
to exclude any element of remoteness or of some 
intervening complicat ion between the want of care and the 
injury, and like `privity’ may mislead by introducing alien 
ideas.” Goddard, L.J., however, said in Hanson v. 
Wearmouth Coal Co. ,76 that the legal conception of duty due 
to “proximity” has been authoritat ively laid down by the 
House of Lords in Donoghue’s  case77 and that the modern 
tendency is to enlarge, and not to restrict, the ambit  of that 
duty. 
 
5.9.3 Reasonable man’s standard of care: 
 
Care is always a matter of degree but it  is dif f icult to def ine 
the precise legal standard of care required in all  cases. I t is 
fundamental, that the standard of conduct which is the basis 
of law of contract is determine by balancing the risk, in the 
light of the social value of the interests threatened, and the 
probabili ty and extent of the harm. Again the value of the 
interest which the actor is seeking to protect, and the 
                                      
75  Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, AIR 1936 P.C. 34 at p. 42. 
76  Hanson v. Wearmouth Coal Co., (1939) 2 Al l . E.R. 47 at p. 
54. 
77
  Donoghue’s (1932) A.C. 562. 
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experience of the courts persuade. The standard of care is 
thus a question of fact depending upon the circumstances of 
each case.78 In determination of the standard, courts are 
called upon to consider how reasonable prudent man would 
behave under given circumstances. Lord MacMil lan gives 
some of the attr ibutes of a “reasonable man” in his speech 
in Glasgow Corporation v. Muir,79: “The standard of 
foresight of a reasonable man is in one sense an 
impersonal test. I t el iminates personal equation and is 
independent of the idiosyncracies of the particular person 
whose conduct is in quest ion. Some persons are by nature 
unduly t imorous and imagine every path best with l ions; 
others, of more robust temperament, fai l to foresee or 
nonchalantly disregard even the most obvious dangers.  
 
The reasonable man is presumed to be free both from over-
apprehension and from over-confidence.” The reasonable 
man is cool and collected and remembers to take 
precautions for his own safety even in an emergency. He is 
one who is able to think and weigh the pros and cons  of  his 
act ion. The addit ion of the epithet “prudent” also indicates 
that he is a man of suff icient wisdom actuated by self-
interest and having forethought, discretion and caut ion. He 
cannot be equated with a “man in the street”. But he must 
not be expected to act or behave l ike a perfect cit izen.80  
 
The qualit ies of the reasonable man are for the intuit ion of 
the court,  and the f lexibi l i ty of the standard would be 
impaired by over-elaborate rules. ”In the realm of 
negligence,” says Lord Reid, “r igid rules give r ight to 
avoidable injustice. I see no reason to depart unnecessarily 
                                      
78  Biyth v. Birmingham Waterworks, (1956) Ex. 781 at p. 783. 
79  Glasgow Corporat ion v. Muir ,  91943) A.C. 448 at p. 457. 
80  Jones v. Barclay Bank, (1949) W.N. 196 (C.A.). 
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f rom the simple method of asking in my cause; what would a 
reasonable man in the shoes of the defendant have done?  
 
That test is subject to obvious l imitat ion. In some cases it is 
impract icable and in many cases it is for one reason or 
another undesirable to make that which a reasonable man 
would do as a legal obligat ion.”81  
 
  Reasonable foresight: 
 
The standard of a care, which a reasonable and prudent 
man should take is,  however, l imited by reasonable 
foresight, i .e. he must use reasonable care to avoid the 
situat ions which cause damages because of breach, which 
are reasonably foreseeable. The consensuses of an act or 
omission may be numerous and many of them may be within 
the range of “reasonable foresight” but he is not obliged to 
guard against every one of them. Law wi ll  compel him to 
guard against those consequences, which are probable, and 
not against those which are merely possible. “People must 
guard against reasonable probabil i t ies but they are not 
bound guard against fantastic possibil it ies. This does not 
mean everything, which is not a “fantastic possibil ity”, is a 
probabili ty.82  
 
5.10 PARTIES TO AN ACTION IN CONTRACT WHO 
MAY SUE: 
 
5.10.1 Remedies for Breach Contract: 
 
Every contract has always at least two persons to it, the 
promiser and the promisee, between whom there is 
                                      
81  London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Harton, (1951) 2 All. E.R. 1 at p. 29 : 
(19510 A.C. 737. 
82  Fardon v. Harcourt Rivington, (1932) 146 L.T. 391. 
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necessari ly pr iv ity of contract exist ing. The essence of a 
contract being that earl ier party is bound to perform his part 
in its enti rety, i t follows that by non-performance by one 
gives other a r ight to sue either for specif ic performance or 
for damages, or for both according to the nature and subject 
matter of the contract, not by the reason of any expressed 
stipulation in the contract i tself but by reason of law.83  
 
5.10.2 Damages, a personal remedy: 
 
An act ion for damages is laid for the purpose of seeking 
personal redress against one who stands in certain special  
relat ion, contractual or otherwise, to the plaint if f .  It is,  
therefore, generally a personal action or what is known 
according to civil  law as an action in personam.  The parties 
to such an action are the person who suffered the injury and 
the person who committed the wrongful act. In such an 
act ion the plaint if f claims the payment of a sum of money 
for breach of contract or the violation of right.  
 
5.10.3 Remedy of damages distinguished from relief by 
specific performance: 
 
The cause of action is the breach of contract, specif ic 
performance is merely a relief  and not a cause of action, in 
some cases, the rel ief of specif ic performance may be 
granted and in others it may be refused, and it is entirely at 
the discret ion of the concerned court whether to give any 
rel ief by way of specif ic performance or not. 84 
 
I t  is essent ial that the purchaser must prove his own 
readiness and wil l ingness to perform his part of contractual  
                                      
83  Rajeshwar Prasad v. Chunilal, AIR 1942 Pat. 269. 
84  Fernandez v. Gonsalves, AIR 1925 Bom. 97. 
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obligation. Readiness and wil l ingness to carry out his 
obligation is always a condit ion precedent to the plaint if f ’s 
right to recover damages for the breach of contract. Where 
the plaint if f  was not in a posit ion to perform his part  of 
contractual obligation, he was not entit led to recover any 
damages for breach of contract.85  
 
The rel ief  of specif ic performance, which is in Engl ish law, 
an equitable remedy is regulated in India by the Specif ic 
Relief Act and is beyond the scope of this work. On the 
other hand, the rel ief  of damages is common law remedy, 
and is open to any party who has sustained an injury on 
account of the non-performance or breach of a contract.  In 
the language of Sec. 73 of the Indian Contract Act, the 
party who suffers by a breach is ent it led to recover from the 
party who has broken the contract,  compensation for any 
loss or damage caused to him thereby.  
 
The two relieves i.e. specif ic performance and damages are 
alternat ive and not cumulat ive, the former being in nature a 
superior type of remedy. It  may be said generally that no 
person can be the plaint i ff  in a suit for specif ic performance 
of a contract who could not and should not recover 
compensation for its breach. But the converse is not always 
true. “For damages form the universal remedy in cases of 
breach of contract,  and it is only in special cases that, with 
the object of doing more complete justice, the court decrees 
specif ic performance.” In other words, as has been 
observed before, every breach of contract gives r ise to an 
act ion for damages, or for specif ic performance86 but, 
according to the Specif ic Relief Act, contracts are of two 
                                      
85  Abdulla Bey v. Tevenham, AIR 1934 P.C. 91 at p. 92; Tan Ah Boon v. 
State of Johore, AIR 1936 P.C. 236 at p. 238. 
86  Nogendra Chandra Mitter v. Kishan Soondaree Dasee, 19 W.R. 133. 
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kinds, those which can be specif ically enforced, and those 
which cannot be specif ical ly enforced. However, in regard 
to the former, courts are empowered to award compensation 
to the plaintif f,  either in addit ion to, or in subst itut ion for,  
such performance. With this dist inct ion in mainly, i t  may be 
broadly said that the proper person to sue for damages is 
the person whose right to call  for the performance of the 
contract has been violated.87I t  has even been held that if  a 
third person’s name has been mentioned in the contract by 
mistake, the plaint i ff  might show by parole evidence that he 
is the real promise entit led to sue.88 
 
5.10.4 Plaintiff to be legally innocent of breach: 
 
The fundamental principle of law being that no person who 
is not legally innocent of the breach of contract can sue for 
damages,89 i t  fol lows that the plaintif f  who claims damages 
must have performed or must show his readiness and 
wi ll ingness to perform his part of the contract,90 and must  
not have contr ibuted to the breach in respect of which he is 
suing.91 
 
5.10.5  Plaintiff must be the ultimate sufferer because 
of breach of contract: 
 
The proper person to bring an act ion under the head of  
“damages” for breach of contract is the person who is the 
ultimate sufferer because of breach of contract and the 
broad principle has been well established that an act ion 
                                      
87  Gray v. Pearson, (1970) 5 C.P. 568; Iswaram Pillai v. Taragan, 23 I.C. 
951 at P. 956 : I.L.R. 38 Mad. 753. 
88  Mohammad Bhoy v. Chutterput Singh, I.L.R. 20 Cal. 854. 
89  Mulji v. Ramsey Devraj, 3 I.C. 387 at p. 857. 
90  Totaram v. John’s Flour Mill, 10 I.C. 18;  
Tan Ah Boon v. State of Johore, AIR 1936 P.C. 236 at p. 238. 
91  Mohammad Habibullah v. Mohammad Shafi, 50 I.C. 948. 
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does lie at the instance of person who is not a party to the 
contract i.e.  the third party. It  is well sett led that no act ion 
can be brought except for the breach of contractual r ight, 
and the person, who sustains the damages, i.e. whose legal 
contractual rights are violated, is the person who bring an 
act ion for the damages against the person who is 
responsible for the breach of contract. No one as can bring 
an act ion under any head who is not a party to a contract. It  
follows therefore, that A can never claim damages merely 
on a ground that B  has suffered with the loss because of  
breach of contract committed by X.92   
 
Nice question has arisen as to whether a r ight to sue for 
damages exist in a person whose stands in a certain natural  
or contractual relat ionship with the person injured.  
 
5.10.6 Right of assignee in case of suit for damages 
for breach of contract: 
 
In the case of assignees again, the Indian Contract Act has 
made no provision specif ically deal ing with their r ights. 
Speaking general ly,  the benefit of  a contract can be 
assigned but not the burden. This is also subject to the 
same exceptions, in the case of purely personal contract, as 
have been understood to affect the rights of executors. “It is 
equally clear that the benefit of  a contract can be assigned, 
and whatever the considerat ion has been executed, and 
nothing more remains but to enforce the obligation against 
the party who has received the considerat ion, the right to 
enforce it can be assigned and be put in by the assignee in 
his own name after not ice.”93 
 
                                      
92  Girwarsingh v. Siramansingh, I.L.R. 32 Cal. 1060. 
93  Tolhurst v. Asociation of Cement Manufacturers, (1902) 2 K.B. 660 at 
pp. 668, 669. 
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5.10.7 Suit for damages by legal representative: 
 
The right of the legal personnel representat ive of a 
deceased who sue has been so wel l established that i t  is 
unnecessary to elaborate it in this research work. As was 
said by Lord Abinger in Raymond v. Fitch,94 “the authorit ies 
are uniform that a personal representat ive may sue not only 
for al l debts due to the deceased by special ity or otherwise, 
but for all  covenants and indeed, all contracts with the 
testator broken in his l ifet ime, and the reason appears to be 
that these are choses-in-action and are parcel of the 
personal estate in respect of which the executor or 
administrator represents the person of the testator and is in 
law the testator’s assignee”. 
 
The Indian Contract Act does not contain any rules as to the 
extent to which person other than the original promisee may 
become entit led to sue. Generally, the representatives of a 
deceased person may enforce subsisting contracts with him 
for the benefit of  the estate.95 “”It is no real except ion to this 
rule that in some cases the nature of the contract is,  in 
itself , or may be made by the intent ion of the parties such, 
that the obl igation is determined by the death of the 
promise. The most obvious instance is the contract to marry 
in the common law. Another seeming than real except ion is 
where performance by the deceased was not completed in 
his li fet ime, and is of such a personal character that 
performance by his representatives cannot be equivalent….” 
It is to be remembered that all part ies of the kind are in aid 
                                      
94  Raymond v. Fi tch, (1835) 5 L.J. Ex. 45. 
95  Pollock and Mulla’s Contract Act, 6th Edn., p. 261. 
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of the presumed intent ion of the parties and if  rules have 
expressed a special intent ion, i t  must prevail.96  
 
But i t  may be stated, as an elementary proposit ion, that i f  
moneys had been earned and had accrued due to the 
deceased, though for service of a conf idential and personal 
kind, they are part of his estate and his representatives 
succeed to his r ight of act ion to recover them.97 So, too, in 
the case of conventional damages or penalt ies, that is to 
say, damages which have been st ipulated or agreed upon 
during the person’s lifetime as compensation for a breach of  
contract of a purely personal nature, or for personal injuries 
aris ing from negligence in the performance of a contract, 
the right to sue can be availed of by the representatives.98 
 
5.10.8 Suit for damages by minor: 
 
The quest ion whether a minor can sue for damages for 
breach of a contract entered into by him or by his guardian 
presents some dif f iculty.  The leading case of Mohori Bibi v.  
Dharmodas Ghose,99 decided by the Privy Council, has 
deninitely established that an infant cannot be enforced 
against him. But the converse, namely, whether an infant, 
being a promise, can sue the promisor for breach of the 
agreement must, i t  is submitted, depend upon the further 
quest ions, whether the whole of the considerat ion 
purport ing to have been received from the minor has been 
executed an there remains no obligat ion on his part  to 
perform any outstanding part of the contract, and whether 
the agreement is for the benefit, of  the minor. Where, for 
                                      
96  Pollock and Mulla’s Contract Act, 6th Edn., p. 261. 
97  Stubbs v. Holy Well Ry. Co., (1867) 2 Exh. 311. 
98  Beckham v. Drake, (1849) 2 H.L.C. 579 : 81 R.R. 329. 
99  Mohori Bibi v. Dharmodas Ghose,  I .L.R. 30 Cal.  539. 
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instance, the whole of the considerat ion has been received 
from the minor and the benefit of  it  has been enjoyed by the 
promisor, and where al l that remains to be done is purely 
for the benefit of  the minor, it  appears to be opposed to 
natural reason and just ice to refuse to allow him to sue. On 
the other side, to allow the promisor to br ing into question 
the validity of the transact ion in respect of which he has 
received the full  considerat ion is total ly to subvert the ends 
of just ice. As has been observed in a well-known work on 
contracts, “infancy is a personal privilege of which no one 
can take advantage but the infant himself ; and, therefore, 
although the infant may repudiate his contract, i t  binds the 
other party. Indeed, were it otherwise, the infant ’s 
incapacity, instead of being an advantage to him, might in 
many cases turn great ly to his detriment.”100 
 
The question was the subject of a Full  Bench decision of 
the Madras High Court in Raghavachariar v. Srinivasa 
Raghavachariar,101 in which after a very elaborate 
discussion it was held that a minor can sue for the 
enforcement of a mortgage executed in his favour if  the 
mortgage has received the consideration. In an earlier case 
in the same court, i t  was held that a minor can be the payee 
under a promissory note and can sue to recover the money 
due thereunder.102 It  has to be noted that there is nothing in 
the Indian Contract Act which prevents a minor from being 
the promise under a contract and if  a minor, at the request 
of the promisor, pays money, or does some service or 
refrains from doing any act whether i t is of value or not, that 
would be suff icient considerat ion for the promise which can 
                                      
100  Chitty on Contract, 18th Edn., p. 182. 
101  Raghavachariar v. Srinivasa Raghavachariar,  31 M.l .J. 
575 : I .L.R. 4 Mad. 308. 
102  Setharazu v. Basappa, 24 M.L.J. 363 : 18 I.C. 968; Bhola Ram v. 
Bhagat Ram, AIR 1927 Lah. 24 at p. 27. 
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be enforced by the minor by way of damages or by specif ic 
performance. If , for instance, a minor engages himself  as a 
servant and performs the service, he can certainly sue for 
the wages due to him. So also, a minor may sue an adult 
person for breach of the promise of marriage103 although the 
adult cannot sue the minor on such a promise.104  These 
principles were applied in a recent case in Bombay high 
Court in which it was held that the minor was ent it led to 
maintain the suit for damages for breach of a contract of 
marriage made by the minor’s father during his or her 
minority. The court in that case, recognized the right of the 
father or other guardian of a minor to enter into a contract 
of apprent iceship or marriage, both of them being for the 
benefit of  the minor, and observed, that “neither a contract 
for personal service nor a contract of marr iage can be 
ordered to be specif ical ly performed so that, in either case,  
the apprent ice or the girl  cannot be compelled to carry out 
his or her part of a contract against his or her wishes. 
However, i f  i t is an enforceable contract, the other result, 
namely, the l iabi li ty in damages, of the party making the 
breach of the contract would fol low.”  105 
 
5.10.9 Suit for damages by and against lunatics: 
 
As far as contractual obligat ions are concerned, decision 
taken by the Privy Council in the case of Mohori Bibi  v. 
Dharmodar Ghoshe106 is l ike a complete code in i ts own self .  
According to the terms of the Indian Contract Act, the rule 
of law applicable to minor is also applicable lunatics and 
other persons of unsound mind. It was held in a very loud 
                                      
103  Holt v. Ward, (1732) 93 E.R. 954. 
104  Hale v. Ruthven, (1869) 20 T.L.R. 404. 
105  Fernandez v. Gonsalves, AIR 1925 Bom. 97: I.L.R. 48 Bom. 673. 
106
  Mohori Bibi v. Dharmodar Ghoshe, I.L.R. 30 Cal. 539. 
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and clear voice by the Hon’ble Madras High Court in the 
case of Machaima v. Usman Beari107 that a contract with a 
lunatic is void and an unforeseeable. I t would also seen that 
the same rule of law which enables a minor who sue for the 
benefit ar ising out of a contract with an adult, where the 
consideration has been executed and / or that remains to be 
done by the adult has been left unperformed, will  also 
enable a lunatic or other person of unsound mind, to claim 
the rel ief which a minor is al lowed to receive. There are 
certain persons, who, though they have no beneficial 
interest in the contract,  by virtue of that legal posit ion, 
some t ime allows to sue upon it.  
 
5.10.10 Suit for damages by an agent: 
 
An agent is person employed to do any act for another or to 
represent another in dealings with third persons. The 
principal is the real party to the contract,  and the person 
really interested in its performance; as such, the right of 
act ion is real ly in the principal. But the agency is coupled 
with the interest, that is to say, when the agent is made a 
contract in the subject matter of breach, he has special  
property or interest he may, even though he contracted for 
an avowed principal, sue in his own name. Hon’ble Madras 
High Court in the case of Subramanya v. Narayanan,108 has 
observed that where an agent enters into a contract, as 
such, i f  he has an interest in the contract, he may f i le a suit  
to claim damages for breach of contract in his own name. 
This no doubt is not an exception to the general rule stated 
above, for the agent in such a case is virtually a principal to 
                                      
107  Machaima v. Usman Beari, 17 M.L.J. 78; Kamala Ram v. 
Kanza Khan, 1812 P.R. 41. 
108  Subramanya v. Narayanan, I.L.R. 24 Mad. 130; Coorla 
Spinning and Weaving Mil ls  Co. Ltd. v. Vallabhadas 
kalianj i ,  AIR 1925 Bom. 547 at p. 558. 
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the extent of his interest. But, where the plainti ff ’s 
purported to act under a contract with the defendant as 
broker for the sale and purchase of goods, but really acted 
on their own account as principles without the knowledge 
and consent of the defendant, it  was held that they were not 
entit led to recover damages for the latter’s breach of 
contract.109  
 
In some forms of contract,  as, for instance, in F.O.B. (Free 
On Board) contracts, an agent stands in the posit ion of 
principal, although he was act ing as agent for an up-country 
purchaser. A right of action for damages arises in his 
favour, if  the seller with whom he contracts to purchase for 
his constituents fai ls to perform the contract.110  
 
5.10.11 Suit for damages by benamidar: 
 
The general r ight of the benamidar to sue, without the 
concurrence of the real owner, upon contracts, entered into 
in his name has been recognized by the Privy Council.111  
The fact that he is a mere name lender with no interest in 
the property might generally be taken to negative his 
liabil i ty. But the benamidar might so conduct himself  in the 
transaction that he is looked upon as one of the actual  
contracting parties l iable to be sued for breach of any of its 
terms. Thus a benami-holder of immovable property who 
executes and signs a sale-deed in respect of i t along with 
the real owner, was also held l iable to the purchaser under 
an express unqualif ied covenant for quiet enjoyment 
contained in the deed. Where a Kobala was entered into, 
                                      
109  Sewdutt Roy Maskara v. Nahapit, I.L.R. 34 Cal. 628. 
110  Girija Prasad v. National Coal Co., AIR 1949 Cal. 472 at pp. 476, 477; 
Krishun Das v. Ganesh Ram, AIR 1950 Pat. 481 at pp. 482, 483. 
111  Gurunarayanan v. Sheolal Singh, I.L.R. 46 Cal. 566 : 49 I.C. 1; Maung 
San Da v. Maung Chang Tha, AIR 1930 Rang 130 at p. 131. 
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with the plaint if f  by a Hindu widow as vendor, and it was 
perfect ly consistent with her being a benamidar for her 
sons, the real vendors, who actually received the 
consideration which was to be returned to the purchaser in 
a given event, and also consistent with the allegat ions in 
the plaint that her sons caused her to enter into it  on their 
behalf , i t  was held that the plaint if f  was ent it led to sue the 
benamidar and the real owner for return of the purchase 
money on the happening of an event mentioned in the 
Kobala.112 
 
5.10.12 Suit for damages by official assignee and 
receiver: 
 
Where the commission of the breach of contract results in 
injuries both to the property and to the person, the off icial 
assignee or receiver can fi le a suit  for such damages under 
the heading, “suit for damages for breach of contract” for 
the damages caused to the property or to the person and 
such right of act ion wil l be split up between the off icial 
assignee or receiver and the insolvent, where, however, 
personal qualif icat ions to be exercised by the insolvent f rom 
the material considerations in a contract, it  is not 
assignable in law and so the off icial assignee or receiver is 
not ent it led to ask for i ts performance or sue for its 
breach.113 But if  the breach of such a contract has occurred 
before the insolvency, the off icial assignee or receiver is 
entit led to sue for damages thereof.114  
 
The cases in which a discharged insolvent is ent it led to sue 
for damages in his own name have been succinct ly set out 
as fol lows:  
                                      
112  Bishoswari Debya v. Govind Pershad Tewari, 26 W.R. 32. 
113  Baily v. Thompson & Co., (1903) 1 K.B. 137. 
114  Beckham v. Drake, (1849) 2 H.L.C. 579. 
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(1) For damages in respect of a breach of contract 
result ing an injury exclusively to his property or person.  
 
(2) Where a breach of contract results in injuries both to 
the property and person, for damages for injury to his 
person. 
 
(3) For damages for breach after insolvency, of a contract 
for personal service made before insolvency and remaining 
unexecuted at the date of insolvency.  
 
5.10.13 Suit for damages by executors and 
administrators: 
 
As regards the right to sue which vests in an executor or 
administrator, reference may be made to Sec.306 of the 
Indian Succession Act,115 which says that al l demands 
whatsoever existing in favour of a person at the t ime of his 
death survive to his executors and administrators, except 
causes of action for defamation, assault, or other personal 
injuries where, after the death of the party, the rel ief  sought 
could not be enjoyed or granting it  would be nugatory. So a 
cause of action for damages for injuries of a purely personal 
nature, though aris ing out of a breach of contract cannot be 
sued upon by the executor or administrator.  Similarly, a 
right to sue for damages for personal injur ies caused by the 
executor or administrator. Barring the above and similar 
cases where the injury is of a purely personal nature, the 
executor or administrator can sue for recovering damages in 
al l other cases of breach of contract.  
 
                                      
115  H.S. Gambhir v. Vam Dev Sharda, (1991) 1 A.C.C. 162  at p. 163    
(P. & H.) 
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5.10.14 Suit for damages by parties and legal 
representatives: 
 
The general rule may be stated to be that whoever is bound 
to perform a contract, but fails to do it commits a breach 
thereof and is l iable to compensate the other party ent it led 
to enforce it.  Ordinari ly,  a person not a party to the contract  
ought not to be brought before the Court. Therefore, f irstly,  
either party to the contract may f igure as the defendant,  and 
secondly, in the event of his death, his heir, legal 
representative, executor or administrator and assignee.116  
As regards the latter c lass of persons, the recognized 
exception is that i f  the contract involves the ski l l or other 
personal qualif icat ions of the default ing party, his heirs,  
legal representatives, executors and administrators wil l not 
be held l iable for such default.  
 
5.10.15 Suit for damages by strangers to the contract: 
 
A contract does not create a right or l iabi lity in a person 
who is not a party or pr ivy to i t, unless he claims or be 
charged through a party, as in the case of cestui que trust 
claiming through the trustee.117 In other words, a person 
who is not a party to a contract is not l iable thereon. So, an 
agreement between a mortgage and a purchaser of a 
portion of the equity of redemption, with regard to the 
consideration money left with the latter, was held not 
binding on the vendor-mortgagor. If  a third person 
admittedly received rent due to a landlord from his tenant,  
                                      
116  Vide Sec. 27 Cls. 9a) and (b) of the Specific Relief Act 91 of 1877); 
now Specific Relief Act, 1963. 
117  Kherode Behari Gossami v. Narendralal Khan, 55 I.C. 310. 
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such person cannot be sued for the amount collected as 
money received for the use of the plainti f f.  Again, where 
rights under a usufructuary mortgage were sold away by a 
person joint ly entit led with another with whom there was an 
agreement to sell  away such r ights, and the purchaser 
al lowed redemption of the mortgage rights by receiving a 
certain amount, it  was held that the joint mortgage cannot 
sue the purchaser upon the agreement and claim from him 
the amount he received in al lowing redemption of  the 
mortgage.  
 
5.10.16 Expenditure incurred by third party when 
plaintiff entitled to recover amount: 
 
A plainti ff  is only ent it led to recover the amount of 
expenditure incurred or loss sustained by a third party, f irst, 
if  he, the plainti ff ,  is under a legal l iabil ity to this third party 
in respect of that expenditure or loss, and, secondly, i f  i t 
was reasonable for that expenditure to have been incurred 
or that loss to have been sustained.  
 
5.11 CONCLUSION: 
 
I t  was the say of Thesiger, L.J. in Hiort v. London and North 
Western Ry. Co.118 “the unauthorized act, whether i t be a 
conversion or whether i t be a breach of contract or breach 
of duty did vest a right of action and for this reason, that 
the law presumes a damages in respect of that unlawful  
act.” So, in an action a surety where the creditor was found 
to have made advances to the principal debtor, which he 
was not bound to mark, it  was held, that the creditor was 
not ent it led to anything more than nominal damages. So 
                                      
118  Hiort v. London and North Western Ry. Co., (1879) 4 Exh. 
D. 188. 
  
- 338 - 
also in an action on the case against the secretary of an 
insurance company, for false representat ion as to the 
management and affairs of the company, whereby the 
plaint if fs was induced to effect an insurance with it the 
Court awarded nominal damages though it did not appear 
that he had sustained any posit ive loss.119 The rule that 
every injury imposes damages is under English Law and 
very widely accepted in case if  the action is based upon a 
contract. It was on and often says that every breach of duty 
aris ing out of a contract given rise to an act ion for damages 
without proof of actual loss.  
 
While making comparative study between English Law and 
Indian Law on the subject of damages for breach of contract 
the researcher found that the rule in India on aforesaid 
subject is ent irely dif ferent. In India, there is nothing l ike 
recovery of nominal damages in act ions for breach of 
contract.120 I t  is to be observed that fai lure, by itself , to 
perform a contract would not result in damages, for it  is 
open to the plainti f f,  if  he could, to obtain the result which 
eh expected from the defendant’s performance of contract 
by other means which an ordinary prudent man would 
adopt.121 I f  upon doing so the plaint if f f inds he has suffered 
no actual loss by the defendant’s fai lure. In al l  such cases, 
the court inquires whether the party complaining of the 
breach has suffered any damage and if  so, what is the 
extent of the damage, and if  the court f inds that no damage 
has actually resulted from the breach it wil l refuse to give 
any rel ief . Where the defendants engaged to serve the 
plaint if fs in India for a specif ied period, undertook to return 
                                      
119  Warren v. Calvert, (1837) 7 Ad. & El. 143. 
120  Pontifix v. Bignold, (1841) 3 M. & G. 63. 
121  Gedehal Karibashavana Gowda v. Nandavaram Veerabhadrappa, 
I.L.R. 36 Mad. 580 : 16 I.C. 14 : 25 M.L.J. 3. 
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to England on the termination of service, but stayed on at 
Madras in breach of the covenant, it  was held, that the mere 
fact that the defendants stayed on, though const itut ing a 
breach of agreement, could have caused no damages to the 
plaint if fs and as such the plaint i ffs’ act ion must fai l.122  So 
also in a case where the purchaser sued the vendor for 
damages for non-delivery at the appointed date, of goods 
agreed to be sold to him, and where the price of the goods 
had fal len on the due date, i t  was held the plainti f f,  instead 
of being a sufferer from the breach of the agreement, was 
actually a gainer, and that he was not ent it led to nominal 
damages.123 The Court pointed out that Sec. 73 of the Indian 
Contract Act of 1872, which contains the rule of damages 
for breach of contracts, lays down, that where a contract 
has been broken, the party who suffered by such breach is 
entit led to receive from the party who has broken the 
contract compensation for any loss or damage caused to 
him thereby. It  appears, therefore, that Sec. 73 makes it  
compulsory on the plaint if f  to show that he has suffered and 
to what extent he has suffered. Knight, J., observed in P.R. 
& Co. v. Ghagwan Dass124 :  “I am convinced that the Indian 
Act does not sanction or permit an action for breach of  
contract save where specif ic damage is proved to have 
resulted from the breach.” It has, therefore, been held that 
though every breach of duty arising out of a contract gives 
rise to an action for damages without proof of actual  
damage, the amount of damages recoverable is, as a 
general rule, governed by the extent of the actual damage 
sustained in consequence of the defendant’s act.125 The 
                                      
122  Oakes & Co. v. Jackson, I.L.R. 1 Mad. 134. 
123  Banarasi Dass & Co. v. Lulla Mull, 29 I.C. 950. 
124  P.R. & Co. v. Ghagwan Dass, 10 Bom. L.R. 1113, reversed in I.L.R. 
34 Bom. 192 on another point. 
125  Frederick Thomas Kingsley v. Secretary of State, AIR 1923 Cal. 49 at 
p. 50. 
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rule, however, appears to be dif ferent in cases fal l ing under 
Sec. 74 of the Indian Contact Act. It is enacted that “when a 
contract has been broken, i f  a sum is named in the contract 
as the amount to be paid in case of such breach ……… the 
party complaining of the breach is ent it led whether or not 
actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused 
thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the 
contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the 
amount so named … …” Where, therefore, the part ies have 
been careful enough to f ix any part icular amount in the 
contract itself  to be paid in case of breach, the stricter rule 
under Sec. 73 of the Indian Contract Act cannot apply. So it  
was held that under Sec. 74 a party complaining of the 
breach of contract is entit led, whether or not actual damage 
or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive 
reasonable compensation and the defendant in the action 
cannot plead or take advantage of the admission of the 
plaint if f  that he did not suffer any loss or damage from the 
breach.126   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
126  Meyappa Chetty v. Nachammal Achi, 123 I.C. 343 : AIR 1929 Mad. 
783 at p. 784. 
CHAPTER - VI 
 
 
ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF THE TERM DAMAGES 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION: 
 
Any person who has suffered loss, detr iment, or injury, 
whether to his person, property, or rights, through the 
unlawful act or omission or negligence of another is ent it led 
to a pecuniary compensation or indemnity.  Such 
compensation or indemnity may be recovered in the Courts 
by any person who is a sufferer.   
 
In the decision of  A.S.Sharma v. Union of India,1 the Gujarat 
High Court has given very simple meaning to word 
‘damages’.  ‘Damages’ are simply a sum of money given as 
a compensation for loss or harm of any kind.   
 
The definit ion given in the aforesaid judgment sounds quite 
simple to understand the entire concept but to derive at 
such a level of simplic ity the system, the framers of law, 
Jurist, Juries, decision making authorit ies and Judges have 
to pass through rocky roads. The original law of damages 
have its roots in a long past and the best study on any 
subject in the world can be made by gett ing an idea about 
it ’s or igin. The scope of the history and development of 
remedies for injuries and wrongs in the various system of 
jurisprudence is beyond.  But in br ief i t may be described 
the earl ier forms of remedies recognized by the three 
principal system of jurisprudence that have developed quite 
independently of one another known as, namely, The Hindu, 
                                      
1  A.S. Sharma v. Union of India, 1995 ACJ 493 at 498 (Gujarat).  
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The Mohammedan, and The English System. Thus, the 
origin of law of damages is found in al l the three oldest 
legal system in the world. Those three systems are namely:  
 
( i)  Hindu jur isprudence  
(i i)  Mohammedan jurisprudence and  
(i i i )  English jurisprudence. 
 
6.2 HINDU JURISPRUDENCE: 
 
The oldest of the three systems is that of the Hindus. Vedas 
constitute the earl ier sources of laws which govern the 
Hindus is now established beyond doubt.  “According to the 
Law Books the Vedas should be regarded as the f irst and 
foremost source of Dharma.  They are, therefore, frequently 
quoted, special ly in the Dharmashastra  which generally 
follow the Vedas very closely and may, on the whole, be 
regarded as the oldest sources of Law”, According to 
Processor Jolly in his Hindu Law and Custom.2  The Smrit is  
or Dharshastras  const itute the second source of Hindu Law 
and with the numerous commentaries of latter period which 
are helpful in the understanding of the Smrit is ,  they from 
the enti re fabric upon which the Hindu System of 
jurisprudence was buil t.  From a study of the above 
authoritat ive work it is evident that the Hindu Law has a 
gradual growth varying from time to t ime according to the 
needs and exigencies of the society.3 “Hindu Jurists at a 
very remote period laid down eighteen divisions of subjects 
and treated of law under what are called the eighteen topics 
of legislat ion.  These eighteen  topics are  again sub divided  
                                      
2  Jolly’s Hindu Law and Custom translated by Balakrishna Ghose, Ch.I, 
Art.I, p. 1.  
3  C.Kameshwara Rao, (2005), 6th Edition, Vol.I , Law of Damages and 
Compensation, p.2, Law Publishers (India) Pvt. Ltd.  
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into One hundred thirty two sub divisions and included 
every possible form of legal relations that arises in the 
Hindu Society.  The divisions which have direct bearing on 
the subject of the present work being breach of contract, 
debt, deposit or pledge, sales and their rescission, master 
and servant, t respass, personal v iolence including assault,  
deceit, adultery, theft, nonpayment of wages, and dispute 
between owners of catt le and herdsmen”.4 It  wil l be found on 
reference to Narada, that in all the above act ions at Law 
payment of damages and compensation were among the 
recognized form of remedies available to the injured party.  
“The obligat ion to pay compensation for every kind of injury 
is recognized in the ful lest extent and the evidence for i t  
may also be found in what has been stated above”.5 Thus, 
the whole scheme of the Hindu Jurists, therefore, appears 
to be to provide for payment of damages and compensation 
for infringement of all  k ind of legal rights, including rights 
ex-contractu as well as for injuries arising independently of 
contract and also to regulate the payment of such 
compensation by reference to a f ixed scale, varying 
according to the nature, extent, gravity of the injury and the 
animus to the wrongdoer.   
 
6.3 MOHAMMEDAN JURISPRUDENCE: 
 
In Mohammedan jurisprudence also we f ind that it  has gone 
almost through the same stage of development and grown 
up in the same manner as any other legal system.  The 
jurist ic system of the Mussalamans had its origin in Arabia, 
                                      
4  Acharya’s Commentaries on Narada; Golab Chandra Sarkar Sastry, 
Hindu Law, Ch. I. pp 42, 43; H.C. Ghose, Principles of Hindu Law, 
Ch.I, pp.6,7.  
5  Quoting from Vishnu (vi.5,51,59,75,100 to 109). 
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and has been developed by Arab Jurists.  The original  
sources of Arabic Law or the usage or customs of the 
people and the Laws, which govern their society, bear the 
dist inct impress of their nomadic habits.  It  was Mohammed, 
the great prophet of God who began to promulgate the 
principles of Islam and preach them “not merely for the 
municipal Government of the Arabs, but for the guidance of 
men’s lives generally”.  When the laws of Islam came into 
force, the const itut ion of Arabs society was that of a people 
which had not yet completely lost i ts nomadic habits and 
characteristics. It  must have given immense dif f iculty to the 
prophet to inculcate into the minds of such a people, the 
ideas of right and wrong as adumbrated in his teachings. 6  
After the death of prophet Mohammed the two schools of 
Mohammedan Law came into existence known as Sunni & 
Shiah .   Sunni school of Mohammedan Law was further 
divided into four dif ferent schools.  But, so far as the 
principles of law or jurisprudence are concerned, there does 
not appear to be much dif ference among these sub divisions 
or even between the two original systems or school of 
Mohammedan Law.   
 
  Comparison or similarity in the two schools of 
thought: 
  
 
Like Hindu Jurists,  Mohammedan Jurists also divide rights 
under dif ferent head.  Mohammedan Jurists divide rights 
under two broad head; 1) Public, 2) Private.  Public r ight is 
famously known as r ight of God, which is total ly different 
from private r ight, which is known as right of man.  
Enforcement of public right was the duty of the State as the 
said r ight a right provided by the God.  While in the case of 
                                      
6
  Abdur Rahim’s, Mohammedan Jurisprudence, Ch.I, Sec.1, p.2. 
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an infringement of a private right, the enforcement is lef t to 
the opt ion of the individual affected.  These rights have 
been further classif ied by the Mohammedan Jurists into four 
sub divis ions.  One of them is damages or compensation for 
breach of contract.   The said right is governed under a head 
“Matters in which rights of individuals only are concerned, 
are private rights pure and simple, e.g. enforcement of 
contracts, r ight to protect one’s person and property.  The 
enforcement of such rights is the concern of the individual 
who is injured and he is permitted to condone or compound 
the injury”.7  From the above brief discussion, i t  is crystal  
clear that the remedial r ights propounded in the 
Mohammedan jurisprudence dif fer in some particulars from 
those obtaining in Hindu Jurisprudence because Mr. Abdur 
Rahim divides private r ights into six heads: (1) right to 
safety or person, (2) r ight to reputat ion (according to 
Shafeis), (3) right to ownership, (4) family right, (5) rights to 
do lawful act, and (6) rights ex-contractu.8 But from the point 
of view of their or igin obligat ions may, according to him, be 
classif ied as those arising (1) by impl icat ion of law, (2) out 
of man’s own act of utterance, i.e.  r ights ex-contractu,  etc. 
(3) by reason of conduct infringing another’s right.9 In the 
matter of the enforcement of these obl igations, 
Mohammedan law recognizes two dist inct remedies, viz.  
specif ic and non-specif ic.  The principle underlying the non-
specif ic remedy is that wherever i t is not possible to 
discharge the obligat ion “by means of something which is 
intel l igibly similar to the subject-matter of suit both in 
appearance and in essence, the law wi ll be satisfied with 
something  which  is  similar in essence such as payment of  
                                      
7  C.Kameshwara Rao, (2005), 6th Edition, Vol.I, Law of Damages and 
Compensation,  p.4, Law Publishers (India) Pvt. Ltd.  
8  Abdur Rahim’s Mohammedan Jurisprudence, p.206.  
9  Abdur Rahim’s Mohammedan Jurisprudence, p.207.  
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the price of an art icle which has been misappropriated”. In 
other words payment of compensation is allowed in all  
cases where specif ic performance is not possible, and the 
amount of compensation seems in many cases to be f ixed 
and determined.  In the case of wrongs independent of 
contract the Mohammedan law again recognizes three 
dist inct remedies: (1) relation, (2) compensation, and (3) 
restitution, “The remedies recognized by the Mohammedan 
law are retal iat ion and compensation in cases of 
infringement of a man’s right to the safety of the person; 
and rest itut ion and compensation are the remedies provided 
for the violat ion of a man’s property rights and for other 
wrongs of a similar character”.10   
 
6.4  ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE: 
 
Amongst the above three English system of jurisprudence is 
last ly developed jurisprudence.  Though it has evolved out 
of the old Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence it  is not dif f icult to 
trace in its development the inf luence of the Roman law. 
Meaning thereby English system of jurisprudence provides a 
developed legal system, which is highly inf luenced by 
Roman law.  In fact, the entire Civil law of modern Europe 
has its root and foundation upon the principles of Roman 
jurisprudence.  The old Anglo-Saxon laws of Kind Ethelbert 
deal almost exclusively with wrongs resembl ing our modern 
“Breach” and rules have been careful ly framed for the 
payment of were or compensation in money value, by way of  
 
 
                                      
10  Abdur Rahim’s Mohammedan Jurisprudence, p.358.  
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damages.11  Sedgwick in his treaties on the measures of 
damages whi le discussing the history of this branch of law 
referred to the various kinds of wrongs which the old Anglo-
Saxon law dealt with, together with and the f ixed amount of 
compensation in money value, payable for each wrong.  The 
law of the subsequent Anglo-Saxon monarchs also 
recognize the applicat ion of the were and that among the 
law of King Alfred there appears a more minute 
classif ication of wrongs and the remedies for their redress, 
but in the laws of Wil l iam the Conqueror the weres  become 
very few.  It is no doubt an interesting study to tract the 
precise t ime in the history of this branch of law, at which 
the weres  were completely abolished and in their stead the 
rule was laid down that compensation payable to the injured 
party has to be ascertained by the Court.  Sedgwick while 
remarking upon the fact the weres became very few in the 
law of Wil l iam the Conqueror, says: “Perhaps this is 
evidence of a civil izat ion gradually increasing and a 
jurisprudence slowly improving; for feeble certainly, and 
unrel iable, must be the tribunal charged with the task of 
imposing damages in civi l suits, if  the legislature considers 
it unsafe to be trusted with the assessment of the amount.  
This elaborate and minute specif icat ion, therefore, though 
on its face it appears to indicate the case and watchfulness 
of the lawgiver, on a closer examinat ion furnishes stronger 
proof of the distrust of the judiciary.  Arbitrary rules which 
do not bend to the justice of the particular matter,  
especially when used to f ixed values, are always a 
misfortune and defect in jur isprudence”.12  This is perhaps 
true  to  some  extent,  but  the  learned  author ignored one  
                                      
11  C.Kameshwara Rao, (2005), 6th Edition, Vol.I, Law of Damages and 
Compensation, p.5, Law Publishers (India) Pvt. Ltd. 
12  Sedgwick,  Damages, 9th Edn., Ch.I, pp. 8-9.  
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obvious advantage in having a f ixed scale of compensation 
payable for each wrong.  Instead of leaving both the 
wrongdoer and the injured in doubt because of the 
uncertainty of the amount, either party was made to know 
before hand what by way of damages to expect.  We have 
known that Courts of law are but imperfect agents and in 
very few cases have they succeeded in correct ly estimating 
the amount of damages payable in redress of wrongs.  It is 
only on the principle of approximation or what is better 
termed as “as nearly as may be” that the amount of 
damages is f ixed by Courts of law, and we may be sure that 
neither the plaint if f  nor defendant ever went sat isf ied with 
the value as found by the Court.  Moreover, it  is not too 
much to asset that this very uncertainty itself  has been the 
effective cause of protracting every act ion in which the 
question of damages came to be l it igated.13   
 
I t  is, however, certain that the common Law of England 
whose characterist ic is mainly remedial, as distinguished 
from preventive, and whose remedies are of a pecuniary 
description always aimed at the payment of compensation 
to the injured party proport ionate to the actual loss 
sustained in al l cases of civi l injury or breach of contract.  
But in cases where the elements of fraud, oppression, 
malice or gross negligence are found, it  did not conf ine its 
remedy to the payment of compensation merely 
proport ionate, but granted vindictive or exemplary damages by way 
of punishment to the wrong-doer.  “The common law”, says 
Sedgwic “as it exists in England, and as it was introduced 
into  the  United  States,  is  generally remedial in character 
 
                                      
13  C.Kameshwara Rao, (2005), 6th Edition, Vol.I, Law of Damages and 
Compensation, p.5, Law Publishers (India) Pvt. Ltd. 
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and its remedies are of a pecuniary description.  I t has few 
preventive powers, it  can rarely compel the performance of 
contracts specif ical ly, i ts rel ief  for the most part, consists in 
the award of pecuniary damages.  Whether it punishes 
wrongs or remunerates for breach of contract, in either 
case, its judgement simply makes compensation, by 
awarding a certain amount of money by way of damage to 
the sufferer”.14  To the Indian student of law and to the 
pract ical lawyer, the old distinction between common law 
and equity is of l it t le interest, except perhaps histor ical ly,  
and it is suff icient for our present purposes to state that 
after the passing of what is known as Sir Hugh Cairns Act15 
the blending of the two systems slowly took place and the 
Court of Chancery was authorized by the Legislature to 
award damages to the injured party either in addit ion to or 
in substitut ion for the rel ief  of injunction or specif ic 
performance.  The Judicature Act of 1873, however, 
affected a complete union of the common law and equity 
into a single harmonious system of general law 
administered in English Courts.  Prior to the passing of the 
Act the plaint if f , in an action founded upon contract,  
covenant or other agreement could only claim and the Court 
could only award a certain sum of money by way of 
compensation for the breach of the agreement.  
 
From the aforesaid brief discussion of the three systems it  
is apparent that they agree upon the basic principle of the 
right to recover compensation by way of damages for 
wrongs  of  al l  the  nature  or  for  breach  of contract.  The  
 
                                      
14  Sedgwick, Damages, 9th Edn. Ch.I, p.8 Art. 9.  
15
  Sir Hugh Cairns Act, 21 and 22 Vict. Ch.27. 
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amount of compensation payable to the injured is almost in 
every case f ixed and predetermined and “ just and 
reasonable” according to the values of money and things 
prevalent in each society.  Moreover, with the advancement 
of civi l izat ion, the ideas of right and wrong grew more, 
ref ined more, developed more, and accordingly the f ixity of 
the scale of compensation was gradually abolished leading 
the assessment of the amount payable in each case to the 
“f luctuating” discret ion of either Judge or Jury.   
 
 
6.5 “DAMAGES”: HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT IN A 
MIDDLE AGE 
 
Having gone to the abovementioned three systems, it  wil l be 
worthwhile to mention the ideas of famous law thinkers on 
damages during the middle ages.  In the words of Hallam 
observed: 
 
“The passion of revenge always among the most 
ungovernable in human nature acts with such violence upon 
barbarians that i t  is utter ly beyond the control of  their 
imperfect arrangements of poli ty.  It seems to them o part  of 
the social compact to sacrif ice the privi leges which nature 
has placed in the arm of valour; gradually, however, these 
f iercer feelings are blunted and other passion hardly less 
powerful than resentment is brought to play in a contrary 
direction.”16 
 
 
 
 
                                      
16  Hallam on Middle Age, Volume I, p.154, Ch. II, pt.II.  
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6.6 “DAMAGES”: HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT IN A      
MODERN TIME 
 
 
The modern thinker Blackstone also gives an idea about the 
law of damages, which is similar to the views taken by the 
ancient law thinker and middle age authors.   
 
Blackstone shares the similar v iew in his own words.  
Blackstone in his commentary says17 “the primary r ight to a 
sat isfaction for injuries is given by the law of the nature,”,  
and this right to receive sat isfaction is based upon the 
sanctity of individual rights which humanity has always been 
from its infancy jealousy protect ing from being wantonly 
violated. This natural r ight was early discovered to be 
essential to the growth and wellbeing of the society, and 
during the successive stages of civi l izat ion and ref inement, 
various means were devised to enforce the same.  In the 
ruder ages when the appeal to arms was the only mode of 
redress for wrongs, the old barbaric not ion of “an eye for an 
eye, a tooth for a tooth” became almost a law.  Indeed, 
instances are not wanting in the history of man where a 
person robbed of his wife was held to have a natural r ight to 
carry off  the wife of the offender or a person robbed of his 
chattels was entit led to rob the thief in turn or where even 
in case of a murder, the heirs of the murdered man were 
held entit led to take the l ife of the murderer.  Though this 
form of obtaining sat isfact ion had its origin in the passion of 
revenge always so prominent in nature, the basic pr inciple 
appears to be nothing but the right to obtain, reparation for 
the wrong or injury.  However as ideas of ref inement began 
to  develop, and  peace  and  progress came to be valued, it   
                                      
17  Blckstone, Law of Damages, Book II, Ch. 29, p. 438.  
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had to be recognized, that this form of reparation is not 
consistent with tranquil i ty, progress and social  
organizat ion.”   
 
With day by day increase of commerce, with the advance of 
society and the varied activ it ies of nat ional and social  
intercourse, the history of human relat ions assumed such a 
complexity as to exercise the minds of the ancient lawgivers 
to evolve new rules for regulating the remedies consonant 
with the changing ideas of r ight and wrong.  The earl ier 
object of jurisprudence is, therefore, as Hallam says, “to 
establish a f ixed, atonement for injuries as much for the 
preservation of tranquil ity as the prevention of crime.”  It is 
beyond the scope of the present work to trace the 
comparative history and development of the injuries or 
wrong in the various systems of jur isprudence known to us.  
Suff ice it to say that al l the several legal systems which 
govern the civi l ized nations of the world agree upon the 
basic principle of a natural r ight to obtain reparation for 
wrongs or infringement of rights, and that the reparat ion or 
sat isfaction which the law allows must be in the nature of 
compensation proportionate to the injury infl icted.  We shall  
however briefly advert to the earl ier forms of remedies 
recognized by the three principal systems of jur isprudence 
with which we are mostly concerned and which have 
developed quite independently of one another.  
 
6.7  ANGLO-INDIAN JURISPRUDENCE: 
 
The f irst and foremost important step in the development of 
modern law of damages is the development of Anglo Indian 
Jurisprudence.   This is the most interest ing branch to study  
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branch of law for the Indian student.  It is always interest ing 
to learn how and in what way this branch of law has 
developed under the influence of what may be called Anglo-
Indian Jurisprudence.  In Ram Koomar Condoo v. Chandra 
Kanta Mookerjee,18 it  is observed that “ the establishment of 
Brit ish Courts in India has superseded the old Hind 
Tribunals for the administration of justice and rules of the 
common law of England regarding wrongs and their 
remedies were freely appl ied to cases aris ing in this 
country, So far as they are found to be based upon nature, 
reason and justice and not opposed to or inconsistent with 
the principles of Hindu and Mohammedan jurisprudence.  
English Judges, presiding in our Courts, have faithful ly t ired 
to fol low the rules of the common law of India in al l cases 
that arose for decision before them.  For instance the 
English laws of Champerty  and maintenance were totally 
rejected by Indian Courts and in its stead have introduced 
the more equitable principle of reasonableness of the 
transaction and freedom from fraud according to the general 
principles of the law of contracts.” Indeed, instances can be 
mult ipl ied wherein English Judges have strict ly adhered to 
the rules of Indian Common Law.  But, sti l l in some more 
important matters, in their anxiety to do just ice between 
man and man, they al lowed themselves to be slowly and 
unconsciously inf luenced by the technical doctrines of 
English law and have, by a process of reasoning strict ly 
applicable to the English condit ions of society laid down a 
law (in spite of the feeble attempts of India Judges to the 
contrary) which has in many instances done more harm than 
it was expected to cure.  Again the strict application of the 
maxim  action  personalis  moritur  cum persona though with  
                                      
18  Ram Koomar Condoo v. Chandra Kanta Mookerjee, I.L.R. 2 Cal. 233. 
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some notable exceptions is another instance in which 
mischief is being done in the name of law.19  So also the rule 
that a person has no cause of action at law for a l ibel on his 
ancestors is another instance of the mischievous 
applicat ion of the Engl ish doctrine.  It may also be not iced 
that the maxim rex non protest peccary (the King can do no 
wrong) is ent irely foreign to the Hindu system of 
jurisprudence which does not recognize the immunity of the 
King or his off icers in respect of wrongs committed against 
the subjects. These and similar instances, therefore, sti l l  
require to be reconsidered in the light of the Indian 
condit ions of l ife and society.  But on the whole the general  
influence of English Judges sitt ing in our Courts may 
unhesitatingly be said to be most beneficial to the interests 
of a more humane system of jurisprudence.  More especially 
in the domain of the Law of Damages the old system of 
adopting f ixed value in the matter of the award of  
compensation for injury has been abrogated and the 
assessment of the amount of compensation on juristic 
principles has been allowed to be appl ied.20   
 
Thus, the Anglo Indian Jurisprudence can be termed as 
extremely good combinat ion of al l  the three oldest legal 
system of the world.  We can say that this is one of the 
most developed, established and stable legal system of law.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
19  Bhupendra Narayan Sinha v. Chandramoni Gupta, AIR 1927 Cal. 277. 
20  Alwar Chetty v. Vaidyalingam Chetty, 1 M.H.C.R.9.  
  
- 355 - 
6.8 CODIFICATION OF LAW: CHARTER OF 1726 
A.D.: 
 
  India governed by English Law: 
 
The indiscriminate applicat ion of English law to Indians,  
within the jurisdiction of the Presidency towns, by virtue of 
the Charter of 1726,21 led to so many inconveniences, that 
the Brit ish Parliament passed two Statutes 22 Geo. III,  Ch. 
70, Sect ions 17 and 3; Geo. III , Ch. 142, Sec. 13, whereby 
English law was superseded and the personal laws of 
Hindus and Mohammedans were declared to be applicable 
in matters of inheritance, succession, contact or dealing 
between party and party. So far as the mofussil  is 
concerned the rule has always been to act according to 
just ice, equity and good conscience, in the absence of 
specif ic enactment.  And this rule of justice, equity and good 
conscience has been interpreted to mean, the rules of 
English law so far as they are appl icable to Indian 
condit ions.22  The passing of the Indian Contract Act put an 
end to this anomaly of administering just ice in India by the 
applicat ion of the Engl ish Statutory and Common Law of 
Damages and Compensation is concerned Sect ions 73 and 
74 contain def inite rules for assessing the amount of 
damages and compensation to be paid upon a breach of 
contract.  But in the case of civ i l wrong, there is no 
legislat ive enactment laying down rules for the measure of 
damages and compensation payable to the injured party and 
the principle which guide the Courts in estimating the 
                                      
21  Charter of 1726, 13 Geo.1.  
22  Waghela Raj Sanji v. Seikh Masludin, I.L.R. 11 Bom. 551 at p. 561; 
Dada v. Babaji, 2 Bom. H.C.R. 36 at p. 38; Webb v. Lestur, 2 Bom. 
HC.R. 52 at p. 56; 59I.C. 143 : 28 I..C. 349.  
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measure of damages, are more or less drawn from the rules 
of English Common Law.  23 
 
In the landmark decision of Sundarmul v. Ladhuram,24 
Justice Page of Calcutta High Court has observed “The 
Common Law of  England except where it has been 
abrogated by legislative enactments and in so far as it  is 
not inapplicable to Indian condit ions is part of the Law of 
India”. In Vitappa Kudua v. Durgamma,25 the Madras High 
Court has held that “if  there was no provision in the 
Legislature of this country and if  they were to apply the 
principles of just ice, equity and good conscience, they were 
not at l iberty to whitt le away the force of rules of English 
law as proposed by eminent Judges and substitute for i t  
something which, in their opinion, should be regarded as a 
rule of equity in this country.  They thought that if  the rules 
of Engl ish law afford any ground for the applicat ion of the 
principles of equity, justice and good conscience that 
should be applied mutat is mutandis, without presuming to 
deduce a new rule from it. ”  But this expression of opinion 
by the Madras High Court appears to have gone too far in 
applying the principles of English law irrespective of the 
question whether those rules apply to the peculiar 
condit ions in India and to the circumstances of the case.  
Where, however, the principles of the Common Law in 
England are in a state of uncertainty there is nothing to 
preclude High Courts in India applying that view of the law, 
which is essential ly just and equitable.26  In one of the 
leading case Stone, CJ while considering the applicabi l ity of 
f  common law observed that; “In considering what is today 
                                      
23  Indian Contract Act IX of 1872.  
24  Sundaramul v. Ladhuram,  AIR 1924 Cal. 240 at p. 242.  
25  Vittappa Kudua v. Durgamma, 55 I.C. 781. 
26
  Balammal v. Palaniandi, AI.R 1938 Mad. 164 at p. 170 : (1938) 2 
M.L.J. 340. 
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consonant to justice, equity and good conscience, one 
should regard the law as it is in England today, and not 
what was part of the law of England yesterday.  One cannot 
take the Common Law of England divorced from the Statute 
Law of England and argue that the former is in accordance 
with justice, equity and good conscience and the latter 
which has modif ied it has to be ignored today.  The 
relevance of Engl ish Common Law is that i t  affords a 
guidance in connection with the rest of Engl ish law as to 
what rule is consonant to justice, equity and good 
conscience, judged not according to circumstances in 
England, judged not according to the date when the rule 
was enunciated, but in accordance with the circumstances 
in India at the date when the guidance is sought.  A rule 
may well be binding as part of the Common Law in England 
because it was developed many years ago and has been 
approved by the House of Lords so may t imes that it  is now 
impregnable, without i ts necessari ly fol lowing that today it 
is a rule to be imported into another jurisdict ion.  What one 
has to be considered is whether in the circumstances 
present in this country and at this rule is really in 
accordance with justice, equity and good conscience.”27 As 
Oliver W indel Homes put it ,  the law is always approaching 
and never reaching consistency.  It is forever adopting new 
principles from life at one end, and it always retains old 
ones from history at the other, which have not yet been 
absorbed or sloughed off .  It  wi l l become ent irely consistent 
when it ceases to grow.  On the other hand, in the 
applicat ion of rules of equity i t is not open to an Indian 
Court to invent a new rule contrary to the well-established 
rules of equity as founded in England.  If  the law in England 
is clear and there is no statutory enactment to the contrary 
                                      
27  Secretary of State v. Rukminibai, AIR 1937 Ng. 354.  
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in India one should hesitate to introduce any supposed rule 
of equity in conf lict with what is to be found in Engl ish 
Law.28 
 
6.9 CONCLUSION: 
 
From the aforesaid discussion, it  is clear that the law of 
damages was in an extremely uncertain, ambiguous and 
confused state for number of decades.  It was a mixed bag.  
It consisted of partly Hindu Law, partly Mohammedan and 
partly English Law.  Which principle of which law would be 
applied by the Court to decide a dispute was most dif f icult 
to predict beforehand t i l l the judicial pronouncement was 
made.  In the Mofussil ,  under the maxim of justice, equity 
and good conscience, some principles of English law were 
being imported.  In the presidency towns, the Supreme 
Courts were required to administer Hindu Law, 
Mohammedan Law and English Laws of damages.  In actual 
pract ice, the Hindu and Mohammedan laws were not very 
much applied end, by an large the English Law was in 
vogue in the presidency towns.  This becomes clear f rom 
the following statement in 1845 of Sir Lawrence Peel, Chief 
Justice Calcutta Supreme Court: “The Engl ish law as to 
contracts is so much in harmony with the Mohammedan and 
Hindu laws as to contracts that a very rarely happens in our 
courts that any quest ion arises on the law peculiar to those 
people in actions on contracts.”  There were many points of 
difference between the law of Contracts more particularly 
law of damages prevail ing in the Mofussil court and in the 
presidency  towns, although the privy counsel made number 
 
 
                                      
28  Ajudhia Prasad v. Chaman Lal, AIR 1937 All. 601 at p. 606.  
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of  attempts to narrow down this gap.  29 The law also 
becomes uncertain because of the frequent changes of 
different views taken by dif ferent courts of law.  The law in 
presidency towns was archaic because only the pre-1726 
English law prevai led there and no post 1726 statue was 
made applicable.  The law lay deeply buried in precedence 
and case law and, thus, i t  becomes diff icult even for a well-
informed and well-prepared lawyer to ascertain the law.  So 
we can say that the law of contract and law of damages 
were thus very inarticulate and adversely affected proper 
development of trade and commerce in the country. 
However the subsequent stable and uniform development in 
a form of codif icat ion of law by applying Anglo Indian 
jurisprudence in this area was a great desideratum.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
29  Professor M.P.Jain, (2006), 6th Edition, Outlines of Indian Legal and 
Constitutional History, p.473, Wadhwa & Company, Nagpur.  
CHAPTER - VII 
 
DEFINITION AND NATURE OF THE TERM 
“DAMAGES”  
 
                             
7.1 INTRODUCTION: 
This chapter deals with the term damages, its def init ion and 
the object for awarding damages for the breach of contract. 
The rule of law governing damages is also dealt with, 
statutory law applicable in India and England. The chapter 
deals with the judicial pronouncements in pre-independence 
India and post-independence India and a comparative study 
between the decisions of courts of England and decisions of 
Indian Courts. The damages are specif ied into different 
kinds and dealt wi th in extensor. The chapter throws light 
on the researcher’s ideas on the comparative study of term 
damages and the rule to grant damages and the chapter is 
prelude to chapter on discussion on remoteness of contract 
as propounded by the English Court in Hadley v. Baxendal .1  
 
7.2 DAMAGES DEFINED: 
 
The Brit ishers came to India for trading and in process of 
trading, became the rulers of India. Being rulers of India, 
they gave legislat ions, precedents and authority of  the 
Crown. The term “damages” has no where been def ined in 
the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The natural r ight of a person 
or primary right is to be sat isf ied for the injury, which a 
person may sustain due to lack of sanctity by individual 
wrong. These are known as natural r ights which human 
being has. Later on, this natural r ight gave way to revenge 
in most ungovernable way or violant way and later on, were 
                                      
1  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex. 341. 
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substituted by the new laws which was to regulate wrong for 
which consonant remedies would be the answer. Damages 
are one kind of remedy for the wrong, which has been 
committed for the breach of a corresponding obligation. As 
seen in the earlier chapter, we would delve into the law of 
contract. The term damages represents pecuniary reward or 
compensation recoverable by due process of law from the 
person who has committed any act which is either wrongful  
or which he ought not to have been committed. A person 
who has sustained injury would be ent it led to pecuniary 
recompense. The Engl ish Court way back in 1955 in2 
Stonedal No. 1 (Owners) v. Manchester Ship Canal Co., 
defined the term to mean that the disadvantage which is 
suffered by a person as a result of an act or default of other 
and its kind of injury which gives rise for legal r ight for 
compensation. As far as contract is concerned, the term 
damages would mean breach of concluded contract and the 
realizat ion of a shortfal l would be monetary compensation.3 
The provisions of Sect ion 73 of the Indian Contract Act has 
been t ime and again interpreted from the aforesaid 
sections, it  can be seen that when a contract has been 
broken, the party who suffers by such breach is ent itled to 
receive compensation for any loss which natural ly arises in 
the usual course of things from such breach. These sect ions 
further contemplate that i f  part ies knew when they made the 
contract, that a particular loss is l ikely to result f rom such 
breach, they can agree for payment of such compensation. 
In such a case, there may not be any necessity of leading 
evidence for proving damages, unless the Court arrives at 
the conclusion that no loss is l ikely to occur because of 
such breach. Further, in case where the Court arr ives at the 
                                      
2  Stonedal No. 1 (Owners) v. Manchester Ship Canal Co; (1955) 2 
All.E.R. 682 (H.L.) 
3  A. Mohd. Basheer v. State of Kerala; (2003) 6 SCC 159. 
  
- 362 - 
conclusion that the term contemplat ing damages is by way 
of penalty, the Court may grant reasonable compensation 
not exceeding the amount so named in the contract on proof 
of damages. However, when the terms of the contract are 
clear and unambiguous then its meaning is to be gathered 
only from the terms and words stipulated therein. In a case 
where agreement is executed by experts in the f ield, i t  
would be diff icult to hold that the intention of the part ies 
was dif ferent from the language used therein. In such a 
case, i t  is for the party who contends that stipulated amount 
is not reasonable compensation, to prove the same.4  
 
The term “Damages”, has been def ined by various 
dict ionaries, to the effect that injury, harm and 
compensation for injury.5  The Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat 
in6 A.S. Sharma v. Union of India; has defined the term 
damages to mean a sum of money given as compensation 
for loss or harm of any kind. Thus damages means a 
pecuniary compensation of indemnity recovered in the Court 
by any person who has suffered a loss due to breach of 
contract. This compensation would mean damages. The 
term compensation vis-à-vis damages signify the sum of 
money claimed or adjudged to be paid. The term 
compensation would etymologically suggest and means 
balancing of wrongs by payment of money. Compensation is 
normally adjudged in terms of pecuniary loss or non-
pecuniary loss. 
 
                                      
4  Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd.; (2003) 5 SCC 
705. 
5  Collin’s Indian Dictionary. 
6  A.S. Sharma v. Union of India; 1995 ACJ 493 at 498 (Gujarat). 
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The term “Damages” is def ined in7 the Oxford Dict ionary so 
as to the courts in India has def ined the terms damages to 
signify which, constitute the sum of money claimed or 
adjudged to be paid in compensation for loss of injury 
sustained, the value est imated in money, or something loss 
or withheld.8  
 
7.3  OBJECT OF AWARDING DAMAGES: 
 
I t  would be clear from the loss are in vogue in India that the 
main purpose or the object for awarding damages is due to 
breach of contract and the determination of breach of 
contract has to be determined by a proper method. The 
object of awarding compensation is when the quantum of 
loss on breach of the contract is proved. The main purpose 
and object is to make good loss which a party suffers due to 
non-fulf i l lment of the contract which obligatory for the other 
party to fulf i l l.  The main purpose for awarding damages for 
breach of contract is l imited to what may reasonably be 
presumed to have been in contemplat ion of the part ies and 
that the party must have reasonable expectation but he 
suffered due to non-getting the fruits of its legit imate 
expectation and when it is proved that there was a wrong, 
such wrong should not be un-redressed and a person 
committ ing breach has to be held liable and for that he has 
to make good a wrong which he has wrong committed.  
 
Bombay High Court way back in the 1927 in the case of 
Seth Ajodhya Prasad v. Sivaprasad9 very categorically,  
through His Lordship Just ice Hall ifax A.J. C., held that if  the 
creditor omits or is unable to prove that he has sustained 
                                      
7  The Oxford Dictionary. 
8  Saraswati Parabhal v. Grid Corp., Orissa, AIR 2000 Ori 13.  
9  Seth Ajodhya Prasad v. Sivaprasad; AIR 1927 Nag. 18. 
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any actual loss or damage, he cannot be granted any rel ief . 
The Hon’ble High Court while interpreting the provision of 
Section 73 and 74 of the Contract Act has held that the 
object of grant ing damages is always there is clear proof 
not only of the creditor having suffered actual damage, but 
also of the extent of that damage in terms of money. But the 
purpose of awarding damages is the loss, which the person 
has incurred due to the breach of the contract. The Bombay 
High Court in Nadiar Chand v. Sat ish Chandra10 has held 
that the object of awarding damages is whether the person 
himself  is not at a wrong and is ready and will ing to perform 
his part, in this case, the plaintif f  had entered into a 
contract for purchase of goods, he gave advance but later 
on refuses to purchase the goods, and therefore, it  was 
held that he was neither entit led to receive back the earnest 
money nor was he ent it led to any damages. The object of 
awarding damages can be said to be mitigat ing the wrong 
committed to a person, and therefore, over and above, the 
actual loss, the wronged would be ent itled to recover 
interest even if  the same is not expressly proved. The 
object of the term damages, therefore, can be summarized 
to mean putting a person in the same posit ion as he was 
before the breach of contract occurred.  
 
7.4 RULE OF LAW GOVERNING DAMAGES: 
  
  Law of Damages in India: 
  
Having discussed the genesis of damages, it  would now be 
important to advert to the condit ions which would permit a 
person to claim damages or claim compensation which 
would take within i t  sweep l iabi lity for damages, measure of 
                                      
10  Nadiar Chand v. Satish Chandra; AIR 1927 Cal. 964. 
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damages, proof of damages and remote and indirect loss so 
as to claim specif ic damages. However, before damages 
can be measured, it  would be important to understand the 
legal rights, which are conferred on a person.  The purview 
of Sect ion - 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act would 
have to be analysed. What would amount to breach of 
contract, which would permit a person to claim damages 
may be l iquidated or unliquidated. Construct ion of contract 
would be very important for our purpose. 
 
It is an admitted posit ion of law as legislated by provisions 
of Section 3 to 8 of the Indian Contract Act that a contract 
is concluded when the sequence of offer and acceptance is 
complete. It is for the courts to spel l out with a meticulous 
sif t ing of the correspondence, which took place between the 
parties at the t ime, the alleged contract said to have been 
undertaken or concluded or not concluded. The suit  for 
damages would l ie only when the contract is concluded out 
of freewil l of  the parties. The parties may enter into contract 
or conclude the same by their own terms and condit ions. 
Mutual agreement would either absolve the part ies or 
compel the party to do certain things and if  the said term is 
not performed, the other party would be l iable for loss, 
damages, compensation, delay which may direct ly or 
indirect ly, arise even for the act of God.11 The provisions of 
Sections 23 and 24 of the Indian Contract Act would also be 
required to be considered as they are necessary for validity 
of the agreement unless there is an exception clause. The 
consideration or object of the agreement should always be 
lawful then only other party would be entit led to damages if  
the agreement itself  is unlawfaul, the said unlawful  
consideration would make the ent ire agreement void as per 
                                      
11  M/s. Basanti Bastralaya vs. River Steam Navigation C. Ltd.; AIR 1987 
Cal 271. 
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the provisions of section 64 of the Act. If  the unlawful  
consideration is severable, the lawful port ion of such 
consideration can be acted upon either by specif ic 
performance or by claiming damages can be sought from 
the defaulting party.  
 
As the study is based on the analysis of the decisions of the 
English Court and the Indian Courts, it  would be important 
for us to analyse Judicial  pronouncements, as early as 
1927, it  was held by the Madras High Court in Nanchappa 
Koundan v. Vetessery Tarwad Karnavan ;  12 that the courts in 
India have the powers both of a Court of equity and a Court 
of law and they can award even interest though not 
provided for under the Interest Act. The Court has held that 
the rule of damages as far as India is concerned is based 
both, on equitable principles and the law of contract. But a 
person would be ent it led to interest,  f rom the date of the 
advance, on the damages which he has claimed as 
damages, can be awarded only from the date of a contract 
comes into force. Thus where the part ies make advance, he 
cannot claim damages from that date the reason being that 
the contract was not performed. However, in the opinion of 
the Researcher, the person would be entit led to damages 
for the damages from the party before f i l ing of the suit and 
not between the date of the advance and the date of 
performance. The Researcher is fort if ied in this view by the 
decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Ramalinga 
Mudaliar v. S.R. Muthuswami Ayyar & Sons.  13 The Apex 
Court has also in Maula Bux v. Union of India14 has held that 
the plaint i ff  is not ent it led to interest prior to the date of the 
                                      
12  Nanchappa Koundan v. Vetessery Tarwad Karnavan; AIR 1927 Mad. 
47. 
13  Ramalinga Mudaliar v. S.R. Muthuswami Ayyar & Sons; AIR 1927 
Mad. 99. 
14  Maula Bux v. Union of India; AIR 1970 SC 1955. 
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suit. However, the said view was conf irmed as no argument 
was advanced by the plaint if f -appellant.  Thus the rule is 
that interest if  not recoverable under Contract Act or under 
Interest Act, then also interest on claim can be granted.  
 
It is a sett led legal posit ion as far as India is concerned that 
where the dispute arises between the buyer and sel ler, 
buyer would be entit led to claim damages if  he proves 
goods supplied to him were of infer ior quality than the one 
for which the part ies had negotiated.  
 
Would a person be liable for damages if  there is 
misrepresentat ion under the Contract Act? The effect of 
misrepresentat ion would ent it le a person to damages but i f  
the person is unable to prove that there was 
misrepresentat ion, he would not be entit led to any damages 
and the suit based on misrepresentat ion if not proved to 
one of fraud but at the most of the omission to state the 
material fact would give other remedy to the plaint if f  other 
then damages: 
 
The Hon’ble High Court of Bombay in Sorab Shah’s case 
held that the only remedy open to the plainti ff  was under 
Section 19 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, on the ground 
of misrepresentation; that assuming without deciding that 
there is a misrepresentation, the plaintif fs had two remedies 
open to them: (a) avoidance or rescission, and (b) 
completion and the enforcement of misrepresentat ion; that 
it  was not open to the plainti f f to avoid contract, for which 
suit was brought after the expiry of  the term of contract; 
that even if the plainti f fs were entit led to be put in the same 
posit ion in which they would have been, if  the 
representation made had been true, the plaintif fs failed to 
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prove that their exceeded Rs. 3,000/- or which the 
government had already allowed.15 
 
The provisions of section 73 and 74 can’t be read or 
interpreted in isolat ion. The concept of damages depends 
on several c ircumstances. These circumstances are not 
al ien or new interpretative aspects but those, which will  
have to be culled out from the agreement. The term 
agreement is in contraindicat ion to the term contract. The 
reason being al l contract are agreements but i f  it  is not 
vise-versa. For an agreement to be an enforceable contract 
has to fulf i l l  the def init ion of the term contract as defined in 
Section 2(e) of the Indian Contract Act.  
 
The provisions of  Sect ion 73 and 74 speak about the 
compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of 
contract, and therefore, dissecting this section, it  would be 
relevant to our study to advert back to what is a contract 
and when it can be said to have been broken and to further 
analyse what would constitute breach of such contract. 
After having understood this concept, it  would be relevant 
what would be the compensation to be paid to such party 
who has been wronged. The law of damages is further 
qualif ied by the term arose in the usual course of thinking 
from such breach. One more aspect is provided in the 
Section it self  that the parties must know that what would be 
the damage if  such breach occurred and this knowledge is 
attributed at the t ime when the contract itself  is made. 
However, the proviso makes it clear that no compensation 
should be given for remote and indirect loss or damage. 
Even compensation can be granted for fai lure of discharging 
obligations, which would resemble one, which is created by 
                                      
15  Sorab Shah vs. Secretary of State; 1927 BLR 1535. 
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such contract. Therefore, quasi contract are also taken care 
of. The provisions of Section 73 and 74 and i l lustrations 
given in Section 73 and 74 are reproduced below for the 
ready reference:  
 
 Section 73.  Compensation for loss or damage 
caused by breach of contract: 
 
When a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by 
such breach is ent itled to receive, from the party who has 
broken the contract compensation for any loss or damage 
caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual 
course of things from such breach, or which the parties 
knew, when they made the contract,  to be likely to result 
f rom the breach of it .   
 
Such compensation is not to be given for any remote and 
indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach. 
 
  Compensation for failure to discharge obligation 
resembling those created by contract:  
 
When an obligat ion resembling those created by contract 
has been incurred and has not been discharged, any person 
injured by the fai lure to discharge it is ent it led to receive 
the same compensation from the party in default,  as if  such 
person had contracted to discharge it and had broken his 
contract. 
 
Explanation .- In estimating the loss or damage arising from 
a breach of contract, the means which existed or remedying 
the inconvenience caused by the non-performance of the 
contract must be taken into account.  
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I l lustrations 
 
(a) A contracts to sell and del iver 50 maunds of saltpetre 
to B,  at a certain price to be paid on delivery. A 
breaks his promise. B is entit led to receive from A,  by 
way of compensation, the sum, if  any by which the 
contract price fal ls short of the price for which B might 
have obtained 50 maunds of saltpeter of l ike quality at 
the t ime when the saltpeter ought to have been 
delivered.  
(b) A hires B ’s ship to go to Bombay, and there takes on 
board, on the f irst of January, a cargo, which A is to 
provide, and to bring it to Calcutta, the freight to be 
paid when earned. B’s ship does not go to Bombay but 
A has opportunit ies of procuring suitable conveyance 
for the cargo upon terms as advantageous as those on 
which he had chartered the ship. A avails himself of 
those opportunit ies, but is put to trouble and expense 
in doing so. A is entit led to receive compensation from 
B in respect of such trouble and expense.  
(c) A contracts to buy of B ,  as a stated price, 50 maunds 
of rice, no t ime being f ixed for delivery. A afterwards 
informs B that he wil l not accept the r ice if  tendered to 
him. B is ent it led to receive from A,  by way of  
compensation, the amount, if  any, by which the 
contract price exceeds that which B can obtain for the 
rise at he t ime when A informs B that he wil l not 
accept i t .   
(d) A contracts to by B’s ship for 60,000 rupees, but 
breaks his promise. A must pay to B ,  by way of 
compensation, the excess, i f  any, of the contract 
prince over the price which B can obtain for the ship 
at the t ime of the breach of promise.  
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(e) A,  the owner of a boat, contract with B  to take a cargo 
of jute to Mirzapur, for sale at that place, start ing on a 
specif ied day. The boat, owing to some unavoidable 
cause, does not start at the t ime appointed, whereby 
the arrival of the cargo at Mirzapur is delayed beyond 
the t ime when it would have arrived if  the boat had 
sailed according to the contract.  After that date, and 
before the arrival of the cargo, the price of jute falls. 
The measure of the compensation payable to B by A 
is the dif ference between the price which  B could 
have obtained for the cargo at Mirzapur at the time 
when it would have arrived if  forwarded in due course, 
and its market pr ice at the t ime when it actually 
arr ived.  
(f) A contracts to repair B’s house in a certain manner, 
and receives payment in advance. A repairs the 
house, but nor according to contract.  B is entit led to 
recover from A  the cost of making the repairs conform 
to the contract. 
(g) A contracts to let  his ship to B for a year, f rom the 
f irst of January, for a certain price. Freights rise, and, 
on the f irst of January, the hire obtainable for the ship 
is higher than the contract price. A  breaks his 
promise. He must pay to B,  by way of compensation, a 
sum equal to the difference between the contract pr ice 
and the price for which B  could hire a simi lar ship for 
a year on and from the f irst of January.  
(h) A contracts to supply B  with a certain quantity of iron 
at a f ixed price, being a higher pr ice than that for 
which A  could procure and deliver the iron. B  
wrongful ly refuses to receive the iron.  B  must pay to 
A,  by way of compensation, the dif ference between 
the contract price of the i ron and the sum for which A  
could have obtained and delivered it. 
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(i) A delivers to B, a common carrier, a machine, to be 
conveyed, without delay, to A’s mill ,  informing B that 
this mills is stopped for want of machine. B 
unreasonably delays the delivery of the machine, and  
A, inconsequence, loses a profitable contract with the 
Government.  A  is ent it led to receive from  B,  by way of  
compensation, the average amount of prof it which 
would have been made by the working of the mill  
during the t ime that delivery of it  was delayed, but not 
the loss sustained through the loss of the Government 
contract.  
( j) A, having contracted with B  to supply B with 1,000 
tons of iron at 100 rupees a ton, to be delivered at a 
stated time, contracts with C for the purchase of 1,000 
tons of iron at 80 rupees a ton, tel l ing C that he does 
so far the purpose of performing his contract with B.   
C fai ls to perform his contract with A, who cannot 
procure other iron, and B, in consequence, rescinds 
the contract. C must pay to A  20,000 rupees, being 
the prof it which A  would have made bythe 
performance of his contract with B.  
(k) A contracts with B  to make and deliver to B, by a f ixed 
day, for a specif ied price, a certain piece of 
machinery.  A does not deliver the piece of machinery, 
at the t ime specif ied, and, in consequences of this; B  
is obliged to procure another at a higher price than 
that which he was to have paid to A, and is prevented 
from performing a contract which B had made with a 
third person at the t ime of his contract with A (but 
which had not been then communicated to  A), and is 
compelled to make compensation for breach of that 
contract.  A  must pay to B, by way of compensation, 
the dif ference between the contract price of the price 
of machinery and the sum paid by B  for another but 
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not the sum paid by B to the third person by way of 
compensation. 
(l) A, a bui lder, contracts to erect and f inish a house by 
the f irst of January, in order that  B  may give 
possession of it  at that t ime to C, to whom B has 
contracted to let it .  A is informed of the contract 
between B and C.  A builds the house so badly that, 
before the f irst of January, it  fal ls down and has to be 
rebuilt by B,  who in consequence, loses the rent,  
which he was to have, received from. C, and is 
obliged to make compensation to C for the breach of 
his contract.  A  must make compensation to B  for the 
cost of rebuilding the house, for the rent lost, and for 
the compensation made to C.  
(m) A sells certain merchandise to B, warranting it to be of 
a part icular quality, and B, in rel iance upon this 
warranty, sel ls it  to C  with a similar warranty. The 
goods prove to be not according to the warranty, and 
B becomes liable to pay C a sum of money by way of 
compensation.  B is ent it led to be reimbursed this sum 
by A .  
(n) A contracts to pay a sum of money to B  on a day 
specif ied. A does not pay the money on that day. B, in 
consequence of not receiving the money on that day, 
is unable to pay his debts, and is totally ruined. A  is 
not l iable to make good to B  anything except the 
principal sum he contracted to pay, together with 
interest upon the day of payment.  
(o) A contracts to deliver 50 maunds of saltpeter to B  on 
the f irst of January, at a certain price, B,  af terwards, 
before the f irst of January, contracts to sell saltpeter 
to C  at a price higher than the market price of the f irst  
of January. A breaks his promise. In est imating the 
compensation payable by A to B, the market price of 
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the f irst  of January, and not the prof it, which would 
have arisen to B f rom the sale to C, is to be taken into 
account. 
(p) A  contracts to sell  and deliver 500 bales of cotton to 
B on a f ixed day.  A  knows nothing of B ’s mode of 
conducting his business. A breaks the promise, and B, 
having no cotton, is obliged to close his mill .  A  is not 
responsible to B  for the loss caused to B  by closing of 
the mill .   
(q) A contracts to sel l  and deliver to B, on the f irst of 
January, certain cloth which B  intends to manufacture 
into caps of a particular kind, for which there is no 
demand, except at that season. The cloth is not 
delivered ti l l af ter the appointed t ime and too late to 
be used that year in making the caps.  B is entit led to 
receive from A, by way of compensation, the 
dif ference between the contract pr ice of the cloth and 
its market price at the t ime of delivery, but not the 
prof its which he expected to obtain by making caps, 
nor the expenses which he has been put to in making 
preparat ion for the manufacture. 
(r)  A, a ship owner, contracts with B to convey him from 
Calcutta to Sydney in A’s  ship, sai ling on the f irst of 
January, and B pays to A,  by way of deposit, one-half 
of his passage money. The ship does not sail on the 
f irst of January, and B, after being, in consequence, 
detained in Calcutta for some t ime, and thereby put ot 
some expenses, proceeds to Sydney in another 
vessel, and in consequence, arriving too late in 
Sydney, loses a sum of money. A  is l iable to repay to  
B his deposit , with interest, and the expense to which 
he is put by his detention in Calcutta, and the excess, 
if  any, of the passage-money paid for the second ship 
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over the agreed upon the f irst, but not the sum of 
money which B  lost by arriving in Sydney too late. 
 
  Damages as a remedy for breach of contract: 
 
The f irst paragraph of Section 73 deals with compensation 
for loss or damage caused by breach of contract.  It  states 
that where a contract is broken, the party suffering from the 
breach of contract is ent itled to receive compensation from 
the party who has broken the contract. Compensation can 
be recovered for loss or damage: 
 
(I) that arose in the usual course of things from such 
breach; or  
(II)  which the party knew at the time they made the 
contract as l ikely to result from such breach. 
 
The second paragraph provides that no compensation is 
payable for any remote or indirect loss or damage. The third 
paragraph applies the same principle when breach occurs of 
obligation resembling contract. The forth paragraph 
provides that while assessing damage, the means which 
existed to the person claiming damages of remedying the 
inconvenience caused by non-performance, must be 
considered.  
 
Damages for breach of contract committed by the defendant 
are compensation to the plaint if f  for the damage, loss or 
injury he has suffered through that breach. An act ion for 
damages is always available as a matter of right when a 
contract has been broken, as against the rel ief  of specif ic 
performance, which l ies in the discret ion of the Court.16  
                                      
16  Specific Relief Act, 1963, Ss. 10-24, particularly, Ss. 10 and 20. 
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Even when the plaintif f  is able to prove his loss, damages 
may not necessari ly be a ful l  recompense for his loss; `i t  
must be remembered that the rules as to damages can in 
the nature of things only be approximately just ’.17  
 
In terms of an arbitration agreement, the arbitrator gave an 
award by excluding provisions of Section 73 of the Indian 
Contract Act, 1872. It was held that in the context of terms 
and condit ions of the contract, provisions of Section 73 
could be excluded, and thus the award could not be 
regarded as patently absurd or wholly unreasonable.18   
 
A statutory receiver committed default in respect of supply 
of the contracted quality of sugar. The suit was f i led against 
him and also against the appellant corporat ion in which the 
property had vested under law. It was held that the receiver 
was not personally l iable and the recovery could be made 
only from the property of the mill and through the 
corporation. The liabi l ity of the receiver was not personal  
but i t  attached to the property in his Receivership.19  
 
  Section 74. Compensation for breach of contract 
where penalty stipulated for:  
 
When a contract has been broken, if  a sum is named in the 
contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach, or 
if  the contract contains any other stipulation by way of 
penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entit led, 
whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have 
                                      
17  Rodocanachi v. Milburn, (1886) 18 QBD 67, p. 78. 
18  Maharashtra State Electricity v. Sterilite Industries (India), (2001) 8 
SCC 482. 
19  Uttar Pradesh State Sugar Corporation v. Mahalchand M. Kothari, 
(2005) 1 SCC 348. 
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been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has 
broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding 
the amount so named or, as the case may be, the penalty 
stipulated for. 
 
Explanation .-A stipulation for increased interest from the 
date of default may be a stipulation by way of penalty.20  
 
Exception.-When any person enters into any bai l-bond, 
recognizance or other Instrument of the same nature, or 
under the provisions of any law, or under the orders of the 
[Central Government]21 or of any [State]22  Government, 
gives any bond for the performance of any public duty or 
act in which the public are interested, he shal l be l iable, 
upon breach of the condit ion of any such instrument, to pay 
the whole sum mentioned therein.  
 
Explanation .-A person who enters into a contract with 
Government does not necessarily thereby undertake any 
public duty, or promise to do an act in which the public are 
interested.  
 
(a)   A contracts with B to pay B Rs 1,000 if  he fai ls to pay 
B Rs 500 on a given day. A  fails to pay B  Rs 500 on 
that day. B  is ent it led to recover from A such 
compensation, not exceeding Rs 1,000, as the Court 
                                      
20  Substituted for first paragraph of s.74 by s.4, the Indian Contract 
(Amendment) Act 1899 (6 of 1899). The first paragraph of the section 
stood as follows before the amendment: 'When a contract has been 
broken, if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in 
case of such breach, the parry complaining of the breach is entitled, 
whether or nor actual damages or loss is proved to have been caused 
thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract 
reasonable compensation nor exceeding the amount so named.'  
21  These words were substituted for ‘Government of India’ by the AO 
1937.  
22  These words were substituted for ‘Provincial’ by the ALO 1950. 
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considers reasonable.  
(b)   A contracts with B  that, if  A  practices as a surgeon 
within Calcutta, he will  pay B  Rs 5,000. A  practises 
as a surgeon in Calcutta. B  is entit led to such 
compensation, not exceeding Rs. 5,000, as the 
Court considers reasonable.  
(c)  A gives a recognizance binding him in a penalty of 
Rs 500 to appear in Court on a certain day. He 
forfeits his recognizance. He is l iable to pay the 
whole penalty.  
(d)  A gives B a bond for the repayment of Rs. 1,000 with 
interest at 12 per cent at the end of six months, with 
a stipulat ion that,  in case of default, interest shall be 
payable at the rate of 75 per cent from the date of 
default. This is a stipulat ion by way of penalty, and B 
is only entit led to recover from A  such compensation 
as the Court considers reasonable.  
(e)  A,  who owes money to B , a money-lender, undertakes 
to repay him by delivering to him 10 maunds of grain 
on a certain date, and st ipulates that, in the event of 
his not delivering the stipulated amount by the 
stipulated date, he shall be liable to deliver 20 
maunds. This is a stipulation by way of penalty,  and B  
is only ent it led to reasonable consideration in case of 
breach. 
(f)  A undertakes to repay B a loan of Rs 1,000 by f ive 
equal monthly installments with a stipulation that, in 
default of payment of any instal lment, the whole shall 
become due. This stipulation is not by way of penalty, 
and the contract may be enforced according to its 
terms.  
(g)  A borrows Rs 100 from B  and gives him a bond for Rs 
200, payable by f ive yearly instal lments of Rs 40, with 
a st ipulat ion that in default of payment of any 
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instal lment, the whole shall become due. This is a 
stipulation by way of penalty.23 
 
Before adverting to the principle on which the damages can 
be granted, it  would be important to go through the 
provisions of Section 4 and 5, which deal with the formation 
of bi lateral contract.  
 
The offer may be withdrawn by a person who had made an 
offer but it  has to be withdrawn before the acceptance or 
even if  it  is accepted before it was communicated to him. It 
is cardinal principle that the acceptance should be 
uncondit ional and absolute if  there is no binding, the 
contract between the parties or i f  the acceptance is nei ther 
absolute nor uncondit ional, a party would not be ent it led to 
damages. The next aspect, which has to be looked into for 
granting of damages, is that the consideration should not be 
unlawful. The law not only requires considerat ion but insist  
on lawful considerat ion. The object also must be lawful. 
Section - 23 makes it clear that a cr ime, which has unlawful 
consideration, is void ( il legal). This is also seen that at 
t imes, damages have to be asserted if  on the basis of terms 
of contract and if  on t ime, term is essential ingredient.  
 
 
7.5 DAMAGES DISTINGUISHED FROM 
COMPENSATION AND OTHER KINDS OF 
PAYMENT: 
 
 
The term damages, compensation, interest, loss, act ionable 
wrong are inter-connected but there is thin l ine of 
difference. The distinct ion between the terms “damages” 
                                      
23  Illustrations (d) to (g) added by s.4(2), the Indian Contract 
(Amendment) Act 1899 ( 6  of 1899 ). 
  
- 380 - 
and “compensation” should never be ignored. At t imes, they 
are intermingled and being etymologically equivalence. The 
term “damages” is used in reference to pecuniary 
recompense awarded for loss or injury caused by wrongful 
act or omission, whereas compensation can be given even 
for lawful act which causes injury and for which indemnity 
has to be obtained under the provisions of specif ic statute, 
for example, Motor Vehicle Act, Land Acquisit ion. The two 
terms are not equivalent of each other. However, the 
English Courts have considered that the term compensation 
would include the term damages in i ts broad genus.24 The 
term compensation takes within its purview any loss, which 
a party has suffered, may be out of contract or within a 
contract. The term compensation would take within its 
purview the loss, which a party would suffer, if  i t  is 
prevented from doing some work and it would come under 
the wider def init ion of the word `damages’. Damages cannot 
be classif ied into any rigid formula. A person who suffers 
should receive proper monitory recompense.  
 
There are certain special terms which are frequently used in 
connection with the subject of damages and which, though 
they acquired special meaning in legal phraseology, are not 
at all dist inct and separate from one another. It is,  
therefore, necessary to acquaint ourselves with those terms 
f irst and that legal signif icance before we proceed further.  
 
The word “compensation” would embrace in i ts purview any 
actual loss suffered by a party. For example, if  trees had to 
be cut or certain structure had to be altered or some 
unwarranted structure had to be demolished, in that case a 
question of praying compensation would arise but the 
                                      
24  Doyle v. Olby Ltd.; (1969) 2 All. E.R. 119. 
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question as to what loss a party would suffer in case he was 
prevented from making any construct ions or using the roof 
would not come within the meaning of the word 
“compensation”. Such type of loss would be governed under 
the wider def init ion of the word “damages”.25  
 
One can easily distinguished word “damages” from debt.  
And from a sum payable under contractual l iabi lity to pay a 
sum certain on a given event (other than breach), but 
include sums payable under claims for a reasonable price or 
remuneration for goods sold or services rendered and under 
claims under an insurance policy than the quantum of 
damage has to be proved. Damages are not only 
dist inguishable from compensation only but from a penalty 
and even from costs.26  
 
 
7.6 DAMAGES SHOULD NOT BE STANDARDISED: 
 
 
I t  cannot be said that damages should be standardized or 
that there should be any attempt at any classif ication. It  is 
but to recognize that, since in a Court of Law, compensation 
for physical injury can only be assessed and f ixed in 
monetary terms, the best the Court can do is to hope to 
achieve some measure of uniformity by paying heed to any 
current trend of considerate opinion. As far as possible, i t  
desirable that to l i tigants whose claims correspond should 
receive similar treatment, just as it is desirable that they 
                                      
25  Union of India v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1975 All. 221 at p. 225. 
26  Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. 12 p. 413; Amarjit kaur v. 
Venguard Insurance Company Ltd., AIR 1982 Delhi 1 at p. 3. 
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should both receive fare and equal treatment and by that 
fare and equal just ice.27  
 
 
7.7 CONCLUSION: 
 
 
The aforesaid discussion would show that from the time 
when the Brit ishers came to India for trading and in the 
process of trading became the rulers of India. Being rulers 
of India, they gave legislat ions, precedent and authority of 
the crown. Law of damages was completely developed 
under the shadow of the Brit ish regime. However, the word 
“Damage” has nowhere been def ined in either English Law 
or in the Indian Contract Act, 1872. But with the gradual 
development of stable and systematic legal system we are 
now able to arrive at c lear meaning of damages and various 
heads in which it can be claimed. There has been a long 
journey through which the concept of damages has passed. 
The decision taken by Exchaquer Court in England while 
dealing in the case of Hadley v. Baxendal28 proved to be a 
limestone in the history of development of the concept of 
damages for breach of contract. Indian Law on damages 
sti l l holds the view of Hadley v. Baxendal  decided before 
one and half  centuries. The chapter would show that the 
term “Damages” in India and in England connotes in injury 
for compensation. The Indian law is based on Sect ion 73 
and 74 of the Indian Contract Act and the chapter shows 
that what amount has to be paid as damages would vary 
from Court to Court, contract to contract and kind of loss 
suffered by the plaintif f.  I t  wil l be seen that the Indian Law 
                                      
27  Singh (an infant) v. Toong Fong Omnibus Co. Ltd., (1964) 3 All. E.R. 
925 at p. 927. 
28  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex. 341. 
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is March-ahead of his counter part in England. The chapter 
in the beginning deals with the def init ion of damages, object 
of awarding damages and rule of law governing the 
damages.  The said chapter further deals with various types 
of damages and dif ferences between compensation and 
damages under the Indian Contract Act, 1872.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER - VIII 
 
CONCEPT OF REMOTENESS OF DAMAGES  
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION: 
 
Development of General Rule for providing 
compensation for breach of contract: 
 
 
The scope of measure of damages in act ion on Contract is 
basically very l imited.  The Jury or the decision making 
authority or those standing in the place of jury have to 
decide the measure of damages for breach of Contract 
within i ts four corner.  While deciding the damages, the 
decision making authority have not to traverse any vague 
f ields.  Basically the damages are never “at large in action 
on Contract”.  The injury sustained by the promisee can in 
almost every case, be very nearly measured by a pecuniary 
standard, and sat isfaction rendered with a near approach to 
completeness.  One can say that damages in act ions on 
Contract are only compensation, not the prof it making 
issue.  But the diff iculty is even this is frequently 
inadequate because the Law has set i ts own l imits upon the 
theory of compensation. It takes into consideration only the 
proximate and direct consequences of the wrongful act 
which are necessari ly arising out of breach of contract.   In 
other words whi le deciding the amount of compensation, the 
decision making authority is not required to have a look or 
to give a thought about the indirect consequences of breach 
of contract.  One can say the primary and immediate result 
of such breach of contract alone wi ll be taken into 
consideration.1 There is no doubt i t  that it  has been 
                                      
1  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex. 341. 
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repeatedly held by the Courts that the party who has 
sustained loss by the reason of breach of contract with 
respect to damages is required to be placed in the same 
situat ion as he would have been in, if  the contract had been 
performed.2 But as we al l know that this principle is only 
theoretical ly proved, academically applicable, but in 
pract ice it is certain crystal clear that it  is impossible to 
restore the party,  who has suffered with breach of contract 
by the other side, to status quo ante.   
 
8.2 SCOPE OF PROTECTION; MEASURE OF 
DAMAGES BEFORE THE RULE IN HADLEY V. 
BAXENDALE3 
 
 
The basis rule for deciding or solving the problem of 
measure of damages for breach of contract is that the 
plaint if f  is ent it led to placed, so far as money can do it,  in 
the same posit ion as he would have been in had the 
contract been performed. This Rule is l imited f i rst, but not 
substantially.  The principle as to causat ion just dealt with; 
the second and much more far reaching l imit is that the 
scope of protect ion is marked out by was in the 
contemplation of parties. When damage is said to be too 
remote in contract it  is generally this later factor, i.e. is in 
issue, i.e. in the same posit ion as he would have been in 
had the contract been performed.    
 
In 1848 Parke B. in his remarkable decision in Robinson v. 
Harman4 clearly stated that the start ing Rule for the 
assessment of an award of contract damages, no general  
                                      
2  Robinson v. Harman, (1848) 1 Ex. 853; compare Livingstone v. 
Rawyards Coal., (1880) 5 A.C. 75; Union of India v. Baij Nath Mandal, 
AIR 1951 Pat. 219. 
3  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex. 341. 
4  Robinson v. Harman, (1848) 1 Ex. 850 at 855. 
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rules as to whether damage might be too remote had been 
formulated.  Thus, the cases of that t ime seem to be very 
generous to the plaintif fs especial ly in Black v. Baxendale5 
and  Waters v. Towers.6 
 
The generous att itude of rule of damages can be 
understood by the following wording which is re-produce 
from the aforesaid decided case laws: 
 
“this purpose, if  relentlessly pursued, would provide him 
[the plaint if f ]  with a complete indemnity for al l loss de facto  
result ing from a particular breach, however improbable, 
however unpredictable”. 
 
Looking to the generousness to plaint if f , there was a strong 
need rather a compell ing necessity of some l imitations to 
the rule of damages.  In the f ield of damages it becomes 
dyeing need for the defendant and / or al l the concerned or 
affected part ies that some limitation should be introduced.   
 
8.3 REMOTENESS OF DAMAGE: 
 
In case of breach of contract the injured party may feel the 
consequences for a long time and in variety of ways.  Every 
breach of contract upsets many sett led expectations of the 
injured party.  Theoretical ly the consequences of a breach 
may be endless but there must be an end to liabil ity.   The 
defendant cannot be held l iable for all  that fol lows from his 
breach. There must be a l imit to l iabil ity and beyond that 
l imit the damage is said to be too remote, and therefore, 
                                      
5  Black v. Baxendale, (1847) 1 Ex. 410. 
6  Waters v. Towers, (1853) 8 Ex. 401 : 22 L.J. 186 : 155 E.R. 1404. 
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ir recoverable.7  With the aforesaid discussion, one thing is 
very clear that somewhere in between 1840 to 1850 the 
Jury, the Courts and the other decision making authority 
was in need to frame some straight jacket formula to make 
a balance between the parties to the li t igation.  The idea 
must have been there in the mind of the Jury, the Courts 
and the other decision making authority to draw the l ine, 
which decides the proper, val id, lawful, appropriate and 
proport ionate damages for breach of contract.  But the 
crucial problem must have been where to draw the line as 
the dif ference was very thin line difference between the 
damages natural ly arising from a breach of contract and the 
damages which would not arise in a usual course of things 
from a breach of contract, but which do arise from 
circumstances peculiar to the special case.   
 
However, at the present surprise of the legal fraternity this 
diff icult task was successful ly achieved in a short t ime in 
landmark decision of Hadley v. Baxendale.  Today, as with 
al l cases decided before Hadley v. Baxendale on question 
of remoteness in contract,  they cannot be regarded as very 
compell ing authority.     
 
Hadley and another v. Baxendale and others8   
 
This landmark decision given by Court of law of England 
proved to be landmark decision by al l means for number of  
decades.  This is the case law which has provided the base 
to the framers of laws while codifying and modifying the law 
of contract as far as the law of contract, law of breach of 
                                      
7  Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., Court of Appeals of NY, (1928) 284 
NY 339. 
8
  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex. 341, S.C.2 C . L.R. 517; 23 L.J. 
Ex.179; 18 Jur.358; 2 W.R. 302; 23 L.T. O.S. 69. 
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contract, law of damages and circumstances in which the 
damages can be awarded to the aggrieved party and the 
quantum of damages are concerned.  
 
Up to what extent damages can be recovered from the other 
side who is responsible for breach of contract by the 
aggrieved party is laid down in this famous case popularly 
known as Hadley v. Baxendale by the Court of law in 
England. The facts in nutshell of  the case read as under: 
  
“Where two part ies have made a contract, which one of 
them has broken, the damages which the other party ought 
to receive in respect of the breach of contract should be 
such as may fair ly and reasonably be considered ei ther 
aris ing natural ly,  i .e. according to the usual course of 
things, from the breach of contract itself , or such as may 
reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation 
of both part ies at the t ime they made the contract, as the 
probable result of the breach of it .  
 
 Where the plainti ffs, the owners of a f lour mil l , sent a 
broken iron shaft to an off ice of the defendants, who were 
common carr iers, to be conveyed by them, and the 
defendants’ clerk, who attended at the off ice, was told that 
the mil l was stopped, that the shaft must be delivered 
immediately, and that a special entry, if  necessary, must be 
made to hasten its delivery; and the del ivery of the broken 
shaft to the consignee, to whom it had been sent by the 
plaint if fs as a pattern, by which to make a new shaft, was 
delayed for an unreasonable t ime; in consequence of which, 
the plainti ffs did not receive the new shaft for some days 
after the t ime they ought to have received it, and they were 
consequently unable to work their mil l  from want of  the new 
shaft, and thereby incurred a loss of prof its : Held, that,  
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under the circumstances, that loss could not be recovered 
in an act ion against the defendants as common carr iers.” 
 
However, for the academic purpose and to get a better idea 
about the law of damages, the important paragraphs of the 
judgment would be required to be reproduced, which read 
as under: 
 
“The f irst count of the declarat ion stated, that, before and at 
the t ime of making by the defendants of the promises 
hereinafter mentioned, the plaintif fs carr ied on the business 
of millers and mealmen in co-partnership, and were 
proprietors and occupiers of the City Steam Mil ls, in the city 
of Gloucester, and were possessed of a steam-engine, by 
means of which they worked the said mil ls,  and therein 
cleaned corn, and ground the same into mean, and dressed 
the same into f lour, sharps, and bran, and a certain portion 
of the said steam-engine, to wit, the crank shaft of the said 
steam-engine, was broken and out of repair, whereby the 
said steam-engine was prevented from working, and the 
plaint if fs were desirous of having a new crank shaft made 
for the said mil l,  and had ordered the same of certain 
persons trading under the name of W.Joyce & Co.,  at  
Greenwich, in the county of Kent,  who had contracted to 
make the said shaft for the plaintif fs; but before they could 
complete the said new shaft it  was necessary that the said 
broken shaft should be forwarded to their works at 
Greenwich, in order that the said new shaft might be made 
so as to f i t  the other parts of the said engine which were not 
injured, and so that i t  might be subst ituted for the said 
broken shaft; and the plaintif fs were desirous of sending the 
said broken shaft to the said W. Joyce & Co. for the 
purpose aforesaid; and the defendants, before and at the 
t ime of the making of the said promises, were common 
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carriers of goods and chattels for hire from Gloucester to 
Greenwich, and carried on such business of common 
carriers, under the name of “Pickford & Co.;” and the 
plaint if fs, at the request of the defendants, delivered to 
them as such carriers the said broken shaft, to be conveyed 
by the defendants as such carriers from Gloucester to the 
said W. Joyce & Co., at Greenwich, and there to be 
delivered for the plaint if fs on the second day after the day 
of such del ivery, for reward to the defendants; and in 
consideration thereof the defendants then promised the 
plaint if fs to convey the said broken shaft from Gloucester to 
Greenwich, and there on the said second day to deliver the 
same to the said W. Joyce & Co. for the plaint if fs. And 
although such second day elapsed before the 
commencement of this suit,  yet the defendants did not nor 
would deliver the said broken shaft at Greenwich on the 
said second day, or to the said W. Joyce & Co. on the said 
second day, but wholly neglected and refused so to do for 
the space of seven days after the said shaft was so 
delivered to them as aforesaid.  
 
The second count stated, that, the defendants being such 
carriers as aforesaid, the plainti f fs, at the request of the 
defendants, caused to be delivered to them as such carriers 
the said broken shaft, to be conveyed by the defendants 
from Gloucester aforesaid to the said W. Joyce & Co.,  at 
Greenwich, and there to be delivered by the defendants for 
the plaintif fs, within a reasonable t ime in that behalf, for 
reward to the defendants; and in considerat ion of the 
premises in this count mentioned, the defendants promised 
the plainti ffs to use due and proper care and di ligence in 
and about the carrying and conveying the said broken shaft 
f rom Gloucester aforesaid to the said W. Joyce & Co.,  at 
Greenwich, and there delivering the same for the plaintif fs 
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in a reasonable t ime then fol lowing for the carr iage, 
conveyance, and delivery of the said broken shaft as 
aforesaid; and although such reasonable t ime elapsed long 
before the commencement of this suit, yet the defendants 
did not nor would use due or proper care or di l igence in or 
about the carrying or conveying or delivering the said 
broken shaft as aforesaid, within such reasonable t ime as 
aforesaid, but wholly neglected and refused  so to do; and  
by reason of the carelessness, negligence, and improper 
conduct of the defendants, the said broken shaft was not 
delivered for the  plaint if fs to the said W. Joyce & Co., or at 
Greenwich, unt i l the expirat ion of a long and unreasonable 
t ime after the defendants received the same as aforesaid, 
and after the t ime when the same should  have been 
delivered for the plaint if fs; and by reason of the several  
premises, the completing of the said new shaft was delayed 
for f ive days, and the plaintif fs were prevented from working 
their  said steam-mil ls, and from  cleaning corn, and 
grinding the same into meal, and dressing the meal into 
f lour, sharps, or bran, and from carrying on their said 
business as millers and mealmen for the space of f ive days 
beyond the t ime that they otherwise would  have been 
prevented from so doing, and they thereby were unable to 
supply many of their customers with f lour, sharps, and bran 
during that period, and were obliged to buy f lour to supply 
some of their other customers, and lost the means and 
opportunity of  sel l ing f lour,  sharps, and bran, and were 
delivered of grains and prof its which otherwise would have 
accrued to them, and were unable to employ their workmen, 
to whom they were compelled to pay wages during that 
period, and were otherwise injured, and the plaint if fs claim 
£300.  
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The defendants pleaded non-assumpserunt to the f irst 
count;  and to the second payment of £25 into Court in 
sat isfaction of the plaint if fs’ claim under that count.  The 
plaint if fs entered a nolle prosequi as to the f irst count; and 
as to the second plea, they replied that the sum paid into 
Court was not enough to sat isfy the plaint if fs’ claim in 
respect thereof; upon which replication issue was joined.  
 
At the tr ial before Crompton, J., at the last Gloucester 
Assizes, it  appeared that the plainti ffs carried on the an 
extensive business as mil lers at Gloucester and that, on the 
11th May, their mil l  was stopped by a breakage of the crank 
shaft by which the mill  was worked. The steam engine was 
manufactured by M/s. Joyce & Co., the engineers, at 
Greenwich, and it became necessary to send the shaft as a 
pattern for a new one to Greenwich. The fracture was 
discovered on the 12th, and on the 13th the plaint if fs sent 
one of their servants to the off ice of the defendants, who 
are the well-known carriers trading under the name of 
Pickford & Co., for the purpose of having the shaft carried 
to Greenwich. The plaint if f ’s servant told the clerk that the 
mill  was stopped, and that the shaft must be sent 
immediately; and in answer to the inquiry when the shaft 
would be taken, the answer was, that if  it  was sent up by 
twelve o’clock any day, it  would be delivered at Greenwich 
on the fol lowing day. On the fol lowing day the defendants, 
took the shaft before noon, for the purpose of being 
conveyed to Greenwich, and the sum of 2l.4s. was paid for 
its carriage for the whole distance; at the same time the 
defendants’ clerk was told that a special entry, if  required, 
should be made to hasten its delivery.  The delivery of  the 
shaft at Greenwich was delayed by some neglect; and the 
consequence was, that the plaint if fs did not receive the new 
shaft for several days after they would otherwise have 
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done, and the working of their mi l l was thereby delayed, 
and they thereby lost the prof its they would otherwise have 
received. On the part of the defendants, i t  was objected that 
these damages were too remote, and that the defendants 
were not l iable with respect to them. The learned Judge left  
the case generally to the jury, who found a verdict with 25 l . 
damages beyond the amount paid into Court. 
 
 Whateley, in last Michaelmans Term, obtained a rule nisi  
for a new tr ial,  on the ground of misdirection.  
 
 Keat ing and Dowdeswell (Feb.1) showed cause: 
 
 The plaint if fs are ent it led to the amount awarded by the 
jury as damages. These damages are not too remote, for 
they are not only the natural and necessary consequence of  
the defendants’ default, but they are the only loss, which 
the plaintif fs have actually sustained. The principle upon 
which damages are assessed is founded upon that of 
rendering compensation to the injured party. This important 
subject is ably treated in Sedgwick on the Measure of 
Damages. And this particular branch of it  is discussed in the 
third chapters, where, after pointing out the distinction 
between the civi l  and the French law, he says, “I t is 
sometimes said, in regard to contracts, that the defendant 
shall  be held l iable for those damages only which both 
parties may fairly be supposed to have at the t ime 
contemplated as l ikely to result f rom the nature of the 
agreement, and this appears to be the rule adopted by the 
writers upon the civil law.” In a subsequent passage he 
says, “In cases of fraud the civ il  law made a broad 
dist inction” and he adds, “in such cases the debtor was 
liable for al l the consequences.” It is dif f icult, however, to 
see what the ground of such principle is,  and how the 
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ingredient of fraud can affect the quest ion. For instance, i f  
the defendants had maliciously and fraudulently kept the 
shaft, it  is not easy to see why they should have been l iable 
for these damages, i f  they are not to be held so where the 
delay is occasioned by their negl igence only. In speaking of 
the rule respecting the breach of a contract to transport 
goods to a part icular place, and in actions brought on 
agreements for the sale and delivery of chattels, the 
learned author lays it down, that, “In the former case, the 
difference in value between the price at the point where the 
goods are and the place where they were to be delivered, is 
taken as a measure of damages, which in fact, amounts to 
an allowance of prof its; and in the latter case, a similar 
result is had by the applicat ion of the rule, which gives the 
vendee the benefit of  the rise of the market price.” The 
several cases, Engl ish as well as American, are their 
collected and reviewed.  
 
(PARKE, B.: The sensible rule appears to be that which has 
been laid down in France, and which is declared in their 
code: Code Civil ,  l iv. I i i.  Tit. I i i.  Ss. 1149, 1150, 1151, and 
which is thus translated in Sedgwick:  “The damages due to 
the creditor consist in general  of the loss that he has 
sustained, and the prof it which, he has been prevented from 
acquiring, subject to the modif icat ions hereinafter 
contained. The debtor is only liable for the damages 
foresee, or which might have been foreseen, at the t ime of 
the execut ion of the contract, when it is not owing to his 
fraud that the agreement has been violated. Even in the 
case of non-performance of the contract, result ing from the 
fraud of the debtor, the damages only comprise so much of 
the loss sustained by the credi tor,  and so much of the profit 
which he has been prevented from acquir ing, as direct ly and 
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immediately results from the non-performance of the 
contract.”)  
 
 I f  that rule is to be adopted, there was ample evidence in 
the present case of the defendants knowledge of such a 
state of things as would necessari ly resul t in the damage 
the plainti ffs suffered through the defendants default.  The 
authorit ies are in the plaint if fs’ favour upon the general  
ground. In Nurse v. Barns ,9 which was an action for the 
breach of an agreement for the lett ing of certain iron mil ls,  
the plainti ff  was held entit led to a sum of 500 l.,  awarded by 
reason of loss of stock laid in, although he had only paid 10 
l. by way of consideration. In Borrandaile v. Brunton,10 which 
was an act ion for the breach of the warranty of a chain 
cable that i t  should last two years as a subst itute for a rope 
cable of sixteen inches, the plainti f f was held ent it led to 
recover for the loss of the anchor, which was occasioned by 
the breaking of the cable within the specif ied t ime.  
  
(ALDERSON, B.: Why should not the defendant have been 
liable for the loss of the ship? 
 
PARKE, B.: Sedgwick doubts the correctness of that 
report.11  
   
MARTIN B.:  Take the case of the non-delivery by a carrier 
of a delicate piece of machinery, whereby the whole of  an 
extensive mi ll is thrown out of work for a considerable t ime; 
if  the carrier is to be l iable for the loss in that case, he 
might incur damages to the extent of 10,000l.  
                                      
9
  Nurse v. Barns, 1 Sir T. Ray. 77. 
10  Borrandaile v. Brunton, 20 R.R. 548 (8 Taunt. 535). 
11  The learned Judge has frequently observed of late that the 8th 
Taunton is of but doubtful authority, as the cases were not reported by 
Mr.Taunton himself. [ See 19 R.R. Preface, vi., vii.]  
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PARKE, B., referred to Everard v. Hopkins12) 
 
These extreme cases, and the diff icul ty which consequently 
exists in the estimation of the true amount of damages, 
supports the view for which the plaintif fs contend, that the 
question is properly for the decision of a jury, and therefore 
that this matter could not properly have been withdrawn 
from their consideration. In Ingram v. Lawson,13 the true 
principle was acted upon. That was an action for a l ibel  
upon the plaintif f ,  who was the owner and master of a ship, 
which he advert ised to take passengers to the East Indies; 
and the l ibel imputed that the vessel was not seaworthy, 
and that Jews had purchased her to take out convicts. The 
COURT held, that evidence showing that the plaint if f ’s14 
prof its after the publicat ion of the l ibel were 1,500 l. below 
the usual average, was admissible, to enable the jury to 
form an opinion as to the nature of the plainti f f ’s business, 
and of his general rate of prof it. Here, also, the plaint if fs 
have not sustained any loss beyond that which was 
submitted to the jury. Bodley v. Reynolds15 and Kettle v.  
Hunt16  are similar in principle. In the latter, i t was held that 
the loss of the benefit of  trade, which a man suffers by the 
detent ion of his tools, is recoverable as special damages.  
 
(PARKE, B:  Suppose, in the present case, that the shaft 
had been lost, what would have been the damage to which 
the plaint if fs would have been ent it led?) 
 
                                      
12  Everard v. Hopkins, 2 Bulst 332.   
13  Ingram v. Lawson, 54 R.R. 766 (6 Bing. N.C. 212). 
14
  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex.  341 at p. 348. 
15  Bodley v. Reynolds, 70 R.R. 640 (8 Q.B. 779). 
16  Kettle v. Hunt, Bull N.P. 77. 
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The loss they had sustained during the time they were so 
deprived of their shaft, or unt i l  they could have obtained a 
new one. In Black v. Baxendale,17 by reason of the 
defendants’ omission to deliver the goods within a 
reasonable t ime at Bedford, the plaint if f ’s agent, who had 
been sent there to meet the goods, was put to certain 
addit ional expenses, and this Court held that such expenses 
might be given by the jury as damages. In Brandt v. 
Bowlby,18 which was an act ion of assumpsit against the 
defendants, as owners of a certain vessel, for not delivering 
a cargo of wheat shipped to the plaint if fs, the cargo reached 
the port of discharge but was not delivered; the pr ice of the 
cargo at the t ime it  reached the port of dest ination was held 
to be the true rule of damages.  “As between the parties in 
this cause,” said PARKE, J., “the plaint if fs are enti t led to be 
put in the same situat ion as they would have been in, if  the 
cargo had been delivered to their order at the t ime when i t 
was delivered to the wrong party; and the sum it  would have 
fetched at that t ime is the amount of the loss sustained by 
the non-performance of the defendants’ contract.” The 
recent decision of this Court, in Waters v. Towers ,19 seems 
to be strongly in the plaintif fs’ favour.  The defendants there 
had agreed to f it  up the plainti f fs’ mil l  within a reasonable 
t ime, but had not completed their contract within such t ime; 
and it was held that the plaintif fs were ent it led to recover, 
by way of damages, the loss of prof it upon a contract they 
had entered into with third parties, and which they were 
unable to fulf i l l by reason of the defendants’ breach of 
contract.  
 
                                      
17  Black v. Baxendale, (1847) 1 Ex. 410. 
18  Brandt v. Bowlby, 36 R.R. 796 (2 B. & Ad. 932). 
19  Waters v. Towers, 91 R.R. 556 (8 Ex. 401). 
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(PARKE, B.:  The defendants there must of necessity have 
known that the consequence of their not completing their 
contract would be to stop the working of the mi ll.  But how 
could the defendants here know that any such result would 
follow?) 
 
There was ample evidence that the defendants know the 
purpose for which this shaft was sent,  and that the result  of 
its non-delivery in due time would be the stoppage of the 
mill;  for the defendants’ agent, at their place of business, 
was told that the mil l was then stopped, that the shaft must 
be delivered immediately,  and that if  a special entry was 
necessary to hasten its delivery, such an entry should be 
made. The defendants must, therefore, be held to have 
contemplated at the t ime what in fact did follow, as the 
necessary and natural result of their wrongful act. (They 
also cited Ward v. Smith,20 and PARKE B., referred to Levy 
v. Langridge.21)  
 
Whateley, W ill ies, and Phipson, in support of the rule 
(Feb.2): 
 
It has been contended, on the part of the plaint if fs, that the 
damages found by the jury are a matter f it  for their 
consideration; but sti l l  the question remains, in what way 
ought the jury to have been directed? It has been also 
urged, that,  in awarding damages, the law gives 
compensation is not to be awarded; for instance, the non-
payment of a bi l l  of  exchange might22 lead the utter ruin of 
the holder, and yet such damage could not be considered 
as necessari ly result ing from the breach of contract, so as 
                                      
20  Ward v. Smith, (1822) 11 Price 19 : 147 E.R. 388. 
21  Levy v. Langridge, 46 R.R. 689 (4 M. & W. 337). 
22  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex.  341 at p. 350. 
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to entit le the party aggrieved to recover in respect of it .  
Take the case of the breach of a contract to supply a Rick-
cloth, whereby and in consequence of bad weather the hay, 
being unprotected, is spoiled, that damage would not be 
recoverable. Many similar cases might be added.  The true 
principle to be deduced from the authorit ies upon this 
subject is that which is embodied in the maxim: “In jure non 
remota causa sed proxima spectator. ”  Sedgwick says,23 “In 
regard to the quantum of damages, instead of adhering to 
the term ‘compensation’, i t  would be far more accurate to 
say, in the language of Domat, which we have cited above, 
‘that the object is to discriminate between that portion of the 
loss which must be borne by the offending party and that 
which must be borne by the sufferer.  The law in fact aims 
not at the sat isfact ion but at a division of the loss.” And the 
learned author also cites the fol lowing passage from 
Broom’s Legal Maxims: “Every defendant, ’ says Mr.Broom, 
“against whom an action is brought experiences some injury 
or inconvenience beyond what the costs wil l compensate 
him for.”24 After referring to the case of Flurean v. 
Thornhil l,25 he says, “Both the English and American Courts 
have generally adhered to this denial of prof its as any part  
of the damages to be compensated, in case of, breach of  
contract. So, in a case of i l legal capture, Mr. Justice Story 
rejected the item of prof its on the voyage, and held this 
general language: ‘Independent, however, of al l  authority, I 
am sat isfied upon principle, that an al lowance of damages 
upon the basis of a calculation of prof its is inadmissible.26 
The rule would be in the highest degree unfavourable to the 
interests of the community.  The subject would be involved in 
                                      
23
  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex.  341. 
24  Broom’s Legal Maxims, p. 95; Davies v. Jenkins, 63 R.R. 744 (11 M. & 
W. 755).  
25  Floreau v. Thornhill, (1776) 2 Wm. Bl. 1078. 
26
  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex. 341 at  351. 
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utter uncertainty. The calculation would proceed upon 
cont ingencies, and would require knowledge of foreign 
markets to exactness, in point of t ime and value, which 
would sometimes present embarrassing obstacles; much 
would depend upon the length of the voyage, and the 
season of arrival, much upon the vigilance and act ivity of 
the master, and much upon the momentary demand. After 
al l,  i t  would be a calculation upon conjectures, and not upon 
facts; such a rule therefore has been rejected by courts of 
law in ordinary cases, and instead of deciding upon the 
gains or losses of part ies in particular cases, a uniform 
interest has been appl ied as the measure of damages for 
the detent ion of property.’ ” There is much force in that 
admirably constructed passage. We ought to pay al l  due 
homage in this country to the decisions of the American 
Courts upon this important subject, to which they appear to 
have given much careful consideration. The damages here 
are too remote. Several of the cases, which were pr incipally 
rel ied upon by the plainti ffs, are distinguishable. In Waters 
v. Towers,27 there was a special contract to do the work in a 
particular t ime, and the damage occasioned by the non-
completion of the contract was that to which the plaint if fs 
were held to be ent it led.  In Borradaile v. Brunton28 there 
was a direct engagement that the cable should hold the 
anchor. So, in the case of taking away a workman’s tools, 
the natural and necessary consequence is the loss of 
employment: Bodley v. Reynolds.29 The following cases may 
be referred to as decisions upon the principle within which 
the defendants contend that the present case fal ls: Jones v. 
Gooday,30 Walton v. Fothergil l,31 Boyce v. Baylif fe32 and 
                                      
27  Waters v. Towers, (1853) 8 Ex. 401 : 22 L.J. 186 : 155 E.R. 1404. 
28  Borradaile v. Brunton, 20 R.R. 548 (8 Taunt. 535). 
29  Bodley v. Reynolds, 70 R.R. 640 (8 Q.B. 779). 
30  Jones v. Gooday, 58 R.R. 649 (8 M. & W. 146). 
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Archer v. Wil l iams .33 The rule, therefore, that the immediate 
cause is to be regarded in considering the loss, is 
applicable here. There was no special contract between 
these part ies. A carr ier has a certain duty cast upon him by 
law, and that duty is not to be enlarged to an indef inite 
extent in the absence of a special contract, or of fraud or 
malice. The maxim “dolus circuitu non purgatur,” does not 
apply. The question as to how far l iabil ity may be affected 
by reason of malice forming one of the elements to be taken 
into consideration, was treated of by the Court of Queen’s 
Bench in Lumley v. Gye.34 Here the declaration is founded 
upon the defendants’ duty as common carriers, and indeed 
there is no pretence for saying that they entered into a 
special contract to bear al l the consequences of the non-
delivery of the article in quest ion. They were merely bound 
to carry it  safely,  and to del iver it  within a reasonable t ime. 
The duty of the clerk, who was in attendance at the 
defendants’ off ice, was to enter the article, and to take the 
amount of the carriage; but a mere notice to him, such as 
was here given, could not make the defendants, as carr iers, 
l iable as upon a special contract. Such matters, therefore, 
must be rejected f rom the considerat ion of the question. If 
carriers are to be l iable in such a case as this, the exercise 
of a sound judgment would not suff ice, but they 
understood,” said PATTESON, J., in Kel ly v. Part ington,35 
“that the special damage must be the natural result of the 
thing done.” That sentence presents the true test. The Court 
of Queen’s Bench acted upon that rule in Foxall v. Barnett.36 
This therefore is a quest ion of law, and the jury ought to 
                                                                                                 
31  Walton v. Fothergill, (1835) 7 C. & P. 392. 
32  Boyce v. Bayliffe, 1 Camp. 58. 
33  Archer v. Williams, (1846) 2 C.& K. 26. 
34  Lumley v. Gye, 95 R.R. 501 : 2 El. & Bl. 216. 
35  Kelly v. Partington, 5 B. & Ad. 651. 
36  Foxall v. Barnett, 95 R.R. 906 : 2 El. & Bl. 928. 
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have been told that these damages were too remote; and 
that, in the absence of the proof of any other damage, the 
plaint if fs were ent it led to nominal damages37 only: Tindall v. 
Bell.38 Siordet v. Hall39 and De Vaux v. Salvador,40 are 
instances of cases where the Courts appear to have gone 
into the opposite extremes – in the one case of unduly 
favouring the carrier, in the other of holding them liable for 
results which would appear too remote. If  the defendants 
should be held responsible for the damages awarded by the 
jury, they would be in a better posit ion if  they conf ined their 
business to the conveyance of gold. They cannot be 
responsible for results,  which, at the t ime the goods are 
delivered for carriage, are beyond all human foresight.  
Suppose a manufacturer were to contract with a coal  
merchant or mine owner for the delivery of a boat-load of 
coals, no intimation being given that the coals were 
required for immediate use, the vendor in that case would 
not be l iable for the stoppage of the vendee’s business for 
want of the artic le which he had fai led to deliver: for the 
vendor has no knowledge that the goods are not to go to the 
vendee’s general stock. Where the contract ing party is 
shown to be acquainted with al l  the consequences that must 
of necessity fol low from a breach on his part of the contract,  
it  may be reasonable to say that he takes the risk of such 
consequences. If , as between vendor and vendee, this 
species of l iabil i ty has no existence, a fort iori the carrier is  
not to be burthened with it. In cases of personal injury to 
passengers, the damage to which the sufferer has been 
held ent it led is the direct and immediate consequence of 
the wrongful act.   
                                      
37
  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex. 341 at p. 353. 
38  Tindall v. Bell, 63 R.R. 584 : 11 M. & W. 232. 
39  Siordet v. Hall, 29 R.R. 651 : 4 Bing. 607. 
40  De Vaux v. Salvador, 43 R.R. 474 : 4 Ad. & El. 420. 
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The judgment of the COURT was now delivered by 
ALDERSON, B.:  
 
“We think that there ought to be a new trial in this case; but,  
in so doing, we deem it to be expedient41 and necessary to 
state explic it ly the rule which the Judge, at the next tr ial,  
ought,  in our opinion, to direct the jury to be governed by 
when they est imate the damages.   
 
It  is, indeed, of the last importance that we should do this; 
for, if  the jury are left without any def inite rule to guide 
them, if  t i l l,  in such cases as these, manifestly lead to the 
greatest injust ice. The Courts have done this on several  
occasions; and in Blake v. Midland Railway Company,42 the 
Court granted a new tr ial on this very ground, that the rule 
had not been def initely laid down to the jury by the learned 
Judge at Nisi Prius.”  
 
There are certain established rules,” “this Court says, in 
Alder v. Keighley,43 “according to which the jury ought to 
f ind.” And the Court, in that case, adds: “and here there is a 
clear rule, that the amount which would have been received 
if  the contract had been kept, is the measure of damages if 
the contract is broken.” 
 
 Now we think the proper rule in such a case as the present 
is this:  Where two parties have made a contract which one 
of them has broken, the damages which the other party 
ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract 
                                      
41  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex. 341 at p. 354. 
42  Blake v. Midland Railway Company, 88 R.R. 543 : 18 Q.B. 93. 
43  Alder v. Keighley, 71 R.R. 592 : 15 M. & W. 117. 
  
- 404 - 
should be44 either such as may fairly and reasonably be 
considered aris ing natural ly,  i .e. according to the usual 
course of things, from such breach of contract itself , or 
such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the 
contemplation of both part ies, at the t ime they made the 
contract, as the probable result of the breach of it .  Now, if  
the special circumstances under which the contract was 
actually made were communicated by the plaint i ffs to the 
defendants, and thus known to both parties, the damages 
result ing from the breach of such a contract, which they 
would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of 
injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of 
contract under these special circumstances so known and 
communicated. But, on the other hand, i f  these special  
circumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking 
the contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to 
have had in his contemplat ion the amount of injury which 
would arise generally,  and in the great mult i tude of cases 
not affected by any special c ircumstances, from such a 
breach of contract.  For, had the special c ircumstances been 
known, the parties might have specially provided for the 
breach of contract by special terms as to the damages in 
that case; and of this advantage it would be very unjust to 
deprive them. Now the above principles are those by which 
we think, the jury ought to be guided in estimating the 
damages aris ing out of any breach of contract. It is said, 
that other cases, such as breaches of contract in the non-
payment of money, or in the not making a good ti t le to land, 
are to be treated as exceptions from this, and as governed 
by a conventional rule. But as, in such cases, both parties 
must be supposed to be cognisant of that well-known rule, 
these cases may, we think, be more properly classed under 
                                      
44  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex. 341 at p. 355. 
  
- 405 - 
the rule above enunciated as to cases under known special  
circumstances, because there both parties may reasonably 
be presumed to contemplate the est imation of the amount of 
damages according to the conventional rule. Now, in the 
present case, i f  we are to apply the principles above laid 
down, we f ind that the only circumstances here 
communicated by the plaintif fs to the defendants at the t ime 
the contract was made, were, that the art icle to be carr ied 
was the broken shaft of a mill,  and that the plainti ffs were 
the mi llers of that mil l .  But how do these circumstances 
show reasonably that the prof its of the mill  must be stopped 
by an unreasonable delay in the delivery of the broken shaft 
by the carrier to the third person? Suppose the plaintif fs 
had another shaft in their possession put up or putt ing up at 
the t ime, and that they only wished to45 send back the 
broken shaft to the engineer who made it; i t is clear that 
this would be quite consistent with the above 
circumstances, and yet the unreasonable delay in the 
delivery would have no effect upon the intermediate prof its 
of the mil l.  Or, again, suppose that, at the t ime of the 
delivery to the carr ier, the machinery of the mil l had been in 
other respects defective, then also, the same results would 
follow. Here it  is true that the shaft was actually sent back 
to serve as a model for a new one, and that the want of a 
new one was the only cause of the stoppage of the mi ll,  and 
that the loss of prof its really arose from not sending down 
the new shaft in proper t ime, and that this arose from the 
delay in delivering the broken one to serve as a model. But 
it  is obvious that,  in the great mult itude of cases of millers 
sending off  broken shafts to third persons by a carrier under 
ordinary circumstances, such consequences would not,  in 
al l probabil ity, have occurred; and these special  
                                      
45
  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex. 341 at p. 356. 
  
- 406 - 
circumstances were here never communicated by the 
plaint if fs to the defendants. It follows, therefore, that the 
loss of prof its here cannot reasonably be considered such a 
consequence of the breach of contract as could have been 
fair ly and reasonably contemplated by both the part ies when 
they made this contract. For such loss would neither have 
f lowed natural ly from the breach of this contract in the great 
mult itude of such cases occurring under ordinary 
circumstances, nor were the special ci rcumstances, which, 
ordinary circumstances, nor were the special  
circumstances, which, perhaps, would have made i t a 
reasonable and natural consequence of such breach of 
contract, communicated to or known by the defendants. The 
Judge ought, therefore, to have told the jury that, upon the 
facts then before them, they ought not to take the loss of 
prof its into consideration at al l in estimating the damages. 
There must therefore be a new tr ial in this case.  
Rule absolute.”  
    
The Court puts the aforesaid unique concept in very loud 
and clear words, which is popularly known as Remoteness 
of Damages. Constant reference of the said concept in later 
cases make it must that the relevant passage to be quoted 
in as it  is manner. In addit ion to the aforesaid relevant 
paragraph of the judgment, the General Rule upon which 
this was based was enunciated by Alderson B. delivering 
the Court’s judgment, and its great importance and the 
constant reference made to it in later cases require the 
relevant passage to be quoted in full.  The landmark 
passage dictated by Alderson B. runs thus: 
 
“We think the proper rule in such a case as the present is 
this:  where two parties have made a contract which one of 
them has broken, the damages which the other party ought 
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to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be 
such as may fair ly and reasonably be considered ei ther 
aris ing natural ly,  i .e. according to the usual course of 
things, from such breach of contract itself , or such as may 
reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation 
of both parties, at the t ime they made the contract, as the 
probable result of the breach of it .  Now, if  the special  
circumstances under which the contract was actually made 
were communicated by the plaint if fs to the defendants and 
thus known to both part ies, the damages result ing from the 
breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably 
contemplate, would be the amount of injury which would 
ordinari ly fol low from the breach of contract under these 
special circumstances so known and communicated.  But,  
on the other hand, if  these special circumstances were 
wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at 
the most, would only be supposed to have had in his 
contemplation the amount of injury which would arise 
generally, and in the great mult i tude of cases not affected 
by any special circumstances been known the part ies might 
have special ly provided for the breach of contract by special  
terms as to the damages in that case; and of this advantage 
it would be very unjust to deprive them. Now the above 
principles are those by which we think the jury ought to be 
guided in estimating the damages aris ing out of any breach 
of contract.”  
 
Accordingly, the Court rejected the claim on the ground that 
the facts, which the defendants were held, to know were not 
suff icient to “show reasonably that the prof its of the Mill  
must be stopped by an unreasonable delay in the delivery of 
the broken shaft by the carriers to the third person.”   
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The phraseology of the said judgment can be broadly 
divided into three parts. Those three parts are three golden 
rules to measure damages arising out of breach of contract. 
From the above passage itself  we can make out those three 
different situat ions, which provide three golden rules. Those 
rules have been deduced as below: 
 
Damages natural ly ar ising from a breach of contract  
according to the usual course of things are always 
recoverable.  
 
Damages which would not arise in the usual course of 
things from a breach of contract,  but which do arise from 
circumstances peculiar to the special case, are not 
recoverable unless the special c ircumstances are known to 
the person who has broker the contract.  
 
Where the special circumstances are known, or have been 
communicated to the person who breaks the contract, and 
where the damages complained of f lows naturally from the 
breach of the contract in those special circumstances, such 
special damage must be supposed to have been 
contemplated by the part ies to the contract and is 
recoverable.  
  
8.4 DAMAGES NATURALLY ARISING: 
 
The First Rule laid down in Hadley v.  Baxendale.46 
 
Any damages, which are natural ly aris ing out of any breach 
of contract, the same is recoverable by the party who has 
been put to suffer ing from such a breach. As night fol lows 
                                      
46  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex. 341. 
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day, the loss, which arises from the breach of contract, 
must directly f low from it, that seems to be the basic idea of 
using the word ‘natural ly’ by Alderson B. while del ivering 
the landmark judgment. However, there is no test 
prescribed, to judge whether a particular thing is a natural 
result of another. To call  a thing the natural  result  of a 
particular act or omission is to say that it  is produced in the 
normal course of events without the aid of adventit ious 
accidental circumstances. The said word is explained by 
Lord Sumner in his landmark decision of Weld-Blundell v.  
Stephens.47 In very loud and clear though in a very simple 
manner Lord Sumner said, “everything that happens, 
happens in the order of nature, and is, therefore, natural.”  
The only way to approach the question is to see whether 
according to the judgment of a reasonable man a particular 
result would have occurred as a direct consequence of 
which the complaint of a grievance is being made before the 
Court by the aggrieved party in circumstances which are not 
peculiar in themselves. As Pol lock and Mul la has rightly 
pointed out that “the f irst rule in Hadley v. Baxendale is only 
specif icat ion of simple cases under the second, for the 
natural and ordinary consequences of an event are always 
assumed to be in the contemplation of reasonable men and 
it is no excuse for a man to say that he fai led to think 
reasonably or did not think at all .”48  
 
Here it is pertinent to draw an attent ion to thin line 
difference about those cases in which Court held that 
though admittedly the damage is caused to a plaintif f  as a 
direct result  of defendant’s conduct, the plainti f f  should not 
qualify for the compensation. There the Court asked the 
                                      
47  Weld-Blundell v. Stephens, (1920) A.C. 956 at p.984. 
48  C. Kemeshwara Rao, 6th Edition, (2005), Vol.I, p.162, Law of 
Damages and Compensation, Law Publishers (India) Pvt. Ltd.     
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question that what kind of damage is the plaint if f  entit led to 
recover compensation? Damage of the most catastrophic 
and unusual nature may ensue from breach but on practical 
ground the law takes the view that these cases should fall  
under the category where a line must be drawn and the 
plaint if f ’s claim for recovery of damage is required to be 
rejected. In a renowned judgment of Liesbosch Dredger v. 
SS Edison,49 Lord Wright stated the aforesaid concept as 
below:  
 
 “The law cannot take account of everything that fol lows a 
wrongful act;  it  regards some subsequent matters as 
outside the scope of its selection, because ‘i t  were inf inite 
for the law to judge the cause of causes’, or consequences 
of consequences…. In the varied web of affairs the law 
must abstract some consequences as relevant, not perhaps 
on grounds of pure logic, but simply for practical reasons”.  
 
8.5. KNOWLEDGE ABOUT NATURAL OR ORDINARY 
CIRCUMSTANCE:  
 
A person who has suffered loss from a breach of contract 
can certain take any reasonable step that are available to 
mitigate the extent of the damage caused by the breach. 
The innocent party is required to be compensated by the 
party in default for loss, which is really due because of the 
breach committed,  by the other party.  The party committ ing 
a breach is not al lowed to take shelter under the roof of 
words that “he fai led to think reasonably or did not think at 
al l” as the law presumes that the natural and ordinary 
consequences of an event are always assumed to be in the 
contemplation of reasonable prudent men. The simplest 
cases aris ing under the f irst rule are ordinary cases of non-
                                      
49  Liesbosch Dredger v. SS Edison, (1933) A.C. 449 at p. 460. 
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payment of money and non-delivery of goods. In case of 
non-payment of money, the party complaining the breach is 
entit led to be compensation for loss of interest and the 
reasonable expenses of recovering the amount, for the law 
assume that he can obtain the money elsewhere on 
payment of interest. While in the case of non-delivery of 
goods, the plaintif f is expected to go into the market and 
purchase the goods, and, i f  he is to pay a higher pr ice he 
can recover, as compensation the dif ference which he paid 
and the price at which he agreed to purchase as per 
contract agreed upon by the parties.  As the price of 
different art icles varies according to the demands of the 
season, the plaint i ff  may not have suffered any loss if  the 
price he pay be less than the contract pr ice. In both cases, 
therefore, the loss, which arises to the plaint i ff ,  is the 
natural result of the defendant’s breach and it is a loss, 
which the defendant may reasonably be supposed to have 
contemplated. In a landmark decision of Inchbald v. 
Western Neilgherry Coffee Plantation,50 the said concept is 
nicely reanalyzed in the fol lowing words, “the measure of 
general damages is pecuniary dif ference between the state 
of plaintif f  upon the breach of contract and what i t would 
have been if  the contract would have been performed, in 
other words, i t is the value of the performance of the 
plaint if f  and not the cost of the performance to the 
defendant.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
50  Inchbald v. Western Neilgherry Coffee Plantation, (1864) 34 L.J. C.P. 
15; Michael v. Hart & Co., (1902)) 1 K.B. 482; Wigsell v. School for 
Indigent Blind, (1882) 8 Q.B. D. 357 
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8.6  DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES: 
   
The second rule in Hadley v. Baxendale.51 
 
Damages, which are arising out of special c ircumstances, 
are covered under the head of “Special Damages” in the 
second rule in the case of Hadley v. Baxendale. It was 
decided in the very case that the plaint if f  could recover 
damages arising under special c ircumstances if  the special  
circumstances were known to the person who is guilty of the 
breach of contract. This rule clearly states that damages 
which could not arise in usual course of things from the 
breach of contract but which do arise from the 
circumstances peculiar to the special case, are not 
recoverable unless the special c ircumstances are known to 
the person who has committed breach of contract. There 
are four core questions to be answered before the special  
damage claim can be held recoverable, in order to apply the 
second rule which is stated hereinabove. Those four core 
questions are as under:  
 
(1) What are the damages, which actually resulted from 
the breach of contract? 
 
(2) Was the breach of contract made under special 
circumstances and, if  so, what are they? 
 
(3) What, at the t ime of making the contract, was the 
common knowledge of both part ies? And 
 
(4) What may the Court reasonably suppose to have been 
in the contemplation of the part ies as the probably 
                                      
51
  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex. 341. 
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result of a breach of the contract assuming the parties 
to have applied their minds to the cont ingency of there 
being such a breach?52  
 
8.7 KNOWLEDGE ABOUT SPECIAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES: 
 
The rule of legal jurisprudence is that the person must have 
intention or knowledge for the wrong he is committ ing to 
hold him guil ty for that particular wrong. It may be either 
because of commission of the act or omission of the act, 
l ikewise in other act. Here in second rule also “knowledge” 
of the special c ircumstances under which the contact is 
made is must i.e. condit ion sine qua non.  But the mil l ion 
dollar quest ion arises is, whether,  mere knowledge of 
circumstances entai ls, the liabil ity to pay damages which 
arose under those circumstances upon the party who 
commits the breach of the contract agreed between the 
parties?   
 
 In the landmark decision of Brit ish Columbia Saw Mill  Co. 
v. Nettleship,53 Just ice Wills answers this question in the 
most beautiful f rame of mode. Just ice Wills observed, “the 
mere fact of knowledge cannot increase the liabil ity.  
Knowledge must be brought home to the party charged, 
under such circumstances, that he must know that the 
person he contracts which reasonably believes that he 
accepts the contract with the special condit ion attached to 
it. I t may be that the knowledge is acquired casually from a 
stranger, a person to whom the goods below not knowing or 
carrying whether he has such knowledge or not.   
Knowledge, in fact can only be evidence of fraud or of an 
                                      
52  Hammond v. Bussey, (1888) 20 Q.B.D. 79.  
53  British Columbia Saw Mill Co. v. Nettleship, (1868) L.R. 3 C.P. 499 at 
p. 500. 
  
- 414 - 
understanding by both parties that the contract is based 
upon the circumstances which is communicated.”   
 
 There are certain framers of contract who are vigi lant at 
the t ime of draft ing clauses, terms and condit ions of 
contract. Those contracts contain the express clause for 
breach of contract, consequences for breach of contract, 
sometimes more specif ical ly a clause for special damages   
which can be asked for in special circumstances of breach. 
Such cases create no dif f iculty at al l  or l it t le less dif f iculty 
at the t ime of mitigat ing the exact amount of damages for 
breach of contract.  
 
When special circumstances are not expressly provided in 
terms of contract, damages have some times being 
assessed on the basis of an implied knowledge of special  
circumstances, which the defendant may be presumed to 
know. E.g. In a renowned case of Hammond v. Bussey,54 the 
defendant contracted for the sale of  coal of a particular 
description to plainti ffs, knowing that they were purchasing 
such coal for the purpose of reselling it as coal of the same 
description. The coal delivered by the defendant to the 
plaint if fs, which they in turn delivered to the vendees, did 
not answer to the descript ion, but this could not be 
ascertained by inspection of the coal and only became 
apparent after the use by the vendees. The sub-vendees 
brought an action against the plaintif f  for breach of contract.  
Plaint if fs gave notice of act ion against the defendants, who, 
however, repudiated all  l iabil i t ies and insisted that the coal 
was according to the contract.  
 
                                      
54  Hammond v. Bussey, (1888) 20 Q.B.D. 79.  
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The plaint if fs defended the act ion against them, but at the 
trial the coal was found to be not according to contract and 
the sub-vendees accordingly recovered damages from the 
plaint if fs. Plaint if fs thereupon sued the defendant for breach 
of contract, claiming as damages the amount of the 
damages recovered from them and the costs, which had 
been incurred in the former action. Defendant paid the 
amount of the damages in the previous action, but dented 
his l iabil ity in respect of his costs. It was held that the 
defence of the previous act ion being, under the 
circumstances, reasonable, the costs incurred by the 
plaint if fs as defendants in such action were recoverable as 
being damages which might be supposed to have been in 
the contemplation of the parties at the t ime when they made 
the contract as the probable result of  a breach of i t.  It  will  
be observed, that in this case, the rule relating to special  
damages, aris ing from special circumstances, has been 
extended by the Court to the case of a sub-contract not yet 
actually made at the t ime of the contract, but which will  
probably or in the ordinary course of things is sure to be 
made. 
 
8.8 PROBABILITY ONLY DENOTES A CHANCE OF 
HAPPENING OF A THING: 
 
The element of probabili ty involved in the second rule in 
Hadley v. Baxendale,55  has, st il l further, recent ly, been 
extended by the Court of King’s Bench and the Judicial  
Committee of the Privy Council in the under-mentioned 
cases where there is a string of buyers and sellers.56 
Therein, the plaint i ffs were awarded (1) damages recovered 
                                      
55  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854)  9 Exch, 341. 
56  Kashler & Cohen v. Slavouski, (1928) 1 K.B. 78; Hope Prudhomme & 
Co. v. Hamel & Harvey, I.L.R. 49 Mad. 1; Biggin & Co. v. Germanite 
Ltd., (1950) 2 All. E.R. 859, (1951) 2 All. E.R. 191 (C.A.).  
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by the last buyer from the last sel ler,  (2) the costs of both 
sides in the act ion, and (3) a sum in respect of costs 
incurred by al l the intermediate holders including the 
plaint if fs, in connection with the claims made against each 
of them by their respective intermediate purchasers. The 
word “probability” as used in Hammond v. Bussey,57 for 
bringing in the l iabil i ty for special damages must not, under 
the authorit ies be taken to mean that the chances are al l  in 
favour of the event happening. As Lord Dunedin observed, 
“to make a thing probable it is enough, in my view, that 
there is an even chance of its happening”.58 Lord Shaw 
observed in the same case, “I would venture to read that as 
a sub-contract which the ordinary course of business, was 
not l ikely to be made”. Thus, i f  an event is not unlikely to 
happen in the usual course of business it  would come under 
the head of probabi lity.  
 
8.9 DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE KNOWN TO THE  
PARTIES:  
  
 
The third rule in Hadley v. Baxendale.59  
   
I t  may be pointed out that subsequent cases have 
considerably modif ied it to the effect that it  is not enough 
that the party sought to be made l iable should be informed 
that the breach of contract wil l  result in a part icular kind of 
loss.60 I t  must be shown that, on being informed of the 
special circumstances in which the loss wil l be incurred, he 
had entered into the contract subject to that l iabi l ity.  In 
                                      
57  Hammond v. Bussey, (1887) 20 Q. B.D. 79. 
58  R. & H. Hall, Ltd. v. W.H. Pin. (Junior) & Co., (1928) 33 Com. Cas. 324
  
59  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854)  9 Exch, 341. 
60  British Columbia Saw Mill Co. v. Nettleship, (1868) L.R. 3 C.P. 499; 
Horne v. Midland Rly. Co., (1873) L.R.  8 C.P. 131.  
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other words, information or not ice must be given under such 
circumstances as that an actual contract arises on the part 
of the defendant to bear the exceptional loss. Such 
information, however, must be given at the t ime of entering 
into the contract. If  it  be given at a later date, whether it  is 
of circumstances which were contemplated by the party 
giving such information at the date of the contract, or of 
those which arose at a later date, it  is not suff icient to f ix 
the responsibi l i ty of the defendant for that particular loss.61 
 
8.10 LIABILITY FOR SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
WHEN ARISES: 
 
The rule says where the special c ircumstances are known, 
or have been communicated to the person who breaks the 
contract, and where the damage complained of f lows 
natural ly from the breach of contract, under those special  
circumstances, such special damage must be supposed to 
have been contemplated by the parties to the contract and 
is recoverable. It is obvious that this rule goes far beyond 
what law can ever intend. It is possible to contend, that the 
mere fact of the communicat ion of the special  
circumstances attending upon the bargain, makes the 
default ing party l iable for the special consequences unless, 
he consented to undertake such l iabi li ty, on being informed, 
at the t ime of the contract that he would be held answerable 
for them. It wil l be perceived that no one who has entered 
into a contract,  will  agree to enlarge his responsibi l ity 
beyond the natural and ordinary consequences of a breach 
by him, unless upon special terms. It is open to him to 
refuse to enter into the contract at al l,  if  an opt ion is lef t to 
him. In fact, without a contract to that effect, it  would be 
                                      
61  Hydraulic Engineering Co. v. McHaffie, (1878) 84 Q.B.D. 670; Smeed 
v. Ford, (1859) I.E. & E. 602.  
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most inequitable to fasten a l iabi li ty upon him which the law 
would not have implied and the injustice will be al l the more 
great in cases where the party has no opt ion to refuse and 
has no power to st ipulate for special terms.   
 
This view, however, has not found favour with the Court of 
Appeal in England, because “it  cannot be said that damages 
are granted because it is part of the contract that they shall  
be paid, it  is the law which imposes or implies the term that 
upon breach of a contract damages must be paid”.62 I t  is 
clear that part ies do not enter into a second contract to pay 
damages in the event of a breach thereof; they only expect 
that performance will  be made in i ts due t ime, for it  is the 
very thing they contemplate at the t ime of the contract and 
not its probable breach. There may no doubt be cases in 
which the parties to a contract provide for its breach but in 
those cases, the damages wi ll  be st ipulated and need not 
be determined according to the above principles.  
 
But in the subsequent case of Simpson v. London & North 
Western Railway Co.63 the above suggestion was qualif ied to 
this extent that if  the special  circumstances are already 
within the knowledge of the party breaking the contract,  the 
formality of communicating them to him may not be 
necessary.  
 
 The plainti f f was in the habit of exhibit ing samples of his 
implements at catt le shows. He delivered his samples to the 
defendant company for consignment to the show grounds at 
New Cast le. The consignment note said: “must be at New 
Cast le on Monday certain”. But no mention was made of the 
                                      
62
  Hydraulic Engineering Co. v. McHaffie, (1878) 84 Q.B.D. 670. 
63  Simpson v. London & North Western Railway Co., (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 
274.. 
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intention to place the goods in the exhibit ion. On account of  
negligence the goods reached only after the show was over.  
 
But as the company was already aware of the object of 
carrying the goods there, the plaint if f  was al lowed to 
recover not only the loss of freight but also the profits he 
would have made by placing the goods at the show. 
COCKBURN, CJ said: 
 
The principle is now wel l-sett led that,  whenever either the 
object of the sender is special ly brought to the not ice of the 
carrier, or the circumstances are known to the carrier, f rom 
which the object ought in reason to be inferred, so that the 
object may be taken to have been in the contemplation of 
both part ies, damages may be recovered for the natural 
consequences of the failure of that object. 
 
In other case,64 a fragmentiser was purchased by the 
plaint if f  under a hire-purchase agreement. Its rotor broke 
down before normal l ife.  The plaint if f  had no means to 
replace it at cash price. He had to arrange it again at a hire-
purchase price and claimed the same as damages. The 
defendant contended that the plaint if f  had to pay hire-
purchase price because of his lack of means. This 
content ion was rejected. The fact that in the present 
circumstances of economy business has to depend upon 
hire-purchase system was held to be within the 
contemplation of parties.  
  
 
 
                                      
64  B.P. Exploration & Co. v. Hont, (1982) 1 All ER 925 : (1983) 2 A.C. 
352 : (1982) 2 W.L.R. 253, Jaques v. Millar, (1877) 6 Ch D 153.  
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8.11   NO RECOVERY OF SPECIAL DAMAGES WHEN 
SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOT KNOWN 
TO THE PARTIES: 
 
Lack of knowledge of special circumstances once again 
prevented recovery of special damages in Home v. Midland 
Railway Company.65  
 
The plainti ffs, a f irm of shoe manufacturers contracted to 
supply a quantity of shoes to a f irm in London for the use of  
the French army at an unusually high price. The shoes were 
to be delivered by the 3rd of February. The consigned the 
shoes with the defendant rai lway company tel l ing them that 
the consignment must reach by the 3rd, but not that there 
was anything exceptional in the contract. The consignment 
was delayed and the consignee refused to accept it .  The 
plaint if fs had to sell  them in the market at about half  their 
contract price.  
 
In the act ion against the defendants for the delay in 
delivering the shoes, they paid into the court a suff icient 
sum to cover any ordinary loss occasioned thereby, but the 
plaint if fs further claimed the dif ference between the price at 
which they had contracted to sell  the shoes and the price, 
which they ult imately fetched. But it  was held that this was 
a damage of an exceptional nature and it could not be 
supposed to have been in the contemplat ion of the rai lway 
company when it  contracted to convey the goods by the 3rd.  
 
For the same reason loss of profits was not al lowed to be 
recovered in Brit ish Columbia Saw Mill  Co. v. Nett leship.66  
 
                                      
65  Home v. Midland Railway Company, (1873) L.R. 8 C.P. 131. 
66  British Columbia Saw Mill Co. v. Nettleship, (1868) LR 3 CP 499; 18 
LT 604. 
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The parts of a sawmil l  machinery, packed in cases, were 
given to the defendant, a carrier, for carriage to Vancouver. 
One of the cases was lost and consequently a complete mill  
could not be erected and operated. The plaint if f  claimed the 
cost of lost machinery and the prof i ts, which could have 
been earned if  the mill  had been instal led in t ime.   
 
The Court allowed only the cost in Vancouver of the articles 
lost. The loss of profits to be made from the intended use of 
the mil l was held to be too remote. WILLES J gave the 
following il lustrat ion in support of this conclusion: 
 
Take the case of a barrister on his way to practice at the 
Calcutta Bar, where he may have a large number of briefs 
await ing him, through the default of the Peninsular and 
Oriental Company he is detained in Egypt or in the Suez 
boat, and consequently sustains great loss; is the company 
to be responsible for that, because they happened to know 
the purpose for which the traveller was going?67 
 
WILLES J further pointed out that special damages are 
recoverable only when the special purpose of the contract 
“is brought home to the party sought to be charged, under 
such circumstances that he must know that the person he 
contracts with reasonably believes that he accepts the 
contract with the special condit ion attached to i t.68  
                                      
67  Kadappa Mudaliar v. Muthuswami Ayyar, (1926) 50 Mad 94 : AIR 
1927 Mad 99.  
68  Similarly, in Dominion of India v. All India Reporter Ltd., AIR 1952 Nag 
32, loss by railways of three volumes of a set of books without which 
the set became useless, recovery allowed only for the lost volumes, 
the goods were described only as a bundle of books without any 
indication of the importance of a volume. In Hydraulic Engg. Co. v. 
McHaffie, (1878) 4 QBD  670, the defendant failed to supply an 
essential part of a machine about which he knew that his buyer was 
under a contract to supply to a third party, he was held liable for the 
plaintiff’s loss of profit. 
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Three golden rules for determining the liabil ity: 
 
In Mayne on Damages,69 af ter an examinat ion of the 
authorit ies, the following rules have been substituted in the 
place of the third rule in Hadley v. Baxendale:70  
 
(1) Where special circumstances connected with a 
contract may cause special damage if  it  is broken, 
mere notice of such special  ci rcumstances given to 
one party will  not render him liable for the special 
damage, unless it can be inferred that he consented to 
be l iable for such special damage. 
 
(2) Whether a person with knowledge or not ice of special  
circumstances might refuse to enter into contract,  or 
might demand a higher remunerat ion for entering into 
it, the fact that he accepts the contract without 
requiring any higher rate will  be evidence, though not 
conclusive evidence, that he had accepted the 
addit ional r isk in case of breach.  
 
(3) Whether the defendant has no opt ion of refusing the 
contract, and is not at l iberty to require a higher rate 
of remunerat ion, the fact that he proceeded with the 
contract after knowledge or not ice of special  
circumstances is not a fact from which an undertaking 
to incur a l iabi l i ty for special damages can be 
incurred. 
 
                                      
69  Mayne, 10th Ed., p. 36; Law of Damages, Paula Lee Ltd. v. Robert 
Zehil and Ltd., (1983) 2 All. E.R. 390 (Q.B.D.).  
70
  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854)  9 Exch, 341. 
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The authorit ies, relied upon in Mayne’s work for deducing 
the above three rules are the under mentioned cases which 
Courts shall have occasion to discuss in their relat ion to the 
il lustrations given to Sec.73 of the Indian Contract Act. 71 
 
8.12 THE RULE RESTATED IN VICTORIA LAUNDRY v. 
NEWMAN:72 
 
In Victoria Laundry v. Newman  the plaintif fs, launderers and 
dyers, claimed successfully for loss of general  business 
prof its aris ing from the defendant’s delay in delivering a 
boiler he had sold to them, the defendant being aware of 
the nature of the plaint if f ’s business and that they intended 
to put the boi ler into use in the shortest possible t ime. In 
granting these damages the Court of Appeal restated the 
principles as laid down in Hadley v. Baxendale,73 and the 
relevant passage from the judgment of the court, delivered 
by Asquith L.J., puts the matter so clearly that it  deserves 
full  quotat ion. In the view of the court the proposit ions, 
which emerged from the authorit ies as a whole, were these:  
 
“(1) It is well sett led that the governing purpose of 
damages is to put the party whose rights have been violated 
in the same posit ion, so far as money can do so, as if  his 
rights had been observed. This purpose, if  relent lessly 
pursued, would provide him with a complete indemnity for 
al l loss de facto result ing from a particular breach, however, 
improbable, however unpredictable. This, in contract at 
least, is recognized as too harsh a rule. Hence, 
                                      
71  British Columbia Saw Mill Co. v. Nettleship, (1868) L.R. 3 C.P. 499; 
Horne v. Midland Rly. Co., (1873) L.R.  8 C.P. 131; Elbinger Actien 
Gescllschaft v. Armstrong, (1874) L.R. 9 Q.B. 473; Simpson v. London 
North Western Rly. Co., (1876) 1 Q.B. 274. 
72
  Victoria Laundry V. Newman, (1949) 2 K.B. 528, C.A. 
73  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854)  9 Exch, 341. 
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(2) In cases of breach of contract the aggrieved party is 
only ent it led to recover such part  of the loss actually 
result ing as was at the t ime of the contract reasonably 
foreseeable as l iable to result f rom the breach. 
 
(3) What was at that t ime reasonably so foreseeable 
depends on the knowledge then possessed by the part ies, 
or , at  al l  events, by the party who later commits the 
breach. 
 
(4) For this purpose, knowledge `possessed’ is of two 
kinds; one imputed, the other actual. Everyone, as a 
reasonable person, is taken to know the `ordinary course of 
things’ and consequently what loss is l iable to result  f rom a 
breach of contract in that ordinary course. This is the 
subject matter of the `f irst rule’ in Hadley v. Baxendale.74 
But to this knowledge, which a contract-breaker is assumed 
to possess whether he actually possesses it or not, there 
may have to be added in a particular case knowledge which 
he actually possesses, of special circumstances outside the 
`ordinary course of things, ’ of  such a kind that a breach in 
those special c ircumstances would be l iable to cause more 
loss. Such a case attracts the operat ion of the `second rule’  
so as to make addit ional loss also recoverable.  
 
(5) In order to make the contract-breaker l iable under 
either rule i t is not necessary that he should actually have 
asked himself  what loss is l iable to result from a breach. As 
has often been pointed out, part ies at the t ime of 
contracting contemplate not the breach of the contract, but 
its performance. It  suff ices that, i f  he had considered the 
                                      
74  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854)  9 Exch, 341. 
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question, he would as a reasonable man have concluded 
that the loss in question was liable to result.  
 
(6) Nor, f inally, to make a part icular loss recoverable, 
need it be provided that upon a given state of knowledge 
the defendant could, as a reasonable man, foresee that t 
breach must necessari ly result in that loss. It is enough … if 
he could foresee it was l ikely so to result. It  is indeed 
enough if  the loss (or some factor without which it would not 
have occurred) is a `serious possibil i ty’ or a `real danger.’  
For short,  we have used the word ` liable’ to result.  Possibly 
the colloquialism `on the cards’ indicates the shade of 
meaning with some approach to accuracy.”75 
 
There are two factors in this lucid restatement of pr inciple, 
which stand out. The f irst is that the test of the extent of 
l iabil i ty is reasonable foresseabil ity,  as stated in the second 
proposit ion and further def ined in the f if th and sixth 
proposit ions. The second is that what is reasonably 
foreseeable depends upon knowledge, actual or imputed, as 
stated in the third proposit ion and further def ined in the 
fourth proposition. However, before considering these 
important criteria in detai l,  it  is necessary to look at the 
qualif icat ions introduced on the f irst of them by the House 
of Lords in Czarnikow v. Koufos.   
 
8.13 THE RESTATED RULE QUALIFIED IN 
CAZRNIKOW v. KOUFOS: 76 
 
In Czarnikow v. Koufos  where the House of Lords upheld 
the claim of charterers to recover for the shipowner’s late 
delivery of a consignment of sugar the dif ference between 
                                      
75  Victoria Laundry V. Newman, (1949) 2 K.B. 528, C.A. 
76  Czarnikow v. Koufos, (1969) 1 A.C. 350. 
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the market prices of sugar at due delivery and at actual  
delivery, their Lordships subjected to a thorough 
examination Asquith L.J.’s restatement of pr inciple in 
Victoria Laundry V. Newman ,  expressing “varying degrees 
of enthusiasm” for i t.77 Lord Reid was particularly critical. 
His main attack was on Asquith L.J. ’s use of the test of 
reasonable foreseeabili ty. “To bring in reasonable 
foreseeabili ty “, he said “appears to me to be confusing 
measure of damages in contract with measure of damages”. 
Lord Reid was satisf ied that for contract the court in Hadley 
v. Baxendale:78  
 
“Did not intend that every type of damage which was 
reasonably foreseeable by the parties when the contract 
was made should either be considered as arising naturally,  
i.e. in the usual course of things, or be supposed to have 
been in the contemplation of the part ies. Indeed the 
decision makes it clear that a type of damage which was 
plainly foreseeable as a real possibi l ity but which would 
only occur in a small minority of cases cannot be regarded 
as aris ing in the usual course of things or be supposed to 
have been in the contemplation of the parties: the parties 
are not supposed to contemplate as grounds for the 
recovery of damage any type of loss or damage which on 
the knowledge available to the defendant would appear to 
him as only l ikely to occur in a small minority of cases.” 
 
Accordingly, in Lord Reid’s opinion, the proper test is 
whether the loss in question is: 
 
“Of a kind which the defendant,  when he made the contract, 
ought to have realized was not unl ikely to result  f rom the 
                                      
77  Aruna Mills v. Dhanrajmal Gobindram, (1968) 1 Q.B. 655 at 668. 
78  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854)  9 Exch, 341. 
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breach…the words `not unl ikely’… denoting a degree of 
probabili ty considerably less than an even chance but 
nevertheless not very unusual and easily foreseeable”. 
 
Having formulated the test in this way, Lord Reid then 
proceeded to jett ison al l of  the related phrases, which 
Asquith L.J. had introduced in his restatement. He took 
exception to “l iable to result” because he thought that “one 
would usual ly say that when a person foresees a very 
improbable result he foresees that it  is l iable to happen”, he 
considered that: 
 
“In the ordinary use of language there is a wide gulf  
between saying that some event is not unlikely or quite 
likely to happen and saying merely that it  is a serious 
possibi l ity, a real danger, or on the cards”. 
 
While far less sweeping in their condemnation of Asquith 
L.J.’s terminology the rest of Their Lordships basically 
agreed with Lord Reid’s analysis.  Thus Lord Upjohn 
specif ically agreed that the terminology of reasonable 
foreseeabili ty was to be avoided, for the assessment of 
damages as between contracting part ies “should depend on 
their assumed common knowledge and contemplation and 
not on a foreseeable but most unlikely consequence”; the 
others in effect accepted that the kinds of loss for which 
recovery is to be al lowed are those which are not unlikely to 
result f rom breach, much rel iance being placed on the 
House’s earl ier decision in Hall v. Pim79 which, as Lord Reid 
right ly said: 
 
                                      
79  Hall v. Pim, (1928) 33 Com.Cas. 324, H.L. 
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“Must be taken to have established that damages are not to 
be regarded as too remote merely because, on the 
knowledge available to the defendant when the contract was 
made, the chance of the occurrence of the event which 
cause the damage would have appeared to him to be rather 
less than an even chance.”80  
 
At the same time, while Their Lordships were unanimous in 
rejecting the colloquial ism “on the cards” as far too 
imprecise and even “capable of denoting a most improbable 
and unlikely event”, the expression “a serious possibil i ty” 
and “a real danger” commended themselves to the majority 
of the House as correct ly giving the required shade of 
meaning. “Liable to result” was generally regarded as a 
convenient, innocuous phrase, which did not really advance 
the matter further. (Lord Pearce thought the words 
“ambiguous” but “useful as shorthand for a collect ion of 
definable ideas”. Lord Hudson thought the expression 
“colourless” but one on which he did “not f ind it possible to 
improve”. ) 
 
Yet it  is fair to say that, taken as a whole, Asquith L.J.’s 
careful restatement in Victoria Laundry V. Newman,81 has 
survived the various str ictures appearing in Their Lordship’s 
speeches. For Lord Morris, Asquith L.J.’s “i l luminat ing 
judgment” was “a most valuable analysis” of the Hadley v. 
Baxendale,82 rule; for Lord Pearce, it  was “a justif iable and 
valuable clarif ication of the principles which Hadley v. 
Baxendale was intending to express. Donaldson J. In Aruna 
Mills v. Dhanrajmal Gobindram83 expressed the opinion that,  
                                      
80  Czarnikow v. Koufos, (1969) 1 A.C. 350. 
81  Victoria Laundry V. Newman, (1949) 2 K.B. 528, C.A. 
82  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854)  9 Exch, 341. 
83  Aruna Mills v. Dhanrajmal Gobindram, (1968) 1 Q.B. 655. 
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subject to two qualif ications introduced by Their Lordships,  
namely the minor one of the rejection of the colloquial ism 
“on the cards” and the major one that the references to 
losses as being reasonably foreseeable should now be read 
as referring to losses as having been in the parties’  
contemplation, Victoria Laundry v. Newman,84 “remained 
unimpaired as the classic authority on the topic” of 
remoteness in contract. Certainly, no doubts were cast upon 
Asquith L.J.’s second cr iterion, that l iabi l ity depends upon 
actual or imputed knowledge, and even the object ion to his 
f irst cr iter ion of reasonable foreseeabil i ty was really that i t  
was l iable to be misunderstood rather than that it  was 
necessari ly wrong, for Lord Reid admitted that, in using the 
phrase “, reasonably foreseeable”,  Asquith L.J. may well 
have meant foreseeable as a l ikely result. Indeed, as Lord 
Upjohn pointed out,  
 
“As a matter of language there wil l in many cases be no 
great dif ference between foreseeing the possibil ity of an 
event happening and contemplating the possibil i ty of that 
event happening and in some of the cases, from Blackburn 
j. in Cory v. Thames Ironworks Co.85 onwards the word 
foresee or foreseeable is used in connection with contract”.  
 
8.14 CONCLUSION: 
 
 
To this end Hadley v. Baxendale  def ines the kind of damage 
i.e. appropriate subject of damages and excluded al l other 
kinds as being too remote. The decision was concerned 
solely with what is correct ly called remoteness of damage, 
and it wi ll conduce to clarity if  this expression is reserved 
for cases wherein the defendant denies l iabi l ity for certain 
                                      
84  Victoria Laundry v. Newman, (1949) 2 K.B. 528, C.A. 
85  Cory v. Thames Ironworks Co., (1968) L.R. 3 Q.B. 181. 
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consequences that have fol lowed from his breach. The other 
question is which must be kept quite dist inct from the 
aforesaid, concerns the principle upon which damage could 
be evaluated or quantif ied in terms of money. This may 
appropriately be called the quest ion of measurement of 
damages. The principle adopted by the Courts in many 
cases dating back to at least 1848 is that of rest itut io in 
integrum.  If  the plaintif f  has suffered damage that is not too 
remote, he must, so far as money can do it, be restored the 
posit ion he would have been in had that particular damage 
not occurred. From the aforesaid discussion, it  is now 
crystal clear that what is awarded under heading of 
damages for breach of contract is, what is to be the loss 
which the plaintif f  has suffered and not the prof it  which the 
defendant has made. 
 
However, the phraseology of the judgment of Hadley v. 
Baxendale86 has been crit icized on many occasions, most 
particularly the expression “arising natural ly” and “probable 
consequences” by Lord Sumner in Weld-Blundell v.  
Stephens.87   
 
The term “direct consequences” achieved a certain vogue in 
contract, but this term is only properly applicable to 
causation aspect of remoteness. Indeed, may of the 
suggested alternat ives have themselves been crit icized. 
Also there was a tendency that f irst to regard the rule 
established by the judgment as three rules, and then as two 
rules, the f irst deal ing with the ordinary case and the 
second dealing with the case where there were known 
special circumstances. These two factors, namely the 
                                      
86  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854)  9 Exch, 341. 
87  Weld-Blundell v. Stephens, (1920) A.C. 956 at 983.  
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abundance of phraseology and the breakdown of the rule 
into parts, led to confusion, and a restatement of the rule 
for modern condit ions became a real need. This restatement 
came with the Court of Appeal decision in 1949 in Victoria 
Laundry V. Newman,88 so that today the intervening 
discussions of phraseology and classif icat ions of the rule 
are only a matter of history.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
88  Victoria Laundry V. Newman, (1949) 2 K.B. 528, C.A. 
 CHAPTER - IX 
 
 
KINDS  OF DAMAGES 
 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION:   
    
 
Although categorizat ion into types is dif f icult  in the case of 
f inancial loss, loss of ordinary business or prof it  is dif ferent.  
From loss fall ing from a part icular contract, which gives r ise 
to very high prof its whereas non-writ ing loss sees of a fair 
large magnitude than any contemplated work of the same 
type as those foreseeable. In the context of physical injury 
it is established that the word 'damage' refers to the type of 
damage in quest ion; it  is not necessary for a plaintif f  to go 
further and show contemplation of the exact nature of the 
damage that has arisen, or the amount of damage of the 
type or kind. Although it has been said that the same 
principles apply to cases of loss of prof it,1 so this is dif f icult  
to reconcile with the decision of the Court of Appeal in the 
Victoria Laundry case2 in which the 'ordinary' loss of prof its 
were recovered but not that from the highly lucrative 
Ministry of Supply contracts.3 
 
 
                                      
1  Parsons (H.) Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co. Ltd., (1978) Q.B. 
791, Wroth v. Tyler (1974) Ch.30, Transworld Oil Ltd. V. North Bay 
S.S. Cpn. (1987) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 173, Brown v. K.M.R. Services Ltd. 
(1994) 4 All E.R. 385,Homsy v. Murphy (1997) 73 P. & C.R. 26.  
2  Victoria Laundry V. Newman, (1949) 2 K.B. 528, C.A. 
3  Islamic  Republic of Iran S.S. Lines v. Ierax S.S. Co. of Panama 
(1991) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 81, Brown v. K.M. R. Services Ltd. (1995) 4 All 
E.R. 598.    
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9.2 NATURE OF DAMAGES: 
 
9.2.1 Damages Arising in Usual Course of Things:  
 
I t  wil l now be convenient to examine separately the 
operation of each branch of the rule, in view of the fact that 
each covers a dif ferent degree of knowledge possessed by 
the contract ing parties. The first branch of the rule in Hadley 
v. Baxendale 4 deals with such damage as may fair ly and 
reasonably be considered arising natural ly, i .e., according 
to the usual course of things, from the breach of contract, 
as the probable result of the breach. It  depends, as we have 
seen, on the knowledge which the parties are presumed to 
possess and the scope of the contractual  duty undertaken.5  
 
( I)   Normal business position of parties: 
 
Damages wil l not be too remote if  they f low from the normal 
business posit ion of the part ies, for the Court wi ll assume 
that this is known to both of them. In Monarch Steamship Co. 
Ltd. v. Karlshamns Oljefabriker (AIB),6 the facts of which are 
summarized, as a result of the diversion of the delayed 
vessel to Glasgow the purchasers of the cargo of soya 
incurred expenses in having them forwarded to the 
contractual dest ination in Sweden.  
 
 
 
                                      
4  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854)  9 Exch, 341. 
5  South Australia Asset Management Co. v. York Montague Ltd. (1997) 
A.C. 191.  
6  Monarch Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Karlshamns Oljefabriker (AIB), (1949) 
A.C. 196.  
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The House of Lords held that the purchasers were ent it led 
to recover this cost. Lord Wright pointed out that the 
question in al l  such cases must always be 'what reasonable 
business men must be taken to have contemplated as the 
natural or probable result i f  the contract was broken. As 
reasonable business men each must be taken to understand 
the ordinary practices and exigencies of the other's trade or 
business'.7 In this case, the possibi l i ty of war must have 
been present in the minds of the parties, and experienced 
business people would know that one of the risks that would 
be consequent upon prolongation of the voyage at that t ime 
would be the diversion of the vessel by the order of the 
Admiralty. The cost of transshipment was therefore not too 
remote a consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship.  
 
( II )   Market fluctuations:  
 
The Sale of Goods Act 1979 contains statutory provisions 
for the assessment of damages for breach of a contract of 
sale, which are founded on the f irst  branch of the rule in 
Hadley v.  Baxendale.8 But the f irst branch of the rule applies 
where the seller fails to deliver or is late in delivering what 
is on the face of it  obviously a prof it-earning chattel, for 
instance, a merchant or passenger ship, or some essential  
part of such a ship.9 In such cases the party injured will  be 
entit led to recover the loss of prof it, which might reasonably 
be expected to arise if  the contract were broken.10 
 
                                      
7  Bulk Oil v. Sun International. (1984) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 531.  
8  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854)  9 Exch, 341. 
9  Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd. v. Newman  Industries Ltd. (1949) 2 
K.B. 528, Fletcher v. Tayleur (1855) 17 C.B. 21; Saint Lines v. 
Richardsons Westgarth & Co. (1940) 2 K.B. 99.  
10  Cory v. Thames Ironworks & S.S. Co., (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B.  181; Fyffes 
Group Ltd. v. Reefer Express Lines Pty Ltd.; (1996) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
171.  
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In contracts for the carriage of goods, if ,  by default of a 
carrier, the goods which he has contracted to deliver are 
lost or delayed in transit, certain loss wil l ordinari ly be 
assumed to have been suffered by the consignee as the 
natural and probable result of the breach. In the case of 
loss, the normal measure of damages is the market value of 
the goods at the t ime when they ought to have arr ived, less 
the freight payable on safe delivery.11 In the case of delay in 
delivering the goods, it  is the dif ference between the market  
value of the goods on the day on which they ought to have 
arrived and their market value on the day on which they did 
arrive.12 Thus, in Koufos v. C. Czarnikow Ltd.:13 
 
The respondent, a sugar merchant, chartered the ship 
Heron I I f rom the appellant to carry a cargo of sugar from 
Con stanza to Basrah.  The ship deviated without authority 
from the agreed voyage, with the result that the cargo was 
delayed. Owing to a fall in the market for sugar at Basrah,  
the respondent obtained £3,800 less for the sugar than the 
price obtainable when it should have been delivered. 
 
The appellant contended that he was not l iable for this sum 
as he had no special knowledge of the seasonal and other 
f luctuat ions of the sugar market. But the House of Lords 
held that a ship owner must be presumed to know that 
prices in a commodity market were l iable to f luctuate, and 
judgment was given against him. 
( II I )  Exceptional loss not covered: 
 
                                      
11  Rodocanachi v. Milburn, (1886) 18 Q.B.D. 67.  
12  Wilson v. Lancs. & Yorks. Ry. (1861) 9 C.B.N.S. 632. 
13  Koufos v. C.  Czarnikow Ltd.,  (1969) 1 A.C. 350. 
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On the other hand, the f irst branch of the rule in Hadley v. 
Baxendale14 does not cover losses, which are the 
consequence of special facts not known to the party in 
default at the t ime the agreement was made. In Hadley v. 
Baxendale i tself , the plaint if fs were unable to recover 
damages aris ing from the fact that they had only one shaft,  
and in Victoria Laundry15 they were unable to recover in 
respect of the exceptionally lucrative Ministry of Supply 
contracts because information about those facts had not 
been conveyed to the defendants. Again in Brit ish Columbia 
etc. Saw-Mil l  Co. Ltd. v. Nettleship16 
 
A number of cases of machinery intended for the erection of 
a sawmil l at Vancouver were shipped on the defendant 's 
vessel. The defendant fai led to deliver one of the cases, but 
was unaware of the fact that i t contained a material part  
without which the sawmill  could not be erected at al l.  The 
plaint if f  claimed the cost of replacing the lost parts, and the 
loss incurred by the stoppage of i ts works during the time 
that the rest of the machinery remained useless owing to 
the absence of the lost parts. 
 
It was held that the measure of damages was the cost of 
replacing the lost machinery at Vancouver only, and the 
Court said:  
 
“The defendant is a carr ier, and not a manufacturer of 
goods supplied for a particular purpose ...  He is not to be 
made liable for damages beyond what may fair ly be 
presumed to have been contemplated by the part ies at the 
                                      
14  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854)  9 Exch, 341. 
15  Victoria Laundry V. Newman, (1949) 2 K.B. 528, C.A. 
16  Brit ish Columbia etc . Saw-Mi l l  Co. L td. v. Nett leship ,  
(1868) L.R. 3 C.P. 499. 
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t ime of entering into the contract. It must be something 
which could have been foreseen and reasonably expected, 
and to which he assented expressly or impliedly by entering 
into the contract.” 
 
This principle wil l  exclude the recovery of damages in 
respect of loss of prof it on actual or contemplated forward 
contracts where the carrier has no actual or imputed 
knowledge of these at the t ime of the contract. The loss of  
prof it on such sales is too remote. An i l lustration is provided 
by Horne v. Midland Rai lway Company.17  
 
The plaintif f  being under contract to deliver mil itary shoes in 
London for the French army at an unusually high price by a 
particular day, delivered them to the defendant to be car-
ried, with not ice of the contract only as to the date of 
delivery. The shoes were delayed in carriage, and were 
consequently rejected by the intending purchasers. The 
plaint if f  sought to recover, in addit ion to the ordinary loss 
for delay, the difference between the price at which the 
shoes were actually sold and the high price at which they 
would have been sold if  they had been punctually delivered.  
 
It was held that this damage was not recoverable unless it  
could be proved that the company was informed of the 
exceptional loss, which the plaintif f might suffer from an 
unpunctual delivery. Again, it  has been held that a person 
who contracts to purchase land intending to resell  i t  to an 
identif ied sub-purchaser at a profit wil l not be able to 
recover in respect of the loss of the sub-sale where the 
seller does not know of the purchaser's intent ion and 
purpose and the consequent exposure of the seller to the 
                                      
17  Horne v. Midland Railway Company, (1873) L.R. 8 C.P. 131. 
Heskell v. Continental Express (1950)  1 All E.R. 1033. 
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risk of such damage in the event of breach.18  
 
( IV)  Immaterial that breach not contemplated:  
 
I t  is,  however, immaterial that the breach was of a type not 
reasonably to be ant ic ipated, for the parties natural ly 
contemplate performance and not breach. Thus, in Banco 
de Portugal v. Waterlow &  Sons Ltd.:19 
 
W & Co. agreed to pr int for the Bank of  Portugal a quantity 
of  Portuguese banknotes of  a part icular type. They 
negligent ly del ivered to one M, the head of an internat ional 
band of cr iminals, some 580,000 of  these notes, and these 
were subsequently put into circulat ion in Portugal. Upon 
discovery of  the f raud, the Bank issued not ices 
withdrawing from circulat ion al1 notes of  that  type,  and 
undertook to exchange them for other notes. The Bank 
then brought an act ion against W & Co. claiming as 
damages for breach of contract the value of  the notes 
exchanged, and the cost of pr int ing the genuine notes 
withdrawn.   
 
I t  was held by a major ity of  the House of  Lords that these 
losses were recoverable. The damage suf fered, al though 
the result  of a breach which could scarcely be said to have 
been in the contemplat ion of  the parties at the t ime they 
made the contract,  was nevertheless to be considered as 
f lowing f rom the business posi t ions of  the parties and 
ar is ing natural ly f rom the breach.  
 
9.2.2 Damage in contemplation of the parties:  
                                      
18  Seven Seas Properties v. Al Essa (No.2), (1993) 3  All E.R. 577.  
19  Banco de Portugal v. Water low &  Sons Ltd.  (1932) A.C. 
452.   
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This deals with such damage as may reasonably be 
supposed to have been in the contemplat ion of  both 
part ies, at the t ime they made the contract,  as the 
probable result of the breach of  i t .   
 
As we have seen, the appl icat ion of  this second branch of 
the rule depends upon the knowledge, which the contract-
breaker possesses at the t ime of the contract,  of  special 
c ircumstances, outside the 'ordinary course of  things',  of  
such a k ind that  a breach in those ci rcumstances wi l l  
cause more loss. I t  is well i l lust rated by Simpson v . London 
and North Western Rai lway Company:20 
 
The plaint i f f ,  a manufacturer,  was in the habit  of  sending 
specimens of  his goods for exhibit ion to agricultural shows.  
After exhibit ing in a show at Bedford,  he entrusted some of 
his  samples to an agent of the defendant company for  
carr iage to a show-ground at  Newcast le. On the 
consignment note he wrote: ' l \1ust be at Newcast le Monday 
certain'.  Owing to a default  on the part  of the company, the 
samples arr ived late for the Newcast le show. The plaint i f f  
therefore claimed damages for his loss of  prof its at the 
show. I t  was held that the company was l iable. The 
company's agent had knowledge of  the special  
c ircumstances, that the goods were to be exhibited at the 
Newcast le show, and so should have contemplated that a 
delay in delivery might resul t in th is loss.  
 
I t  is usual ly said that 'bare knowledge' of  the special  
c ircumstances surrounding the contract  is suf f icient  to 
                                      
20  Simpson v . London and North Western Railway Company, 
(1876) 1 Q.B.D. 274. 
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make the contract-breaker l iable.21 But there is some 
authori ty for the v iew that,  in addit ion, the contract-breaker 
should either expressly or impl iedly has contracted to 
assume l iabil i ty for the exceptional loss. On this view, the 
mere communicat ion to a party of  the existence of  special 
c ircumstances is  not enough: there must be something to 
show that the contract was made on the terms that the 
defendant was to be l iable for that loss.22  
 
This view cannot  be supported. No doubt a casual 
int imation would not suf f ice, for the special c ircumstances 
must be disclosed in such a manner as to render i t  a fair  
inference of  fact that both part ies contemplated the 
exceptional loss as a probable result  of the breach. Thus,  
in Kemp v. Intasun Hol idays Ltd. :23  
 
While booking a holiday Mrs K remarked to the travel agent 
that her husband was not present because he was 
suf fering, as he sometimes did, f rom an asthma attack. In 
breach of  contract  Mr and Mrs K were accommodated for 
the f irst  30 hours of  their hol iday in a f i l thy and dusty room 
in an inferior hotel  and Mr.  K had an asthma attack 
throughout the per iod. The tria l judge awarded Mr. K inter  
al ia £800 for the consequences of  having suf fered an 
asthma attack due to the state of  the alternat ive 
accommodation. 
 
                                      
21  Patrick v. Russo- British Grain Export Co. Ltd., (1972) 2 K.B. 535.  
22  British Columbia etc. Saw-Mill Co. ltd. v. Nettleship (1868) L.R. 3 C.P. 
499,; Horne v. Midland Ry. (1873)  L.R. 8 C.P. 131,; Victoria  Laundry 
(Windsor Ltd.)  v. Newman Industries Ltd. (1949) 2 K.B. 528,;  Seven 
Seas Properties v. Al Essa (No 2), (1993) 1 W.L.R. 1083, Hadley v. 
Baxendale, (1854)  9 Exch, 341.  
23  Kemp v.  In tasun Hol idays Ltd. ,  (1987) 2 F.T. L.R. 234. 
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I t  was held by the Court of  Appeal that this casual remark 
did not suff ice to give the defendant the necessary degree 
of  knowledge of  specia l ci rcumstances to make the 
defendant responsible for the consequences of  the asthma 
attack he had suf fered. What is necessary to enlarge the 
area of  contemplat ion is that the special c i rcumstances 
should be brought home to the party.24 But i t  is  
unnecessary that i t  should be a term of  the contract that 
the defendant is to be l iable for that loss.25 
 
9.3 KINDS OF DAMAGES:  
   
After deciding the nature of  damages, i t  becomes 
reasonably easy or af fordable for the Jur ies, Courts  or 
decis ion making authorit ies to award damage under the 
head of a part icular type or kind of damage. The damages 
of  fol lowing al l  the dif ferent types are recognized and 
awarded as wel l by the England and nat ive Courts. More or  
less, the al l  types of  damages are div ided into the 
fol lowing four broad categories: 
 
(e) General  Damages.  
( f)  Special Damages. 
(g) Nominal Damages.  
(h) Exemplary Damages. 
 
9.3.1 General Damages:  
    
The term “General  Damages” has been interpreted by the 
Indian Courts  and the English Courts in var ious ways. The 
purpose of  awarding general damages is measured by 
which the loss can be assessed except the opin ion and the 
                                      
24  Heywood v.  Wellers (1976) 1 Q.B.  446.  
25  Koufos v. C Czarnikov Ltd., (1969) 1 A.C.  350.  
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judgment of  a reasonable man and which can be said to be 
based on assessment of the damages, which can be based 
on pract ical aspect.26 The Engl ish Court Divis ion Bench 
has in the year 1963 in the case of  Charter-house Credit v.  
Tol ley ,27 held that  assessment of  damages has never been 
an exact science.  I t  is essent ial ly pract ical.  As early as 
1880, the English Court in Marzelt i  vs. Wil l iams28 held that  
general damages are those damages which the law wil l  
presume in case of  breach of contract which would arise 
out of  direct,  natural ly,  or probable consequences of  Act 
which has been complained of .29 Al l  these judgements 
when analyzed would lead to the pr inciple that general  
damages are dist inct f rom special damages and general or 
nominal damages can be given if  the plaint i f f  is unable to 
prove the exact  quantum of loss, then he would be ent i t led 
to e ither nominal damage or he may be precluded f rom 
recovering general  or ordinary damages. The law now is  
sett led that general damages have to be awarded in 
respect of injury to the plaint i f f  out of the breach of 
contract.  I t  may even include loss of future income pain 
and suf fer ing.  The term general damages also takes within 
i t  purview damages at  large.  This expression is  based on 
law of  pract ical  compensation for  the injury caused. I f  the 
plaint i f f  proves that the result  of  breach of  the contract is 
such which has caused some wrong then the Court would 
award damages. I t  would be necessary to give proof of  
damages but normally this is given for wrongful act or 
under the breach or  where a person malic iously induces 
other person to break their business, such damages have 
                                      
26  Union of India v. M/s. Commercial Metal Corporation; AIR 1982 Delhi 
267.  
27  Charter-house Credit v. Tolley (1963) 2 Q.B. 683, 711.  
28  Marzelti v. Williams, (1880) 1 B & Ad. 415.  
29  Ashby v. White; (1703) 2 Ld. Raym, 938; Stroms Brucks Aktie v. 
Hutchinson, (1905) A.C. 515. 
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been awarded or can be awarded. Thus in short,  general  
damages are awardable for non-pecuniary loss and it  
inc ludes several  elements, which would include: 
 
[A] Damages for mental and physical shock, pain,  
suf fer ing, already suffered by the cla imant or l ikely to 
suf fer in future, 
 
[B] Damages for the loss of expectat ion of  l i fe,30 that is  
the normal longevity of  the person concerned is a 
shortened on account of  injury. 
 
[C] Damages to compensate for the loss of  amenit ies of  
l i fe that may inc lude a pattern (variety) of matters, 
that is,  the claimant may not be able to walk, sit ,  run 
or loss of  marr iage prospects, disf igurement, Sexual  
inter course, and loss of  other amenit ies in l i fe on 
account of  in jury.  
 
[D] Inconvenience, hardship, frustrat ion, disappointment,  
discomf iture, mental  stress in l i fe,  deject ion and 
unhappiness in future l i fe.  
 
The Rule propounded in Hadley v. Baxendale31 has been 
t ime and again rei terated by Indian and Engl ish courts  to 
mean that general  damages are awarded for those act ions,  
which arise natural ly in the usual course of  things and 
breach committed thereof . The defendant is l iable for al l  
that natural happens in the course of  such breach in 
course of  the contract and af ter the breach of  the contract.  
 
                                      
30  Baldeo Krishnan v. Chander Deep Jain, AIR 1984 P & H 9.  
31  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854)  9 Exch, 341.  
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General damages are such as the jury may give when 
the Judge cannot point out any measure by which they 
are to be assessed except the opinion and the judgment 
of  a reasonable man.32 They are, therefore,  those 
damages, which the law wi l l  presume in the case of  
every breach of  contract ,33 as the direct , natural or  
probable consequences of  the act  complained of.34  
 
General damages may, consequently, include nominal 
damages and are quite dist inct  from special  damages.35 
For, there is authori ty for the proposit ion that in cases 
of  breach of contract . i f  the special  damages claimed 
are not proved the plaint i ff  wi l l  be enti t led to nominal  
damages. General damages are given for injury to 
reputat ion or the humil iat ion caused of  necessity by the 
wrongful act.36 As the Privy Counci l has observed in 
Madan Mohan Dass v. Gokul Dass .37 "the pr inciple 
appl ied to act ions of breach of  contract is , the plaint i f f  
is never precluded from recovering ordinary damages by 
reason of  his fai l ing to prove the special  damages he 
has laid,  unless the special  damage is the gist of the 
action” . 
 
But, where special  damage is the gist of the plaint i f f ’s 
cause of action and he fai ls to prove such damage, he is 
precluded from recover ing ordinary damages.38  
                                      
32  Prehn v. Royan Bank of Liverpool, (1870) 5 Exch. 92.  
33  Marzetti v. Williams, (1880)  1 B. & Ad. 415;  Omkarlal v. Banwarilal, 
AIR 1962 Raj. 127.  
34  Stroms Brucks Aktie v. Hutchinson, (1905) A.C. 515.  
35  Columbus Co. v,. Clowes, (1903)  1 K.B. 244; Chaplin v. Hicks, (1911) 
2 K.B. 786.  
36  Suhbaraya v. Venkatarama Iyer, 32 I.C. 592.  
37  Madan Mohan Dass v.  Gokul Dass,  10 M.I.A. 563; Puran 
Deb v. Govinda  Ram, 15 C.P.L.R. 39; Sardar Khan v. Munshi, 1961 
M.P.L.J. 165. 
38  Edward Wilson  v. Kanhaya Sahoo, 11 W.R. 143 
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9.3.2 Special Damages:   
 
 
Special damages are such damages, which can be 
computed in terms of  money.  Halsbury cal ls,  “Special  
damages which may be la id and proved in terms of f igures;  
while on the other hand,  general  damages are def ined as 
matters which cannot be stated in money or money worth 
and including such things has bodily or mental ly suf fered, 
loss of  reputat ion and the l ike as pointed above.  In regard 
to special damages, they have to be specif ical ly pleaded 
and proved; whereas general damages do not need to be 
so specif ical ly al leged and proved.  
 
Special damages, on the other hand,  are such, as the law 
wil l  not infer f rom the nature of  the act.  They do not fol low 
in the ordinary course. They are exceptional in their  
character and, therefore, they must be claimed specif ical ly 
and proved st rict ly.39 As pointed out by Bowen. L.J.  in 
Ratdif fe v.  Evans40:  The term “special damages" is not  
always used with reference to similar subject-matter nor in 
the same context.  At t imes, in the law of  contract,  i t  is 
employed to denote that damage aris ing out of the special  
c ircumstances of  the case, which, properly pleaded may be 
superadded to the general damage which the law implies in 
every breach of contract  and every inf ringement of  an 
absolute r ight.  In al l  such cases the law presumes that  
some damages wi l l  fol low in the ordinary course of  things 
f rom the mere invasion of plaint i f f ’s r ights and calls  i t  
general damage. Special damage in such a context means 
                                      
39  Stroms Brucks  Aktie v. Hutchinson, (1905) A.C. 515.  
40  Ratdif fe  v . Evans, (1892)  2 Q.B. 524 : 61 L.J. Q.B.  535. 
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the particular damage. Beyond the general damage, which 
results f rom the part icular ci rcumstances of  the case and 
of  plaint i f fs claim to be compensated, for which he ought to 
give warning in his pleadings in order that there may be no 
surprise at the tria l.  But where no actual  and posit ive r ight 
(apart f rom the damage done) has been disturbed, i t  is  the 
damage done that is the wrong;  and the expression 
'special  damage' when used of this damage denotes an 
actual and temporal  loss which has, in fact,  occurred. The 
term 'special damage' has also been used in act ions on the 
case brought for a public nuisance, such as the obstruct ion 
of  a r iver or  a highway to denote that actual  and part icular 
loss which plaint i f f  must al lege and prove that he has 
sustained beyond what is sustained by the general publ ic,  
i f  his act ion is to be supported, such part icular loss being,  
as is obvious, the cause of  act ion."  
 
The special damages arise on account of  c ircumstance 
which may be unusual and which af fect the applicant or 
plaint i f f .  The law has developed by the Engl ish courts and 
the Indian courts basically emphasizes on the fact that the 
Special Circumstance was brought to the knowledge of  the 
other contract ing party and possib ly al l  special loss was 
conveyed to the other contract ing party.  As early as 1868, 
English Court in Brit ish Columbia Saw Mil l  Co.  v.  
Nett leship41 observed that:  
 
“The parts of  a saw mil l  machinery, packed in cases, were 
given to the defendant,  a carr ier,  for carr iage to 
Vancouver. One of  the cases was lost and consequently a 
complete mi l l  could not be erected and operated. The 
plaint i f f  c laimed the cost of  lost machinery and the prof its, 
                                      
41  British Columbia Saw Mill Co. v.  Nettleship; (1868) L.R. 3 C.P. 499. 
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which could have been earned if  the mil l  had been instal led 
in t ime.  The Court  al lowed only the cost in Vancouver of  
the art icles lost.  The loss of  prof its to be made f rom the 
intended use of  the mil l  was held to be too remote.” 
 
However, subsequently,  the said view in 1876 was 
qualif ied to mean that even i f  the other party to the 
contract was not made aware of  the special c i rcumstance 
but was in knowledge of the circumstance, he would be 
l iable for such damages and the Court in England had held 
that the formal  communicat ion between two part ies was not 
necessary. In the case of  Simpson v. London & North 
Western Railway Co.,42 i t  has been observed that:  
 
“The plaint i f f  was in the habit  of  exhibit ing samples of his  
implements at catt le shows. He del ivered his samples to 
the defendant company for consignment of  the show 
grounds at New Cast le. The consignment note said: “must 
be at New Cast le on Monday certa in”. But no mention was 
made of  the intent ion to place the goods in the exhibit ion.  
On account of  negl igence the goods reached only af ter the 
show was over.  But as the company was already aware of  
the object of  carrying the goods there, the plainti f f  was 
al lowed to recover not only the loss of  freight but also the 
prof its he would have made by plac ing the goods at the 
show.” 
 
This view was again reiterated in the case of  B.P. 
Explorat ion & Co. v.  Heent ,43 that  a f ragmentize was 
purchased by the pla int i f f  under a hire-purchase 
agreement. Its  rotor broke down before normal l i fe.  The 
                                      
42  Simpson v. London & North Western Railway Co. : (1876) 1 QBD 274.
  
43  B.P. Exploration & Co. v. Heent; (1982) 2 QBD  925. 
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plaint i f f  had no means to replace it  at  cash price. He had 
to arrange i t again at a hire-purchase price and claimed 
the same as damages. The defendant contended that the 
plaint i f f  had to pay hire-purchase pr ice because of  his lack 
of  means. This content ion was rejected. The fact that  in 
the present circumstance of  economy business has to 
depend upon hire-purchase system was held to be within 
the contemplat ion of  part ies. In the case of  Jaques v. 
Mil lar ,44 where the lessor knew the purpose for which the 
lessee required the premises,  he was held l iable for the 
loss of that purpose during the delayed period.  
 
Therefore, i t  can be said that in London,  the law is now 
qualif ied that where the party is  in know how that the 
contract breacher was in knowledge of special  
c ircumstance, he would be l iable. Thus foreseeabi l i ty is the 
pr inciple, which covers the theory propounded in Hadley v. 
Baxendale .45 Thus the Engl ish Courts have now developed 
the law on the basis of  reasonable foreseeableness.46  
 
Under the Indian Law, damages can be claimed only where 
there is a valid contract and that contract  has been 
breached.47  I t  is held that where there was memorandum 
of  understanding reached between the part ies to decide to 
sett le their dispute through compromise. However, i f  the 
memorandum of  understanding was entered, the part ies 
corresponded with each other,  exchanging of fers and 
counter of fers. This correspondence showed that there was 
no consensus to the terms and condit ions st ipulated in the 
                                      
44  Jaques v. Millar; (1877) 6 Ch D 153. 
45  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854)  9 Exch, 341. 
46  Heron II, the Koufos v. C. Czarnikow Ltd. (1969) 1 AC 350: (1967) 3 
All E.R. 686, HL. 
47  Union Bank of India v. Ramdas  Madhav Prasad; (2004) 1 SCC 252. 
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memorandum of understanding and when there is no 
consensus, there cannot be any remedy.  
 
 
To c laim damages, the f rustration of the contract must  be 
based on fundamental or sweeping character, which would 
virtually make the contract unperformable, and not just 
contract,  which would make the contract capable of being 
performed at a later stage.48 I t  is r ightly held that event  
should be of  such a nature, which the part ies could not 
with or iginal di l igence for forcee and must not be self  
induce.  
 
The House of  Lords, as early as 1932 in Portuguese-Bank 
note case in Banco de Portugal v. Waterlow & Sons Ltd.49 
have held that losses are recoverable when the damage 
occurred may be the result  of  a breach which can be said 
to have been contemplated by the part ies at the t ime when 
they make contract .  However, the part ies were supposed to 
consider that the breach was from the business posi t ion of  
the part ies and the damage was aris ing natural ly f rom such 
a breach. This v iew can be said to be innovat ive in those 
days, which would appear f rom the facts of the case and 
the rule that special  damages were to be granted even if  
the breach was not  contemplated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
48  Gujarat Housing Board v.  Vikul  Corporation;  AIR  2004  Guj. 319. 
49  Banco de Portugal v. Waterlow & Sons Ltd. (1932) A.C. 452.  
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  Different Meanings of Special Damages: 
 
The observat ions made by Bowen. L.J . .  in the above case 
have been fol lowed by the Madras High Court in Nanjappa 
Chettiar v.  Ganapati Goundan.50 According to this passage,  
therefore, there are three dif ferent meanings in which the 
term "special  damage" is used.  
 
In the f irst  place. i t  means the actual damages sustained  
may be proved beyond what are known as general  
damages. i .e.  the part icular damage which results in the 
part icular circumstances of  the case.51 In this class of  
cases, special damages, i f  properly al leged and proved,  
can be recovered in addit ion to the general  damages which 
f low f rom the wrongful act  complained of ,  and such special  
damages are recoverable in act ion founded on breach of 
contract.52  
 
In the second place, where it  is the damage done that is 
the wrong or where it  otherwise said that damage is the 
gist  of  the act ion and no posit ive r ight is v iolated, i t  means 
the actual  and temporal loss that has in fact occurred. 
When used in this  sense it  is synonymous with "express 
loss" or "part icular damage" or "damage in fact".   
 
In the third place, the term "special  damage" means the 
part icular loss which the plaint i f f  has suffered beyond what 
is sustained by the general publ ic and which is i tself  the 
                                      
50  Nanjappa Chett iar  v . Ganapat i  Goundan, I.L.R.  35 Mad. 508 
at 598 : 12 I.C. (M) 507; Khurshid Hussain v. Secretary of State, A.I.R.  
1937 Pat. 302. 
51  Omkarlal v. Banwarilal,  A.I.R.  1962 Raj. 127.  
52  Frante v. Gaudet, (1872) L.R. 6  Q.B.  199;  Ramalingam v. Gokuldas, 
A.I.R. 1926 Mad.  1021.  
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cause of  act ion, e.g. where the act complained of  is a 
public nuisance.53  
 
When used in this sense. "Special damage" is not conf ined 
to merely pecuniary loss but means and inc ludes very 
great inconvenience,54 and in some cases it  was even held 
that narrowing a highway so as pract ical ly to block it  
amounts to specia l  damages.55 
 
  General and Special Damages:  
 
The l ine may at t imes be dif f icul t to draw between what is 
general damage and special  damage. But the l ine, though 
it  may be thin, is yet there and there can be two 
categories of  damages, general  and special,  even in 
respect of  a loss result ing directly from a defamatory 
al legat ion against a person engaged in a business.  
 
I t  wil l  by and large depend on the nature of one's  
business. I f  the person concerned is deal ing with a 
part icular category of  customers who regularly approach 
him, then it  may very well in a given case, fal l  under the 
category of  a specia l damage. But i f  the transact ions that  
the person would be undertak ing are casual and the 
customers are such who do not regular ly seek him, then in 
that given context the loss of  business can be taken to be 
a general damage.56 
 
                                      
53  Mohandas v. Gokuldas, 12  I.C. 507.  
54  Khaji Sayyad Hussain v. Ediga Narasimhappa, 16  I.C. 962: 23 M.L.J. 
539.  
55  Ram Kishun v. Banwari Rai, 25 I.C.  266.  
56  Bela Ram v. Sukh Sampat Lal,  AIR  1975 Raj. 40;  Pillamarri 
Lakshmikantham v. Ramakrishna  Pictures, Vijayawada,  AIR  1981 
A.P.  224.  
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  Damages at large:  
 
The expression "damages at large" may be explained as 
meaning that the Judge can give whatever amount he 
thinks r ight as if  he were the jury. I f  facts are suff ic ient ly 
proved f rom which it  may properly be inferred that  some 
damage must have resulted to the plaint i f f  f rom the 
defendant 's wrongful act,  the jury may give any damages, 
and it  is not necessary to give proof  of  speci f ic damage. 
The damages are damages at large. Thus in actions for  
trespass,57 or  for malic iously inducing persons to break 
their business contracts,58 or  for infr ingement of  a 
copyright,59 or for publishing a l ibel,  whether on a person,  
a f irm or a company,60 the damages are said to be at 
large, and the Court may grant any amount which it  
considers f i t ,  having regard to the conduct  of  the part ies 
respect ively,  and al l  c i rcumstances of  the case.61 
 
  Special Damages have to be pleaded: 
 
I t  is true that the part iculars of  damages are not detai led in 
the plaint but at the same t ime it  has to be remembered 
that what is claimed is only general damages. I t  is a wel l-
recognized pr inciple of  law that when once the injur ies 
mentioned in the plaint  are proved to be the result  of 
act ionable negl igence on the part  of defendants. General 
damages have to be presumed by the Court.  In the case of 
                                      
57  Saha Lal v. Amba Prasad, AIR 1922  All 526. 
58  Exchange Telegraph Co. v.  Gregory & Co. (1896)  1 Q.B.  147 : 65 
L.J.Q.B. 262.  
59  Fenning Film Service Ltd. v.  Wolverhampton Walsall and District 
Cinemas, (1914) 3 K.B. 1171 : 83 L.J.Q.B.. 1860.  
60  South Helton Coal Co.  v. North  Eastern News Association, (1894) 1 
Q.B. 133:  63 L.J. Q.B. 293.  
61  Nadirshaw v. Pirojshaw, 19 I.C.  98.  
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Brit ish Transport Commission v. Gourley ,62 Lord 
Goddard explaining the posit ion has observed:  
"In an act ion for personal injuries the damages are 
always divided into two main parts. First, there is what 
is referred to as special damage, which has to be 
special ly pleaded and proved. This consists of out-of-
pocket expenses and loss of earning incurred down to 
the date of t r ial, and is generally capable of 
substant ial ly exact calculat ion. Secondly,  there is 
general damage, which in, law implies and is not 
special ly pleaded. This includes compensat ion for pain 
and suffer ing and the l ike and if  the injuries suffered 
are such as to lead to cont inuing or permanent 
disabi l ity compensation, for loss of earning power in 
the future."  
 
Thus it is clear that special damages claimed should be 
specif ied in the plaint and proved in the evidence whereas 
general damages have to be presumed by the Court. What 
is claimed in the present case is only general damages and 
hence the defect in the plaint would not come in the way of 
the Court awarding damages.63 
 
9.3.3 Nominal Damages: 
 
“Nominal damages is a technical phrase, which means that 
you have negatived anything l ike real damages. That there 
is an infraction of a legal right which though it gives you no 
right to any real damages at al l , yet gives you a right to 
the verdict,  or judgment because your legal r ight has 
                                      
62  Brit ish Transport Commiss ion v.  Gour ley,  (1956) A.C. 185.  
63  Adamkhan Mohammad v. Ramesh Raya Naik, 1978 A.C.J. 409. 
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been infr inged."64 Nominal damages are intended only 
where the plaint if f  has sustained injur ia sine damnum ,  that 
is, where a right of  his has been infringed but not so as to 
cause any sensible damage.65 Nominal damages can, 
therefore be def ined as a sum of money that may be 
spoken of but that has no existence in point of quantity;  a 
mere peg on which to hang coats.66 From this it  must not 
be supposed that nominal damages necessari ly mean small 
damages.67 They form an intermediate class of damages 
between contemptuous and substant ial damages, and in 
pract ice the amount varies from forty shill ings in English 
money68 to one shil l ing.69 The Indian Courts have decreed 
to the plaintif f  sums varying from Rs. 75 to Rs. 100. 
towards nominal damages.70  
 
The case must be one in which the plaint if f  has cause 
of act ion owing to infr ingement of civi l r ight but in which 
no real damage has been caused to him71 or where a 
breach of duty has been committed against him but has 
not in fact produced any actual damages72 or where he 
fails to prove that  he has suffered any substant ial loss73 
he is only ent it led to nominal damages.74 Again, where 
the plaint if f  has no intention of performing his part of 
the contract and the defendant committed only a 
                                      
64  “The Mediana”, (1900) A.C. 113,  per Lord Halsbury , cited in Bishun 
Singh v. A.W.N.  Wyatt, 14 C.L.J. 515:  11  I.C. 729.  
65  Seetaramaswami v. Secretary of State of India,  AIR  1925  Mad. 682. 
66  Beaumont v. Greathead, (1816) 2 C.B. 494. 
67  Bishun Singh v. A.W.N. Wyatt,  14 C.L.J.  515 :  11 I.C. 729; Akshoy 
Kumar  v.  Akman  Molla,  27  I.C. 397.  
68  Columbus Co. v. Clowes, (1903)  1  K.B. 245.  
69  Sapwell v. Bass,  (1910)  2  K.B. 486.  
70  Bishun Singh v. A.W.N. Wyatt,  14 C.L.J.  515.  
71  Kumud Kanta Chakraburthy v.  E. Bignold , Manager Court of Wards, 
AIR 1923 Cal. 306.  
72  Columbus Co. v. Clowes, (1903)  1 K.B. 244.  
73  Marzetti v. Williams, (1830)  1 B. & Ad. 415. 
74  Weld & Co. v. Harcharan, 4 Lah. L.J. 317.  
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technical breach thereof, or where the plaint if f  has 
sustained actual damages not through the wrongful act  
of the defendant,75 but from his own (negligent) 
conduct,76 the damages he is ent it led to receive are 
merely nominal.  In general, it  may be said that where a 
cause of act ion is established, the plaint if f is ent it led to 
some damages.77 Even where the Court f inds that the 
suit is vexat ious and that no damages have really been 
sustained by the plaint if f there is nothing to prevent it  
from giving him nominal damages78 though as a matter of 
right,  he is not ent it led to insist upon such damages being 
awarded to him.79 But he is, in law, at least entit led to a 
decree in declaration of his rights without costs and 
damages.80  
 
The award of nominal damages for the inf l ict ion of a 
legal wrong may, very often, sett le the quest ion of t it le 
or determine rights of the greatest importance to the 
plaint if f,  for as has been observed by Sergeant Wil l iams 
in Meller v.  Spateman,81 whenever any act injures 
another's r ight and would be evidence in future in 
favour of the wrong-doer, an act ion may be maintained 
for an invasion of the right without proof of specific 
damages. I t  is important to observe, as Courts shall  
not ice hereafter, that in India, owing to the provisions 
of Sec. 73 of the Indian Contract Act, the award of 
nominal damages for breach of contract is not  
                                      
75  Sanders v. Stuart, (1876) 2 C.P.D. 326. 
76  Warre v. Colvert, (1837)  7 Ad. & Edn. 143.  
77  Parusnath Saha v. Brijo Lal,  8  W.R.  44.  
78  Futeek Parooee v. Mohender Nath, I.L.R. 1 Cal. 385 : 25 W.R. 226. 
79  A. Buchanan v. Avdali,  15 B. L.R.  276 : W.R. Suppl. Vol. III. p. 283:  
Nabakrishna v. Collector of Hooghly, 2  B.L.R.  275 :  W.R. Suppl. Vol. 
I  p. 120.  
80  Kaliappa Gaundan v.  Vayapuri Gaundan,  2 M.H.C.R.  442.  
81  Meller  v.  Spateman,  (1651)  1  Saunders  346. 
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permissible. A plaint if f  is ent it led to "nominal damages" 
where his r ights have been infr inged, but he has not in 
fact sustained any actual damage from the 
infr ingement,82 or he fai ls to prove that he has,83 or 
although he has sustained actual damage, the damage 
arises not from the defendant 's wrongful act,84 but from 
the conduct of the plaint i ff  himself85 or the plaint if f  is  
not concerned to raise the quest ion of actual loss,86 but  
bring his act ion simply with the view of establishing his 
r ight.87  
 
Nominal damages have been defined as a sum of  
money that  may be spoken of but that has no existence 
in point of quant ity, or a mere peg on which to hang 
coats.88 
 
As far as nominal damages are concerned, it  is  
awarded where the plainti ff  has sustained damage but 
which is not of a major magnitude and it  can be the 
damages where the breach is technically and the plaint if f 
had not performed his part of the contract. The Calcutta and 
                                      
82  Taylor v. Hemiker, (1849)  12 Ad. 488;  Clifton v. Hooper, (1844)  6 
Q.B.  468;  West  v. Houthton, (1879)  4 C.P.O.  197;  Northam v. 
Hurley,  (1853)  1 E. & B. 665;  Columbus  Co.  v.  Clowes ,  (1903)  1  
K.B.  244;  Ashdown  v. Ingamells,  (1880)  5 Exd.  280.  
83  Twyman v. Knowles, (1853)  13 C.B.  222;  Marzetti v.  Williams, 
(1830)  1 B. & Ad.  415;  Nicholls  v. Ely Best  Sugar Factory Ltd. 
(1936)  Ch. 343. C.A.;  Clomien Fuiel Econmiser Co. Ltd.  v. National 
School of Salesmanship Ltd., 60 R.P.C. 209 (C.A.).  
84  Hiort v. London and North Western Rly. Co. , (1879) 4 Exc. 188 :  C.A. 
Saunders v. Stuart,  (1876)  1  C.P.D.  326.  
85  Warre v. Calvert,  (1837)  7  Ad. &  El. 143;  Hamlin v. Great Northern  
Rly. Co., (1856)  1  H. & N. 408; Weld  Blundell v. Stephens,  (1920)  
A.C.  956  (H.L.)  
86  1  Wms.  Saund  (1871)  Edn. 626 at p. 627 (note) : Marzetti v. 
Williams, (1830)  I.  &  Ad.  415.  
87  Northam  v. Hurley,  (1833)  1  E. & B.  665;  Medway Co. v.  Earl of 
Rommey,  (1861) 9 C.B. N.S. 575;  Emray v. Owen,  (1850)  6 Exch.  
353;  Nicolls v.  Elp. Beet Sugar Factory Ltd.  (1936)  Ch. 343 (C.A.). 
88  Beaumont v.  Gresthead, (1846)  2 C.B. 494;  Halsbury’s Law of 
England, 4th Edn., Vol. 12, p. 417. 
  
- 457 - 
Lahor High Courts have concurrent on this term. In Arjandas 
vs. Secretary89 the English courts have held that where the 
plaint if f  had not suffered actual or fails to prove any 
damage, is ent it led to nominal damage.90 Bombay High 
Court way back in 1958 held that the plaint if f  can be 
awarded nominal damage when the damage has been 
caused where it was caused by the conduct of the plaint iff 
itself  rather than that of defendant. These normal damages 
are normally awarded where the plainti f f wants to establ ish 
his right or get his right recognized but this is always at the 
discretion of the Court. However, Indian Court have held 
that in India Normal damages can also be granted if  
damage is actual occurred. The Court of Appeal way back in 
1957 in the case of Charter v. Sull ivan91 has held that the 
party can recover i ts loss; even if  he sales the property to 
some other person. However, there is a distinction in 
another case92 on account of the customer’s breach in lif t ing 
the car in terms of his agreement, the dealer had to return 
the car to the manufacturer. He was allowed to recover the 
prof its which he would have made on sale of the car to the 
default ing customer.  
 
It  has been pointed out by the Delhi High Court, following 
some earl ier High Court decisions that Section 73 does not 
give any cause of action unless and unt il the damage is  
actually suffered. The case before the Court was Union of 
India vs. Tribhvandas Lalj i  Patel .93 
 
                                      
89  Arjandas v. Secretary;  AIR  25  Cal  737.  
90  Halsbury’s Laws of England, 2nd Edn., Vol. 10, Para-105. 
91  Charter v.  Sullivan; (1957) I  All ER  809 : (1857) 2 Q.B. 117.  
92  W.L. Thompson Ltd. v.  Robinson (Gunmakyrs) Ltd., (1955)  1 ALL ER 
809. 
93  Union of India vs. Tribhvandas Lalji Patel, AIR 1971 Delhi  120. 
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A contract for the supply of s leepers to the Railway 
administration contained a number of clauses including this 
that irrespect ive of whether the government suffered any 
loss or not on account of the contractor’s fai lure to supply 
the Government was ent it led to damages. The contractor 
failed to supply, but the rai lways did not suffer any loss. 
Even so an action for damages was instituted against the 
Contractor. The Court did not award any damages and 
further observed, “If  the contrary view was to be taken, the 
provisions of S. 73 wi l l become nugatory and a party would 
be penalized, though the other party has suffered no loss. 
But,  where the plaintif f  suffers no loss the Court may sti l l  
award him nominal damages in recognit ion of his right. But 
this is in the discretion of the Court.  
 
In State of Karnataka vs. Rameshwars Rice Mi lls, 
Thirthahalli ,94 there was the fol lowing provision in the 
agreement:” … for any breach of condit ions set forth herein-
before, the f irst party (contractor) shall be l iable to pay 
damages to the second party (State Govt.) as may be 
assessed by the second party” .95  
 
Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that the 
assessment power was “subsidiary and consequential”, and 
could be exercised only when the f irst party admitted 
breach. The second party could not adjudicate upon the 
question of breach as law does not al low it to be an arbiter 
in his own case.” 
 
                                      
94  State o f  Karnataka vs. Rameshwars Rice Mil ls ,  
Thir thahal l i ,  AIR  1987 SC 138.;  Devendra  Singh v. State, AIR  
1987  All  306;  State of U.P.  v.  Tipper  Chand,  AIR  1980  SC  1522. 
95  AIR  1987  SC  1257.  
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The Court, however, examined the quest ion whether one of 
the part ies could assess or quantify damages but did not 
express any opinion whether that party had unbridled power 
to apply any measure of damages or follow the rule of the 
thumb. The measure of damages cannot be made bonfire at 
he altar of a party’s whim in derogation of the sett led 
principles of assessment of damages envisaged in Sections 
73 and 74 of Indian Contract Act,  1872.96 
 
There is a dif ference between the power to sell the goods 
and power to enter into contract to sell  the goods at the 
future date. This aspect has been very clearly interpreted 
by the Bombay High Court in Satyanarayan A. Bhatt vs. 
Vithal N. Jandar.97  This fact has been interpreted to mean 
that a person who has power to sell  ready goods cannot be 
considered to have power to enter into the contract of sell  
of  all  future goods. Section 74 of the Contract Act would 
apply where the parties have pre-est imated their damages 
in case there is breach. If, however, this amount has been 
mentioned in terrorem, it  wi ll be by way of penalty and the 
plaint if f  wi ll not to be ent it led to claim this amount of any 
reasonable amount unless it has shown that he is actually 
sustained damages.  
 
It is a sett led legal posit ion as far as India is concerned that 
where the dispute arises between the buyer and sel ler, 
buyer would be entit led to claim damages if  he proves that 
goods supplied to him were of infer ior quality than the one 
for which the parties had negotiated. In The Board of 
Trustees for the Port of Calcutta vs. Dhanrajmal 
                                      
96  Annual  Survey  of the Law; 1987;  Vol.  23.  
97  Satyanarayan A.  Bhatt  v. Vithal N. Jandar; 1957 BLR  1071. 
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Gobindram98 a Division Bench of  the Calcutta High Court 
set aside the tr ial Court ’s decree for damages for Rs. 
15,000 in favour of  the plaint i f f  when there was no material  
on record, he not having produced any evidence before the 
Court to substant iate h is c laim for damages, and remanded 
the case to that Court for considerat ion of  the quantum of  
damages af ter giv ing the part ies opportunity of  adducing 
further evidence on that  point.  The goods (cotton) had 
been imported by him f rom the U.S.A. part  of  the goods 
were lost when they were in the possession of  the port  
authori t ies for fumigat ion. The Court held them l iable for 
the loss of  the goods as they had fa i led to take the degree 
of  care requi red of  them as bailees under the law. The 
plaint i f f ,  however, had fai led to let  in any evidence by 
producing his accounts to show the price he had paid for 
the goods. The tr ial  Court had rel ied on the oral evidence 
of  the manager of  the plaint i f f  f i rm that the price of  the 
goods lost was Rs. 15,000. The observed that ‘ in  the 
absence of  any special  c ircumstance the measure of  
damages cannot be the amount of  the loss ult imately 
sustained by the (plaint i f f ),  i t  can only be the dif ference of 
the price which he paid and the price which he would have 
received i f  he had resold them in the market forthwith af ter  
the purchase provided of course that there was a fair  
market then.”99 
 
9.3.4 Exemplary Damage:  
 
The primary object of  an award of damages is  to 
compensate the plaint i f f  for the harm done to him; a 
possible secondary object is to punish the defendant for 
                                      
98  The Board of Trustees for  the Port of Calcutta vs . 
Dhanrajmal  Gobindram, AIR  1978  Cal. 369. 
99  Annual  Survey of the Indian Law.  1978, Vol. 14.  
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his conduct in inf l ict ing that harm. Such a secondary object  
can be achieved by awarding, in addit ion to the normal 
compensatory damages, damages which are var iously 
cal led exemplary damages, punit ive damages, vindict ive 
damages or even retr ibutory damages,100 and comes into 
play whenever the defendant 's conduct is  suf f icient ly 
outrageous to merit  punishment. Whether a modern legal 
system should recognise exemplary damages at al l  has 
been much debated, but i t  is thought that,  al l  in al l ,  the 
case for dispensing with them is made out.  The central  
argument against them is that they are anomalous in the 
civi l  sphere, confusing the c iv i l  and cr iminal funct ions of  
the law;101 in part icular,  i t  is anomalous that money exacted 
f rom a defendant by way of  punishment should come as a 
windfal l  to a plainti f f  rather than go to the state. On the 
other side, a major just i f icat ion of  exemplary damages is 
that their ex istence provides a suitable means for the 
punishment of  minor cr iminal  acts which are in pract ice 
ignored by pol ice too caught up in the pursuit  of serious 
crime.102  
 
In the 1760’s exemplary damages f i rst  made their 
appearance on the English legal scene. The earl iest  cases 
arose in the cause celebre of  John Wilkes and the North 
Briton. In the government 's ef fort to stop the North Briton 
f rom being published, a variety of individuals suf fered 
interference at the hands of  publ ic of f ic ials,  and that too in 
act ions of 1763 based upon such interference, Huckle v.  
Money103 and Wilkes v. Wood,104 awards of  exemplary 
                                      
100  Bell v. Midland Ry (2861) 10 C.B. (N.S.) 287. Broome v. Cassell & Co. 
(1972) A.C.  1027, Rookes v. Barnard (1964) A.C.1129.    
101  Broome v. Cassell & Co. (1972) A.C. 1027.  
102  Street, (1962), Principles of the Law of Damages, pp.34-36.  
103  Huckle v . Money,  (1763) 2  Wils. K.B. 205. 
104  Wilkes v. Wood,  (1763)  Lofft .   
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damages were made. By the end of  the decade further 
awards had appeared in other contexts,105 and thereaf ter 
exemplary damages became a famil iar feature of  contract  
law. In the 1960s the situation total ly changed. In Rookes 
v. Barnard106 the House of  Lords took the opportunity to 
review the whole doctr ine and held that,  except in a few 
exceptional cases, which are dealt  wi th later,  i t  is  no 
longer permissible to award exemplary damages against a 
defendant,  however outrageous his  conduct.  That their  
Lordships recognised the exemplary principle as out  of 
place in the law of  damages is clear f rom the fact that they 
stated that their task was to consider,  in the absence of 
any decision of the House approving an award of  
exemplary damages, whether i t  was open to them "to 
remove an anomaly f rom the law of England". There was, 
however, an attempt by the Court of  Appeal in Broome v. 
Cassell & Co.107 to quest ion the decision, but on the appeal 
in that case their Lordships put  paid to any such 
quest ionings. The House was, in the words of  the Lord 
Chancellor:  
 
"not prepared to fol low the Court of  Appeal in i ts cr it ic isms 
of  Rookes v. Barnard,108 which .. .  imposed valuable l imits 
on the doctrine of  exemplary damages as they had hitherto 
been understood in English law and clar if ied important 
quest ions which had previously been undiscussed or lef t 
confused.” "We cannot", he added, "depart f rom Rookes v. 
Barnard here. I t  was decided neither per incur iam nor ultra 
vires this House.”  
 
                                      
105  Benson v. Frederick (1766) 3 Burr. 1845 (assault); Tullidge v. Wade 
(1769) 3 Wils. K.B. 18 (seduction). 
106  Rookes v . Barnard, (1964) A.C. 1129. 
107  Broome v. Cassel l  &  Co. Ltd . ,  (1972)  A.C.  1027. 
108  Rookes v . Barnard, (1964) A.C. 1129. 
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The result  is that two centur ies of authorit ies have become 
suspect.  Yet,  the new thinking does not have such a 
drast ic effect upon the exist ing case law as would at f i rst  
s ight appear. For as Lord Devlin, who spoke for al l  their  
Lordships on the issue of  exemplary damages, pointed out  
in Rookes v. Barnard, there is a double rationale behind 
such awards. "When one examines the cases in which 
large damages have been awarded for conduct of  this  
sort ", he said, " i t  is not at al l  easy to say whether the idea 
of  compensat ion or the idea of  punishment has prevailed".  
The House considered that pract ical ly al l  the so-called 
exemplary damages cases could, and should, be explained 
as cases of  aggravated damage-that is,  as cases of  extra 
compensation to the plaint i f f  for the injury to his feel ings 
and digni ty109 and indeed it  was the avai labi l i ty of  this  
alternative explanation of  the cases which al lowed the 
House to place a general ban upon exemplary damages 
while remaining within the f ramework of  precedent.  Lord 
Devlin hoped that the decision of  the House would:  
 
"Remove f rom the law a source of  confusion between 
aggravated and exemplary damages which has troubled 
the learned commentators on the subject.  Otherwise, i t  wil l  
not,  I think, make much dif ference to the substance of  the 
law or rob the law of  the strength, which i t  ought to have. 
Aggravated damages in this type of  case can do most,  i f  
not al l ,  of  the work that could be done by exemplary 
damages. In  so far as they do not,  assaults and mal icious 
injuries to property can general ly be punished as 
crimes."110 
 
                                      
109  Ley  v.  Hamilton (1935)  153 L.T.  384.   
110  Rookes v . Barnard, (1964)  A.C.  1129  at  1230. 
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Accordingly, the House did not f ind it  necessary to overrule 
the earl ier author i t ies. Indeed, only one case, Loudon v.  
Ryder,111 was expressly overruled; the great majority fal l  
now to be explained as awards on account  of  aggravated 
damage.112 
 
Lord Devl in expressed the view in Rookes v. Barnard113 
that exemplary damages were a pecul iarity of  Engl ish law. 
I t  is more exact to regard them as a pecul iar ity of  the 
common law, not accepted by other legal systems. For the 
English lead of  the 1760s was in fact taken up both 
throughout the Commonwealth and in the United States of  
America, whi le the Engl ish volte face of  the 1960s has not 
been largely fol lowed by other jur isdict ions within the 
common law family.  Indeed, in Austra l ia a clear reject ion 
emerged when, in a l ibel act ion, the High Court refused to 
adopt the new English approach.114 This refusal,  moreover, 
was upheld on appeal by the Judicial  Committee of  the 
Privy CounciI ,115 basing its decision on two factors: that  
Austral ia, unl ike England before Rookes, had already ful ly 
accepted the exemplary pr inciple, with al l  i ts impl icat ions,  
where damages for l ibel  were concerned;  and that i t  was a 
matter for Austral ia,  in an area of domestic rather than 
international signi f icance where the need for  uniformity 
within the Commonwealth is less, to decide whether to 
change her sett led judicial policy on this issue in the law of 
l ibel.  However, in Broome v. Cassel l & Co.116 Lord 
                                      
111  Loudon v . Ryder,  (1953)  2  Q.B. 202,  C.A. 
112  Owen and Smith v. Reo Motors (1934) 151 L.T.  274, C.A.; Williams  
v.  Settle (1960) 1  W.L.R.  1072, C.A.  
113  Rookes v . Barnard, (1964)  A.C.  1129  at  1221. 
114
  Uren v. John Fairfax  & Sons  Pty, (1967) Argus L.R. 25 : (1966) 40 
A.L.J.R.  124;  Australian Consolidated Press v.  Uren, (1967) Argus 
L.R. 54; (1966) 40 A.L.J.R.  142. 
115
  Australian Consolidated Press v.  Uren, (1969) 1 A.C. 590, P.C. 
116  Broome v. Cassel l  & Co.,  (1972) A.C. 1027. 
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Hailsham L.C. said that he viewed with dismay the doctr ine 
that the common law should d if fer in dif ferent parts of  the 
Commonwealth, and expressed the hope that,  in the l ight 
of  their Lordships'  observat ions on Rookes, Commonwealth 
courts might modify thei r cri t ic ism of  i t .   
 
The anomaly of  exemplary damages having thus been 
largely removed, now for l i t t le short of  half  a century, from 
English law-such damages have no place in Scots law-by 
the efforts of  two most distinguished courts,117 i t  is  
somewhat disturbing to f ind moves on foot to bring them 
back. In i ts Consultat ion Paper on Aggravated,  Exemplary 
and Resti tut ionary Damages the Law Commission has 
stated that i t  does not believe that the only funct ion of  the 
civi l  law is to compensate and has proposed provisionally,  
subject  to the views of  a wide range of  consultees, that  
exemplary damages be re- int roduced but be put upon what 
i t  cal ls a principled basis. A textbook on damages is not  
the place to address this ful l  and admirable consultat ion 
paper but i t  is the place to assert a clear view that  the t rue 
and only f ield of  damages is compensation for loss and a 
consequent, and strongly held, bel ief  that the re-
int roduct ion of  exemplary damages would be a retrograde 
step, with i ts inevitable and twin results of  al lowing the 
civi l  law to enter the very d if ferent domain of the criminal  
law and of  prov iding windfal ls for plainti f fs which are in 
truth unmeri ted.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
117  Rookes v. Barnard (1964) A.C.1129.; Broome v. Cassel l  & Co. 
Ltd. ,  (1972)  A.C.  1027. 
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  Cases in which exemplary damages may be 
awarded:  
 
While laying down that,  as a general rule, exemplary 
damages should no longer be awarded, Lord Devl in in 
Rookes considered that their Lordships   
 
"Could not,  without  a complete disregard of  precedent, and 
indeed of statute, now arr ive at a determinat ion that  
refused altogether to recognise the exemplary princ iple 
and there remain three categories of  cases in which 
awards of  exemplary damages continue to be legit imate,  
though not mandatory as whether to make an award is in 
the court 's discretion.118 Lord Devl in in Rookes found two 
categories of  case which he described as categories in 
which an award of  exemplary damages can serve a useful  
purpose in vindicat ing the strength of  the law and thus 
af fording a pract ical justi f icat ion for admitt ing into the civi l  
law a principle which ought logical ly to belong to the 
criminal.”119 
 
Though two categories are establ ished as part  of  the 
common law; Lord Devlin had necessari ly to add the 
category of  exemplary damages expressly authorised by 
statute. However, before turning to the three categories to 
which exemplary damages have been restricted since 
1964, an addit ional restrict ion of  a general nature on the 
avai labi l i ty of  an award of  exemplary damages should be 
addressed. This restrict ion only appeared in 1993 with the 
decis ion of  the Court of Appeal in A.B. v. South West 
Water Services.120 
                                      
118  Holden  v.  Chief Constable of Lancashire,  (1987) Q.B. a 380. 
119  Rookes v . Barnard, (1964) A.C. 1129. 
120  A.B. v . South West Water  Serv ices, (1993) Q.B.  507, C.A. 
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(1)    The need for pre-Rookes acceptance of 
exemplary awards: 
 
The restr ict ion which requires the pre-Rookes acceptance 
of  exemplary awards was not f irmly establ ished, indeed 
dormant,  unt i l  A.B. v.  South West Water Services where it  
was held, fol lowing the views of  Lord Hai lsham and Lord 
Diplock in Broome v. Cassel l121 that Lord Devlin in Rookes 
had not intended to add to or expand the anomaly of  
exemplary damages. In  his judgment,  said Stuart-Smith LJ.  
in A.B. v.   South West Water Services, "th is is not a 
developing f ield of the law".  Awards might therefore only 
be made where the plaint i f f 's cause of  act ion was one in 
respect of  which awards of this kind had already been 
made before Rookes was decided.  
 
(2)  The three categories in which exemplary 
awards are possible: 
 
(a)  First common law category:  oppressive, 
arbitrary or unconstitutional  conduct by 
government servants.  
 
The f irst  of  the two common law categories comprises 
cases in which, in Lord Devl in 's words in Rookes, there 
has been "oppressive,  arbi trary or unconst itut ional act ion 
by the servants of  the government" .122 This category is  
based primari ly on the eighteenth-century cases, which 
int roduced the general  doctrine of  exemplary damages.  
While the general  just i f icat ion advanced by the House in 
Rookes for retain ing such cases within the exemplary 
damages net is that here: 
                                      
121  Broome v. Cassel l ,  (1972) A.C.  1027,  at 1076B  and  1131A  
respectively. 
122  Rookes v . Barnard, (1964) A.C. 1129. 
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"An award of  exemplary damages can serve a useful  
purpose in vindicat ing the strength of  the law and thus 
af fording a pract ical  justi f icat ion for  admitt ing into the civi l  
law a principle which ought logical ly to belong to the 
criminal.  More important is the part icular just i f icat ion which 
is put by way of  a contrast between public servants on the 
one hand and private corporat ions and individuals on the 
other.  W ith the latter where one man is more powerful than 
another, i t  is inevi table that he wil l  t ry to use his power to 
gain his ends; and if  his power is much greater than the 
other's,  he might, perhaps, be said to be using it  
oppressively. I f  he uses his power i l legally,  he must of  
course pay for his i l legal i ty in the ordinary way; but he is 
not to be punished simply because he is the more 
powerful.  In the case of  the government i t  is dif ferent ,  for 
the servants of  the government are also the servants of the 
people and the use of  their power must always be 
subordinate to their duty of  serv ice.”123 
 
Accordingly, the facts of  Rookes i tself ,  which concerned 
trade unions and t rade disputes, fel l  outside this category. 
I t  may be a matter for speculat ion how far the House, in 
select ing this category, was really impressed by the 
dif ference in the context of damages between the public  
and private sectors and how far i t  was mot ivated by the 
need to retain some scope for exemplary damages in order 
not to appear to be act ing too caval ier ly with the doctr ine 
of  precedent;  in such a search, what better author it ies to 
leave standing than those in which exemplary damages 
had originated? In Broome  v.  Cassell  & Co. (1972) A.C. 1027.124 
                                      
123  Rookes v . Barnard, (1964)  A.C.  1129  at 1226. 
124  Broome  v.  Cassell  &  Co. (1972)  A.C. 1027. 
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Lord Diplock doubted whether today it  was sti l l  necessary 
to retain this category. From the aforesaid analysis and 
comparison of  many cases of  English and Indian Courts,  
that wi l l  fal l  within i t ,  hardly being ful l  of  cases of  actions 
ar is ing out of oppressive conduct of public  servants, which 
had attracted exemplary damages awards. I t  was said that  
i t  was probably true to say that the f irst  three cases of  the 
opening salvo in the campaign for exemplary damages125 
are the only decisions of  the past  two centuries, which 
survive. af ter Rookes, by v irtue of  fal l ing with in this  
category, whi le Holden v. Chief Constable of Lancashire,126 
coming nearly  a quarter of  a century af ter Rookes and 
involving a wrongful arrest by a police of f icer, was a so far 
isolated latter day i l lust rat ion.127 While i t  has been said that 
the retent ion of Lord Devl in's f irst  category has al lowed 
exemplary damages to cont inue to play an important role in 
the protect ion of civi l  l ibert ies i t  is nevertheless suggested 
that the posit ion has not basical ly al tered f rom the posit ion 
as it  was stated in the last edit ion, for reasons,  which wil l  
appear.  
 
Three condit ions must be sat isf ied before a f irst  category 
case can be establ ished. The f irst  concerns the conduct  of 
the defendant.  This has to be shown to be, in Lord Devl in's  
words, oppressive,  arbitrary or unconst itut ional and, while 
i t  was said in Holden v. Chief Constable of Lancashire128 
that unconst itutional act ion would suff ice without the need 
for addit ional oppressive or arbit rary behaviour,  so that in 
                                      
125  Huckle v.  Money, (1763)  2  Wils.  K.B.  205;  Wilkes v.  Woods, 
(1763)  Lofft 1; Benson v.   Frederick  (1766)  3  Burr.  1845. 
126  Holden v . Chief Constable o f Lancashire,  (1987)  Q.B.  380,  
C.A. 
127  Att.-Gen. of St Chiristopher, Nevis and Auguilla v. Reynolds, (1980) 
A.C. 637,  P.C.  
128  Holden v . Chief  Constable of Lancashire, (1987)  Q.B.  380, 
C.A. 
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ef fect the three epithets fal l  to be read disjunct ively,  i t  is 
thought that unconsti tut ional act ion wil l  not suf f ice without  
the presence of  aggravating features; the central  
requirement for exemplary damages has always been,  as 
already said, the presence of outrageous conduct,  
disclosing mal ice,  f raud, insolence,  cruel ty and the l ike, 
and the anomaly of  exemplary damages is not to be 
widened now. Thus Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. in A.B. v. 
South West Water Services129 described the public 
nuisance there negligent ly committed as being "qui te 
unlike the abuses of power which Lord Devl in had in mind".  
 
The second condit ion to open the door to a f irst  category 
award concerns the status of the defendant.  Lord Devl in in 
Rookes spoke of servants of  the government but in Broome 
their Lordships were agreed that that term was to be widely 
interpreted so as to include not only Crown servants but  
also the police and local and other off ic ials.130 This wide 
approach has caused it  to be suggested in Columbia 
Picture Industries v. Robinson131 that sol ic itors execut ing 
an Anton Pi l ler order as of f icers of  the court,  and in R. v. 
Reading J.J.,  ex. p. South West Meat132 that off icers of  the 
Agricul tural  Produce Intervent ion Board, are inc luded. 
Even where the defendant is clear ly within the def init ion of 
government servant i t  must be established that the act  
complained of  has been done in the exerc ise of  a 
governmental funct ion. In Bradford City Council v.  Arora133 
the select ion of an employee by a local authority,  
improperly made by reason of  sexual and racial  
                                      
129  A.B. v . South West Water  Serv ices, (1993)  Q.B.  507,  C.A. 
130  Broome  v.  Cassell  &  Co. (1972)  A.C. 1027. 
131  Columbia Pic ture Industr ies  v. Robinson,  (1987)  Ch. 38. 
132  R. v . Reading J .J.,  ex . p. South West Meat,  (1992)  Crim. 
L.R. 672. 
133  Bradford Ci ty Counc i l  v .  Arora, (1991) 2  Q.B.  507, C.A. 
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discriminat ion, was held to const itute the exercise of  a 
governmental funct ion and the argument that the author ity 
was act ing in a private capacity was rejected. Nevertheless 
Neil l  L.J.  was of  the view that there might be cases where 
the carrying out of a duty by a junior off icer of such an 
authori ty might not  be the exercise of  a publ ic funct ion and 
indeed in Holden v. Chief Constable of Lancashire134 the 
court s imi lar ly was not prepared to accept that every act of 
a pol ice off icer without authori ty brought the category into 
play. And in A.B. v.  South West Water Serv ice135 the 
defendant,  a nat ionalised body set up under statute for  the 
commercial purpose of  supplying water to the public,  was 
held by the Court of  Appeal not to be with in the f i rst  
category because in i ts commercial  act iv it ies i t  was not  
act ing as an instrument or agent of  government. Moreover,  
with today's trend towards privat isation such bodies are 
l ikely to cease even being government servants; indeed the 
defendant in A.B.,  though a publ ic body at the t ime of  the 
inc idents complained of ,  had since been privat ised.  
 
(b)   Second common law category: conduct 
calculated to result in profit:  
 
The second of the two common law categories comprises 
cases in which,  again in Lord Devl in 's words in Rookes,  
"the defendant 's conduct has been calculated by him to 
make a prof it  for  himself  which may exceed the 
compensation payable to the plaint i f f ".136 As with the f irst  
common law category, the general  just i f icat ion advanced 
was that here exemplary damages could serve a useful  
purpose in vindicat ing the law's st rength, but,  once again, 
                                      
134  Holden v. Chief Constable of Lancashire,  (1987)  Q.B. 380, 
C.A. 
135  A.B. v . South West Water  Serv ice, (1993)  Q.B.  507,  C.A. 
136  Rookes v . Barnard, (1964)  A.C.  1129  at  1230. 
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i t  is the part icular just i f icat ion, which is the more 
important.  Lord Devlin in his c lassic words has said: 
 
"Where a defendant with a cynical disregard for  a 
plaint i f f 's r ights has calculated that the money to be made 
out of  his wrongdoing wi l l  probably exceed the damages at 
r isk, i t  is necessary for the law to show that i t  cannot  be 
broken with impunity.  This category is not conf ined to 
money making in the st r ict  sense. I t  extends to cases in 
which the defendant is seeking to gain at the expense of  
the plaint i f f  some object perhaps some property which he 
covets-which he ei ther could not obtain at al l  or not obtain 
except at a pr ice greater than he wants to put down."  
 
(c)  Express authorisation by statute: 
 
In the past,  i t  has been known for statutes expressly to 
empower the courts to award exemplary damages in 
respect  of particular wrongs where this is  just i f ied by the 
conduct  of  the defendant.  However, the early statutes so 
providing, which are the Dist ress for Rent Acts of 1689 
and 1737 and the Landlord and Tenant Act of  1730, did 
not refer to exemplary damages as such but enacted that 
the plaint i f f should be ent it led to double damages or in 
one case to treble damages. Clearly,  the House of  Lords 
in Rookes had no opt ion but to accept these dictates of 
statute,  and therefore no quest ion of  rat ionalising the 
inc idence of  exemplary damages in this category arose. 
Nevertheless, statutory provisions of  this nature before 
Rookes were extremely few, and beyond these early 
statutes there exis ted only two, the Reserve and Auxil iary 
Forces (Protection of  Civi l  Interests) Act 1951 and the 
Copyr ight Act 1956, both of  which, as wi l l  be seen, were 
equivocal on the issue. Understandably, now that 
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exemplary damages have been general ly prohibi ted, none 
has appeared-or at  least none has clearly appeared-s ince.  
Lord Devl in 's only i l lustrat ion in Rookes v. Barnard137 was 
indeed the Reserve and Auxil iary Forces (Protect ion of 
Civi l  Interests) Act  1951, a statute of  a somewhat esoteric 
nature, which gave by Part I  protect ion to servicemen 
against remedies involving interference with goods, such 
as execut ion, dis tress and the l ike, and provided by 
sect ion 13(2) that in any act ion for damages for convers ion 
in respect of  such goods the court  may take into account  
the defendant 's conduct and award exemplary damages. In 
Broome Lord Ki lbrandon interpreted "exemplary" in sect ion 
13(2) as meaning "aggravated",  basing this interpretat ion 
upon the fact that the subsect ion appl ies, by section 13(6),  
to Scot land where exemplary damages are not 
recognised.138 Indeed he expressed himself  as "not 
convinced that any statutory example of  the recognit ion of  
the doctr ine is  to be found", and appears to have taken the 
view that  with the confusion of terminology before Rookes, 
al l  references to exemplary damages in pre-Rookes 
statutes should be treated as referr ing to aggravated dam-
ages, putt ing forward the ingenious suggest ion that,  to 
make sense of  the provision in the surv ival of  act ions 
legislat ion of  1934 prohibit ing "exemplary" damages in 
act ions by, but not against,  the estate, "exemplary" must 
be read as "aggravated".  
 
Certainly,  where there is a statute which makes no express 
reference to exemplary damages but is so phrased as to 
permit  an authorisat ion to award exemplary damages to be 
inferred, such an inference is now not l ikely to be drawn. 
This si tuat ion arises with the Copyr ight,  Designs and 
                                      
137  Rookes v . Barnard, (1964) A.C. 1129. 
138  Broome  v.  Cassell  &  Co. (1972)  A.C. 1027. 
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Patents Act 1988,  which by sect ion 97(2) gives the court 
power, in assessing damages for an inf ringement of 
copyright, to award such "addit ional damages" as the court  
may consider appropriate in the l ight of  the f lagrancy of the 
inf r ingement and any benef it  accruing to the defendant  by 
reason of  i t ;  a provision in similar terms is introduced for 
act ions for inf ringement of  design r ight by sect ion 229(3).  
The predecessor of  sect ion 97(2),  sect ion 17(3) of  the 
Copyr ight Act 1956 which essential ly said the same, had 
been held in Will iams v. Sett le139 to permit  an award of  
exemplary damages, but Lord Devl in reserved his 
opinion in Rookes v. Barnard140 as to whether the Act 
"author ises an award of  exemplary, as dist inct from 
aggravated, damages". Yet the answer to this question 
would appear to be impl ici t  in Lord Devl in's own speech: 
since he was careful to phrase this category in terms of 
exemplary damages which are expressly authorised by 
statute, the provision of  the Copyr ight,  Designs and 
Patents Act 1988 must fal l  outs ide i ts ambit .  In Broome, 
while Lord Ki lbrandon expressed himself  as sat isf ied that 
the sect ion in i ts 1956 version did not authorise exemplary 
damages,141 Lord Hai lsham L.c. said that even if  i t  did-and 
he considered the point an open one-Wil l iams v. Sett le142 
should be regarded as a case fal l ing within the second 
common law category as the defendant 's motive was 
prof it .143  
 
 
 
 
                                      
139  Will iams v . Sett le, (1960)  1  W.L.R. 1072, C.A. 
140  Rookes v . Barnard, (1964) A.C. 1129. 
141  Broome  v.  Cassell  &  Co. (1972)  A.C. 1027. 
142  Will iams v . Sett le,  (1960)  1 W.L.R. 1072, C.A. 
143  Broome  v.  Cassell  &  Co. (1972)  A.C. 1027. 
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(3)  The amount of the exemplary award:  
  
(I)   Various criteria applied by the courts: 
 
In so far as the object of exemplary damages is to 
punish, the calculat ion of the amount to be awarded 
must clearly be based on cr iteria dif ferent from those 
employed in the calculat ion of compensatory damages. 
Over the years various criter ia have been advanced, and 
some accepted, as relevant to the calculat ion; now, in 
par ticular, in Rookes v.  Barnard144 Lord Devlin,  speaking 
for al l  their Lordships, has stated three consider-
ations145, which should always be borne in mind when 
awards of exemplary damages are in issue.  
 
(a)  The plaintiff to be the victim of the 
punishable behaviour: 
 
Lord Devl in's f irst rul ing was that  a plaint if f  cannot 
recover exemplary damages unless he is the vict im of 
the punishable behaviour . I t  is dif f icult ,  however, to see 
that there is any real scope for the operation of  such a 
rule, a rule indeed that had not appeared before in the 
cases. Since it is general ly accepted law that causes of  
action cannot be assigned by act of part ies, the only 
important si tuation in which the victim is not the 
plaint if f  is where he has died and suit is being brought 
by his estate.  But this situation has already been 
provided for by statute; the Law Reform (Miscel laneous 
Provisions) Act 1934, in providing for the survival of  
wrongful act, expressly stated that damages in an 
action for the benef it  of the estate should not inc lude 
                                      
144  Rookes v. Barnard, (1964)  A.C. 1129. 
145  Broome v. Cassel l  &  Co. Ltd . ,  (1972)  A.C.  1027. 
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any exemplary damages. Perhaps Lord Devl in should 
be taken as intending only to endorse the statutory 
rule; yet i t  may be doubted whether the statutory rule is 
itself  a part icularly sound one.  
 
(b)  Moderation in awards:  
 
Next, on a more general note, Lord Devlin considered 
that awards of exemplary damages should be moderate.  
Some of the awards that jur ies have made in the past 
seemed to him. And in Broome v.  Cassel l & Co.146 Lord 
Hailsham L.C. said that, while himself  unable to fol low 
Lord Devlin:  
 
"So far as regards the r ight of  appellate courts to interfere 
with jury awards on princ iples dif ferent f rom the t radit ional 
nor,  I  think, with the proposal that Benhom v. Gambbing147 
of fers a precedent for arbit rary l imits imposed by the 
judiciary in defamation cases. I  regard it  as extremely 
important  that,  for  the future, judges should make sure in 
their direct ion to jur ies that  the jury is ful ly aware of  the 
danger of  an excessive award.”  
 
I t  is true that in Broome the House of Lords was upholding 
an exemplary award of  £25,000, now worth near ly 
£200,000, but various features of  this decis ion need to be 
remembered: that the decision was one of  a bare majority,  
three out  of  a ful l  House of  seven being prepared to upset  
the award as excessive; that the majority was swayed by 
the great reluctance of  the courts  to interfere with the 
damages award of  a jury and that Lord Diplock's "doubt i f  
                                      
146  Broome v. Cassel l  & Co.,  (1972)  A.C. 1027. 
147  Benhom v. Gambbing, (1941) A.C.J . 157 (H.L.)  
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any of  your Lordships would have hesitated to interfere 
with i t i f  i t  had been awarded by a judge si tt ing alone"148 
was amply just i f ied f rom what was said in the speeches;  
that Lord Morris regarded the "case as exceptional in the 
sense that the jury must have considered that the conduct 
of  the defendants merited very special condemnation".  In 
John v. MGN149 the Court of  Appeal awarded £75,000 by 
way of  exemplary damages in a l ibel  case, a f igure which 
may not appear to be so very moderate, but there were 
other factors to be taken into considerat ion such as the 
wealth of  the defendant,  a cr iter ion dealt  with below; 
furthermore, the award was in subst itut ion for the far 
higher one made by the jury of  £275,000. Certainly 
moderat ion is much more in evidence in the cases of  
trespass and nuisance brought by evicted tenants than in 
the l ibel cases. Drane v. Evangelou150 and Guppy (Bridport)  
v. Brookling and James,151 also dealt  with below, produced 
awards of  £1,000 and later cases have ranged f rom £1,000 
to £3,000; many such awards too have been of  aggravated 
and exemplary damages combined.   
 
(c)  The means of the parties:  
 
The third consideration propounded by Lord Devl in was 
the means of the part ies. Clearly,  a small exemplary 
award would go unnot iced by a rich defendant whi le 
even a moderate award might cr ipple a poor defendant, 
so that for the s ize of  the defendant's bank balance to 
inf luence the size of the award is ful ly appropriate. This 
has probably always been the impl icit  practice of the 
                                      
148  Broome v. Cassel l  & Co.,  (1972)  A.C. 1027 at 1122 E. 
149  John v . MGN, (1996) 2  All  E.R. 35, C.A. 
150  Drane v . Evangelou,  (1978)  1  W.L.R.  455, C.A. 
151  Guppy (Bridpor t)  v . Brook l ing and James, (1983)  1  H.L.R.  
1, C.A.   
  
- 478 - 
courts; indeed i t was expl ici t ly recognised r ight at the 
start of exemplary damages in Benson v. Frederick,152 
and today in John v. MGN i t  was said that i t was not 
there disputed that the defendant's great wealth was a 
relevant consideration. On the other hand, i t  is di f f icult  to 
see how the means of the plaint i f f  can have any real 
relevance to the amount to be awarded on an exemplary 
basis.  
 
(d)  The conduct of the parties:  
 
The part ies'  conduct has also been taken into account in 
the past and, though unmentioned by Lord Devl in,  would 
appear to remain today a relevant consideration in 
assessing exemplary damages. Thus the court may take 
into account, according to the decision in Praed v. 
Graham,153 the conduct of the defendant r ight down to 
the t ime of judgment, and also, according to the view 
expressed in Greenlands v. Wilmshurst,154 the conduct of  
the defendant 's counsel at the tr ia l.  An apology by the 
defendant in the witness box would make a di f ference in 
his favour, according to Singleton L.J. in Loudon v.  
Ryder,155 while persistence in the charge might increase 
exemplary damages.156 Similar ly, the conduct of the 
plaint if f  may be mater ial to the assessment. Thus if  the 
plaint if f  has provoked an assault  by the defendant, and 
assuming c ircumstances which would today admit of an 
exemplary award, then, as was said in Lane v. 
                                      
152  Benson v. Freder ick, (1766)  3  Burr.  1845. 
153  Praed v. Graham,  (1890)  24 Q.B.D. 53, C.A. (libel).   
154  Greenlands v. Wilmshurst,  (1913)  3 K.B.  507,  at  532 (libel). 
155  Loudon v. Ryder,  (1953)  2 Q.B. 202, C.A. at  207 (assault). 
156  Warwick v. Faulkes  (1844)  12  M. &  W.  507;  Walter v. Alltools  
(1944)  61  T.L.R. 39,  C.A. 
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Holloway,157 the provocation would be "relevant to the 
quest ion of  whether or not exemplary damages should be 
awarded, and, i f  so, how much".158 
 
(e)  The relevance of the amount awarded as 
compensation  
 
While the assessment of  compensation can never be 
af fected by the amount awarded by way of  exemplary 
damages, the converse is not t rue. The size of  an 
exemplary award may indeed be inf luenced by the size of 
the compensatory one. Thus Lord Devl in in Rookes v.  
Barnard159 indicated that,  in a case where exemplary 
damages were appropriate:   
 
"a jury should be directed that i f ,  but only i f ,  the sum which 
they have in mind to award as compensation (which may, 
of  course, be a sum aggravated by the way in which the 
defendant has behaved to the plaint i f f )  is inadequate to 
punish him for his outrageous conduct,  to mark their 
disapproval of  such conduct and to deter him from 
repeating it ,  then it  can award some larger sum."  
 
There is no reason why the same principle should not  
apply to awards made by judges si tt ing a lone. This 
pr inciple was ful ly endorsed by al l  seven of their Lordships 
in Broome v. Cassel l & CO.160 and its operat ion is well  
i l lust rated by Drane v. Evangelol l161 where a landlord 
resorted to trespass by forcible entry in order to evict  his  
                                      
157  Lane v. Holloway,  (1968)  1  Q.B. 379,  C.A., at  391. 
158  O'Connor v. Hewitson (1979) Crim.L.R. 46. C.A.; McMillan v. SinKh 
(1914) 17 H.L.R. 120. CA.; Greenlands v. Wilmshurst (1913) 3 K.B. 
507, C.A .. at 532; Tolley v. Fry (1930) 1 K.B. 467. CA. at 476.  
159  Rookes v . Barnard, (1964)  A.C.  1129  at  1228. 
160  Broome v. Cassel l  & CO.,  (1972) A.C.1027.  
161  Drane v . Evangelol l ,  (1978) 1 W.L.R. 455, C.A. 
  
- 480 - 
protected tenant and the Court of  Appeal upheld the county 
court judge's decision that such monstrous behaviour 
cal led for exemplary damages of  £1,000. While Lord 
Denning M.R. was content to view the award simply as one 
of  exemplary damages and endorse i t  as such, Lawton and 
Goff  L.JJ. thought that i t  could be just i f ied as an amalgam 
of  aggravated damages and exemplary damages.  Both 
indeed considered that the award was not excessive as 
one for aggravated damages only,  but said that,  even 
assuming in the landlord's favour that i t  was excessive as 
such, they had, in Gof f  L.J. 's words, "not the sl ightest  
doubt that the aggregate included an element of 
punishment which was not in the circumstances excessive" 
 
And in Guppy (Bridport) v.  Brookling and James,162 where a 
simi lar act ion by tenants against their landlord succeeded 
in nuisance rather than trespass, an award of  £1,000 which 
combined exemplary and compensatory elements was 
again upheld by the court of  appeal.   In  John v. MGN163 
Lord Devlin 's  " i f ,  but only i f " test,  as i t  was there called, 
was expl ici t ly appl ied; the result  of  i ts applicat ion was st i l l  
to require an exemplary award.  In  so far as the object of  
exemplary damages is to deter  f rom wrongful  conduct,  the 
real isat ion of  this object wi l l  generally require that a 
potent ial wrong doer should know that he may have to pay 
exemplary damages even if  he has not caused any 
signif icant loss to the plaint i f f ;  i f ,  on the other hand,  his  
Course of act ion wi l l  c learly cause the plaint i f f  substant ial  
damage for which he wi l l  be required to pay, that in i tself  
should prove a suf f icient deterrent. 
 
                                      
162  Guppy (Br idport)  v . Brook l ing and James,  (1983)  14 H.L.R.   
1, C.A. 
163  John v . MGN, (1996) 2  All E.R.  35,  C.A. 
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(f)   The irrelevance of the judge's cri ticism in his 
judgment: 
 
I t  was at  one t ime suggested that the fact that the judge, 
where he is sit t ing alone, has severely cr i t ic ised the 
defendant in his judgment should be taken into 
considerat ion to reduce the exemplary award. In  Rook v. 
Fairr ie164 the princ iple had been laid down by the Court of 
Appeal that,  whereas a jury cannot mark their sense of  the 
grossness of  a l ibel in any other way than by awarding 
heavy damages, a judge may take into account,  as a 
ground for awarding less than a jury would probably al low, 
that he has been able to express his views in h is judgment. 
This principle, capable of  appl ication, has af ter  a cold 
recept ion165 by the Court of  Law eventually been 
disapproved by the House of  Lords in Dingle v. Associated 
Newspapers,166 which was again an act ion for l ibel.  While 
this  disapproval was obiter, as it  did not appear that  the 
judge at f irst  instance had awarded smal ler damages 
because he had expressed his views in h is judgment,  i t  
was a very f i rm one and was expressed by al l  their  
Lordships. Lord Morton, with whose remarks the rest of  
their Lordships agreed, and also Lord Denning, pointed out  
that the judge could not know what ef fect his vindicat ion 
would have, as he could nei ther ensure that  the 
newspapers would give it  adequate public ity nor know how 
far the plaint i f f 's general reputat ion would be improved by 
his complimentary remarks. These arguments do indeed 
suggest that their Lordships were examining the rule in i ts 
relat ion to compensatory damages for aggravated injury,167 
                                      
164  Rook v . Fairr ie,  (1941)  1  K.B. 507,  C.A. 
165
  Knuppfer v. London Express Newspaper (1943) K.B. 80. CA., at 91.; 
Bull v. Vazquez [1947] I All E.R. 334, CA .. at 336-337.  
166  Dingle v . Assoc iated Newspapers , (1964)  A.C.  371. 
167  Rookes v. Barnard, (1964) A.C.1129. 
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but the disapproval of the Rook v. Fairrie168 princ iple 
appears to be a wise one even in the context of  exemplary 
damages proper, since it  is doubtful  how far a defendant 
meri t ing punishment wil l  be affected by adverse comments 
of  one of  Her Majesty's judges as opposed to the 
extract ion of money f rom his pocket.   
 
(g)  The position with joint  wrongdoers: 
 
Where joint wrongdoers are sued together,  the conduct of 
one defendant does not al low exemplary damages to be 
awarded in the single judgment which must be entered 
against al l  i f  the conduct of  the other defendant  or 
defendants does not mer it  punishment. This was the v iew 
of  Pollock B. in Clark v. Newsam,169 and is now f inal ly 
established by the House of Lords in Broome v. Cassel l & 
CO. 170 However, in so far as an award of  aggravated 
damages is being made, then the aggregate award should 
take into account both the aggravat ion engendered by the 
one defendant and the absence of  aggravation on the part  
of  the other or others. This was the view of  Alderson B.,  
also in Clark v. Newsam,171 and was adopted by Slesser 
L.J. in Chapman v. Ellesmere.172 The pract ical applicat ion 
of  these basical ly complementary rules should be easier 
now that a c lear demarcat ion between exemplary damages 
and aggravated damages has been established, but i t  must 
be said that in Broome v. Cassell  & CO.173 Lord Wilberforce 
and Lord Diplock indicated in obiter dicta, apparent ly not 
concurred in by Lord Reid, that they would apply the rule 
                                      
168  Rook v . Fairr ie,  (1941)  1  K.B. 507, C.A. 
169  Clark v . Newsam, (1847)  1  Ex. 131  at  141. 
170  Broome v. Cassel l  &   CO. ,  (1972)  A.C.  1027.   
171  Clark v . Newsam,  (1847)  1  Ex. 131  at  141. 
172  Chapman v.  E l lesmere,.  (1932)  2  K.B.  431, C.A.; at  471-472. 
173  Broome v. Cassel l  &  CO.  (1972)  A.C.  1027. 
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that the House was unanimously establ ishing for exemplary 
damages to aggravated damages as wel l.   
 
( II )   The irrelevance of the cri teria to the second 
common law category:  
 
Yet whi le the applicat ion of these cr iter ia to the 
assessment of  the award no doubt makes sense where the 
aim of  the court  is in truth the punishment of  the 
defendant,  they have l i t t le or no relevance where the so-
cal led exemplary damages are designed to operate as an 
indirect method for extract ing prof its wrongful ly obtained 
by the defendant.174 This proposit ion may be tested against 
any of  the cr iteria dealt  with above,  but i t  wi l l  suff ice to 
examine it  in relat ion to a few of  them and it  is probably 
best to take the three considerat ions which Lord Devlin 
required to be borne in mind when awarding exemplary 
damages. Thus, i f  a defendant 's unjust enrichment is to be 
prevented,  awards should not be moderate or indeed 
immoderate, but should be geared to the prof it  obtained or 
obtainable by the defendant;  s imilar ly, awards should be 
inf luenced not by the overall  means of  the defendant but 
by the amount that he stands to gain from his conduct.  
Moreover, dif f icult  enough as it  is to see why a defendant 
should only be punished where the plaint i f f  is the vict im of  
the punishable behaviour,  i t  is even more dif f icult  to be 
persuaded that he should lose his prof it  only i f  he is sued 
by the person upon whom he has inf l icted the wrong. If  
exemplary damages are now largely to be used as an 
indirect means of prevent ing the unjust enr ichment of  a 
wrongdoer, i t  is certainly t ime to remove, or at least  
qualify,  the statutory prohibit ion of  exemplary damages in 
act ions brought by the estate of  a deceased vict im.  For i t  
                                      
174  Malo v. Adams [1970] 1 O.B. 548, C.A,  
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must not be forgotten, when evaluat ing the various criter ia 
for assessment which have developed over the years and 
which, either in general or in part icular,  have been re-
stated by Lord Devl in, that i t  is this  second common law 
category relat ing to conduct br inging prof it  in  i ts train 
which seems dest ined to dominate the exemplary damages 
scene in  the future; the f irst common law category is 
thought now to have a comparat ively small compass and 
the statutory category certainly an ins ignif icant one. 
 
In certain circumstances, the court may award more than 
the normal measure of  damages, by taking into account 
the defendant 's motives or conduct.  Such damages may 
be:175  
   
( i)  'aggravated damages',  which are compensatory in 
that they compensate the v ictim of  a wrong for 
mental  distress, or injury to feel ings,  in 
circumstances in which that  injury has been caused 
or increased by the manner in which the defendant  
committed the wrong,  or the defendant 's conduct  
subsequent to the wrong; or 
 
( i i )  'Exemplary damages'  are intended to make an 
example of  the defendant;  they are punit ive and not  
intended to compensate the plaint i f f  for any loss,  
bur rather to punish the defendant.   
 
While aggravated damages are of compensatory nature, 
exemplary damages are punit ive in nature.  
 
                                      
175  Halsbury’s Law of England, ‘Damages’, Fourth Edn., reissue, Vol. 12, 
para 811.   
  
- 485 - 
The English Law Commission has recommended176 for 
enact ing a legis lat ion providing that aggravated damages 
may be awarded only to compensate a person for h is or  
her mental  d istress rather than to punish the defendant for 
his or her conduct ,  and that,  wherever possible, the term 
'damages for mental  distress'  should be used instead of  
'aggravated damages' . It  also recommended that  
'exemplary'  or 'punit ive' damages being damages awarded 
if  in committ ing the wrong, or later, deliberately and 
outrageously d isregarded the plainti ff 's r ights, but that  
such damages should not  be awarded for breach of  
contract.   
  
Exemplary damages are those awarded against the 
defendant as a punishment, and hence the assessment 
exceeds compensation to the plaint i f f.  These are awarded 
not to compensate the claimant,  nor even to strip the 
defendant of  his  prof i t,  but to express the court 's  
disapproval of  the defendant 's conduct,  e.g.,  where he has 
deliberately committed a wrong with a v iew to prof i t .177 
Exemplary damages could be awarded in cases of  breach 
of  promise to marry,178 unt i l  th is cause of  act ion was 
abolished there in the year 1970.  Punit ive damages are not  
avai lable under the Engl ish law in an act ion for breach of 
contract.179 In Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd,180 i t  was held 
that exemplary damages could not  be awarded for wrongful  
dismissal,  and no compensation was payable on the 
ground that the plainti f f 's feelings were injured due to the 
                                      
176  The Report of the (English) Law Commission (Law Com no 247 of 
1997) on 'Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages.' 
177  Treitel, Tenth Edn., The Law of Contract, p. 872. 
178  Quirk v. Thomas, (1916)  1 KB  516. 
179  Perera v Vtmdiyar [1953] 1 All ER 1109 : [1953] 1 WLR 672 (CA); 
Reed v Madon [1989] Ch 408 : [1989] 2 All ER 431;  
180  Addis v  Gramophone Co Ltd ,  (1909)  AC 488. 
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humil iat ing manner in which he was dismissed.181 The 
Canadian view is that punit ive damages may be awarded, 
albeit  rarely,  in contract cases.182  
 
The rules in law of  contract for remoteness of  damages are 
quite narrow in compare to rules for remoteness of 
damages. In Addis v Gramophone Co. L td , 183 the House of 
Lords held that aggravated damages cannot be awarded in 
an act ion for breach of  contract.  I t  has, however, been held 
that where elements of f raud, oppression, malice or the 
l ike are found, the court may grant vindict ive or  exemplary 
damages by way of punishment to the wrongdoer.184 
 
This kind of  damages is sometime called v indict ive or puni-
t ive damages. They are intended not merely to award 
adequate compensation to the in jured party but also to 
punish the wrongdoer. In other words, they are intended to 
be in solat ium to the pla int i f f  and in terrorem to the public.  
The interest of society and of  the aggrieved party is 
blended together and the damages are given not only to 
recompense the suf ferer but also to punish the of fender.  
They are damages given for "example's sake" and they are 
clearly punit ive or  exemplary in nature. In such an act ion 
there are three dist inct heads of damages, namely (I)  
pecuniary loss. (2) Compensation for wounded feel ings and 
injured pride, and (3) a sum of money of  penal nature in 
addit ion to the compensating damage given for either 
                                      
181  Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce Intl, (1998) AC 20 : (1997) 3 All 
ER  1 (HL). 
182  Vorvis v. Insurance Corpn of British Columbia, (1989) 1 SCR  1085. 
183  Addis v  Gramophone Co. L td ,  [1909] AC 488 : [1908-10] All ER 
Rep I; Bliss v SE Thames Regional Health Authority [1987] ICR 700; 
Alexander v Home Office [1988] 2 All ER 118. 
184  Sheikh Jaru Bepari v AG Peters,  AIR 1942  Cal 493. 
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pecuniary or physical  or mental  suffer ing.185 I t  is not 
suf f icient,  however, merely to show that the defendant has 
committed a wrongful  act,  but his conduct  must be high-
handed, insolent or malic ious.186  
 
Where in a case the reckless conclusions of  the defendant 
may amount to mal ice in law but  no private mal ice or 
personal grudge has been proved and the defendants 
acted throughout in the public interests, i t  was held that i t  
was not a case for exemplary damages.187  
 
I t  is to be noted that in act ion for breach of  contract with 
the exemption of  the breach of  promise of  marriage188 
v indict ive damages are not  granted, inasmuch as the 
motives of  the default ing party never enter  into the 
considerat ion of  the quantum of  damages. "Damages for  
breach of  contract  are in the nature of  compensat ion, not  
punishment":189  
 
Exemplary damages not favoured under Indian law. The 
rule of vindict ive damages has not,  however,  found much 
favour with the Indian High Courts and they have 
repeatedly refused to fol low the Engl ish pract ice of  
grant ing vindict ive damages. Turner,  C.J., in Parvati v.  
Manner190 observed: 'We are unwi l l ing to give our 
adhesion to the pr inciple of  vindictive damages.  The 
object of  civ i l  l i t igat ion should be the remedying of  c iv i l  
injuries. "  
                                      
185  Butterworth v. Butterworth of Eaglefield, I.L.R. (1920) Pat. 126. 
186  Livingstone v. Ranyards Coal Co., (1880) 5  A.C. 25. 
187  L.A. Subramania Iyer v. R.H. Hitchock,  A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 950. 
188  Berry v. De Costa, (1856) 1 A. & N. 408. 
189  Addis v. Gramophone Co. Ltd., (1909) A.C. 488. 
190  Parvat i v. Manner,  I.L.R.  8  Mad. 175  at p.181. 
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In the recent case Sadasiva Iyer. J. has said: "I  shal l  
content myself  with observing that the whole doctrine 
of penal and exemplary damages is due to the 
i l legit imate encroachment of the considerat ions of  
punishment by f ine in criminal jur isprudence into the 
realms of c ivi l l i t igat ion and I wholly deprecate the 
introduction of such complicat ions of the English 
system into India".191  
 
Even in cases of breach of promise of marriage 
vindict ive damages were refused on the ground that  
the condit ions in India are ent irely dif ferent f rom those 
obtaining in England.192 In the same Court,  such 
damages were refused to a very respectable lady who 
was wrongful ly detained by the rai lway authorit ies.193 
In short,  in assessing damages caused by a wrongful 
act the injury sustained should alone be considered 
and not the punishment to be inf l icted.194 And even in 
England. it  has been stated that  where exemplary 
damages have to be granted there must be some 
reasonable proport ion between the wrong done and 
the damages awarded.195 
 
However, the Calcutta and Allahabad High Courts 
would seem to favour the grant of vindict ive or 
exemplary damages in cases where the conduct of the 
defendant was not that of an honest man and was 
                                      
191  Naganatha  Sastri  v.  Subramanya  Iyer, 32 M.L.J. 392 at p. 398 :  
5  L.W. 598. 
192  Abdul Rasak v. Mohammud Hussain, 38 I.C. 771. 
193  Kasturbai v. G.I.P. Rly. Co., A.I.R.  1923  Bom.  172 at p. 172. 
194  Bulbaddar Singh v. Solamo, 5 W.R. 107. 
195  Greenlands Ltd. v. Willmshurst and London Association, (1933) 3 K.B.  
507 at p. 532. 
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actuated by no improper motive or mal ice. Thus where 
the defendant was found guilty of persistence in a 
proved nuisance exemplary damages were granted by 
the Calcutta High Court.196  
 
Again in the case of wil lful continuance of t respass by a 
defendant who took a r isk and persisted in f ight ing 
when he knew or ought to know that he was wrong the 
Allahabad High Court granted damages part ly in 
terrorem  to the other persons who might be disposed to 
act as the defendant had done.197 And the same Court  
expressed the opinion that, where a person's name was 
omitted f rom the electoral rol l of a certain const ituency 
and he was thereby deprived of the r ight to vote. The 
same Court held that exemplary damages may be 
awarded, if  the defendant acted malic iously.198  
 
But  the Madras High Court199 in similar circumstances 
granted only nominal damages Rs.50. The Nagpur High 
Court has, however,  expressed the opinion that  the rule 
of exemplary damages is not l imited to act ions in 
trespass, and appl ied the rule in an act ion against  a 
rai lway company for compensat ion for injury caused to 
a consignment of  goods made over to them as a result  
of the cont inuous negligence of their servants.200 
 
In al l these cases, however,  owing to the existence of  
aggravating circumstances, substant ial damages were 
granted to the plaint iffs as a solat ium  to the injury they 
suffered.  
                                      
196  J.C. Galstaun v. Dunia Lal Seal, 9 C.W. N. 612. 
197  Sohan Lal v. Amba Prasad, A.I.R.  1922 All. 526 at p. 526. 
198  Municipal Board, Agra v. Asharfi Ali, A.I.R.  1992 All. 1 at pp.3,4. 
199  Draviyam Pillai v. Cruz Fernandez, 31 I.C. 322. 
200  Sitaram v. G.I.P. Ry. Co., A.I.R. 1947 Nag. 224 at pp.227, 228. 
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This k ind of award serves a double purpose, according 
to the major ity view of American Courts, viz. 
punishment of defendant and, at the same t ime 
compensat ion to the plaintif f  for intangible harm not 
otherwise compensable, thus compensat ing him more 
fully. Subject,  however,  to the requirement of  a 
reasonable relation between compensatory and 
exemplary damages.201 
 
No vindict ive damages against  Secretary of State.-It  
must, however, be noted that. in any view, no 
vindict ive damages can be awarded against the 
Secretary of State because damages recovered from 
the Secretary of  State are in t ruth,  recovered from the 
tax-payer who has done no wrong to the plaint iffs.202 At 
any rate it  seems expedient that, in proper cases, the 
off icer, for whose wrongful acts the Secretary of  State 
is sought to be made l iable, should also be sued so as 
to leave it  to the discret ion of the Government to 
determine how far the damages should be borne by the 
default ing off icer and how far, i f at al l,  borne by the 
public.  
   
Where the Court f inds that the conduct of the public 
off icer is high-handed, insolent or mischievous, and 
that the wrong suffered by the plaint if f is t raceable to 
the wil l ful and insolent conduct of the off icer, there is 
no reason to refuse substant ial if  not vindict ive 
damages to the plaint if f .  
 
                                      
201  (1947)  61 Harvard Law Review, pp. 119, 120. 
202  Beramji v. Secretary of State for India, 1887 P. J. 205. 
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9.4 OTHER TYPES OF DAMAGES: 
 
9.4.1 Moral Damages:  
 
These damages are such as can be awarded to a 
person who has a special dignity by virtue of an off ice, 
rel igious or secular, which he is ent it led to maintain 
against any person who intent ionally insults or in any 
way lowers the dignity of such off ice. Moral damages 
are always dif f icult  to est imate in money value, and the 
posit ion of the plaint if f as respected member of the 
public, and the holder of an off ice, has to be taken into 
considerat ion.203  
 
In addit ion to the three kinds of damages, nominal, 
general or ordinary, and special or part icular damages, 
there are certain other terms employed in order to 
indicate the degree of damages, which may be 
awarded. 
 
9.4.2 Contemptuous Damages:  
 
The term "contemptuous damages" by its very nature,  
indicates that the Court is incl ined to treat the plaint i f fs 
claim with contempt, and that he is not ent it led to 
anything more than a formal verdict fol lowed by a 
tr if l ing amount towards damages claimed.204 The jury, 
or those who have to discharge the funct ions of jury, 
are ent it led to examine the whole conduct of the 
plaint if f both before and during the act ion, and if  they 
                                      
203
  Chenna Basappa v. Sree Sankara Bharatiswami, AIR 1929 Mad. 493 
at p. 495. 
204  Nadirshaw v. Pirojshaw, 19 I.C. 98 (per Beaman, J.). 
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f ind that it  was the plaint if f  who provoked the wrongful 
act of the defendant, or that he is not entit led to the 
same respect and considerat ion as a thoroughly honest 
and innocent man deserves,  or that  his atti tude is 
highly dissatisfactory,205 they are not bound to give him 
anything more than what are known as contemptuous 
damages. The usual amount granted in such cases in 
English money is one farthing, but in Indian currency 
one rupee or sometimes even one pie is granted 
towards such damages.206 But though the plaint if f  may 
obtain a verdict in his favour he very often stands in 
danger of being deprived of his costs.207 
 
9.4.3 Substantial Damages: 
 
Substantial damages are those damages, which a 
plaint if f,  with a good cause of action, is ent it led to 
receive as a fair and adequate compensat ion for the 
damage he has suffered from the wrongful act of the 
defendant. No extraneous factors are taken into 
considerat ion in the assessment of  such damages and 
the principle of ' rest itut io in integrum’ is more faithful ly 
adhered to. The Courts wil l endeavour to get at that  
sum of money, which wil l  put the party, who has 
suffered, in the same posit ion in which he would have 
been, i f he had not sustained the wrong for which he 
seeks to recover compensat ion.208  
  
 
                                      
205  Kelly v. Sherlock, (1866) 7 B. & S.  480. 
206  Naridshaw v. Pirojshaw, 19 I.C. 98 (per Beaman, J.). 
207  O’Conner v. Star Newspaper Co. Ltd., (1893) 69 L.T. 146. 
208
  Livingstone v. Ranyards Coal Co., (1880) 5 App. Cas. 25; “The 
Columbus”,  (1849) 3 W. Rob.  158. 
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Courts in India more frequently adopt the principle of  
grant ing substant ial damages even in cases of 
aggravated wrongs, and in case of fai lure to prove 
damage that can be measured in money, award209 
nominal damages. Besides where a person has suffered 
injury in respect of his social posit ion and est imat ion,  
substant ial damages wil l  be awarded notwithstanding 
that he may not have sustained a pecuniary loss or 
physical injury by the act complained of.210  
 
There are many authorit ies which established that  
substant ial damages can be claimed where a breach is 
proved even though the calculat ion of damages is “not  
only diff iculty but  incapable of being carr ied out with 
certainty or precis ion”. In al l  these cases, however, the 
extent of breach was established. There was complete 
failure on side to perform contract .211 However, where 
the breach is part ial and the extent  of fai lure is 
unascertained, only nominal damages are awarded.  
The plaint if f  who cannot show that he occupies a worse 
f inancial posit ion after breach than he would have had, 
the contract been performed, can ordinari ly recover 
only nominal damages for breach of contract.212  
 
Where a defendant refuses to accept goods sold to or 
manufactured for him, and the plaint if f  sel ls it to a third 
                                      
209  Keshob Lal Nag v. Jhanendra Nath, 24 I.C. 538. 
210  Bhyron Prasad v. Ishare, 3 N.W. 313; Kasturibai v. G.I.P. Rly. Co., 
AIR 1923 Bom. 172 at p. 172; Nadirshaw v. Pirojshaw, 19 I.C. 98. 
211  Luna Park (NSW) Ltd. v. Tramuways Advertising Proprietary Ltd., 
(1938) 61 CLR 286, p. 301; Chaplin v. Hicks, [1911] 2 KB 786, p. 791; 
Marbe v. George Edwards (Daly’s Theatre) Ltd., [1928] 1 KB 269 : 
[1927] All ER Rep 253; Herert Clayton and Jack Waller Ltd. v. Oliver, 
[1930] AC 209 : [1930] All ER Rep. 414; Withers v. General Theatre 
Corpn., [1933] 2 KB 536 : [1933] ER Rep 385. 
212  Halsbury’s Laws of England, `Damages’, Fourth Edn., reissue, Vol. 
12, para 980. 
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party on the same terms as were agreed to by the 
defendant and makes a similar prof it ,  the plaint if f  is 
ent it led to nominal damages if  the demand exceeds the 
supply of s imilar goods; but if  supply exceeds the 
demand, the plaint if f  wil l be entit led to recover his loss 
of prof it on the defendant ’s contract.213  
 
9.4.4 Prospective Damages: 
 
The term "prospective damages" is used in cases 
where damages are granted to a plaint if f in respect of 
probable future loss or loss which he may 1 reasonably 
be expected to suffer f rom the wrongful act  of  the 
defendant. In such cases, damages, which the plaintif f  
has already suffered, and damages, which he might 
suffer in future, wil l be once for al l assessed in a s ingle 
act ion.  The cause of act ion is s ingle and indiv isible and 
in the very nature of things, therefore prospective 
damages cannot be awarded in a case where a 
cont inuing cause of act ion subsists.  
 
In the assessment of prospect ive damages, that is, of 
loss which is expected to happen in the future, there 
must necessari ly be some degree of vagueness and 
want of precision, and a f inding of future or prospective 
damages wil l not be bad in law merely because it  
cannot be justif ied by the evidence with perfect legal 
accuracy.214  
 
                                      
213  Charter v. Sullivan, [1957] 2 QB 117 : [1957] 1 All ER 809 : [1957] 2 
WLR 528; W.L. Thompson Ltd. v. R. Robinson (Gum Makers) Ltd., 
[1995] Ch 177 : [1955] 1 All Er 154 : [1955] 2 WLR 185. 
214  Koomaree Dasee v. Bama Sundari Dasee, 10 W.R. 202. 
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9.4.5 Consequential Damages: 
 
The term "consequent ial damages" denote those 
damages which fol low as a consequence of a wrongful 
act producing loss of an indirect nature and which, 
however, are so proximate as to be recoverable.  
 
The term "consequential damages" has acquired a 
special s ignif icance in this branch of law. Whenever 
damage fol lows a wrongful act, i t  may, in a broad 
sense, be said to be a consequence of the wrong and 
damages, therefore, be claimed by the injured party.  
But the law does not authorize the award of  
compensat ion in respect of al l damages that f lows out 
of a wrongful act.  There can, properly speaking, be no 
l imits to the damage caused by a wrong. Law has, 
therefore, set certain l imits to the recovery of 
damages. The damages that are suff icient ly proximate 
to the cause of act ion so as to be the natural  
consequence of the wrongful act,  though of an indirect 
nature, are called consequent ial damages and are 
held recoverable in law.215 This is almost the pivot  
upon which the ent ire Law of Damages hinges and 
Courts shall have occasion to discuss it .   
 
9.4.6 Statutory Damages: 
 
In Halsbury's Laws of England, statutory damages are 
described as meaning either the remedy in damages 
provided by some part icular statute, under which the 
                                      
215
  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Exch. 341;  “The Argentino”, (1888) 13 
P.D. 191. 
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act ion is brought, or such damages as are awarded for 
the direct infr ingement of the provisions of a statute or 
for neglect of a statutory duty.216   
 
For Example the remedies provided by the Fatal 
Accidents Act, the Workman’ Compensation Act, etc.  
fall  under the former head, while the damages that can 
be recovered from Railway Companies and other 
statutory bodies for infr ingement of dut ies laid upon 
them by virtue of the provisions of part icular statue fal l  
under the second head.  
 
9.4.7 Irreparable Damages: 
 
Damages, which are impossible to measure, wil l  be 
deemed irreparable damages.217 Such damages can 
only be est imated by conjecture and not by any 
accurate standard.  
 
At one point of t ime, it  was believed that there was a 
general rule that one could not recover the damages for 
certain losses in act ion for breach of contract which 
turns into non-pecuniary losses. But over a period of 
t ime, court comes to a conclusion that there are certain 
losses, which are irreparable in nature on one, or other 
count and those losses can certainly be claimed as 
damages under the head irreparable damages.  
 
A plaint if f who books a holiday with a tour operator may 
recover for loss of enjoyment if  the holiday is spoilt  by 
                                      
216  Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. X, pp. 306 and 307. 
217  London and North-Western Rly. Co. v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Rly. 
Co., (1876) L.R.  4 Exch. 174. 
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a breach of contract.218 The same principle was appl ied 
to an employee who suffered distress through the 
employer’s breach of contract219 (but  this was later said 
to be wrong),220or to a client who suffers distress 
arising out of her solic itor’s incompetent handling of an 
injunction designed to prevent molestat ion.221 In these 
cases distress was precisely by the result  to be 
expected f rom breach of the contract.  I t  seems that 
damages cannot be recovered for distress ar ising from 
breach of an ordinary commercial contract.222 
 
A separate but  perhaps overlapping pr inciple was 
thought to have been laid down by the House of Lords 
in Addis v. Gramophone Co. Ltd.223 In this case the 
plaint if f was wrongful ly dismissed from an important 
post in India in humil iat ing circumstances, which could 
hardly have fai led adversely to affect his future 
employment prospects.  It  was held that his damages 
were l imited to the wages that would have been earned 
during the period of not ice that should have been given. 
Lord Loreburn had laid down a rule that a wrongful ly 
dismissed servant could not recover damages for the 
manner of his dismissal, for his injured feelings or for 
the loss that he may suffer because it  is more dif f icult  
for him to obtain fresh employment.  Of these, the 
manner of dismissal and injured feelings may be 
                                      
218  Jarvis v. Swans Tours Ltd. [1973] QB 233 : [1973] 1 All E.R. 71; 
Jackson v. Horixon Holidays Ltd., [1975] 3 All ER 92 : [1975] 1 WLR 
1468, Baltic Shipping Co. v. Dillon, [1993] 176 CLR 344. 
219  Cox v. Philips Industries Ltd., [1976] 3 All ER 161 : [1976] ICR 138. 
220  Bliss v. South East Thames Regional Health Authority, [1987] ICR 
700. 
221  Heywood v. Wellers, [1976] QB 446 : [1976] 1 All ER 300. 
222  Jayes v. James and Charles Dodd (a firm), [1990] 2 All ER 815, [1988] 
BTLC 380; Watts v. Morrow, [1991] 4 All ER 937 : Rose 55 Can Bar 
Rev 333; Jackson 26 ICLQ 502; MacDonad 7 JCL 134. 
223  Addis v. Gramophone Co. Ltd., [1909] AC 488. 
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regarded as non-pecuniary loss but the effect on future 
employment prospects is clearly f inancial. 
 
Addis v. Gramophone224 has att racted crit icism since it  
was decided. In the last few years it has been 
considered in two important House of Lords decisions.  
In Malik v. Bank of Credit  and Commerce 
Internat ional,225the facts of which have already been set 
out, the House of Lords held that, in principle, a plaint if f  
could recover damages for the loss of  reputat ion and 
for the f inancial loss which f lowed from it so called 
`st igma damages’.  
 
Malik was not a case of wrongful dismissal but  of  
breach of the implied term of trust and conf idence but 
he matter came before the House of Lords again in a 
dismissal context  in Johnson v. Unisys Ltd.226 In this 
case the claimant had successful ly al leged unfair  
dismissal before an industr ial tr ibunal on the ground 
that his employer had not given him a fair opportunity to 
defend himself and had not followed its own disciplinary 
procedure. He had been awarded then statutory 
maximum. He then began an act ion for breach of the 
implied term of t rust and conf idence, c laiming that his 
future employment prospects had been irretr ievably 
damaged. 
 
The House of  Lords held that the claim fai led. The 
major ity view was that though employment law had 
been the subject matter of major developments through 
                                      
224  Addis v. Gramophone Co. Ltd., [1909] AC 488. 
225  Malik v. Bank of Credit and Commerce Internation, 
[1997] 3 Al l ER 1. 
226  Johnson v. Unisys Ltd.,  [2001] 2 All ER 801.  
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implied terms, it  would not be appropriate to have a 
further common law development in the f ield of 
dismissal where Parl iament had introduced a statutory 
system of unfair  dismissal which was not based on 
contract. Lord Steyn concurred in this result  because he 
thought that on the part icular facts the claimant would 
have insuperable remoteness diff icult ies but in al l other 
respects his analysis was very dif ferent and he 
considered that in principle on such facts an employee 
had a reasonable cause of act ion based on the implied 
obligat ion of trust and conf idence. His Lordship took the 
view that  if  the head note of Addis’s case correct ly 
stated the rat io decidendi the t ime had arrived to depart  
from it  and indeed that the House of Lords had done so 
in Malik ’s case. 
 
9.4.8 Vindictive or Punitive Damages: 
 
The term "vindict ive damages" is used as synonymous 
with exemplary, or punit ive damages. "The right to give 
punit ive damages in certain cases is so f irmly 
embedded in our law that only Parl iament can remove 
it .  The f irst category of cases in which punit ive 
damages may be embedded is oppressive, arbitrary or 
unconstitut ional act ion by the servants of the 
Government.  I  should not extend this category. I  say 
this with part icular reference to the facts of this case, to 
oppressive act ion by private corporat ions or individuals.  
I t is not  correct to say that it included only servants of  
the Government in the str ict sense of the word.  
 
 
 
  
- 500 - 
I t would obviously apply to the police and almost as 
certainly to local and other off icials exercising 
improperly r ight of search or arrest without warrant,  and 
it  may be that  in the future it  wil l  be held to include 
other abuses of  power without warrant by persons 
purport ing to exercise legal authority. What it  wil l not  
include is the simple bully, not  because the bully ought 
not to be punished in damages, for he manifest ly ought,  
but because an adequate award of compensatory 
damages, by way of solat ium  wil l necessari ly have 
punished him".227 
 
9.4.9 “Pecuniary” and “non-pecuniary” Damages:  
 
"Pecuniary damage" or "pecuniary loss" refers to any 
f inancial disadvantage, past or future, whether 
precisely calculable or not. Thus, past loss of earnings 
and an assessment of loss of future earnings, loss due 
to damage to a chattel, loss on breach of a contract for 
the sale of goods, and loss of prof i ts const itute 
pecuniary damage.228  
   
"Non-pecuniary damage" is exemplif ied by personal 
injur ies, damage to reputat ion and interference with the 
employment of  property, of course,  although, of course,  
in each case pecuniary damage may have been 
sustained as well.229  
 
                                      
227  Cassell & Co. Ltd. v. Broome, (1972) 1  All E.R. 801 at pp. 829, 830, 
838. 
228  Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th  Edn., Vol.12, p. 414.   
229  Cf. British Transport Commission v. Gourley, (1956) A.C. 185 at 
p.206: (1985)  3 All. E.R.  796 at p.804 (H.L.) per Lord Goddard. 
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9.4.10 Non-pecuniary Special Damages: 
 
In R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Put. Ltd.230 
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down as under:- 
 
"Broadly speaking while f ixing an amount of 
compensat ion payable to a vict im of an accident, the 
damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary 
damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are 
those, which the vict im has actually incurred and which 
is payable or being calculated in terms of money; 
whereas non-pecuniary damages are those, which are 
incapable of being assessed by arithmetical 
calculat ions. In order to appreciate two concepts 
pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by 
the claimant ( i) medical attendance; ( i i) loss of earning 
of prof it  up to the date of tr ial;  ( i i i )  other mater ial loss.  
So far non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they may 
include (i) damages for mental and physical shock,  
pain, suffering, already suffered or l ikely to be suffered 
in future; ( i i)  damages to compensate for the loss of 
amenit ies of l ife which may include a var iety of matters 
i.e. on account of  injury the claimant may not be able to 
walk, run or sit ;  ( i i i )  damages for the loss of expectat ion 
of l ife, i.e. on account of injury the normal longevity of  
the person concerned is shortened; ( iv) inconvenience, 
hardship, discomfort,  disappointment, f rustration and 
mental stress in l i fe".231 
 
                                      
230  R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control  ( India) Put. Ltd., 
1995 (1) T.A.C. 557 (S.C.). 
231  Surendra Singh v. Chiraguddin, 1998(2) T.A.C. 84 at p. 85 (Raj.). 
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9.4.11 Liquidated damages and unliquidated damages: 
 
The old common law dist inct ion between l iquidated 
damages and penalty has been done away with by 
virtue of the provisions of Sec.  74 of the Indian 
Contract Act, IX of 1872, as amended by Sec. 4 of Act  
VI of 1899. The term " l iquidated damages" is applied to 
such damages as const itute a l iquidated demand 
payable in money. I f  a sum of money is previously 
agreed upon between the part ies to a contract,  to be 
paid, to either party, in case of breach of such contract  
whether or not actual damages is proved to have been 
caused thereby,  it  is cal led l iquidated or st ipulated 
damages which the party complaining of the breach is 
ent it led to recover.232  
 
On the other hand, the term "unliquidated damages", as 
opposed to l iquidated damages, is applied to those 
damages which are not pre-determined or pre-arranged 
by the part ies, but left  to the discret ion of the Court  to 
be determined by the rules governing the measure of 
damages. It  is immaterial even if  a part icular amount is 
specif ied in the pleading as the sum at which the 
plaint if f est imates the damages. Damages are said to 
be l iquidated when they have been agreed and f ixed by 
the part ies. I t  is the sum, which the part ies have agreed 
by contract as payable on default  of one of them. 
Section 74 applies to these damages. In al l other 
cases, the court quantif ies or assesses the damages or 
loss; such damages are unliquidated. It  is possible that  
the part ies f ix an amount as l iquidated damages for a 
specif ic type of  breach only;  then the party suffer ing 
                                      
232  Arnold,  2nd Edn., p.4., Law of Damages. 
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from other type breach may sue for the unliquidated 
damages arising f rom such breach.233  
 
Where, under the terms of the contract,  it  was 
st ipulated that if  the goods were not supplied before the 
date f ixed, the purchaser had a right to c laim damages 
at the rate agreed and if  they were not delivered within 
seven days of the date f ixed, then the purchaser was 
ent it led to cancel the contract and encash the bank 
guarantee, but the goods were delivered within the 
extended t ime, i t  was held that  the purchaser was 
ent it led to claim damages only at the rate agreed, and 
the clause relat ing to conf iscation of bank guarantee 
could not be invoked since the contract was not  
cancelled.234 
 
So far as the law in India is concerned there is no 
qualitat ive dif ference in the nature of l iquidated and 
unliquidated damages, as s 74 el iminates the somewhat 
elaborate ref inement made under the Common Law 
between st ipulat ions providing for payment of l iquidated 
damages and st ipulat ions in the nature of penalty,  
which under the Common Law is st ipulat ion in terrorem; 
and a genuine pre-est imate of damages is regarded as 
l iquidated damages, and is binding. 
 
A claim for l iquidated damages stands on the same 
footing as a claim for unliquidated damages, and a 
party in breach of contract does not incur eo instant i a 
pecuniary l iabi l ity, nor does the injured party become 
ent it led to c laim a debt. The injured party is only 
                                      
233  Aktieselskabet Reidar v. Arcos (1927) 1 KB 352 : (1926) All ER Rep 
140. 
234  Shiv Ispat Udyog Pvt. Ltd. v. Industries Valley, AIR 1984 Del 405. 
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ent it led to sue for damages, and have them adjudicated 
upon. The mere fact that the damages for a breach 
would be very dif f icult  to assess does not mean that the 
agreed sum cannot be l iquidated damages-on the 
contrary, this is precisely the situat ion in which the 
part ies may reasonably wish to agree on the sum 
payable for breach.  
 
A good example of such a stipulat ion is where a lump 
sum is f ixed for breach of a covenant, not to compete-
loss result ing from such breach is always uncertain in 
amount and diff icult  to prove.  
 
Where the part ies have provided for compensat ion in 
express terms, the r ight to claim unliquidated damages to 
that extent is necessari ly excluded. In Chuni lal V Mehta v 
Century Spinning and Mfi Co Ltd235,  i t  has been stated:  
 
“Where part ies name in a contract reduced to writ ing a 
sum of  money to be paid as l iquidated damages they must 
be deemed to exclude the r ight to c laim unascertained sum 
of  money as damages. The right  to claim l iquidated 
damages is enforceable under s  74 of  the Contract Act  and 
where such a r ight is found to exist , no question of 
ascertain ing damages really ar ises.  Where the part ies 
have deliberately speci f ied the amount of  l iquidated 
damages there can be no presumpt ion that they at the 
same t ime, intended to al low the party who has suf fered by 
the breach to give a go-by to the sum specif ied and claim 
instead a sum of  money which was not ascertained or 
ascertainable at the date of  the breach.”  
                                      
235  Chunila l V Mehta v  Century Spinning and Mfg Co Ltd. ,  AIR 
1962 SC 1314, p. 1319 : [1962] 3 Supp. SCR 549. 
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  Sections 74 does not overlap Section 74:  
 
This section applies when there is a sum named in the 
contract as the amount paid in case of  breach of  contract,  
or  the contract contains any other st ipulat ion by way of  
penalty.   
 
In Shiva Jute Bal ing Limited v Hindley & Co Ltd,236 an 
agreement for supply for 500 bales of jute between an 
Indian company and a Brit ish company contained a clause 
for payment of  ' l iquidated damages'  for default  at the 
dif ference between the contract rate and rate on the day 
fol lowing the default  plus 10 sh  per ton, and also a 
provision for arbitrat ion in accordance with the byelaws of 
London Jute Associat ion. On disputes having arisen, the 
arbit rators in London gave an award for l iquidated 
damages as given in the agreement, i .e. ,  the dif ference in 
rates plus 10 sh per ton. The Supreme Court held that  the 
stipulat ion was val id as also the award. Both Sect ions  73 
and 74 provide for reasonable compensat ion, but S.  74 
contemplates that the maximum reasonable compensat ion 
may be the amount which may be named in the contract,  
but not  more,  even though according to" Sect ion 73 ,  the 
amount of compensation may exceed the sum named. 
 
9.5 CONCLUSION:  
 
Any aggrieved or injured party can claim damages under 
any of  the above mentioned heads of  damages for breach 
of  contract,  and get compensation only i f  he proves to 
suf fer injury because of  the breach committed by the 
                                      
236  Shiva Jute Baling Limited v  Hindley & Co Ltd, AIR 1959 
SC 1357 :  [1960] 1 SCR 569. 
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defendant.   To put i t  in simple words, one may say that 
before a person can get any damages, he must prove that  
he had suf fered an injury. Law does not taken into account  
al l  harms suf fered by a person,  which caused no legal 
injury.  The damage so caused is called damnum sine 
injuria. The term ‘ injur ia ’ is to be understood in i ts r ightful  
and proper sense.  If  such legal injury is proved, i t  becomes 
the duty of  the Court to do justice to the suf ferer but whi le 
doing so the Judges have to i temize the damages in order 
to calculate the interest.  This does not mean that the total  
award is necessari ly to go up higher on that count.  The 
total award is st i l l  to be one, which gives him fair  
compensation in money for his injury. Care must be taken 
to avoid the r isk of  over lapping. A high future for loss of  
earnings might go in reduct ion of  the award for pain and 
suf fering and other loss to the so one may say that the 
dif ference between contract rates and the accidental rates 
which prevailed on the date of  breach of  contract is a 
reasonable process by which damages are computed and 
required to be computed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER - X 
 
LEQUIDATED  DAMAGES  AND   PENALTY 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION:    
 
The part ies to a contract may, as part of the agreement 
between them, f ix the amount, which is to be paid by way of 
damages in the event of breach. In some cases this amount 
wi ll apply to all breaches, in others only to particular 
breaches. In some cases it wil l apply to breach by either 
party, in others only to breach by one part icular party. And 
sometimes dif ferent sums may be stipulated for different 
breaches, whether by one or by both parties. 
 
Whether the agreed sum is recoverable from the party in 
breach depends upon whether it constitutes l iquidated 
damages, when it is recoverable, or a penalty, when it  is 
not. The law as to liquidated damages and penalt ies has a 
long involved history, and a brief account of the 
development over the centuries is necessary for a full  
understanding of the modern law. 
 
The part ies to a contract not infrequently make provision in 
the contract for the damages to be paid on a breach of 
contract. Such provision does not exclude the applicat ion of 
the rule that damages for breach are intended to 
compensate for the actual loss sustained by the plaint if f . I t 
is a quest ion of the proper construction of the contract to 
decide whether a sum f ixed in this way, however the part ies 
may have described it, is a 'penalty', in which case it cannot 
be recovered, or a genuine attempt to ' l iquidate', that is to 
say, to reduce to certainty, prospective damages of an 
uncertain amount, wherein the sum wil l be recoverable.  
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The rule against penalt ies originates in equity which would 
rel ieve against penalt ies, cutt ing them down to the actual  
damage suffered, but was taken up and applied by the 
common law, and reinforced by statute.1 The Court will  
accept as l iquidated damages the sum fixed by the parties i f  
it  is a genuine pre-est imate of the damage which seems 
likely to be caused if  the breach provided for should occur. 
The question is one of construction, to be decided upon the 
terms and inherent circumstances of each particular 
contract, judged as at the t ime of making the contract,  not 
as at the t ime of breach.2 Or, again, if ,  although it is not an 
est imate of the probable damage, the part ies had fixed that 
sum because they were agreed in l imit ing the damages 
recoverable to an amount less than that which a breach 
would probably cause, it  wil l similar ly be accepted by the 
Court.3 On the other hand, if  the sum was f ixed in terrorem,  
the provision wil l  be considered to be a penalty. I t wi ll  be 
unenforceable. 
 
In construing the terms 'penalty' and ' l iquidated damages' 
when inserted in a contract, the Courts will  not be bound by 
the phraseology used, but wil l look to the substance rather 
than to the form. The part ies may call  the sum specif ied 
'l iquidated damages' if  they wish, but if  the Court f inds it  to 
be a penalty,  it  wil l  be treated as such. Conversely, if  the 
parties had descr ibed the sum f ixed as a 'penalty',  but i t  
turns out to be a genuine pre-est imate of the loss, it  will  be 
treated as liquidated damages.4 
                                      
1  Wall v. Rederiaktieholaget Luggude, [1915] 3 K.B. 66, at pp. 72-
3; Simpson (1966) 82 L.QR.392. 
2  Dunlop Pneumatic T)'re Co. Ltd. v. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. 
[1915] A.C. 79; Phillips Hong Kong Ltd. v. Att.-Gen o/Hong Kong 
(1993) 61 Build. L.R. 41 (p.c.). 
3  Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. Ltd. v. Widnes Foundr)' (192S) Ltd. [1933] 
A.C. 20, for facts see post, p. 591. 
4  Union Eagle Ltd. v. Golden Achievement Ltd. ; [1997] 2  W.L.R. 341. 
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10.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT: 
 
The question of penalt ies originally arose in relation to 
penal bonds. Such a bond consisted of a promise to pay a 
stated sum of money if  another promise was not fulf i l led. 
The exact form of a penal bond was a promise absolute to 
pay a stated sum, with a condit ion inserted to the effect that 
if  the main obligat ion were performed by a certain day the 
promise to pay the money would be void. The common law 
courts originally recognised and enforced these penal 
bonds, but equity early granted rel ief  by means of 
restraining any action, which was brought for a penalty.  
This resulted in the common law courts fol lowing suit by 
means of a statute of Will iam III in 1697. This provided that 
in an action upon a bond the plaintif f  must assign one or 
more breaches of the obligat ion upon which the bond was 
condit ioned, and, while he remained entit led on proving a 
breach to judgment for the full  amount of the sum promised 
in the bond, he could only recover by execution the amount 
of the damage proved to have been sustained by the breach 
or breaches assigned, although the judgment would remain 
as a security for future breaches.  Since the judgment was 
sti l l for the amount promised by the bond, this penal sum 
was st i l l of  some pract ical importance in that it  f ixed the 
maximum amount which could be recovered upon the bond.5 
 
This provision has now disappeared from the statute book 
and penal bonds have to all intents and purposes 
disappeared from the present-day scene. It is therefore 
                                      
5  White v. Sealy (1778) Doug. 49; Wilde v. Clarkson (1795) 6 T.R. 303. 
Beckham v. Drake (1849) 2 H.L.e. 579 at 598. per Williams J.; in 
Brett~ v. Burch (1859) 4 H. & N. 506 at 510. per Bramwell 8.; and in 
Wall v. Rederiaktiebolaget Luggude [1915] 3 K.B. 66 at 72. per 
Bailhache J. 
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hardly necessary to load down a textbook on the modern 
law with the many eighteenth-century and early nineteenth -
century cases on penal bonds: They have now only an 
historical interest.  
 
(1)  Sums agreed to be paid as damages for breach 
of contract: 
 
After the penal bond came the sum agreed to be paid for 
breach of contract. This reversed the posit ion: no longer 
was the penalty put as the primary obligat ion in the wording 
of the agreement. This type of case made its appearance in 
the course of the eighteenth century and with Lord 
Mansf ield's judgment in Lowe v. Peers6 in 1768 the law 
began to take shape. He said there that  
"covenants secured by a penalty or forfeiture ... the obl igee 
... may either bring an act ion of debt for the penalty,  and 
recover the penalty; (after which recovery of the penalty, he 
cannot resort to the covenant; because the penalty is to be 
a satisfact ion for the whole:) or,  if  he does not choose to go 
for the penalty,  he may proceed upon the covenant, and 
recover more or less than the penalty, tot ies quot ies”.  
 
This laid down, therefore, that the plaintif f  had an elect ion 
between suing for the penalty or for such damages as he 
could prove in the ordinary way, but Lord Mansf ield did not 
suggest that the plaintif f ,  where he elected to sue for the 
penalty, would be unable to recover the whole penalty at 
common law, although he did say that equity would relieve 
against a penalty as opposed to a covenant "to pay a 
particular l iquidated sum". Not until  1801 in Astley v. 
Weldon,7 a case which may be regarded as establ ishing 
                                      
6  Lowe v. Peers, (1768) 4 Bur. 2225. 
7  Astley v. Weldon, (1801) 2 B. & P. 346. 
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the l iquidated damages doctr ine,8 was it clearly laid down 
that if  a plaint if f  sued for a penalty he was not ent it led even 
at common law to recover more than the actual damage 
which he could prove he had incurred. Impl ied in this 
decision was the proposit ion that if  the sum were a pre-
est imate of loss it would not be regarded as a penalty and 
could be recovered as liquidated damages. The election 
given to the plaint i ff  in the case of a penalty9 to sue for the 
penalty or for breach of contract disregarding the penalty 
was retained. A different rule from that applying to penal  
bonds was thus laid down in that the stipulated sum did not 
f ix the maximum amount that the plaint if f  could recover, 
provided that he ignored the penalty and sued in assumpsit  
for damages.10 Only i f he sued in debt for the penalty itself  
would he impose a ceil ing on his recovery.11  
 
These rules became establ ished without much being said 
about the statute of W il l iam III despite the fact that i t  
applied to such clauses in contracts as much as to penal 
bonds: thus Lord Mansf ield fai led to qualify his statements 
in Lowe v. Peers12 by reference to it.  In a number of the 
cases the court, or one member of the court, introduced the 
statute into the decision13 and sometimes specif ical ly 
                                      
8  In Wallis v. Smith (1882) 21 Ch.D. 243, CA., at 261. 
9  Lowe v. Peers (1768) 4 Bur. 2225. 
10  Winter v. Trimmer (1762) 1 Wm.BI. 395; Harrison v. Wright (1811) 13 
East 343; May/am  v. Norris (1845) 14 L.J.CP. 95; Wall v. 
Rederiaktiebo/aget Luggude [1915J 3 K.B. 66.. 
11  Harrison v. Wright (1811) 13 East 343 at 348. per Lord Ellenborough 
CJ.; Wall v.  Rederiaktiebolaget  Luggude [1915] 3 K.B. 66 at 72, per 
Bailhache J.  
12  Lowe v. Peers, (1768) 4 Bur. 2225. 
13  Astley v. Weldon (1801) 2 B. & P. 346 at 354 itself; see also 
Harrison v. Wright (1811) 13 East 343 at 341, per Lord 
Ellenborough CJ.; Davies v. Penton (1827) 6 B. & C 216 at 
224,per Holroyd and Littledale JJ.; Elphin.l'tone v. Monkland Iron 
and Coal Co. (1886) II App.Cas. 332 at 346, Clydebank 
Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo 
y Castaneda [J 905J A.c. 6 at 10. 
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pointed out that the statute applied as much to penalty 
clauses in a contract as to penal bonds,14 but generally the 
statute was ignored. In Betts v. Burch15 Bramwell B. 
commented on this. He said:   
 
"As to the authorit ies it is remarkable that from the f irst  to 
the last the statute is not mentioned. It seems as if ,  by 
some singular inst inct, the courts have been right, though 
without referr ing to the statute by which they ought to have 
been governed. I believe that the reason is that the judges 
have considered when equity would have relieved."  
 
This eclipse of the statute had become total in the twentieth 
century even before the repeal of the relevant provision in 
it,  so that, although the results reached in the cases were 
consonant with i ts requirements, it  was in pract ice a dead 
letter.16  
 
(2)  The cri terion of the intention of the parties:  
 
For a t ime the courts attempted to justify their interference 
in these contracts by stat ing that they were implementing 
the intention of the part ies. Such a claim required them to 
look to the terminology used in the contract. The contract in 
Astley v. Weldon17 i tself  had used neither the term 
"l iquidated damages" nor the term "penalty" but soon after 
in Smith v. Dickenson18 a clause was held to he a penalty 
because, it  was said, the use of that term clearly prevented 
the court from holding that the provision was for l iquidated 
                                      
14  Betts v. Burch (1859) 4 H. & N. 506 at 510.; Wall v.      
Rederiaktiebolaget  Luggude [1915] 3 K.B. 66 at 72. 
15  Betts v. Burch, (1859) 4 H. & N. 506 at 511. 
16  cf Sparrow v. Paris (11'62) 7 H. & N. 594 at 599. 
17  Astley v. Weldon, (1801) 2 B. & P. 346. 
18  Smith  v. Dickenson, (1804) 3 B. & P. 630. 
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damages while conversely, in Reil ly v. ]ones,19 i t  was said 
that no case had been adduced in which a clause had been 
held to be a penalty where the parties had used the 
terminology of l iquidated damages. However, when in 1829 
in Kemble v. Farren,20 another milestone case, an amount 
expressed to be l iquidated damages by the part ies was held 
to be a penalty by the court, the bankruptcy of such an 
interpretation was clear. This, however, was only slowly 
realised,21 and, furthermore, there was as yet no clearly 
developed test to take the place of the test of the part ies'  
intention. As Righy L.J. said at the end of the nineteenth 
century in Willson v. Love:22  
 
"The history of the decisions appears to me to lead to the 
conclusion that the courts made a mistake when they 
departed in regard to these cases from the general rule that 
effect ought to be given to the terms of the agreement 
entered into by the parties, and that, when once the rule 
was departed from, it became extremely dif f icult to arrive at 
any clear rule on the subject."  
 
And, indeed, the numerous nineteenth-century cases show 
some confusion and not infrequent dif f iculty in reconcil ing,23 
a factor, which must be recognised when relying on them as 
precedents. Perhaps today they are of real value only as 
il lustrations of type-situations. 
 
 
10.3 DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN LAW: 
                                      
19  Reil ly  v. ]ones, (1823) 1 Bing. 302. 
20  Kemble v. Farren, (1829) 6 Bing. 141. 
21  Boys v. Ancell (11'39) 5 Bing.N.C 390 
22  Willson v. Love,  (1896) 1 Q.B. 626, C.A., at 633.   
23  Re Newman (1876) 4 Ch.D. 724. C.A; Wallis v. Smith (1882) 21 Ch.D. 
243, C.A. 
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The law has been re-stated for today in a number of 
authoritat ive decisions of the House of Lords and Judicial  
Committee at the beginning of the century, culminating in 
1915 in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage and 
Motor Co.24 where Lord Dunedin reframed in a series of 
"rules" the principles for ascertaining whether a stipulated 
sum is liquidated damages or penalty. Upon these cases 
and upon these rules the modern law rests,25 at the end of 
the century the Judicial Committee in Phil ips Hong Kong v. 
Attorney-General of Hong Kong26 has endorsed their 
approach, while stressing the need for that approach to be 
realist ic. 
 
  Rules of Construction: 
 
The leading case on penalt ies is that of Dunlop Pneumatic  
Tyre Co. Ltd. V. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd.  
 
The appel lant sold motor tyre-covers, tyres and tubes to the 
respondent which contracted not to resell them, or offer 
them for sale, at a price below the appellant's l ist prices 
and to pay the sum of £.5 by way of l iquidated damages for 
every breach of this agreement. The respondent sold a tyre-
cover at less than the list price, and was sued by the 
appellant for damages for breach.  
 
                                      
24  Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage and Motor Co.,  
[1915] A.C. 79. Clydebank Engineering Co. v. Don Jose Ramos 
Yzquierdo y Castaneda, [1905] AC. 6; Public Works Commissioner v. 
Hills, [I9061 A.C. 368; P.C.; Webster v. Bosanquet, [1912] A.C. 394 
P.C.; De Soysa v. De Pless Pol, [1912] A.C. 194. P.C. 
25  cf Widnes Foundry v. Cellulose Acetate Silk Co., [1931] 2 K.B. 393. 
C.A. at 405; Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage & Motor Co. 
26  Phil ips Hong Kong v. Attorney-General of Hong Kong, 
(1993) 61 B.L.R. 41, P.C. 
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The House of Lords held that the sum f ixed by the parties 
was a genuine pre-estimate of the damage, which might 
ensue and not a penalty. In the course of his speech Lord 
Dunedin laid down the following rules:   
 
(I)  'I t  will  be held to be a penalty if  the sum st ipulated for 
its extravagant and unconscionable in amount in 
comparison with the greatest loss that could conceivably be 
proved to have fol lowed from the breach. '  
 
An i l lustrat ion was provided by the Earl of Halsbury in an 
earl ier case, where he said:27  
 
For instance, if  you agreed to build a house in a year, and 
agreed that if  you did not build the house for £.50,  you 
were to pay a mil l ion of money as penalty, the extravagance 
of that would be at once apparent.  
 
We shall see that there is considerable doubt as to how far 
this pr inciple extends to the forfeiture of a sum already 
paid. But in other situat ions the question is one of fact in 
each particular case. The purpose of such clauses is to 
promote certainty and, especial ly in commercial contracts, 
where the parties are able to protect themselves, the Court 
is l ikely to take the view that "hat the parties have agreed 
should normally be upheld and to take care not to set too 
stringent a standard which could defeat that purpose.28 In 
the case of consumer contracts for the supply of goods or 
services, the common law rule has been embodied in a 
legislat ive presumption that a term requiring a consumer 
                                      
27  Clydebank Engineering  and Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. v. Don Jose Ramos 
Yzquierdo y Castaneda, (1905) A.C. 6, at p.10. 
28  Phillips Hong Kong Ltd. v. Attorney General of Hong Kong, (1993) 61 
Build. L.R. 41 (P.C.).  
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who fai ls to fulf i l l his obligation to pay a disproport ionately 
high sum in compensation is unfair and not binding.  
 
(II)   'I t  wil l be held to be a penalty if  the breach consists 
only in not paying a sum of money, and the sum st ipulated 
is a sum greater than the sum which ought to hare been 
paid. 
 
In Kemble v. Farren:29 
 
The defendant agreed to perform at the Covent Garden 
Theatre for four seasons at £3 6s 8d. a night. The contract  
provided that if  either party refused to fulf i l l the agreement 
or any part thereof , such party should pay to the other the 
sum of £1,000 as ' l iquidated damages'. The defendant 
refused to perform during the second season.  
 
It was held that the stipulation was penal. The obligat ion to 
pay £1,000 might have arisen upon a fai lure to pay £3 6s. 
8d. and was therefore quite obviously a penalty. The most  
obvious example of  this presumption is where a borrower of 
money promises to pay the lender an addit ional sum if  the 
money is not repaid by a f ixed day. Such 'accelerated 
payment'  clauses are common in sales by instal lments and 
leasing arrangements. However, a distinction is drawn 
between contracts, which accelerate an existing l iabi l ity to 
pay on default  and those which create or increase the 
liabil i ty to pay. The penalty rules do not apply to the 
former.30 The dist inction is, however, open to crit icism on 
the ground that it  is commercial ly unrealist ic to hold that a 
debt which can only be recovered by installments over a 
                                      
29  Kemble v. Farren, (1829) 6 Bing. 141. 
30  Protector Loan Co. v. Grice, (1880) 5 QBD. 529; O'Dea v. All States 
Leasing System Pvt. Ltd., (1983) 152 C.L.R. 359;  
  
- 517 - 
period is to be equated with one which can be recovered 
immediately and as permitt ing the circumvention of this rule 
of construct ion by contractual stipulat ion for discount if  
payment is made by a given date.  
 
But even where the penalty rules apply, the presumption 
may be rebutted if the increase is, in the circumstances, 
commercially justi f iable and the dominant purpose of the 
provision is not to deter the borrower from breach. Thus, it  
has been held that a provision increasing by one per cent 
the interest chargeable on a loan from the t ime a borrower 
defaulted ref lected the increased credit r isk of having such 
a debtor, and was not therefore a penalty.31  
 
(III )   'There is a presumption (but no more) that it  is a 
penalty when a single lump sum is made payable by way of 
compensation, on the occurrence of one or more of al l  of  
several events, some of which may occasion serious and 
others but tr if l ing damage. 
 
An il lustration is offered by Ford Motor Co. v. Armstrong32   
 
A retai ler of motorcars agreed with a manufacturer inter alia 
not to sell anyone of the manufacturer's cars, or any part ,  
below the listed price. For every breach of this agreement 
he was to pay £250, as 'agreed damages'.  
 
A majority of the Court of Appeal held that this was a 
penalty. The defendant might have become bound to pay 
the sum of £250 for the breach of some term, which would 
                                      
31  Lardsvale  Finance Plc v.  Bank of  Zambia, (1996)  Q.B. 572. 
32  Ford Motor Co. v. Armstrong, (1915) 31 T.LR.  267. 
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cause only tri f l ing damage. Similarly in Kemble v. Farren,33 
the same factor provided an addit ional reason for the Court 
to hold that the £1,000 was a penalty because that very 
large sum was to become immediately payable if  ' the 
defendant had refused to conform to any usual regulation of 
the theatre, however minute or unimportant’. 
 
A single sum, as opposed to a sum proport ioned to the 
seriousness of the breach (for example per week for delay 
or per item for i tems sold in breach of covenant),  is 
presumed to be penal because one tests i t against the least 
serious breach possible. The presumption does not apply 
where the sum is payable for breach of a single obl igation 
which can be broken in a number of ways, for example non-
completion of a building contract.34 Where it is dif f icult to 
est imate the loss and it is therefore uncertain that losses 
from one breach would be greater than those from another,  
a court may hold that the presumption is rebutted. It may 
also be rebutted where it is clear that the contractual  
provision has sought to average out the probable losses 
from all the breaches provided, however, that the disparity 
is not too great.35  
 
On the other hand:   
 
(IV)  'I t  is no obstacle to the sum st ipulated being a 
genuine pre-estimate of damage, that the consequences of 
the breach are such as to make precise pre-est imation 
almost an impossibi l ity. '   
 
                                      
33  Kemble v. Farren, (1829) 6 Bing. 141. 
34  Law v. Local Board of Redditch, (1892) 1 Q.B. 127. 
35  Dunlop Pneumatlr Tyre Co. Ltd. v. New Garage and Motor Co. Ltd. 
[1915J A.C 79, at p. 99. 
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For example, in the Dunlop Tyre case itself, the st ipulated 
sum of £5 could only, at the most,  be a very rough and 
ready estimate of the possible damage, which might be 
suffered if  a trader undercut the manufacturer's l isted price. 
In public works contracts, such as those for the 
construction of roads or tunnels, the nature of the loss may 
in part be non-f inancial and therefore be part icularly 
diff icult to evaluate, but in Phill ips Hong Kong Ltd. v. 
Attorney-General of Hong Kong36 i t  was said that a clause 
using a formula based on est imates of the loss of return on 
the capital at a daily rate, the effect of the delay on related 
contracts, and increased costs, was said to be sensible.  
 
But these rules are no more than presumptions as to the 
intention of the parties; they may be rebutted by evidence 
of a contrary intention, appearing from a considerat ion of 
the contract as a whole.37 
 
  English law, liquidated damages and penalty: 
 
I t  wil l  be observed that the rule of English law against  
penalt ies is "an irrat ional doctrine bequeathed to people in 
England by a school of English Judges, eminent, no doubt,  
in the law. But over-prone to making agreements for parties 
which the parties had not made and did not intend to make 
for themselves."38 But there has been an age-long 
controversy as to whether a provision in a contract that in 
the event of one party committ ing a breach of the covenant 
he shall be mulcted in a certain amount is to be treated as 
                                      
36  Phil l ips Hong Kong Ltd. v. Attorney-General of Hong Kong, 
(1993) 61  Build.  L.R. 41 (P.C.). 
37  Pye v. British Automobile Commercial Sundicate Ltd., (1906) 1 K.B. 
425. 
38  Banke Behari  v. Sundar Lal, I.L.R. 15  All. 232  at p. 253. 
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penalty not recoverable in full  in equity or as l iquidated 
damages l iterally excisable. It is a matter of frequent 
occurrence that parties to a contract f ix sum of money as 
being payable on a breach thereof, which according to their 
true intent ion, expresses only the maximum amount of 
damages. In such cases such sum of  money is penal in its 
nature and intent and at Common law the parties were not 
entit led to recover anything more than the actual damages 
sustained. On the other hand, owing to the dif f iculty in 
foreseeing the extent of the injury and in sett ing a money 
value thereon parties may agree upon a certain sum of 
money as a f ixed measure of damages to be payable in 
case of a breach of the contract. In such cases Courts of 
law have always treated such a sum as the ascertained 
amount of damages and allowed it to the aggrieved party. In 
the former case it is called a "penalty" merely stipulated in 
terrorem against a possible breach of the obligation and in 
the latter "l iquidated damages" which can be regarded as a 
genuine pre-est imate of the creditor's interest in the due 
performance of the obligat ion.39 The parties may agree by 
contract that a particular sum is payable on the default of 
one of them and if  the agreement is not obnoxious as a 
"penalty", such a sum constitutes " liquidated damages" and 
is payable by the party in default . The term is also applied 
to sums expressly made payable as liquidated damages 
under a statute. In every other case where the Court has to 
quantify or assess the damages or loss whether pecuniary 
or non-pecuniary, the damages are "unliquidated".40  
 
 
 
 
                                      
39  Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. v. Yzquierdo, (1905) 
A.C.6. 
40  Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 12 p. 415. 
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10.4 CONCEPT OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AND 
PENALTY IN ENGLISH LAW: 
 
The part ies to a contract may agree at the t ime of 
contracting that,  in the event of a breach, the party in 
default shall pay a stipulated sum of money to the other, or 
may agree that in the event of breach by one party any 
amount paid by him to the other shall  be forfeited. If  this 
sum is a genuine pre-est imate of damages likely to f low 
from the breach, i t  is called ' l iquidated damages'.  If  it  is not 
a genuine pre-estimate of the loss, but an amount intended 
to secure performance of the contract, it  may be a penalty.  
In Fateh Chand v Balkishan Das ,41 the Supreme Court  
stated:  
 
...  s 74 declares the law as to l iabil ity upon breach of 
contract where compensation is by agreement of part ies 
predetermined or where there is a stipulation by way of 
penalty. But the applicat ion of the enactment is not 
restricted to cases where the aggrieved party claims rel ief 
as a plaint i ff .  The section does not confer a special benefit  
upon any party.  It merely declares the law that 
notwithstanding any term in the contract for determining the 
damages or providing for forfeiture of any property by way 
of penalty, the Court wil l award to the party aggrieved only 
reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount named 
or penalty st ipulated.  
 
Section 74 provides for the measure of damages in two 
classes:  
 
 
                                      
41
  Fateh Chand v  Balk ishan Das  , [1964] 1 SCR 515, P 526 : AIR 
1963 SC 1405, P 1412; Naresh Chandra Sanyal v Calcutta Stock 
Exchange Assn Ltd;  AIR 1971 SC 422, P 428. 
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(i)  where the contract names a sum to be paid in case of 
breach; and  
(i i)  where the contract contains any other st ipulation by 
way of penalty. In both the cases the measure of damages 
is by s 74, reasonable compensation not exceeding the 
amount or penalty stipulated for.42 I t  has been observed that 
in comparison with the extensive power that contract ing 
parties have to bargain over their substant ive contract 
rights and duties, their power to bargain over their remedial 
r ights is surprisingly limited. The most important restrict ion 
is the one denying them the power to stipulate in their 
contract a sum of money payable as damages that is so 
large as to be charecterised as a ‘penalty’.43 
 
10.4.1 The Amendment of 1899: 
 
The original section has been amended by the Indian 
Contract (Amendment) Act 1899, adding the words shown in 
ital ics in the sect ion, and il lusts (d), (e), (f), and (g). The 
marginal note to the sect ion was also altered.  There is no 
doubt that,  as the section originally stood, i t  was intended 
to do away with the distinction between a penalty and 
liquidated damages.44 The sole object of the sect ion45 
appears to have been to provide for the class of cases to 
which Kemble v Farren46 belongs, and in which the 
dist inction between ' l iquidated damages' and 'penalty' has 
given rise to so much dif ference of opinion in the English 
courts. 
                                      
42  Fateh Chand v Balkishan Das [1964] 1 SCR 515, pp 526-527, AIR 
1963 SC 1405,  pp 1410-1411; Shree Hanuman Cotton Mills v Tata 
Air Craft Ltd [1970] 3 SCR 127, AIR  1970 SC 1986, P 1997. 
43  Fansworth, Contract, 3rd Edn.,  p.841. 
44  H. Mackintosh v. Complainant Crow, (1883) ILR  9  Cal 689. 
45  Umarkhan Mahamadkhan Deshmukh v Salekhan; (1893-94) ILR 17-
18 Born 70, p III per Sargent CJ· 
46  Kemble v Farren  , (1829) 6 Bing. 141, (1824-34) All E.R. .Rep 641. 
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10.4.2 Alternative Promises: 
 
Where a contract provides that one of the parties shall do a 
certain thing or pay a certain sum of money and in the event 
of fail ing to perform as agreed upon. He shall perform other 
act. the transact ion may be viewed in either of two ways. In 
the f irst place, it  may be viewed as contract giving the 
promisor the choice of two alternatives, namely of 
performing the one, if  he fai ls to perform the other. For 
instance, if  a man takes a land on lease for pasture at a 
certain rent, with a st ipulat ion to pay a dif ferent sum if  he 
cult ivates it , two alternative courses are open to either of 
which he can perform. In such cases, the parties have f ixed 
the price on payment of which the promisor is absolved from 
the duty of performing the f irst promise and the fai lure to 
perform that const itutes no breach of contract. 
 
10.4.3 Primary and Secondary Promises: 
 
On the other hand, the primary object of the part ies may be 
the performance of the f irst promise, and it may be merely 
with a view to secure that performance that the second 
promise is added. When this is the intent ion of the parties,  
the promisor has no choice in the matter and refusal on his 
part to perform the f irst and substant ive promise amounts to 
a breach of contract.47 In the latter case the stipulation for 
the performance of the second or alternat ive promise 
becomes according to the intention of the parties, a penalty 
or a thing which l iquidates and discharges the result  of the 
non-performance of the f irst promise. 
                                      
47  Cunningham and Shepherd Commentaries on the Indian Contract Act 
p. 258: the observations of Sundarayya, J., Muthukrishnian v. 
Sankaralingam Pillal, I.L.R. 36 Mad. 229 at p. 251 : 18 I.C. 414 at p. 
436: Ramdhan v. Mohanlal, I A.L.J. 688: Soodamani Pattar v. 
Somasundaram Mudaliar, 4 M.L.J. 201. 
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10.5 NATURE AND EFFECT OF LIQUIDATED 
DAMAGES: 
 
A sum of money which has been agreed to be paid on a 
particular eventuality fal ls to be classif ied as l iquidated 
damages or a penalty only where that eventuality is a 
breach of contract between the contemplated payer and the 
contemplated payee. This appears to be a straightforward, 
even self-evident, proposit ion but an unsuccessful attempt 
to chal lenge it, and to extend the law as to penalt ies to a 
wider sphere, was taken to the House of Lords in Export 
Credits Guarantee Department v. Universal Oi l Products 
Co.48 The defendants there had contracted to construct an 
oi l ref inery for a group of Newfoundland companies. 
Bankers had provided the f inancing of this project in return 
for the issue of promissory notes by the companies and for 
the plaint if fs'  guarantee of the promissory notes. By a 
further contract between the plaint if fs and the defendants 
the plaintif fs required the defendants, in the event of their 
default in their performance of the construct ion contract,  to 
indemnify the plainti ffs against any liabil ity they might incur 
under the contract of guarantee. Some promissory notes 
were dishonoured, the plaint if fs duly indemnif ied the 
bankers under the contract of guarantee, and then claimed 
indemnity for themselves over against the defendants whom 
they al leged to be in default  under the construct ion 
contract. The defendants' argument that the sum claimed 
constituted a penalty was f irmly rejected. Their lordships 
declared themselves to be in complete agreement with the 
courts below and for the same reasons, which were in effect 
that the sum in quest ion could not be a penalty as it 
                                      
48  Export Credits Guarantee Department v. Universal Oil Products Co., 
(1983) 1 W.L.R.  399, H.L.  
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became payable in the event of breach by the defendants of 
contractual obligat ions owed not to the plaintif f  but to third 
parties. It was however also pointed out-and this could be 
of some signif icance for other cases-that the sum in 
question represented the actual loss suffered by the 
plaint if fs. 
 
Jobson v. Johnson49 established that a penalty, and 
presumably l iquidated damages, may consist not of a sum 
of money stipulated to be paid on breach but of an item of 
property stipulated to be transferred on breach. In that case 
the defendant had contracted to buy shares in a football  
club for some £350,000 payable in seven instalments. The 
agreement contained a clause that, if  the defendant 
defaulted on the payment of the second or any subsequent 
instalment, he was required to transfer the shares back to 
the sel lers for £40,000, an amount which neither was a 
genuine pre-est imate of the sellers ' loss in the event of the 
defendant's default nor ref lected the true value of the 
shares. The defendant paid £140,000 towards the purchase 
price, the shares were transferred to him, and he then 
defaulted on payment of the instalments.  The plaintif f ,  the 
assignee of the sellers of the shares, c laimed specif ic 
performance of the agreement for the re-transfer of the 
shares while the defendant claimed that the re-transfer 
agreement was a penalty and as such unenforceable. The 
Court of Appeal agreed with the defendant. Di llon L.J. said:  
 
"Does it make any dif ference, then, that the penalty in the 
present case is not a sum of money? In pr inciple, a 
transaction must be just as object ionable and 
unconscionable in the eyes of equity if  it  requires a transfer 
                                      
49  Jobson v. Johnson, (1989) 1  W.L.R.  1026, C.A. 
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of property by way of penalty on a default in paying money 
as if  i t  requires a payment of an extra, or excessive, sum of 
money. There is no dist inct ion in principle between a clause 
which provides that if  a person makes default in paying a 
sum of £1 00 on a certain day he shall pay a penalty of 
£1,000, and a clause which provides that if  a person makes 
default in paying a sum of £100 on a certain day he shall by 
way of penalty transfer to the obligee 1000 shares in a 
certain company for no considerat ion. Again, there should 
be no distinction in principle between a clause which 
requires the defaulter, on making default in paying money, 
to transfer shares for no consideration, and a clause which 
in l ike circumstances requires the defaulter to sel l shares to 
the creditor at an undervalue. In each case the clause ought 
to be unenforceable in equity in so far as it is a penalty 
clause."50  
 
(1)  Nature: genuine pre-estimate of damages as 
against a sum fixed in terrorem .   
 
Where the parties to a contract, as part of the agreement 
between them, f ix the amount which is to be paid by way of 
damages in the event of breach, a sum st ipulated in this 
way is classed as liquidated damages where it is in the 
nature of a genuine pre-estimate of the damage which 
would probably arise from breach of the contract. This is 
the modern phrase used to def ine liquidated damages, f irst 
appearing in Lord Robertson's speech in Clydebank 
Engineering Co. v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y 
Castaneda51 and later incorporated by Lord Dunedin in his 
                                      
50  Jobson v. Johnson, (1989) 1  W.L.R.  1026, C.A. 
51  Clydebank Engineering Co. v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y 
Castaneda, [1905] A.C 6 at 19. 
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l ist of "rules"52 in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New 
Garage and Motor Co.53 since when, as part of these 
"rules", i t  has often been resorted to.54 The intent ion behind 
such a provision is generally to avoid, wherever the amount 
of the damage, which would probably result f rom breach, is 
l ikely to be uncertain, the dif f iculty of proving the extent of 
the actual damage at the trial of the action for breach.  
 
A stipulated sum wil l,  however, be classed as a penalty 
where it is in the nature of a threat f ixed in terrorem of the 
other party. This is again the modern phrase, also to be 
found in Clydebank Engineering Co. v. Don Jose Ramos 
Yzquierdo y Castaneda,55 this t ime in Lord Halsbury's  
speech, and also incorporated by Lord Dunedin in his list of 
"rules” in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage and 
Motor Co.  The intent ion behind such a provision is generally 
to prevent a breach of the contract by establishing a greater 
incentive for its performance. The onus, however, of proving 
that a st ipulated sum is a penalty rather than l iquidated 
damages is upon the party against whom the stipulated sum 
is claimed.56 
 
 
The same sum cannot, in the same agreement, be treated 
                                      
52  These rules, of which this was the second, are considered later: see 
§§ 491-514. infra.  The second rule runs thus: "The essence of a 
penalty is a payment of money stipulated as in terrorem of the 
offending party; the essence of liquidated damages is a genuine 
covenanted pre-estimate of damage." 
53  Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage and Motor Co., (1915] A.C 
79, 86. He had already made use of the phrase in Public Works 
Commissioner v. Hills (1906] A.C 368, P.C at 375-376. 
54  e.g. by Scrutton L.J. in English Hop Growers v. Dering [1928] 2 K.B. 
174. CA .. at  181. 
55  Clydebank Engineering Co. v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo 
y Castaneda, (1905) A.C. 6. 
56  Robophone Facilities v. Blank [1966)1 W.L.R. 1428, c.A.. at 1447, per 
Diplock L.J.  
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as a penalty for some purposes and as liquidated damages 
for others. For i f  the same sum is extravagant and 
unconscionable in relat ion to one breach to which it applies 
it cannot be a genuine pre-est imate, and the sum becomes 
branded as having a penal nature which it cannot lose in 
relat ion to other more serious breaches to which it  also 
applies. It adds nothing to say that i t  would not have been a 
penalty as to the other breach or breaches, or that it  is the 
other breach or breaches that have in the event occurred.  
Nor wil l the court make any severance for the parties, once 
they have tampered with penal stipulations. The parties 
should make their own severance at the t ime of the making 
of the agreement. They may either st ipulate separate sums 
for the various possible breaches,57 in which case one sum 
may be held to be a penalty while another stands as 
liquidated damages. Alternatively, they may contract that 
the stipulated sum shall apply to only one or some 
breaches, and leave the other breaches to be compensated 
for in the ordinary way by an action for unliquidated 
damages.  
 
At the same time a realist ic approach is essential and it is 
salutary to heed Lord Woolf , speaking for the court,  in 
Phil ips Hong Kong v. Attorney-General of Hong Kong58 He 
said there:  
 
"Except possibly in the case of situat ions where one of the 
parties to the contract is able to dominate the other as to 
the choice of the terms of a contract, it  wi ll normally be 
insuff icient to establish that a provision is objectionably 
penal to identify situat ions where the appl icat ion of the 
                                      
57  e.g. Imperial Tobacco Co. v. Parslay;  (1936) 2 All E.R. 515, C.A. 
58  Phil ips Hong Kong v. Attorney-General of Hong Kong, 
(1993) 61 B.L.R.  41, P.C. 
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provision could result in a larger sum being recovered by 
the injured party than his actual  loss. Even in such 
situat ions so long as the sum payable in the event of non-
compliance with the contract is not extravagant, having 
regard to the range of losses that it  could reasonably be 
anticipated it would have to cover at the t ime the contract 
was made, it  can sti l l be a genuine pre-estimate of the loss 
that would be suffered and be a perfectly valid l iquidated 
damages provision. The use in argument of unlikely 
il lustrations should therefore not assist a party to defeat a 
provision as to liquidated damages.”   
 
He elaborated on this point later in the judgment in a useful 
passage, saying:  
 
"Arguments based on hypothetical situat ions where i t is 
said that the loss might be less than the sum specif ied as 
payable as l iquidated damages ... should not be allowed to 
divert attention from the correct test as to what is a penalty 
provision-namely is it  a genuine pre-est imate of what the 
loss is l ikely to be? - to the dif ferent question, namely are 
there possible circumstances where a lesser loss would be 
suffered?”  
 
(2)  Effect of holding a stipulated sum to be 
l iquidated damages or a penalty:59  
 
(a)  Sum held to be liquidated damages:  
 
The courts implement the intent ion of the part ies in the case 
of l iquidated damages by holding the plaintif f  enti t led to 
recover the stipulated sum on breach, without requiring 
                                      
59  Jobson v. Johnson [1989]1 W.L.R. 1026, CA.. 
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proof of the actual damage and irrespect ive of the amount,  
 
if  provable, of the actual  damage. Moreover, it  should be 
appreciated that the concept of a duty to mit igate is ent irely 
foreign to a claim for l iquidated damages. Thus in Abrahams 
v. Performing Rights Society,60 where an employer 
summarily dismissed an employee under a contract which 
provided that the employer could give two years' not ice or 
pay salary in lieu of notice it was held that if  the employee's 
entit lement to claim the payment in l ieu of not ice was by 
way of l iquidated damages-he was in fact held to be entit led 
to claim the money as a contractual debt so that no 
question of damages arose the ful l amount would be 
payable and could not be reduced by any substitute moneys 
the plaint if f earned during the two years.  
 
 
In most cases where the plaint i ff  has recovered his 
liquidated damages the st ipulated sum has been greater 
than the actual, or at least the provable, damage. However, 
just as this cannot diminish his damages, so he cannot 
increase them by ignoring the l iquidated damages clause in 
the rare case where the actual  damage is demonstrably 
greater than the stipulated sum, a situat ion most l ikely to 
arise where one sum is stipulated to be paid on a number of 
varying, yet uncertain, breaches and the most serious 
breach is the one which occurs. Thus in Diestal v.  
Stevenson,61 where a contract for the sale of coal provided 
that for every ton not delivered or not accepted the party in 
default should pay one shil l ing, the seller, in an action for 
non-delivery, was held l imited to this sum despite his 
                                      
60  Abrahams v. Performing Rights Society, (1995) 1 C.R.  1028, 
C.A. 
61  Diestal v. Stevenson,  (1906) 2 K.B.  345. 
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greater loss.  And in Talley  v.  Wolsey - Neech,62 where a  
 
contract of sale of land provided for l iquidated damages on 
the buyer's fai lure to complete based on the amount of the 
loss accruing to the seller on a resale by him, it was held 
that the seller was confined to this amount and could  not 
claim further damages by way of interest in addit ion.63 
These cases show that the plaint if f  can neither claim 
unliquidated damages in addit ion to the l iquidated damages 
which are designed to deal with the loss that has occurred 
nor elect to ignore the l iquidated damages provision and 
sue only for unliquidated damages.64  
 
 
The plaint if f  wi ll ,  however, be ent it led to sue for 
unliquidated damages in the ordinary way, in addit ion to 
suing for the l iquidated damages, if  other breaches have 
occurred outside those which fal l  within the ambit of the 
liquidated damages provision or, i t  seems, if  only part of 
the loss arising from a single breach is regarded as fall ing 
within the provision's ambit. The posit ion is i l lustrated by 
Aktieselskabet Reidar v. Arcos,65 Charterers, in breach of 
their obligation to load a ful l  and complete cargo by a 
certain date, took so long to load that the t ime passed when 
the ship could carry a summer cargo and she was only able 
to carry a much smaller winter cargo. The charterparty 
contained the usual provision for demurrage as l iquidated 
damages for the charterers' detention of the ship in loading, 
but the owners successfully claimed, in addit ion to the 
demurrage, unliquidated damages in the ordinary way for 
                                      
62  Tal ley v. Wolsey-Neech, (1978) 38 P. & C.R. 45, C.A. 
63  Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. v. Widnes Foundry, (1933] AC 20, Temloe 
v. Errill, (1987) 39 B.LR. 30, CA. 
64  Wallace-Turner v. Cole, (1983) 46 P. & CR. 164; Talley v. Wolsey-
Neech, (1978) 38 P. & CR. 45. CA.  
65  Aktieselskabet Reidar v. Arcos, (1927) 1  K.B. 352, C.A. 
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loss of freight caused by the charterers' fai lure to load a full  
and complete cargo. "The provisions as to demurrage", said  
 
Atkin L.J., "quantify the damages, not for the complete 
breach, but only such damages as arise from the detention 
of the vessel.” And in Total Transport Corporation v. Amoco 
Trading Co.,  The Altus,66 where the breach of the obligat ion 
of charterers to load a full and complete cargo caused the 
owners to be entit led to demurrage at a lower rate than that 
to which they would have been entit led had the ful l and 
complete cargo been loaded, the owners successfully 
claimed, in addit ion to the l iquidated damages by way of  so-
called dead freight representing freight on the amount of 
cargo which should have been, but was not, loaded, the 
difference between these two rates. While one may 
question Webster J. 's view in The Altus that there had been 
only a single breach of obligat ion in both that case and in 
the earlier Aktieselskabet Reidar v. Arcos,67 as there must 
surely have been a breach not only of the loading obligation 
but also of the obligation not to delay the ship beyond the 
lay days,68 what is important is that, at least in The Altus, 
the loss for which unliquidated damages were being 
claimed f lowed from the same breach as that for which the 
liquidated damages had been specif ied. Webster J. said 
that he regarded the ratio decided in Aktieselskabet Reidar 
v. Arcos69 as being that:  
 
"Where a charterer commits any breach, even if  it  is only 
                                      
66  Total Transport Corporation v. Amoco Trading Co., The 
Altus, (1985) 1  Lloyd’s Rep. 423. 
67  Aktieselskabet Reidar v. Arcos, (1927) 1 K.B.  352, C.A. 
68  Certainly Sargant L.J. regarded the charterers in Aktieselskabet 
Reidar v. Arcos 11927J I K.B. 352, C.A., Wallace-Turner v. Cole (1983) 
46 P. & C.R. 164 at 168. 
69  Aktieselskabet Reidar v. Arcos, (1927) 1 K.B. 352, C.A. 
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one breach, of his obl igat ion either to provide the minimum 
contractual load or to detain the vessel for no longer than 
the stipulated period, the owner is entit led not only to the  
 
Liquidated damages direct ly recoverable for the breach of 
the obligation to load (dead freight) or for the breach of the 
obligation with regard to detention (demurrage), but also 
for, in the f irst case, to [sic]  the damages f lowing indirectly 
or consequentially from any detention of the vessel ( if  i t 
occurs) and, in the second case, to damages f lowing 
indirect ly or consequential ly from any fai lure to load a 
complete cargo if there is such a fai lure."70 
 
Also in some cases an injunct ion may prove a suitable 
remedy but although a plaint i ff  may elect71 whether to ask 
for an injunct ion or for his l iquidated damages, i t  is 
generally held that he cannot have both. Thus in Sainter v.  
Ferguson,72 and again in Carnes v. Nesbitt,73 an injunction 
was refused because l iquidated damages had already been 
awarded, and this view was adopted in General Accident 
Assurance Co. v.  Noel74 where the plaintif f  was put to his 
election. However, it  would seem that the plaintif f  should be 
entit led to have the two remedies where they relate to 
different breaches. The above three cases, in which an 
election was insisted upon by the court, concerned 
covenants in restraint of trade where a single st ipulated 
sum was to become payable if  the defendant started 
                                      
70  Total Transport Corporation v. Amoco Trading Co., The 
Altus, (1985) 1  Lloyd’s Rep. 423. 
71  Young v. Chalkley, (1867) 16 L.T. 286; Coles v. Sims (1854) 5 De G. 
M. & G. I; General Accident Assurance Co. v. Noel [190211 K.B. 377,; 
Howard v. Woodward (1864) 34 L.J.Ch. 47; Jones v. Heavens (1877) 
4 Ch.D. 636; National Provincial Bank of England v. Marshall, (1888) 
40 Ch.D. 112, C.A. 
72  Sainter v. Ferguson, (1849) 7 C.B. 716. 
73  Carnes v. Nesbit t,  (1862) 7 H. & N. 778. 
74  General Accident Assurance Co. v. Noel,  (1902) 1 K.B. 377. 
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business in competit ion with the plaint if f ,  and it was 
reasonable to regard the two remedies as mutually 
exclusive. But the situat ion is dif ferent where there is a 
clause providing a graduated sum to be paid in l ine with the 
extent of the breach, as in covenants whereby one party 
has accepted restrict ions on his r ight to sell  his goods and 
has further agreed to pay the other a specif ic sum for every 
item sold in breach of covenant. Here it is reasonable to 
award liquidated damages for the past, i .e. on the number 
of items already sold in breach, and an injunction as to the 
future. This result  was reached, without exception being 
taken, in Imperial Tobacco Co. v. Parslay.75  
 
 
(b)  Sum held to be a penalty: 
 
The courts refuse to implement the intent ion of the parties 
in the case of a penalty. The plainti ff  is held ent itled to sue 
and recover for such loss as he can prove in the ordinary 
way. He cannot even claim to recover the st ipulated sum on 
serious breaches if  the clause has been held to be a 
penalty in respect of some breaches, since, as has been 
pointed out, the same sum cannot in the same agreement 
be treated as a penalty for some purposes and as l iquidated 
damages for others. It  was said by the Court of Appeal in 
Jobson v. Johnson76 that str ict ly the penalty clause remains 
a term of the contract and is not struck out, but that, if  the 
clause is sued upon, it  wil l not be enforced by the court 
beyond the amount of the contract ing party's loss. This 
suggested dist inct ion between such a l imited suit on the 
penalty and a claim for unliquidated damages ignoring the 
penalty, which the contract ing party is ent it led to pursue, is 
                                      
75  Imperial  Tobacco Co. v. Parslay, (1936) 2 All E.R. 515, C.A. 
76  Jobson v. Johnson, (1989) 1 W.L.R.  1026, C.A. 
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largely academic, with either approach general ly producing 
the same result. The dist inct ion mattered in Jobson v. 
Johnson because the penalty, exceptionally, required not 
the payment of a stipulated sum but the transfer of a 
stipulated item of property and the court, by a majority,  
wished to afford the plaint if f  a decree of specif ic 
performance provided that the value of the st ipulated 
property did not exceed the plaintif f 's loss.77  
   
In most of the cases where the plaintif f  has recovered for 
his actual damage the st ipulated sum has been greater in 
amount, but just as this cannot augment his damages so he 
wi ll not be restricted to the penalty in the rare cases where 
it is less than the actual damage. It might be thought 
impossible to have what has been categorised as "an 
extravagant and unconscionable sum" turning out to be less 
than the actual damage, but such a situat ion could occur 
where one sum is stipulated to be paid for a number of 
breaches of varying importance, as to one of which it is 
disproport ionately large, and a serious breach occurs 
causing damage greater than the st ipulated sum. This has 
found i l lustration in charter part ies,78 which early developed 
a clause stipulating for a single sum to be paid for any non-
performance. It was held in Winter v. Trimmer79 and again in 
Harrison v. Wright80 that the plainti ff  could ignore this penal 
stipulation and recover for his greater loss. The same result 
was reached in this century in Wall v. Rederiaktiebolaget 
Luggude81 where Bailhache J. retraced the law in a very 
useful judgment, which remains the clearest authority for 
                                      
77  Beckham v. Drake (1849) 2 H.L.E. 579; Gerrard v. Clowes [1892] 2 
Q.B. 11. 
78  Mayiam v. Norris (1845) 14 L.J.C.P. 95.  
79  Winter v. Tr immer, (1762) 1 Wm. Bl. 395. 
80  Harr ison v. Wright,  (1811) 13 East 343. 
81  Wall v. Rederiaktiebolaget Luggude, (1915) 3 K.B. 66. 
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the present rule. However the wording of the clause had 
become more complex and the earl ier cases provide more 
useful i l lustrations of circumstances in which a penalty is 
l ikely to turn out less than the actual damage. The decision 
itself  was approved soon after as to i ts interpretat ion of the 
particular clause as a penalty by the House of Lords in 
Watts v. Mitsui,82 and, as Scrutton L.J. pointed out in 
Widnes Foundry v. Cellulose Acetate Silk Co.83 Lord Sumner 
clearly took the view that "the clause did not prevent the 
ship owners or charterers from recovering the actual  
amount of damage, though it  might be more than the 
est imated amount of freight." In view of this line of 
authority, the occasional dicta, which state that the penalty 
marks the ceil ing of recovery, are unacceptable.84 They are 
probably based upon the histor ical fact that the sum in a 
penal bond f ixed the maximum amount recoverable.85 
 
                                      
82  Watts v. Mi tsui,  (1917) A.C. 227. 
83  Widnes Foundry v. Cellulose Acetate Si lk Co., (1931) 2 K.B.  
393, C.A. 
84  Wilbeam v. Ashton, (1807) 1 Camp. 78,per Lord Ellenborough: 
"Beyond the penalty you shall not go; within it, you are to give the 
party any compensation which he can prove himself entitled to"; 
Elphinstone v. Monkland Iron & Coal Co. (1886) 11 App.Cas. 332 at 
346, per Lord Fitzgerald: "The penalty is to cover all the damages 
actually sustained but it does not estimate them, and the amount of 
loss (not, however, exceeding the penalty) is to be ascertained in the 
ordinary way." In Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. v. Widnes Foundry (1933] 
A.C 20 at 26 Lord Atkin wished "to leave open the question whether, 
where a penalty is plainly less in amount than the prospective 
damages, there is any legal objection to suing on it, or in a suitable 
case ignoring it and suing for damages". Diplock L.J. in Robophone 
Facilities v. Blank [1966] 1 W.L.R.1428, referring to this express 
reservation of opinion, said that the matter was "by no means clear": 
Lord Atkin's comments are not however quite in point as is shown by 
his reference to prospective damages; they are more allied to the 
issue of limitation of liability by way of liquidated damages, which is 
dealt with elsewhere. 
85  Wall v. Rederiaktiebolaget Luggude [1915] 3 K.B. 66 at 72, per 
Bailhache J.: "The result of suing for the penalty is therefore that the 
plaintiff recovers proved damages, but never more than the penal sum 
fixed"; and similarly Harrison v. Wright (1811) 13 East 343 at 348, per 
Lord Ellenborough. 
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10.6 DAMAGES STIPULATED IN THE AGREEMENT: 
 
Now the question remains the plaint i ff is entit led to 
damages of Rs. 50,000 as stipulated in the agreement and 
as has been held by the learned Trial Judge. The Court is 
unable to agree with the f inding of the Trial Judge. The 
Supreme Court in Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Dass,86 has 
held as under:  
 
"The measure of damages in the case of breach of a 
stipulation by way of penalty is by Sec. 74 reasonable 
compensation not exceeding the penalty st ipulated for.  In 
assessing damages the Court has, subject to the limit of the 
penalty stipulated, jurisdict ion to award such compensation, 
as it deems reasonable having regard to al l  the 
circumstances of the case. Jurisdiction of the Court to 
award compensation in case of breach of contract is 
unqual if ied except as to the maximum stipulated, but 
compensation has to be reasonable, and that imposes upon 
the Court duty to award compensation according to sett led 
principles. The section undoubtedly says that the aggrieved 
party is entit led to receive compensation from the party who 
has broken the contract,  whether or not actual damage or 
loss is proved to have been caused by the breach. Thereby 
it merely dispenses with proof of actual loss or damages it  
does not justify the award of compensation when in 
consequence of the breach no legal injury at al l  has 
resulted. Because compensation for breach of contract can 
be awarded to make good loss or damage which naturally 
arose in the usual course of things, or which the parties 
                                      
86  Fateh Chand v. Balk ishan Dass,  AIR 1963 S.C. 1405. 
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knew when they made the contract, to be l ikely to result 
f rom the breach." 
 
Now it remains to be seen whether the sum of Rs. 50,000 
as st ipulated in the agreement is by way of penalty or 
l iquidated damages. If  it  is penalty then the plainti f f wil l  
have to prove actual damages suffered by him and in case it  
is l iquidated damages then the plaintif f  may get the sum 
named in the agreement, if  legal injury is caused. The suit 
agreement is only for the considerat ion of Rs.60,000, and it  
is not possible to accept that for breach of such agreement. 
Damages of Rs. 50,000 would be suffered. Therefore, the 
stipulation was by way of penalty. The plaint i ff  has not 
invested a single pai in pursuance to the agreement and on 
the other hand he has taken refund of advance payment. So 
without incurr ing any loss the plainti ff wants damages of 
Rs.50,000 which he cannot get as l iquidated damages also 
as no injury has been caused to him. Therefore, the plaint iff 
is not ent it led to any damages for breach of agreement 
even if i t is assumed that the agreement is enforceable.87  
 
In the instant case, the plaintif f claimed damages to a tune 
of Rs.6,000 and for execution of the sale-deed. Held that 
there being no claim for damages by not ice from any side. 
the plaintif f  is not ent it led to the damages as st ipulated in 
the contract.  It will  also be inequitable to award any 
damages in the facts and circumstances of the case. He is 
entit led only to specif ic performance of the contract and 
delivery of possession of the land in quest ion.88  
 
 
                                      
87  Sardar Gurubax Singh Gorowara v. Begum Rafiya Khurshid,, 1979 
M.P.L.J.  96 at  pp.99, 100. 
88  Hadupani Sabato v. Ganta Ratnam; (1981) C.L.T. 87 at pp. 89. 97. 
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10.7 AMOUNT STIPULATED BY THE PARTIES:  
 
When may be taken into considerat ion.-In a  recent decision 
of the Supreme Court in MaulaBux v. Union of India,89 
Sec.74 of the Contract Act has been considered. From the 
observat ions, in that case it fol lows that in a case where i t 
is not possible for the Court to assess the compensation 
aris ing from the breach, the amount stipulated by the 
parties, if  i t  is found to be reasonable and is a genuine pre-
est imate of the loss or damage suffered by the party who 
complained of the breach, could be taken into considerat ion 
as a measure of reasonable compensation. But if  the 
amount st ipulated is either excessive or exorbitant or 
unconscionable. The Court would not take that amount as 
representing reasonable compensation. In a case where the 
loss can be ascertained in terms of money also the amount 
stipulated may not represent the correct measure of 
compensation.90  
 
 
10.8 SUM STIPULATED BY WAY OF GENUINE PRE-
ESTIMATE OR PENAL: 
 
A distinct ion has to be made in the instant case between 
the case where the sum stipulated is by way of a genuine 
pre-estimate and the case where it is by way of penalty. 
Even in the former case, what is awardable for breach of 
contract is reasonable damages not exceeding the amount 
so named. Thus, even assuming that the instant case is one 
where there is a sum named as payable by way of damages 
and that such a sum is a pre-estimate by the part ies, even 
then, the plaint if f would be ent it led only to reasonable 
                                      
89  MaulaBux v. Union of India,  A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1955 : (1970)  2 
S.C. J. 249. 
90  Vankineni Sadasiva Chakradhara Rao v. Sri Sardar Pratap Singh. 
(1975) 2 Andh. W.R. 117 at p. 121. 
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damages not exceeding the amount so named. In this view 
of the matter also, the plainti ff  company would not be 
entit led to a sum higher than Rs. 1,380 as compensation. It 
is clear view that having regard to the terms of Cl. 18 of the 
service agreement which does not provide for graduated 
damages, but which provides for compensation to be paid 
on the basis of a set formula and this is irrespective of the 
length of service or the period of special ized training and 
the nature of the breach, the formula set up would work out 
a sum payable by way of compensation, which would be out 
of al l  proportion to the legal injury sustained by the 
company for breach of the service contract by the 
defendant. Thus, the st ipulat ion in the covenant is one in 
terrorem of the defendant and is in the nature of a penalty 
and the plainti ff -company would be ent it led to a reasonable 
compensation. Assuming that it  is in the nature of l iquidated 
damages, even then, taking an integrated view of al l  the 
facts and circumstances of the case including the nature 
and length of the service and the terms of the contract,  the 
plaint if f -company would not be ent it led to anything more 
than the reasonable compensation not exceeding the 
maximum amount to be worked out with the aid of the set 
formula. In either event,  therefore, the plaint if f  would be 
entit led to a sum of Rs. 1,380 only instead of Rs. 3.945 as 
reasonable compensation.91 
 
10.9 DISTINCTION BETWEEN LIQUIDATED DAMAGES 
AND PENALTY:  
 
The distinction between penalt ies and liquidated damages 
depends upon the intention of the parties to be gathered 
from the whole of the contract. If  the intention is to secure 
                                      
91  Arendra Singh MotHal Johary v. Karamchand Prernchand, 1969  GLR  
584 at pp. 599. 600. 
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performance of the contract by the imposit ion of a f ine or 
penalty, then the specif ied sum is a penalty. The essence 
of penalty is a payment of money as in terrorem.92 I f ,  on the 
other hand, the intent ion is to assess the damages for 
breach of the contract, it  is l iquidated damages.93 The 
Courts refuse to be bound by the mere use of the word 
"l iquidated damages" or "penalty" and will look to what must 
be considered, in reason, to have been intended by the 
parties in relat ion to the subject-matter.94 
 
 
 
 
At common law, parties could name a penal sum as due and 
payable in the event of breach and the named sum 
according to the true intent ion of the parties could 
represent damages. Parties to a contract were also free by 
common consent to assent to a f ixed measure of damages 
to avoid the dif f iculty that very often is found in quantifying 
the compensation. The use of the term penalty or l iquidated 
damages by itself  is not decisive and as was pointed out in 
the case of Kemble v. Farren,95 even what is described as 
liquidated damage could turn out to be penalty on the facts 
of a given case. The essence of a penalty was a payment of 
money st ipulated as in terrorem while the essence of 
l iquidated damages is a genuine covenanted pre-est imate 
of damages. As has been pointed out by the Judicial  
Committee in Miehel Habib v. Sheikh Suleiman El Taj i El 
FarouquL96 A penal stipulat ion cannot be enforced. 
Liquidated damages must be the result of a genuine pre-
est imate of damages and they do not include a sum f ixed in 
                                      
92  Kanak Kumar! v. Chandan La!, AIR 1955 Pat. 215 at p. 222; Badhava 
Singh v. Charan Singh, AIR 1955 Raj. 87 at p. 89 at; Union of India v. 
Vasudeo Agarwal;. AIR 1960 Pat. 87 at p. 91. 
93  Law v. Redditch Local Board, (1892) 1 g.B. 127: 61 L.J.g.B. 172. 
94  Magee v. Lavell. (1874) L.R 9 C.P. 107: 43 L.J.C.P. 131 ; 
95  Kemble v. Farren,  (1829) 6 Bing., 141 : 31 R.R. 366. 
96  Miehel Habib v. Sheikh Suleiman El Taj i  El FarouquL, AIR 
1941 P.C. 101. 
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terrorem As was pointed out by the Supreme Court in the 
case of Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Dass,97 the quest ion was 
one of construct ion of a contract to be judged as at the t ime 
it was made, and mere description as penalty or l iquidated 
damages though relevant was not decisive.98 
 
Penalty or l iquidated damages cannot be taken as such on 
merely being so described. A penalty is a sum of money so 
stipulated in terrorem,  and l iquidated damages are a 
genuine pre-estimate of damages. They are to be so judged 
on the facts of each case.  
 
The quest ion whether a part icular stipulation in a contract 
is in the nature of penalty has to be determined by the court 
against the background of various relevant factors, such as 
the character of the transaction and its special  nature, i f  
any, the relat ive si tuat ion of  the part ies, the rights and 
obligat ions accruing f rom such a transact ion under the 
general law,  and the intent ion of the part ies incorporat ing 
in the contract  the part icular st ipulat ion which is 
contended to be penal in nature. I f  on such a 
comprehensive considerat ion, the court f inds that the real  
purpose for which the st ipulat ion was incorporated in the 
contract was that by reason of  i ts burdensome or 
oppressive character,  i t  may operate in terrorem over the 
promisor so as to drive him to ful f i l l  the contract,  then the 
provision wi l l  be held to be one by way of penalty.99 Thus:  
 
 
 
 
                                      
97  Fateh Chand v. Balk ishan Dass, AIR 1963 S.C. 1405. 
98  State of Orissa v. Calcutta Company Limited; AIR 1981 Orissa 206 at 
p. 209. 
99  KP Subbarmna Sastri v. K.S. Raghvan, AIR 1987 SC 1257. 
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(a) an amount wil l  be penalty i f  the sum named is 
extravagant and unconscionable;100  
 
(b) i t  is penalty i f  the breach consists in paying of  money 
and the sum st ipulated is greater than the sum which 
ought to have been paid;101 
 
(c)  there is a presumption (but nothing more) that where 
a single lump sum is payable as compensation on the 
happening of  one or more events some of  which 
cause serious damage and other tr i f l ing,102 the sum 
named wil l  be a penalty.  In such cases, separate 
amounts must be f ixed for each possible event.   
                         
On the other hand;    
 
(d) where it  is pract ical ly impossible to make a precise 
pre-est imate of damage a sum stipulated as damages 
is a t rue bargain between the parties;103  
 
(e) even when a precise pre-est imate of  the damage is 
possible, the part ies may f ix a sum in the Contract to 
avoid the t rouble and expense  assessment.104  
 
 
Whether a stipulated sum is penalty or l iquidated damages 
is a quest ion of construction to be decided upon the terms 
and inherent circumstances, as they existed at the t ime of 
                                      
100  Clyde Bank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co v. Castaneda;  [1905] 
AC 6, P 17, [1904-07] All ER Rep 251. 
101  Kemble v. Farren ( 1829) 6 Bing 141, [ 1824- 34] All ER Rep 641. 
102  Elphinstone v Monkland Iron and Coal Co Ltd (1886) II App Cas 332, p 
342; Interoffice 7i:lephones Ltd v Robert Freeman Co Ltd [1958] I QB 
190, P 194, [1957J 3 AJI ER 479. 
103  Clyde Bank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co v Castaneda; [1905] AC 
6, [1904-07] All ER Rep 251; Imperial Tobacco Co (of Great Britain and 
Ireland) Ltd v Parslay [1936] 2 All ER 515, P 519. 
104  Diestal v. Stevenson ,(1906) 2 KB  345, p.350. 
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the contract, and not at the t ime of i ts breach.105 The 
question whether the stipulated sum is penalty or l iquidated 
damages is a question of construct ion and of law106 to be 
determined by the court,107 and the l i teral language of the 
contract, however clearly expressed, can be disregarded if 
it  does not represent the real nature of the transact ion.108 
Lord Dunedin has summed up the distinct ion between the 
two in the fol lowing proposit ion;109  
 
 
 
(1) Though the parties to a contract who use the words 
'penalty' or ' l iquidated damages'  may prima facie be 
supposed to mean what they say, yet the expression 
used is not conclusive. The court must f ind out 
whether the payment stipulated is in truth a penalty or 
l iquidated damages.   
 
(2) The essence of a penalty is a payment of money 
stipulated as in terrorem of offending party; the 
essence of l iquidated damages is a pre-estimate of 
damage.  
 
(3) The quest ion whether a sum stipulated is a penalty or 
l iquidated damages is a question of construct ion to be 
decided upon the terms and inherent in circumstances 
                                      
105  Public Works Commissioner v Hills [1906] AC 368, [1904-07] AJI ER 
Rep 919; Fateh Chand v Balkishan Das [1964] 1 SCR 515, P 526, AIR 
1963 SC 1405, P 1411; Phonographic Equipment (1958) Ltd v Muslu 
[1961 ] 3 All ER 626. 
106  Wilson v Love [1896J I QB 626, p 629, [1895-99J All ER Rep 325 
(CA), per Lord Esher MR. 
107  Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd 
[1914-15] All ER Rep 739 (HL); Robophone Facilities Ltd v Blank 
[1966] 3 All ER 128. 
108  Bridge v Campbell Discount Co Ltd [1962] AC 600,[1962] 1 AJI ER 
385, P 395 per Lord Radcliffe, [1962] 2 WLR 439 (HL); Diestal v 
Stevenson [1906] 2 KB 345. 
109  Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd 
[1915] AC 79, pp 86-88, [1914-15] All ER Rep 739. 
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of each part icular contract, judged at the t ime of the 
making of the contract, not as at the t ime of the 
breach.   
 
(4) To assist this task of construct ion, various tests have 
been suggested, which, i f  appl icable to the case 
under considerat ion, may prove helpful or even 
conclusive. Such are:   
 
(a)  It wi l l be held to be a penalty i f  the sum stipulated for 
is extravagant and unconscionable in amount in 
comparison with the greatest loss, which could 
conceivably be proved to have fol lowed from the 
breach.   
  
(b)  It will  be held to be a penalty, if  the breach consists 
only in not paying a sum of money, and the sum 
stipulated is a sum greater than the sum, which ought 
to have been paid.  
  
(c)  There is a presumption (but no more) that it  is a 
penalty when a single lump sum is made payable by 
way of compensation, on the occurrence of one or 
more or all of  several events, some of which may 
occasion, serious and others but tr i f l ing damage.  
 
On the other hand:  
 
 
(d)  It is no obstacle to the sum st ipulated being a genuine 
pre-estimate of damage, that the consequences of the 
breach are such as to make precise pre-estimation 
almost impossibil ity.  On the contrary, that is just the 
situat ion when it is probable that the pre-estimated 
damage was the true bargain between the parties.   
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The above rules are but presumptions as to the intent ion of 
the parties, and may be rebutted by giving evidence of  
contrary intent ion.110 The defendant seeking to raise a plea 
that the amount sought to be recovered as liquidated 
damages was in the nature of a penalty, was entit led to 
leave to defend the summary suit f i led against him for 
recovery of damages l iquidated in the contract.111  
 
 
The payment wil l be held to be a penalty if  the breach 
consists only in not paying a sum of money, and the sum 
stipulated is a sum greater than the sum which ought to 
have been paid, but it  may not be a penalty where it  is 
agreed to charge a certain rate of interest with a condit ion 
that if  the payment is made, a lesser rate wil l be accepted; 
nor where the whole sum becomes payable in a contract for 
payment by installments, in the event of any Installment 
fall ing in arrears. Where the stipulation is not a stipulat ion 
by way of l iquidated damages, viz, i t is in the nature of a 
penalty, it  would not preclude a claim for unliquidated 
damages.112 I f  the st ipulation is in the nature of penalty, the 
aggrieved party is sti l l  entit led to invoke the conventional 
remedy of unliquidated damages, but i f  the st ipulat ion is 
one of l iquidated damages, the provision excludes the claim 
of un-l iquidated damages for that breach. There may, again, 
be a conventional sum which is neither damages nor 
penalty, but, as i t has been called a 'l iquidated 
sat isfaction'113 the agreed price of l iberty to do or omit 
something. In such a case there is merely a condit ional or 
alternat ive promise which, if  not open to any other 
objection, wil l take effect according to its terms. 
                                      
110  Pye v. British Automobile Commercial Syndicate Ltd. (1906) 1 KB 425. 
111  Roshan Lal v. Manohar Lal ; AIR 2000 Del 31. 
112  Gopaldas Jethmal v Municipality Hyderabad; AIR 1949 Sind 1. 
113  Elphinstone v Monkland Iron and Coal Co Ltd; (1886) 11 App Cas 
332, p 347. 
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10.10 RULES FOR DISTINGUISHING LIQUIDATED 
DAMAGES FROM PENALTIES:  
 
In one sense it  may be said to be a rule for dist inguishing 
liquidated damages from penalt ies that the one is a genuine 
pre-estimate of damage and the other a sum f ixed in 
terrorem,  and indeed this is made the second in Lord 
Dunedin's l ist of "rules" in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. 
New Garage and Motor Co.114 However, it  is submitted that 
it  is better to regard it as a def init ion of the two categories, 
and to treat as rules for distinguishing liquidated damages 
from penalt ies only the more detai led tests that are now to 
be considered. Yet it  is well to keep in mind that, whether 
stated as def init ion or as rule, i t  forms the basis of the 
dist inction between the two categories: al l the following 
tests stem from it and are subordinate to it.   
 
 
(1)  The wording used by the parties is of marginal 
importance: 
 
Lord Dunedin stated as his f irst "rule" in Dunlop Penumatic 
Tyre Co. v.  New Garage and Motor Co. that   
 
"though the parties to a contract who used the words 
'penalty' or ' l iquidated damages' may prima facie be 
supposed to mean what they say, yet the expression 
used is not conclusive. The court must f ind out 
whether the payment stipulated is in truth a penalty or 
l iquidated damages".  
 
 
I t  is submitted that today even the term "prima facie" is too 
strong, for in truth the importance of the wording is but a 
                                      
114  Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage and Motor Co., 
(1915) A.C. 79 at 86. 
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l ingering from the early days before Kemble v. Farren115 
when the doctr ine that the issue turned on the intent ion of 
the parties was st il l  in favour. W ith that doctrine gone, the 
wording of the parties cannot provide any answer to the 
basic test of whether or not the amount is a genuine pre-
est imate of damage. Ever since the court in Kemble v. 
Farren in 1829 held to be a penalty a sum expressed by the 
parties to be l iquidated damages, there have been 
numerous cases in which either the l ike has been held116 or 
the converse has been held, i.e. the court has al lowed as 
liquidated damages a provision expressed to be a penalty 
by the part ies,117 and no cases in which the wording of the 
parties has turned the scales.118 I t  is true that the judges 
generally go no further in statement than saying that the 
wording is not "conclusive", a term constantly used by the 
courts in this connect ion,119 but it  is submitted that there is 
more truth in the occasionally found less caut ious phrase, 
such as Bramwell B.'s "the names .. . are immaterial120 or 
Coleridge C.J.'s "does not depend ... on the words used".121 
However, it  remains prudent for parties to use the term 
"l iquidated damages" in framing their contracts, since there  
                                      
115  Kemble v. Farren, (1829) 6 Bing. 141. 
116  Magee v. Lavell, (1874) L.R. 9 C.P. 107; Re Newman (1876) 4 Ch.D. 
724. C.A.; Bradley v. Walsh (1903) 88 L.T. 737; Public Works 
Commissioner v. Hills [1906] A.C. 368, P.c.; also Landom v. Hurrell 
[1955] 1 All E.R. 839 and Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co. [1962J 
A.C. 600. 
117  Crisdee v. Bolton (1827) 3 C. & P. 240; Sparrow v. Paris (1862) 7 H. & 
N. 594; Elphinstone v. Monkland Iron Co. (1886) 11 App.Cas. 332; 
Clydebank Engineering Co. v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y 
Castaneda [1905] A.C. 6; Diestal v. Stevenson [1906J 2 K.B. 345; 
Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. v. Widnes Foundry [1933] A.C. 20; Alder v. 
Moore [1961] 2 O.B. 57, C.A.; Stewart v. Carapanayoti [1962] 1 W.L.R. 
34. 
118  Kemble v. Farren (1829) 6 Bing. 141; Smith v. Dickenson (1804) 3 
B. & P. 630. 
119  Lord Atkin in Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. v. Widnes Foundry; [1933] 
A.C. 20 at 25. 
120  Sparrow v. Paris (1862) 7 H. & N. 594 at 599. 
121  Magee v. Lavell (1874) L.R. 9 C.P. 107 at 114-115. 
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is always the slender chance that a court may feel that the 
other pros and cons so balance out that it  is compelled to 
resort to the wording for i ts decision. 
 
 
(2)  The circumstances must be viewed as at the 
time when the contract was made: 
 
 
Lord Dunedin stated as his third "rule" in Dunlop Pneumatic 
Tyre Co. New Garage and Motor Co.122 that:  
 
 
"the question whether a sum stipulated is penalty or 
l iquidated damages is a quest ion of construct ion to be 
decided upon the terms and the inherent 
circumstances of each part icular contract, judged of 
as at the t ime of the making of the contract,  not as at 
the t ime of the breach".  
 
 
Similar statements of this principle, which has never been 
doubted,123 had already appeared in decisions of the 
highest authorit ies, while i ts practical effect had found 
il lustration in Clydebank Engineering Co. v. Don Jose 
Ramos Yzquierdo y Castaneda.124 In that case the 
defendants had contracted to build for the plainti f fs four 
torpedo boats to be used in the Spanish-American War of 
1898, and the contract st ipulated that the defendants 
should pay the plaintif fs £500 for every week's delay in 
delivery of each of the four vessels. Del ivery was delayed 
and the plaintif fs successfully claimed the stipulated sums 
as liquidated damages despite the fact, which was held to 
                                      
122  Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. New Garage and Motor Co.,  
(1915) A.C. 79 at 86-87. 
123  Astley v. Weldon, (1801) 2 B. & P. 346. 
124  Clydebank Engineering Co. v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y 
Castaneda [1905] A.C 6 at 17; Public Works Commissioner v. Hills 
[1906] AC 368, P.C, at 376.. 
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be irrelevant,  that all  four torpedo boats, had they been 
delivered at the specif ied t ime, would have been sunk 
together with the rest of the Spanish f leet.  
 
(3)  A stipulated sum is a penalty if i t is 
extravagant and unconscionable in comparison 
with the greatest loss that could conceivably 
be proved to have followed from the breach: 
otherwise it  is l iquidated damages:  125 
 
Lord Dunedin introduced his fourth "rule" in Dunlop 
Pneumatic Tyre  Co. v. New Garage and Motor Co.126 thus: 
 
"It will be held to be a penalty if  the sum stipulated for is 
extravagant and unconscionable in amount in comparison 
with the greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to 
have followed from the breach.”127   
 
This is the principal test for assessing the nature of the 
sum, i.e. whether pre-estimate or sum f ixed in terrorem.  
 
The application of this test is very dif ferent where there is 
only a single obligat ion upon the breach of which the sum 
becomes payable and where there are several obl igations 
upon the breach of which it becomes payable.  
 
These two situat ions therefore call for separate 
consideration.  
 
 
 
                                      
125  Jobson v. Johnson [1989] 1 W.L.R. 1026, CA., at § 480, supra. 
126  Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre  Co. v. New Garage and Motor  
Co.,  (1915) A.C. 79 at 87. 
127  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex. 341; Robophone Facilities v. Blank 
[1966] 1 W.L.R. 1428, C.A., at 1448. 
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(a)   Where there is only a single obligation upon 
the breach of which the sum becomes payable  
 
( i)  Where the loss is reasonably calculable at the t ime of 
contracting, if  the loss accruing to the plaint if f  f rom the 
breach in question can, at the t ime when the contract was 
made, be accurately or reasonably calculated in money, the 
f ixing of a larger sum wil l  prima facie be treated as a 
penalty.  
 
The loss which can be most accurately calculated is that 
aris ing from a breach which itself  consists of a fai lure to 
pay money, and therefore the clearest, and the classic, 
example of a penalty is a provision that,  upon fai lure to pay 
a sum of money in breach of contract, a larger sum shall 
become payable. Although there are no clear examples of 
this principle in cases where the only event upon which the 
larger sum becomes payable is the non-payment of the 
smaller sum,128 there are plenty of statements of it  in the 
authorit ies. For present-day purposes the principle is now 
enshrined in Lord Dunedin's speech in Dunlop Pneumat;c 
Tyre Co. v. New Garage and Motor Co.,129 where he called it  
"one of the most ancient instances".130 However, it  is 
important to emphasise that the basis of this rule depends 
in turn upon another principle, namely that non-payment of 
money attracts only nominal damages or at least none 
beyond interest and that, start ing with Muhammad v. Ali131 
through Trans Trust S.P.R.L. v.  Danubian Trading Co.132 to 
                                      
128  cf Cato v. Cato (1972) 116 S.J. 138. 
129  Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage and Motor Co.,  
[1915] A.C. 79 at 87.  
130  Astley v. Weldon (1801) 2 B. & P. 346 at 354; Galsworthy v. Strutf 
(1848) I Ex. 659 at 665. 
131  Muhammad v. Al i ,  (1947) A.C. 414, P.C. 
132  Trans Trust S.P.R.L. v. Danubian Trading Co., (1952) 2 Q.B. 
297, C.A. 
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Wadsworth v, Lydall,133 this principle is slowly being 
emasculated; this ought to lead in turn to a corresponding 
emasculation of the principle at present under discussion.134 
The breach consisted of a failure to pay the purchase price 
in Muhammad of  land and in Trans Trust of goods and, i f  
there had been a provision that upon failure to pay the price 
a larger sum should become payable, it  is submitted that 
the larger sum could properly have been considered as 
liquidated damages. 
 
As to a breach other than a fai lure to pay money, there 
appear to be no cases in which a sum, payable only on a 
single breach, has been held to be a penalty on the ground 
that the loss was reasonably calculable in money at the 
t ime of the making of the contract.   
 
 
(i i)  Where the loss is not reasonably calculable at the 
t ime of contracting. If  on the other hand the loss accruing to 
the plaint if f  f rom the breach in question cannot,  at the t ime 
when the contract was made, be accurately or even 
reasonably calculated in money, it  becomes far less easy to 
class the sum to be paid on breach as extravagant and 
unconscionable, and here it is l ikely that the st ipulated sum 
wi ll be held to be l iquidated damages. Indeed the dif f iculty 
of precise est imation is posit ively in favour of a holding of 
l iquidated damages, for, as Lord Dunedin pointed out in 
Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage and Motor Co.135  
 
 
"It is no obstacle to the sum st ipulated being a genuine pre-
est imate of damage, that the consequences of the breach 
                                      
133  Wadsworth v, Lydal l,  (1981) 1 W.L.R. 598, C.A. 
134  Wallis v. Smith (1882) 21 Ch.D. 243, CA,  
135  Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage and Motor  
Co., [1915] AC 79 at 87-88.  
  
- 553 - 
are such as to make precise estimation almost an 
impossibil ity.  On the contrary that is just the situat ion when 
it is probable that pre-est imated damage was the true 
bargain between the parties."  
 
 
A complementary, but s light ly dif ferent, approach is also 
frequently found in the cases; this takes the point that the 
parties are ent it led to make provision to bypass the 
problems set by the dif f iculty and the expense of proving 
certain types of damage. Thus Lord Halsbury L.C. said in 
Clydebank Engineering Co. v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y 
Castaneda,136 "The very reason why the parties do in fact 
agree to such a stipulation is that sometimes . .. the nature 
of the damage is such that proof of it  is extremely complex, 
diff icult and expensive.137   
 
Here too it is dif f icult to put one's f inger on a clear-cut case 
where only a single possible breach was involved. The 
closest i l lustrations are those of a single obligat ion that can 
be broken more than once or in more than one way. These, 
although strict ly germane here, are more suitably treated in 
considering several obligations, since they depend upon the 
dist inction between single and several obligat ions. 
 
(b)  Where there are several obligations upon the 
breach of which the sum becomes payable.  
 
I f  there are several  breaches upon the occurrence of which 
the stipulated sum is to become payable, the test for 
assessing the nature of the sum is sti l l whether it  is 
                                      
136  Clydebank Engineering Co. v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo 
y Castaneda, (1905) A.C. 6 at 11. 
137  Crisdee v.  Bolton (1827) 3 C & P. 240 at 243.; Kemble v. Farren 
(1829) 6 Bing. 141 at 148.; Green v. Price (1845) 13 M. & W. 695 at 
701.; Webster v. Bosanquet (1912) AC 394. P.C. at 398.; Robophone 
Facilities v. Blank [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1428. CA. at 1447.  
  
- 554 - 
extravagant and unconscionable in comparison with the 
greatest possible loss, but there is a much larger chance of 
its being held a penalty since, as Lord Dunedin pointed out 
in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage and Motor 
Co.,138 "if  there are various breaches to which one 
indiscriminate sum to be paid in breach is applied, then the 
strength of the chain must be taken at its weakest l ink".  
This rigorous rule is capable of cast ing many a st ipulated 
sum into the category of a penalty since pract ically every 
contract may be broken more than once, in more ways than 
one, and by more than one party.  Its rigour has been 
tempered, however, in various ways, al l of  which have in 
common that they tend to make the st ipulated sum payable 
only on breach of a single obligation, thus removing it f rom 
the ambit of the present category and moving it back into 
the last. A prel iminary step, therefore, is to deal with these 
various methods before proceeding to deal with the cases, 
which fal l foursquare within the present category.  
 
In the f irst place, the part ies may be careful to delimit the 
f ield in which, the sum becomes payable. Thus they may 
specify that the sum is intended to cover only certain 
breaches or even only certain aspects of a single breach. 
There are many common cases: thus where a seller of  a 
business enters into a covenant not to engage in a similar 
business within a specif ied radius, there are many other 
breaches that he may commit in connect ion with the sale of 
the business, e.g. a failure to complete or a breach of 
warranty of quiet enjoyment, and there are al l  the possible 
breaches which the buyer may commit:  clearly the 
stipulated sum is not intended to have reference to any of 
these breaches, and for these, if  they occur, an ordinary 
                                      
138  Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage and Motor Co.,  
(1915) A.C. 79 at 89. 
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act ion for damages wil l l ie.139 One of the main distinctions 
between Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage and 
Motor Co.140 and Ford Motor Co. v. Armstrong,141 is that,  
that these cases concerning resale price maintenance 
agreements where the courts came to dif ferent conclusions 
on very simi lar facts, is to be found here. In both cases the 
defendant dealer had contracted not to resell  the goods 
below certain prices, not to sell  them to certain prohibited 
persons, and not to exhibit them without the plaint i ff 's 
permission; in both, his breach consisted of a breach of the 
f irst obligat ion. Whereas, in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. 
New Garage and Motor Co.142 the sum stipulated to be paid 
on breach, which was held to be l iquidated damages, did 
not apply to the third and minor obligation not to exhibit  
without permission,  the stipulated sum in Ford Motor Co. v. 
Armstrong,143 which was held to be a penalty, applied 
equally to al l three obl igat ions. 
 
Alternat ively, the parties may st ipulate that dif ferent sums 
shall be paid for dif ferent breaches. This was done for 
breaches of dif ferent st ipulat ions in Imperial Tobacco Co. v.  
Parslay144 and the court was, therefore, able to concentrate 
upon the particular breach which occurred and the 
particular sum st ipulated in relat ion to it.  This sum was in 
the circumstances held to constitute l iquidated damages. 
And in the case of a dif ferent magnitude of breach of the 
same stipulation, parties commonly introduce graduated 
                                      
139  Aktieselskahet Reidar v. Arcos [1927]1 K.B. 352. and Total Transport 
Corporation v. Amoco Trading Co., The Altus [1985]1 Lloyd's Rep. 
423. 
140  Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage and Motor Co.,  
(1915) AC. 79; facts at § 536, infra. 
141  Ford Motor Co. v. Armstrong, (1915) 31 T.L.R, 267. 
142  Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage and Motor Co., 
(1915) A.C. 79. 
143  Ford Motor Co. v. Armstrong,  (1915) 31 T.L.R. 267. 
144  Imperial Tobacco Co. v. Parslay, [1936] 2 All E.R. 515.. 
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sums increasing in proportion to the size of the breach. 
This method has proved particularly useful where the 
breach has consisted of delay in performance. Thus in a 
number of cases of building contracts, of which Clydebank 
Engineering Co. v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y 
Castaneda145 is the chief,146 the courts have upheld as 
liquidated damages a provision that the amount to be paid 
by the bui lder in the event of his breach by delay shall be 
so much for each day, week or other specif ied short period 
beyond the t ime f ixed for completion of the construction.147 
Others have successful ly adopted the graduated sum where 
the breach enlarges itself  in space rather than in t ime. Thus 
the fol lowing two provisions were held to const itute 
liquidated damages. In Elphinstone v. Monkland Iron and 
Coal Co.148 lessees, granted the priv ilege of placing slag 
from blast-furnaces on land let to them, covenanted to pay 
£100 for every acre of the land that was not restored at a 
particular date; in Diestal v. Stevenson149 a contract for the 
sale of coal provided that one shi ll ing for every ton should 
be paid for that part of the contract which was not 
executed, whether by fai lure to deliver by the sel ler or 
failure to accept by the buyer. A number of cases has dealt 
with covenants whereby one party has accepted restrict ions 
on his right to sell  his goods and has further agreed to pay 
the other a specif ic sum for every item sold in breach of 
covenant. Generally the court has al lowed recovery of such 
sums as liquidated damages, as in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre 
                                      
145  Clydebank Engineering Co. v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo 
y Castaneda, (1905) A.C. 6. 
146  Law v. Redditch Local Board, [l892] I Q.B. 127. CA.. Cellulose Acetate 
Silk Co. v. Whines Foundry, [1933] A.C 20 and Philips Hong Kong v. 
Allorney General of Hong Kong, (1993) 61 B.L.R, 41. P.C. 
147  Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co. [19621 A.C 600. 
148  Elphinstone v. Monk land Iron and Coal Co., (1886)  11 App. 
Cas. 332. 
149  Diestal v. Stevenson, (1906) 2 K.B. 345. 
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Co. v. New Garage and Motor Co. ,150 the cases reaching a 
contrary result have turned on further factors: in Ford Motor 
Co. v.  Armstrong151 the stipulated sum became payable also 
upon a minor breach other than sale, and in Willson v. 
Love152 it  became payable upon the sale of either of two 
commodit ies of substant ial ly dif ferent value.  
 
In the second place, the courts do not favour the attempts 
of defendants to give a narrow meaning to what constitutes 
a single obl igation. Most st ipulat ions can be broken in a 
number of ways: a former employee who has covenanted 
not to trade within a certain radius can set up in business 
f ive miles away or ten. To use Lord Parker of Waddington's 
analysis in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage and 
Motor Co.,153 there is at one end of the scale the case of "a 
single stipulat ion, which if broken at all,  can be broken once 
only, and in one way only, such as a covenant not to reveal 
a trade secret to a rival t rader".  At the other end of the 
scale there is the case of a number of dif ferent stipulations, 
whether or not of varying importance. Between l ies the case 
of the st ipulat ion, which "though st il l  a single st ipulat ion, is 
capable of being broken more than once, or in more ways 
than one, such as a stipulation not to solicit  the customers 
of a f irm".  The courts tend to regard any and al l breaches 
of such st ipulations as a breach of a single obl igat ion. Thus 
in Law v. Redditch Local Board154 a sum payable on the 
non-complet ion of a building contract was held to be 
                                      
150  Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage and Motor Co, 
[1915] A.C 79. Other cases are English Hop Growers v. Dering [1928] 
2 K.B. 174. CA.;  Imperial Tobacco Co. v. Parslay [1936] 2 All E.R. 
515. CA. 42 (1915) 31 T.L.R. 267. CA. 
151  Ford Motor Co. v. Armstrong,  (1915) 31 T.L.R.  267, C.A. 
152  Willson v. Love, (1896) 1 Q.B. 626, C.A. 
153  Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage and Motor Co.,  
(1915)  A.C. 79. 
154  Law v. Reddi tch Local Board, (1892) 1 Q.B. 127, C.A. 
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l iquidated damages as it was payable upon breach of a 
single obligat ion or, as it is often put,  upon a single event.  
Kay L.J. said: 
  
"I cannot agree with the ingenious argument that because 
there may be many matters, some very small, which would 
constitute non-completion, these sums may be regarded as 
payable on several events. According to that argument, 
there must be considered to be several dif ferent non-
completions of the works. There may be dif ferent causes of 
non-complet ion; but non-completion is only one single 
event. ”155  
 
There are many i l lustrat ions of this principle in relat ion to 
covenants in restraint of trade. The point was made in the 
f irst case establishing that a sum stipulated for breach of 
such covenants is generally one for l iquidated damages,  
Crisdee v. Bolton,156 where Best C.l. said: "The sum of £500 
is to be paid for the doing of one thing only, v iz., sett ing up 
a victuall ing house within one mile." Similar statements are 
to be found in the later cases on restraint of trade 
covenants.157 And a very valuable and authoritative 
statement of the principle is provided in Lord Atkinson's 
speech in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage and 
Motor Co.,158 a case of  sale of  goods in which the buyer 
had agreed not to resel l  below certain l isted prices. He 
said:  
 
 
"The object of  the appel lants in making this agreement, i f  
                                      
155  Sparrow v. Paris (1862) 7 H. & N. 594. 
156  Crisdee v. Bolton, (1827) 3 C. & P. 240. 
157  Price v. Green (1847) 16 M. & W. 346 at 354. 
158  Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage and Motor Co.,  
(1915) A.C. 79. 
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the substance and real i ty of  the thing and the real nature 
of  the transact ion be looked at,  would appear to be a 
single one, namely, to prevent the disorganizat ion of their 
t rading system and the consequent injury to their t rade in 
many direct ions.” 
 
He then pointed out that the part ies'  object  was ak in in 
some respects to that of  an employer taking f rom an 
employee a covenant in restraint of  trade, and cont inued:  
 
"I t  is, I  think, qui te misleading to concentrate one's 
attent ion upon the part icular act or acts by which, in such 
cases as this,  the r ival ry in t rade is set up, and the repute 
acquired by the former employee that he works cheaper 
and charges less than his old master ,  and to lose sight of  
the r isk to the latter that old customers, once tempted to 
leave him, may never return to deal with him, or that 
business that might otherwise have come to him may be 
captured by his r ival.  . . .  In many cases a person may 
contract to do or abstain from doing an act,  which is a 
composite act, the product or result  of  almost number less 
other acts. It  would be quite i l legi t imate to . . .  dis integrate 
the obl igat ions to do what the part ies regarded as a single 
whole into a number of  obl igat ions to do a number of 
things of  varying importance, and t reat the [st ipulated sum] 
as prima fac ie a penalty,  because these individual 
breaches of  the agreement did not cause, in many 
instances, any injury commensurate with that sum.”   
 
I f ,  however none of  the above methods applies so as to 
make the st ipulated sum payable only on breach of a 
single obligat ion, then the case wil l  remain one of  a sum 
payable on breach of  several obligat ions; such cases must  
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now be considered.   
 
( i)  Where the loss is  reasonably calculable at the t ime 
of contract ing.  I f  the loss accruing to the plainti f f  f rom 
anyone of  the several possible breaches can, at the t ime 
when the contract was made, be accurately or reasonably 
calculated in money, the f ix ing of  a larger sum wil l  pr ima 
facie be treated as a penalty as to al l  the possible 
breaches and it  is  equally immaterial that some or a l l  the 
other breaches were not so calculable or  would involve a 
greater loss and that i t  was one of  these other breaches 
that in the event occurred. 
 
This re- introduces the most accurately calculable loss of 
al l ,  the loss aris ing f rom breach of  a promise to pay 
money. I f  one of  the several  possible breaches is of  this  
type and the st ipulated sum, payable on any breach, is 
greater than the sum due in performance of  the contract,  
the case is one of penalty.  This is well i l lustrated by the 
facts of  the two cases, which established the whole 
doctr ine, Astley v.  Weldon159 and Kemble v. Farren160 In 
the f irst  an actress was engaged by a theatre manager,  
who agreed to pay her a weekly salary with travell ing 
expenses if  she should perform at his theatre, complying 
with al l  i ts rules and subject to al l  i ts f ines, and it  was 
further provided that i f  either should fai l  to perform the 
agreement he or she should pay the other £200. In the 
second an actor was similar ly engaged under a contract 
which provided, inter al ia,  that he should be paid about £3 
every n ight  that the theatre was open,  and that £1,000 
should become payable by either i f  he fai led to perform 
the agreement, or any part  of  i t ,  or any st ipulat ion 
                                      
159  Astley  v.  Weldon,  (1801) 2 B. & P. 346. 
160  Kemble v .  Farren,  (1829) 6 Bing. 141. 
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contained in i t .  In both cases, in a suit  brought by the 
manager for a refusal to appear on the stage, the 
stipulated sum was held to be a penalty;  in the f i rst since 
an act by the actress in contravent ion of  the theatre ru les 
rendered her l iable to a f ine and in the second since the 
manager's neglect to pay the actor for one night 's 
performance would have entai led the ent ire l iabi l i ty.   
 
As to a breach other than a fai lure to pay money, there 
appear to be no cases in which a sum, payable upon 
breach of  several dif ferent obligations, has been held to 
be a penalty on the ground that the loss for one of  the 
possible breaches was reasonably calculable at the t ime of  
the making of  the contract.  This is  probably because in 
most of  the cases of    this type one of  the obligat ions has 
been to pay money.  
 
( i i )  Where the loss is not reasonably calculable at  the 
t ime of contracting. I f  on the other hand the loss accruing 
to the plaint i f f  f rom al l  the several  breaches cannot,  at  the 
t ime when the contract was made,  be accurately or  even 
reasonably calculated in money, i t  becomes less easy to 
class the sum to be paid on breach as extravagant and 
unconscionable. The princ iple that where there is dif f iculty 
of  precise est imation and of  proof of  the damage the 
stipulated sum is l ikely to be l iquidated damages operates 
here as wel l  as with cases where there is only a single 
breach upon which the sum becomes payable. However,  
one f inal rule comes in, in the case of  a stipulated sum 
covering several  breaches, which may swing the pendulum 
away f rom l iquidated damages back to penalty even though 
there may be dif f iculty of  est imation and proof  on al l  
breaches. This rule was def init ively stated by Lord 
Dunedin, once again in Dunlop Pneumat ic Tyre Co. v.  New 
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Garage and Motor Co.161 He said:  
 
 
"There is a presumption (but no more) that i t  is penalty 
when a single lump sum is made payable by way of 
compensation, on the occurrence of  one or more or al l  of  
several  events, some of  which may occasion serious and 
others but tr i f l ing damage."  
 
Numerous statements to this effect have appeared in the 
reports,162 and the principle is wel l i l lust rated in the 
decis ions. In Ford Motor Co. v .  Armstrong163 car 
manufacturers had sold cars to a dealer under an 
agreement whereby the dealer agreed, f i rst , not  to sell  the 
cars under a l isted price, secondly,  not to sel l  them to 
other car dealers, and thirdly,  not to exhibit  them without 
the manufacturers'  permiss ion, and had further agreed that  
for every breach he would pay £250.  The Court  of Appeal 
held this  to be a penalty on the ground that the damage, 
which would arise under the third clause, was dif ferent in 
kind f rom that which would arise under the f irst  two. I t  is 
submitted that dif ference in kind between two breaches is 
not enough to make the stipulated sum a penalty unless 
there is a lso a substant ial dif ference in the amount of  the 
probable loss arising from each breach, a requirement 
which would seem to have been sat isf ied on the facts of  
Ford Motor Co. v .  Armstrong. In Willson v. Love164 the 
lessees of  a farm had covenanted not to sell  hay or st raw 
                                      
161  Dunlop Pneumatic  Tyre Co. v . New Garage and Motor  
Co.,  [1915] A.C. 79 at 87 
162  Boys v. Ancell (1839) 5 Bing.N.C. 390 at 396; Elphinstone v. 
Monkland Iron and Coal Co, (1886) 11 App.Cas. 332 at 343, Dunlop 
Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage and Motor Co. [1915] A.C. 79; 
Betts v. Burch (1859) 4 H. & N. 506 at 511, Magee v. Lavell (1874) 
L.R. 9 C.P. 107 at 115. 
163  Ford Motor  Co. v .  Armstrong,  (1915) 31 T.L.R.  267, C.A. 
164  Willson v. Love, [1896] 1 Q.B. 626. 
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of f  the premises during the last year of  the term but  to 
consume it  on the premises and to pay, as addit ional rent, 
£3 for every ton of  hay or straw so sold. This was held to 
be a penalty because payable upon two dif ferent events,  
the sale of  hay and the sale of  straw, there being a 
substant ial dif ference between the manur ial value of  the 
two commodit ies.165  
 
In Boys v. Ancell166 the defendant had agreed to grant a 
lease to the pla int i f f  in considerat ion of  the plaint i f f 's 
promise to execute the counterpart and to pay the 
expenses, and each party had bound himself  to pay £500 
should he be in breach. In holding this a penalty Coltman 
J. pointed out that "the sum specif ied here is appl icable 
equally to the refusal to grant a lease, and the omission to 
pay the expenses of  i t" .   
 
In Magee v. Lavell167 the plaint i f f  sold h is tenancy in a 
public  house to the defendant together with the goodwil l ,  
with the provis ion for the payment of  £1 00 " if  either party 
shal l  refuse or neglect  to perform al l  or  every part  of  this 
agreement".  This was held to be a penalty,168 Coleridge J. 
saying that i t  involved "several  events of var ious degrees 
of  importance".169 Indeed the most  f requent i l lust rat ion of 
this  category is to be found in cases concerning the sale 
or  lease of  land and businesses where the st ipulated sum,  
 
 
which has been held to be a penalty,  was to become 
                                      
165  Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage and Motor Co. [1915] A.C. 
79  . 
166  Boys v . Ancel l ,  (1839) 5 Bing. N.C. 390. 
167  Magee v. Lavel l ,  (1874) L.R. 9 C.P. 107. 
168  Davies v. Penton, (1827) 6 B. & C. 216. 
169  (1874) L.R. 9 C.P. 107 at 115. 
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payable i f  either party did not comply with each and every 
part  of  the contract .170 
 
However, the tendency of  the courts in the most modern 
cases has been to enclose this f inal  rule within reasonable 
bounds and to assert that variety in the possible losses 
does not necessari ly preclude a proper. 
  
The f i rst  method is to be found in Dunlop provision for 
l iquidated damages. This has been done in two related 
ways:  either by holding that  the probable loss fol lowing on 
al l  the breaches is  so uncertain that i t  is equal ly uncertain 
that the loss f rom one breach would be greater or less 
than that  from the next, or  by holding that the provision is 
a sort  of  averaging out of  the probable loss to be 
sustained f rom all  the breaches, provided always there is 
not too great a disparity between the greatest possible 
loss and the smal lest possible loss.  
 
Pneumat ic Tyre Co. v.  New  Garage and Motor Co.171 Lord 
Atkinson there said that:   
 
"a lthough it  may be true . ..  that a presumption is raised in 
favour of  a penalty where a single lump sum is to be paid 
by way of  compensation in respect of many di f ferent 
events, some occasioning serious, some tr i f l ing damage, i t 
seems to be that the presumption is rebutted by the very 
fact that the damage caused by each and everyone of 
those events, however varying in importance, may be of 
                                      
170  Betts v. Burch (1859) 4 H. & N. 506; Bradley v. Walsh (1903) 88 L.T. 
737; Lock v. Bell [1931J 1 Ch. 35; Michel Habib v. Sheikh Suleiman 
[1941] 1 All E.R. 507. P.C. Astley v. Weldon (1801) 2 B. & P. 346; 
Kemble v. Farren (1829) 6 Bing. 141. 
171  Pneumat ic Tyre Co. v . New  Garage and Motor Co. , (1915) 
A.C. 79. 
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such an uncerta in nature that i t  cannot be accurately 
ascertained." 
 
The same idea had been put in more concrete form much 
earl ier by Alderson B. in Galsworthy v. Strutt , :172  
 
"The  act of  damage . . .  by another 's pract ising within 50 
miles for the period of  seven years,  would not  be the same 
in amount as if  he were to practise within 40 mi les, or next  
door, nor the same if  he had set up in business in the f irst,  
second, or sixth year, but the part ies have agreed to a 
certain f ixed sum, in order to prevent the necessity of  
being at the expense of  procuring the attendance of  
witnesses for  the purpose of  giv ing evidence upon those 
matters.”  
 
This method is more l ikely to prove ef f icacious if  the 
probable damage varies in degree, and not a lso in k ind, 
with each breach,  a point put forward by Lord Parker of 
Waddington in Dunlop Pneumat ic Tyre Co. v.  New Garage 
and Motor Co. ,173 and acted upon by the Court of  Appeal in 
and the breach of  another in loss between £2 and £12, the 
part ies have, therefore, sett led on £8 as l iquidated 
damages. Here the st ipulated sum is expl ici t ly calculated 
as a mean f igure.  Similar ly,  Scrutton L.J. in English Hop 
Growers v. Dering,174 considered it  to be reasonable that 
"damages of  the same kind, but dif f icult  to value exact ly,  
may be averaged”.175  
 
The appl icat ion of  these two methods has assisted in the 
                                      
172  Galsworthy v . Strutt ,  (1948) 1 Ex. 659. 
173  Dunlop Pneumatic  Tyre Co. v . New Garage and Motor  
Co., (1915) A.C. 79 at 98. 
174  Growers v. Der ing,  (1928) 2 K.B. 174, C.A. at  182. 
175  cf Robophone Facilities v. Blank (1966] 1 W.L.R. 1428, CA, at 1449. 
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upholding of sums as l iquidated damages in several  
modern decisions,  although the situat ion has general ly 
been a hybrid one in which the same result  has been 
reached also on the alternat ive, but related, ground that 
the st ipulated sum was payable only on breach of  a single 
stipulat ion.  Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v.  New Garages 
and Motor Co.176 provides, once again, the most useful 
i l lust rat ion.177 In connect ion with these two routes for the 
upholding of  st ipulated sums as l iquidated damages the 
authori tative, and contemporary, remarks of  Lord Woolf  in 
Phil ips Hong Kong v. Attorney-General  of Hong Kong178 are 
part icular ly valuable. He there said:  
 
"There is always going to be a variety of  dif ferent 
situat ions in which damage can occur and even though 
long and detai led provisions are contained in a contract i t  
wil l  of ten be vir tual ly impossible to ant ic ipate accurately 
and provide for al l  the possib le scenarios.  Whatever the 
degree of care exercised by the draf tsman i t wi l l  st i l l  be 
almost inevi table that an ingenious argument can be 
developed for saying that in a part icular hypothetical  
s ituat ion a substant ial ly higher sum wil l  be recovered than 
would be recoverable i f  the plaint i f f  was required to prove 
his actual loss in that s ituat ion. Such a result  would 
undermine the whole purpose of  part ies to a contract being 
able to agree beforehand what damages are to be 
recoverable in the event of  a breach of  contract.  This 
would not be in the interest   of  ei ther of  the part ies to the 
contract. ” 
10.11 RULES FOR DISTINGUISHING LIQUIDATED 
DAMAGES AND PENALTY IN INDIA: 
                                      
176  Dunlop Pneumatic  Tyre Co. v . New Garages and Motor  
Co., (1915] AC 79. 
177  Wallis v. Smith (1882) 21 Ch.D. 243. 
178  Phil ips  Hong Kong v . Attorney-General o f Hong Kong, 
(1993) 61 B.L.R. 41, P.C. 
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The criter ion whether a sum described as "penalty"  or 
"l iquidated damages" is truly l iquidated damages, and,  
therefore, not to be interfered with by a Court, or a penalty 
which covers, but  does not assess the damages, is the 
ascertainment or whether the sum st ipulated for can or 
cannot be regarded as a genuine pre-est imate of  the 
creditor's probable or possible interest in the due 
performance of  the princ ipal  obl igat ion, or is a sum l iable 
to f luctuat ion in amount according to circumstances.179 
From the very nature of things it  is impossible to give a 
general rule appl icable to al l  cases. Much depends upon 
the circumstances of  each particular case and upon the 
quest ion whether the sum st ipulated to be payable is one 
that is fair and not unconscionable.180 I f  there is a large 
dispar ity between the sum mentioned and the amount  of 
the probable loss,  the st ipulat ion may be taken to be by 
way of  penalty,  while i f  i t  is approximate to the real  loss, i t  
wil l  point towards its being l iquidated damages. But the 
mere largeness of the amount f ixed wi l l  not,  however,  by 
i tself ,  conclude the matter.181 The quest ion must always be 
whether the construct ion contended for renders the 
agreement unconscionable or extravagant,  and one which 
no Court  ought to al low to be enforced; and where i t  is 
impossible, when making a contract,  to foresee the extent 
of  the injury which might be sustained in case of  a breach,  
and the damages,  though very real ,  are di f f icult  of  proof , 
which on the other hand, is  l ikely to entai l  considerable 
                                      
179  Public Works Commissioners v. Hills, (1906) A.C. 368: 75 L.J.C.P. 69; 
Kanak Kumar! v. Chandan Lal, AIR 1955 Pat. 215 at p. 222; 
Tarachand v. Chandigram,. (1961) Jab. L.J. 141 : 1960 M.P.L.J. 1379. 
180  Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. Ltd., v. Yzquierdo., 
(1905) A.C. 6 : 14 L.J .P.C. 
181  Astley v. Weldon. (1801) 2B. & P. 346; Herbert v. Salibury 
Yeovil Rly. Co.  (1866) L.R. 2 Eq. 224. 
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expense and the part ies have agreed upon a reasonable 
sum to be paid as l iquidated damages in case of  breach,  
the Court wi l l  not lean towards its being a penalty.182 
 
Therefore, i f  the plaint i f f  succeeds in establ ishing that  the 
sum named in the agreement is a genuine pre-est imate of  
damages, or would otherwise be a reasonable 
compensation for the breach,  the Court may grant  the 
enti re sum named in the breach as such compensation.  I f , 
on the other hand, the Court comes to the conclus ion that 
the amount as f ixed was in terrorem or unconscionable and 
extravagant,  i t  would be open to i t to award such sum as 
may appear to be reasonable.183  
 
  Rules for determining the question:  
 
Upon the language of  the decided cases certain rules have 
been f ramed which may afford assistance in determining 
the true intention of  part ies:184  
 
(1)  where a contract  provides that,  upon the non-
payment of a certain sum of  money, larger sum shal l  
thereupon become forth with payable, the , lat ter  is  always 
deemed to be a penalty;    
 
(2)  where a contract contains a condit ion for payment of  
a sum of  money to secure the performance of  several 
stipulat ions of  varying degrees of  importance, and for 
breach of  some of  which the damages might be deemed to 
                                      
182  Webster v. Bosanaquet. 16 I.C. 147: (1912) A.C. 394. 
183  Badhava Singh v. Charan Singh, AIR 1955 Raj. 87 at p. 90 : 
1955 Raj L.W. 174: I.L.R. (1954) Raj. 755; Union of India v. 
Vasudeo Agarwal, AIR 1961 Pat. 87. 
184  Vide Arnold, Damages, 2nd Edn., p. 27; Mayne, Damages, 
10th Edn., p. 136. 
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be l iquidated but for others unl iquidated, such a sum is,  
pr ima facie ,  a penalty and not l iquidated damages;  
 
(3)  where the damage result ing f rom breach of  contract  
is altogether uncertain, especial ly i f  only a single breach is 
specif ied and yet a def inite sum of  money, reasonable in 
amount is expressly made payable in respect of  i t .  Such 
provision is not in the nature of  a penalty,  but l iquidated 
damages; and   
 
(4)  where a single lump sum is to be paid by way of  
compensation in respect of  many di f ferent events, some 
occasioning serious, some tr i f l ing, damage, and the 
damage caused by each and every one of  these events, 
however varying in importance, is of  such an uncertain 
nature that i t  cannot be accurately ascertained, i t  is, 
again, not a penalty,  but l iquidated damages.  
 
  First Rule:  Payment larger than debt: 
 
The f irst  rule is stated to be an exception to the general  
rules that where part ies have agreed that in the event of  
one of them fai l ing to keep the contract.  he shall  pay a 
specif ic sum as damages to the other,  such sum is to be 
regarded as l iquidated damages. As observed by Lord 
Esher, "One recognized exception to such rule is,  where a 
sum of  money is to be payable upon the non-payment of  a 
smal ler specif ied sum, in this case the Courts have treated 
the larger sum as a penalty,  not as l iquidated damages".185 
In fact as Tindal,  C.J.,  said "that a very large sum should 
become immediately payable in consequence of  the non-
payment of  a very smal l sum, and that the former should 
                                      
185  Law v. Redditch Local Board, (1892) 1 Q.B. 127: 61 L.J.Q.B. 
172: Astley v. Weldon, (1801) 2 B. & P. 346. 
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not be considered a penalty,  appears to be a contradict ion 
in terms".186  
 
In Astley v. Weldon,187 art icles of  agreement were entered 
into between the plaint i f f  and the defendant by which i t 
was agreed on the part  of  the former that he should pay 
the latter so much per week together with travell ing 
expenses, and on the part  of the defendant that he should 
perform at his theatres and comply with al l  the rules and 
regulat ions specif ied and be subject to such f ines as are 
established, and that in the event of  breach the one should 
pay to the other,  a sum of  £ 200. On the defendant 
refusing to perform, the plaint i f f  brought the action for 
recovery of  £ 200, but i t  was held that,  being in the nature 
of  a penalty plaint i f f  could not recover for, i f  he were 
al lowed to do so,  i t  would be al lowing him to recover this  
large sum of  £ 200 for refus ing to pay a tri f l ing f ine,  or 
fai l ing to perform some other act which would be 
punishable by a f ine. In Thompson v. Hudson188 the leading 
case on the subject,  the defendant was indebted to the 
plaint i f f  on several accounts to ascerta in which three 
separate suits were pending against him. In one suit  a 
f inal  decree was made f ix ing the l iabi l i ty on one account  
and direct ing the amount to be paid on a certain day. 
When the defendant wanted further t ime for payment,  i t  
was agreed between the part ies that the terms of  the order 
as to payment should be var ied on the defendant 's  
agreeing not to appeal against the f inal decree already 
made, to admit the amounts claimed in the other two sui ts,  
and on a certa in day to pay a f ixed sum and to execute a 
mortgage, for secur ing payment in a certain manner of 
                                      
186  Kemble v. Farren, (1889) 6 Bing. 141 at p.148. 
187  Astley  v.  Weldon,  (1801) 2 B. & P.  346. 
188  Thompson v . Hudson, (1869) L.R. 4 H.L. 1. 
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another sum. The plainti f fs also agreed,  on their part ,  to 
take a lesser sum than they claimed with a proviso that ,  i f  
the defendant made any default ,  they should be at l iberty 
to recover their whole debt.   
 
Lord Westbury observed: "If  the sum described as 
l iquidated damages be a large sum, and the t i t le to that 
sum is to arise upon some very tr i f l ing considerat ion, then 
it  fol lows plain ly that the larger sum named never could 
have been meant  to be the real  measure of  the damages. 
I t  was an oppressive agreement.  The sum named could 
never have been the proper amount of damages aris ing out  
of  the non-observance of  some of  the stipulat ions of that 
agreement, which probably would have been measured by 
a few shi l l ings, and, therefore, the very large sum stated 
to be damages was properly regarded as in the nature of  a 
penalty."  
 
Lord Hatherly in the same case stated in the rule is much 
broader terms: "Where there is a debt actual ly due, and in 
respect of  that debt a securi ty is given, be it  by way of  
mortgage, or be it  by way of  st ipulat ion that in case of  i ts 
not being paid at  the t ime appointed, a large sum shall  
become payable and be paid, in either of  those cases 
equity regards the security that has been given as a mere 
pledge for the debt,  and it  wil l  not  al low either a forfeiture 
of  the property pledged, or any other augmentat ion for the 
debt as a penal  provis ion on the ground that equity 
regards the contemplated forfeiture which might take place 
at law with reference to the estate,  as in the nature of  a 
penal provision, against which equity wi l l  rel ieve when the 
object in view, namely, the securing of  the debt is  
attained; and regarding also the stipulat ion for the 
payment of  a large sum of  money i f  the sum be not paid at 
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the t ime it  is due, as a penalty and a forfeiture against 
which equity wil l  rel ieve."  
 
 
These cases def inite ly show that i t  is a sett led law, that  
where an ascertained def inite sum of  a less amount is to 
be paid at a certain day, in defaul t of  which a large sum is  
to be paid, the Court wi l l  t reat the latter as a penalty.  
 
  Converse case where debt is large, but 
payment smaller:  
  
But the rule is otherwise in the converse case where under 
a contract a larger sum is the ful l  amount of  the debt  
or iginally intended by the part ies and becomes payable 
forthwith, but the creditor agrees to receive a smaller sum, 
i f  i t  be paid on a certa in day if  secured in a certain way,  
such a provision is not a penalty.189 The agreement to take 
the smal ler sum if  paid punctually is intended for the 
benef it  of  the debtor,  and in no way mil i tates against the 
r ight of  the credi tor to claim the larger sum on default .  
 
On the same principle where a bond st ipulates for the 
payment of  debt in instalments with a provision that,  in 
default  of paying anyone of the insta lments punctual ly,  the 
whole of  the debt shal l  become forthwith payable,  the 
provision for the payment of  the whole debt does not 
consti tute a penalty.190  
       
 
 
 
  Second Rule:  Lump sum to secure 
                                      
189  Astley v. Weldon. (1801) 2B. & P. 346; Thompson v. Hudson. 
(1869) 4 H.L. 1. 
190  Protector Loan Co. v. Grice, (1880) 5 Q.B.D. 592; Willingford v. 
Mutual Society, (1880) 5 App. Cas. 685; Sterne v. Beck. (1863) 
32 L.J. Ch. 682. 
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performance of several stipulations: 
 
The second rule is f ramed on the principle that i f  a 
stipulat ion is to be treated as a penalty in respect of  one 
or  more events i t  must be considered a penalty in respect  
of  al l .  There are a large number of  cases in which this rule 
has been upheld, and broadly stated. I t amounts to this;  
that where articles contain covenants for the performance 
of  several  things and then one large sum is stated at  the 
end to be paid upon the breach of  performance that must  
be considered as a penalty.191 Accordingly i t  has been held 
that where a sum of money is made payable by contract to 
secure the performance of several stipulat ions the 
damages for the breach of  which respect ively must  be 
substant ial ly dif ferent,  or in other words, the performance 
of  stipulat ions of varying degrees of  importance, the sum 
is prima facie to be regarded as a penalty.192 Bayley, J  
stated the rule to be, that  where the sum which is  to be 
security for the performance of  an agreement to do several  
acts, wi l l ,  in cases of  breaches of  the agreement, be in 
some instances too large, and in others too small , a 
compensation for  the injury thereby occasioned, that sum 
is to be considered a penalty.193  
 
In Ford Motor London Co. Ltd. v.  Armstrong,194 the 
agreement between the plaint i f f  and defendant  provided 
that the plaint i f fs should sel l  thei r motor cars, to the 
defendant,  for sale by him within a certain distr ict ,  the 
defendant undertaking not to sel l  any car or parts below a 
certain price and to pay the pla int i f fs a some of  £ 250 for  
                                      
191  Astley v. Weldon,  (1801) 2 B. & P. 346. 
192  Wilson v. Love. (1896) 1 Q.B. 626 : 65 L.J. Q.B. 474. 
193  Davies v. Penton. (1827)6B. & C. 216; 5 L.J.O.S.K.B. 112.   
194  Ford Motor London Co. Ltd.  v. Armstrong,  (1915) 31 T.L.R.  
267. 
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every breach of such undertaking, the sum being 
expressed to "the agreed damages which the manufacturer  
wil l  sustain".  The defendant having sold the cars at a lower 
pr ice than that  f ixed, the plaint i f fs brought  an act ion for  the 
recovery of  the sum of  £ 250. But i t  was held that the 
agreed sum was a penalty and not  l iquidated damages,  
inasmuch as breaches of  the dif ferent condit ions in the 
agreement would result in damages largely varying in 
amount and, therefore, the sum of £ 250 was not a fair  pre-
est imate of  the probable damage. In Kemble v. Farran,195 
the facts are almost similar to those in Astley v. Weldon,196 
The defendant, a comic actor,  engaged himself  to act  at  
the plaint i f fs theatre, for four seasons and abide by the 
rules of  the theatre. The plaint i f f  on his part ,  agreed 
among other st ipulat ions to pay the defendant  the sum of  
£3.6s.9d.,  every night the theatre was not open. I f  either 
party should fai l  to ful f i l l  the agreement in whole or in part ,  
or any of i ts st ipulat ions, he should pay to the other sum of 
£ 1,000 which was st ipulated to be the agreed sum of  
damages sustained by reason of  the breach. The Court  
held that the sum of £ 1,000, named in the contract was a 
penalty and not l iquidated damages, and laid down the ru le 
that where an agreement contains several  st ipulat ions of  
varied degrees of importance and value, a sum agreed to 
be paid by way of  damages for the breach of any of  them 
shal l be construed as a penalty,  and not as l iquidated 
damages, even though the part ies have in express terms 
stated the contrary. This rule was fol lowed in Homer v. 
Fl intoff .197  
 
                                      
195  Kemble v .  Farran,  (1829) 6 Bing.  141. 
196  Astley  v.  Weldon,  (1801) 2 B. & P. 346. 
197  Homer  v . F l in toff ,  (1842) 9M. & W. 678: 11 L.J. Ex. 270. 
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In Magee v. Lavel,198 where the plaint i f f  entered into an 
agreement for the transfer of  his tenancy in a public house 
and the sale of  the goodwil l  thereof  to the defendant,  and 
the agreement contained a variety of st ipulat ions with 
regard to the transfer of  the l icences,  the payment of  rates 
and taxes, purchases of  the f ixtures, furni ture and stock 
and a provision that i f  either party shal l  refuse or neglect  
to perform al l  and every part  of  the agreement, he shall  
pay to the other the sum of  £ 100 damages it  was held that  
the stipulated sum of  £ 100 was not l iquidated damages 
but a penalty.  
 
In al l  such cases where a lump sum is made payable by 
way of compensation on the occurrence of  one or more of  
al l  of  several events, some of which may occasion serious 
and other tr i f l ing damages, presumption has been held to 
ar ise that the parties intended the sum to be penal.199 
 
  Third Rule -   Reasonable sum to secure 
performance of single stipulation: 
 
Under the third rule stated above, i t  is to be noted that ,  i f  
there be only one event upon which the money was to 
become payable and there is no adequate means of 
ascertain ing the precise damage that may result  to the 
plaint i f f  f rom a breach of  the contract,  i t  is perfect ly 
competent to the part ies to f ix a given amount  of 
compensation in order to avoid the dif f iculty.200 So on a 
guarantee that a certain vessel should sail  with or before 
another vessel then in the berth, "under penalty of 
forfeit ing one- hal f  of  the f reight",  another vessel having 
sai led f i rst,  i t  was held, that one-hal f  of the freight could 
                                      
198  Magee v. Lavel ,  (1874) L.R. 9 C.P. 107 : 43 L.J. C.P. 131. 
199
  Elphinstone (Lord) v. Monkland Iron & Coal Co., (1886) 11 A.C. 332. 
200  Sainter v. Ferguson, (1849) C.B. & 716 : 18 L.J.C.P. 217. 
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be recovered as l iquidated damages,  as it  was immateria l 
that the money intended to be payable was called was a 
"penalty".201 Again, where the defendant agreed to take an 
assignment of the plaint i f fs house and premises, wi thout  
requir ing the lessor's t i t le;  that he would pay £ 2,300 for i t  
and take possession on or before a certain day, and the 
plaint i f f  on his part ,  also agreed to deliver possession, and 
do some specif ied things necessary to maintain the 
defendant in possession, and there was a provision that  
either party,  not  fulf i l l ing al l  and every part  of  the 
agreement, was to pay to the other a sum of  £ 500 thereby 
sett led and f ixed as l iquidated damages, i t  was held that 
on breach of  the agreement by omission to take the 
assignment, the defendant was l iable to pay the whole sum 
of  £ 500.202 
 
I t  would seem that  the forfeiture of  the amount of  deposit  
made by a purchaser in case of  a sale, on his default  to 
perform the contract,  fal ls under this rule and in some 
cases the vendor has been held ent it led to retain the 
deposit  amount even though he suf fered on actual  
damages.203  
 
In Law v. Redditch Local Board,204 there was a contract for  
the construct ion of  sewage works, which provided that the 
works should be completed in al l  respects by a specif ied 
date, and that in default  of  such complet ion, the contractor  
should forfeit  and pay the sum of  £ 100 and £ 5 for every 
seven days during which the works should be incomplete 
                                      
201  Sparrow v. Paris, (1862) 7 H.  & N. 594. 
202  Relly v. Jones, (1823) 1 Bing., 302 : 1 L.J. O.S. C.P. 105. 
203  Hinton v. Sparkes, (1868) L.R. 3 C.P. 161 : 37 L.J.C.P. 81 : 
Lea v. Whitaker, (1872) L.R. 8 C.P. 70 : 27 L.T. 676. 
204  Law v. Redditch Local Board,  (1892) 1 Q.B. 127: 61 
L.J.Q.B. 172. 
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af ter the said date, as and for l iquidated damages. On the 
fai lure to complete the works according to agreement i t  
was held that the plainti f fs were ent it led to recover,  
inasmuch as the sums agreed to be paid were payable on 
a s ingle event only, v iz. the non-complet ion of  the works 
and they must,  therefore, be regarded as l iquidated 
damages and not penalt ies.  
 
  Fourth Rule-  Several breaches, damages 
uncertain:  
 
The fourth rule may be taken to be an extension of  the 
pr inciple contained in the third. I f  instead of a single event  
breach of  which has been provided for by the payment of  a 
sum of money on the essent ial ground that  the 
consequential injury cannot be est imated in money, the 
same result  wi l l  have to fol low even though there are 
several  events breach of  which cannot s imilar ly be 
measured in money. Thus although a presumption is said 
to arise in favour of  a penalty where a single lump sum is 
to be paid by way of  compensation in respect  of  many 
dif ferent events, some occasioning serious, some tri f l ing 
damage,205 that presumption may be rebutted by the fact,  
the damage caused by each and every one of  those 
events, however, varying in importance, is of  such an 
uncertain nature that i t  cannot be actual ly ascertained. As 
Alderson. B.,  said: "When the damage cannot be 
ascertained, what  absurdity is  there in a party saying there 
shal l be a f ixed sum, and therefore, in such a case the 
Courts may give the words their plain and ordinary 
meaning."206 In a recent  case,207 Lord Dunedin in 
                                      
205  Elphinstone (Lord) v. Monkland Iron & Coal Co , (1886) 11 App. 
Cas. 332. 
206  Galsworthy v. Strutt, (1848) 1 Ex. 659 : 17 L.J. Ex. 226. 
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explaining the rule stated that where a single sum as 
agreed to be paid as l iquidated damages on the breach of 
a number of  st ipulat ion of  varying importance, and the 
damage is the same kind for every possible breach, and is  
incapable of  being precisely ascertained the st ipulated 
sum, provided it  be a fair pre-est imate of the probable 
damage, and not  unconscionable,  wil l  be regarded as 
l iquidated damages and not as a penalty.   
 
This ru le is f requently applied in cases of  agreements "in 
permiss ible restraint of  trade" as between surgeons, and 
other professional people,  where one partner binds himself  
to pay, on ret irement, a sum of money to the other partner 
in the event of his committ ing a breach of the condit ions 
and st ipulat ions contained in the agreement.208 
 
 Whether intention always allowed to prevail: 
 
I t  may be conceded that the foregoing ru les are, at  best,  
only guides to determine the true intent ion of  the part ies,  
and are more or less art i f ic ial in their nature. I f  as i t  is  
supposed, they enable the Court to arr ive at the intent ion 
of  the parties, would it , in al l  cases al low the intent ion to 
prevai l  and if  i t  is  clear f ix them to the very let ter of  their  
contract,  however unreasonable and exorbitant  the 
stipulat ions may be. In one case, Wal lisv.  Smith,209 which 
is f requently quoted, JesseI, M.R. expressed himself  
strongly against interfer ing with the st ipulat ion of  the 
                                                                                                 
207  Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage & Motor Co. Lid .. 
(1915) A.C. 79 : 83 L.J.K.B. 1574. 
208  Price v. Green, (1847) 15 M & w. 346: 16 L.J. Ex. 108: Atkins 
v. Kinnier, (1850)4 Ex. 776: 19 L.J. Ex. 132: Galsworthy v. 
Strutt, (1848) 1 Ex. 659 : 17 L.J. Ex 226: Reynold3 v. Bridge, 
(1856) 6 E. & B. 528. 
209  Wall isv . Smith, (1882) 21 Ch. D. 243: 52 L.J. Ch. 145. 
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part ies. He said:  "Courts of law should maintain the 
performance of  contracts according to the intent ion of the 
part ies. They should not overrule any clearly expressed 
intent ion on the ground that Judges know the business of 
the people better than the people know it  themselves."210 
Cotton. L.J. was also of the same opinion. In that case, the 
plaint i f f  had entered into a contract  with the defendant.  a 
builder to sell  him an estate for £ 70,000 which was to be 
expended by the defendant in bui lding on the estate. The 
contract  contained various provis ions,  and, amongst  
others, i t  was agreed that the defendant should deposit  a 
sum of  £ 5,000 with certain bankers to the joint  account  of  
himself  and the plainti f f  £ 500,  to be paid on the execut ion 
of  the contract and the remainder within seven months 
there f rom. If  the plainti f f  could not make a good t i t le the 
deposit  of  £ 500 was to be returned and he was to pay to 
the defendant a sum of  £ 5,000 as l iquidated damages. If  
the defendant should commit a substant ial breach of  the 
contract either by not prosecut ing the work with due 
di l igence, or by fai l ing to perform any other prov isions of  
the contract,  then and in either of  such events, the deposit  
of  £ 5,000 should be forfeited, and if  i t  had not been paid 
the defendant should forfeit  and pay to the plaint i f f  £ 5,000 
by way of  l iquidated damages, and the agreement should 
become void and of no ef fect and the plaint i f f  should 
regain possession of the estate. The defendant having 
fai led to pay the sum of  £ 500, and also having al together 
fai led to carry out the contract, the plaint i f f  brought  an 
act ion for recovery of the £ 5,000 as l iquidated damages. 
The Court of  Appeal held af f irming the decis ion of Fry. J, 
that he was ent i t led to recover. But the opinion of  Lindley,  
L.J., however, has not the sweeping ef fect,  which the 
                                      
210  Wallis v. Smith. (1882)21 Ch. D. 243 at p. 266: 52 L.J. Ch. 
145. 
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language of  Jessel,  M.R.,  would seem to indicate. Lindley.  
L.J., said,211 "Now the authorit ies have been careful l y  
examined by the Master of the Rolls,  and there are only 
one or two to which I  wi l l  advert,  but they al l  seem to 
proceed on the pr inciple that the object is to ascertain the 
intent ion of the part ies. You are to ascerta in the intent ion 
of  the part ies by what they said, that is plain enough, but  
you are to ascertain the intent ion of  the part ies not only by 
what they said but what the Court sees to be the 
consequence, and by what the Court mayor may not  
consider i t  to be absurd or oppressive, or  thought  to be so 
in former t imes. Take the common case of a money bond.  
I t  meant what i t  said: Take the ordinary case of  a covenant  
to pay £ 5,000 if  £ 500 was not paid by the day named, the 
part ies meant what  they said; but effect has long ceased to 
be given to what  was intended. Whether rel ief  was given 
on the theory of  oppression,  or on the theory that part ies 
could not have meant what they said-that i t  was too 
absurd-or whether rel ief  was given by reason of  the usury 
laws. I  do not know-it  is an antiquar ian research which I  
have not pursued. But i t  has long been sett led that where a 
person agreed to pay a larger sum if  he does not pay a 
smal l one, he does not mean what he says, and the 
contract is not to have ef fect that one would suppose it  
was intended to have."  
 
From an examination of the foregoing author it ies i t  wil l  be 
seen that in some cases the part ies are bound by the t rue 
letter of  their agreement which was given ef fect to, while in 
others i t  was inferred that they themselves did not 
contemplate being bound by i t and that they did not mean 
what they said.  As pointed out  in Pol lock and Mul la Indian 
                                      
211  Wallis v. Smith, (1882) 21 Ch.D. 243 at p. 270 : 52 L.J. Ch. 145 
at pp. 274. 275. 
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Contract Act212:  ' 'The nearest approximation to a general  
test yet arrived at is that so-called l iquidated damages wi l l  
not be recoverable in ful l  when the Court thinks this would 
be extravagant or unreasonable having regard to 
circumstances of  the part icular case." You are to consider 
whether i t  is extravagant,  or unconscionable at the t ime 
when the stipulat ion is made, that is to say, in regard to 
any possible amount of  damages or  any kind of  damage, 
which may be conceived to have been within the 
contemplat ion of  the part ies when they made the 
contract.213  
 
  Indian Law: 
 
In India, however, the dist inct ion between penalty and 
l iquidated damages has been fortunately done away with 
by a bold stroke of  the Legislature, which rel ieved the 
Courts in this country of  solving the many dif f icult  
quest ions which the dist inct ion has given r ise to.214 Section 
74 of  the Indian Contract Act  makes provision for  payment 
of  compensation in al l  cases in which the part ies named a 
sum in the contract amount to be paid in case of  a breach 
thereof ,  irrespect ive of  the quest ion whether the sum 
named is t reated as a penalty or l iquidated damages.  
 
 
 
 
                                      
212  Pol lock and Mul la ,  Indian Contract Act ,  Sixth Edn., p. 435. 
213  Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. Ltd .. v. 
Yzquierdo, (1905) A.C. 6 : 74 L.J.  P.C. 1. 
214  Mackintosh v. Crow, I.L.R. 9 Cal. 692; Brahmaputra Tea Co. v. 
Scarth, I.L.R. 11 Cal. 550; Deno Nath v.  Nibaran, I.L.R. 27 Cal. 
423; Vengideswara Puttar v. Chatu Ache:1, I.L.R. 3 Mad. 224; 
Nait Ram v. Shib Dat, I.L.R. 5 All 238; Union of India v. 
Vasudeo Agarwal, A.I.R. 1960 Pat. 87 p. 92. 
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  Meaning of penalty:   
 
The word "penalty" used in Sec. 74 has nowhere been 
def ined in the Indian Contract  Act.  But i t  may be taken to 
have been used in the sense of  a secondary stipulat ion, 
which provides for  the payment of  an addit ional burden on 
default .215 Used in th is sense it  may be taken to have been 
intended to bear i ts ordinary common sense meaning,  
when used in relat ion to contract,  namely, a l iabi l i ty agreed 
by the part ies to be imposed as a vindict ive punishment on 
the party committ ing the breach of contract,  and not merely 
as reasonable and even as l iberal  compensation to the 
other side injured by the breach.216 In this view of i ts 
meaning it  must be a matter of  extreme regret i f  a Court of 
equity would al low itself  to be made the medium for 
enforcing terms that may be revolt ing to every sense of  
just ice. Speaking in re lat ion to a case,217 in which an 
exorbitant rate of  interest was claimed, Straight,  J. ,  said 
that i f  Courts are always bound by the agreement between 
the part ies as to interest,  " i t  would be impossible to say to 
what extravagant and extort ionate extent the most  usurious 
claims under the name of  ' interest '  might not be carr ied".  
These remarks wi l l  apply with an equal degree of  force in 
respect of  any other provision in the nature of  a penalty 
stipulated in a contract. ”    
 
 
 
 
                                      
215  Ramakrtshnayya v. Venkata Somazulu, AIR 1934 Mad. 31 at 
p. 36 [F.B.]. 
216  Muthukrtshnan v. Shankaralingam Pillai, 18LC. 414 at p. 421: 
Sukul Sowcar v. Tirumala Rao, 51 I.C. 295; Seetaramayya v. 
Kotayya, 35 I.C. Ill. 
217  Bansidar v. Bu Alikhan, I.L.R. 3 All. 260 at p. 265 (F.B.). 
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  Payment of higher interest included: 
 
The result  of  the amendment of  the sect ion in 1899 has 
been to br ing within the scope of  the equitable jur isdict ion 
of  the Courts al l  st ipulat ions in a contract,  which is in the 
nature of  a penalty,  including st ipulat ions for payment of  
interest  in case of fai lure to pay a debt on the due date. 
The addit ion of  the four new I l lustrat ions (d) to (g) clearly 
indicate the intent ion of the Legislature that Courts  should 
not take too narrow a view of  the meaning of  the word 
"penalty" based on Engl ish precedents, but might hold 
certain provisions for payment of  interest even f rom the 
date of default ,  to be provisions by way of  penalty.  
  
 
  Test to determine: 
 
Whether any provision in a contract is a penalty or not? is 
of  course, for the Court to determine. The use of  the word 
"penalty" is not  necessary,  nor would its use necessari ly 
govern the construct ion to be put by the Court  upon the 
terms of the contract.  The test as pointed out in several  
cases, and notably by Lord Lindley in Wall is v.  Smith,218 is 
whether the st ipulat ion is so oppressive, unjust and 
unreasonable as to make the Court hold that  i t  ought not 
be enforced equity.  I f  the Court f inds the provisions 
unreasonable and unjust,  i t  holds by a f ict ion that the 
part ies did not intend that i t  should be carr ied out.  The real  
test is the Court 's opinion regarding the just ice and 
propr iety of  the provision.219 As pointed out by Lord 
                                      
218  Wall is  v . Smith,  (1882) 21 Ch.D. 243. 
219  Muthukrishnan v. Shankaralingam Pillai, 18 I.C. 414 at p. 438; 
Bhimji N. Dalal v. Bombay Trust Corporation, AIR 1930 Born. 
306 at p. 315. 
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Loreburn (Lord Chancellor) in Samuel v.  Newbold,220 " I f  
there is ev idence which sat isf ies the Court that  the 
transact ion is hard and unconscionable, using these words 
in a plain and not  in any technical  sense, the Court may 
reopen it ,  provided, of  course, that  the case meets the 
other condit ions required. A transact ion may fal l  within this  
description in many ways. I t  may do so because of  the 
borrower's excessive necessi ty and help lessness, or  
because of  the relat ion in which he stands to the lender, or  
because of  his s i tuat ion in other ways. These are only 
i l lust rat ions and. as in the case of  f raud; i t  is neither 
pract icable nor expedient  to attempt any exhaust ive 
def init ion. What the Court has to do in such circumstances 
is,  i f  sat isf ied that the interest or charges are excessive,  to 
see whether in truth and fact and according to i ts sense of 
just ice, the transact ion was harsh and unconscionable."  
 
"The quest ion must always be whether the construct ion 
contended for renders the agreement unconscionable or  
extravagant and one which no Court  ought to al low to be 
enforced. No abstract rule can be laid down as to what  
may, or,  may not be extravagant  or unconscionable,  
without reference to the part icular facts and ci rcumstances 
which are establ ished in each part icular case."  But,  
however, improvident a transact ion may be. i t  is  dif f icult  
for a Court of  Just ice to give rel ief  on grounds of  simple 
hardship in the absence of  any evidence to show that the 
money-lender had unduly taken an advantage of  his  
posit ion.221 
 
                                      
220  Samuel v. Newbold, (1906) A.C. 461 : 75 L.J. Ch. 705; 
Muthukrishnan v. Shankaralingam Pillai, 18 I.C. 414 and 
Challabhroo v. Banga Behari Sen, 31 I.C. 394; Samuel v. 
Newbold. 
221  Aziz Khan v.Dunichand, 48 I.C. 933 (P.C.). 
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The whole princip le of  the law of  penalty as explained by 
Srinivasa Iyengar, J. ,  is this:  I f  in making provis ion for 
breach of  contract the promise st ipulates from the promisor 
on the breach only for such compensation as the Court 
would deem reasonable in the circumstances. Then there 
is no penalty and the stipulat ion is not penal. But i f  on the 
other hand the Court would on a proper considerat ion 
come to the conclusion that the st ipulat ion was put  in not 
only by way of  reasonable compensation to the promisee. 
But in order that by reason of  i ts burdensome or 
oppressive character i t  may operate in terrorem over the 
promisor so as to dr ive him to fulf i l l  the contract,  then the 
stipulat ion is one by way of penalty.222  
   
 
  Whether a clause in a contract is penal to be 
judged at the time of making of contract:   
 
The quest ion whether a part icular clause in a contract is a 
penal clause is a quest ion of  construct ion to be decided 
upon the terms and inherent  ci rcumstances of  each 
part icular contract  judged of  at  the t ime of  the making of  
the contract not as at the t ime of  the breach.223 The law is  
sett led that the question has to be decided on the basis of  
the circumstances obtaining at the t ime the contract was 
made.224  
 
  Four distinctive features: 
The section has four dist inct ive features, which have to be 
borne in mind:  
 
                                      
222  Ramalinga v. Meenakshi Sundaram, AIR 1925 Mad. 177. 
223  Chitty, Contracts. (1492), 23rd Edn.. Vol. I. and Public Works 
Commissioner v. Hills. (1906) A.C. 368 at p. 376 and Webster 
v. Bosanquet. (1912) A.C. 394. 
224  Nonjibhai Karansanji v. Ramkishan Sunderlalji. (1976) 
M.P.L.J. 650 at p. 653. 
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(1)  Every st ipulat ion contained in a contract whether i t  
be for payment of a sun named or compensation in any 
other form which is to come into operat ion up or the 
breach is to be treated as a penalty;    
 
(2)  The party complaining of the breach is ent it led to 
recover only a reasonable compensation and not the ful l  
compensation st ipulated to be paid;   
 
(3)  Such reasonable compensation should in no event 
exceed the or iginal  expectations of the part ies; and   
 
(4)  Such reasonable compensation is recoverable even 
though actual loss or damage has not been sustained 
f rom the breach.  
 
Accordingly, where upon a considerat ion of al l  the 
circumstances of  the case the Court  f inds that  the terms, 
which were intended to come into operat ion on a breach of  
the contract,  are in the nature of  a penalty within the 
meaning of  the sect ion or in other words they are harsh,  
unjust and unreasonable. I t  ought  to refuse to enforce 
them and proceed to assess the damages at a sum, which 
is reasonable under the circumstances. The st ipulat ions of  
the part ies only af ford the maximum to be al lowed but 
much less may be given. 
 
  Penalty by way of conveying property:   
 
The st ipulat ion contained in a bond that the debtor would 
sel l  h is property in default  of  repayment of  the loan within 
the t ime f ixed, is penal and the Court  can re l ieve him of  i t .  
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In a contract the part ies may provide for the consequences 
of  i ts breach. I f  the st ipulat ion put is not by way of  
reasonable compensation to the promise, but,  by reason of  
i ts burdensome or suppressive character,  operates in 
terrorem over the promisor so as to dr ive him to perform 
his  part  of the contract,  such a st ipulat ion is a penalty.  The 
essence of  a penalty is a st ipulat ion in terroremofthe 
of fending party.  A st ipulat ion in a contract in terrorem is a 
penalty and the Court refuses to enforce it . The Court 
awards to the aggr ieved party only reasonable 
compensation. However, the penalty clause does not 
deprive the aggrieved party of his r ight to damages that 
can be est imated. Point ing out the dist inct ion between the 
English common law and our Contract Act in Fateh Chand 
v. Balkishan Dass,225 their Lordships have laid down as 
fol lows:  
 
"The Indian Legislature has sought to cut across the web 
of  rules and presumptions under the English common law, 
by enact ing a uniform principle applicable to al l  
st ipulat ions naming amount to be paid in case of  breach 
and st ipulat ions by way of penalty."  
 
A penal provision contained in a contract is not restr icted 
to money for enhanced rate of interest but is wide enough 
to include a st ipulat ion to convey immovable property on 
default  of payment of a debt on the f ixed date. In the case 
of  a loan, the debtor is bound to repay it  to the credi tor 
together with the interest agreed upon but the st ipulat ion 
that the debtor wi l l  convey his immovable property to the 
creditor.  In case he does not repay the loan within the t ime 
f ixed for i ts repayment is necessari ly in terrorem  of  the 
                                      
225  Fateh Chand v. Balk ishan Dass,  AIR 1963 S.C. 1405. 
  
- 588 - 
debtor to dr ive him to repay the loan within the st ipulated 
t ime. Therefore where a creditor seeks to enforce that 
penalty the Court wi l l  rel ieve the debtor f rom i t and.  
instead, award reasonable compensation to the credi tor.  
This view f inds support in Phoolchand v. Punaram226 The 
expression "any other st ipulat ion by way of  penalty"  has 
been held not only to include stipulat ions for payment of a 
sum of  money or for payment of  interest,  but also al l  other 
kinds of  st ipulat ions which are penal in their nature. Thus 
a st ipulat ion to convey a house or other property on 
default  of  payment of  a debt is a st ipulat ion by way of  
penalty, and the Court is empowered under the sect ion to 
give by way of  recompense al l  that can be reasonably 
expected or desired.227 The Court  should not omit to not ice 
the provision in the secur ity bond for a. deposit  of  thrice 
the value of the goods on default  of  the product ion 
because it  is c lear ly in nature of a penalty and inserted in 
terrorism In such cases the Court has undoubted powers,  
in the exercise of  i ts  equitable jur isdict ion to rel ieve the 
party and conf ine his l iabi l i ty to the extent of  a reasonable 
compensation to the other side not exceeding the penalty 
stipulated for.228  
 
But in Rajagopala Padayachiv Varadaraja Pandachi,229 the 
appellant was one of  three brothers and at the t ime of  
part i t ion it  was agreed that instead of  taking his share of  
                                      
226  Phoolchand v. Punaram, 1963 M.P.L.J. Note No. 84; Raja of 
Ramnad v. Sellachami Tewar, AIR 1917 Mad 405 and 
Mahadeo Baksh Singh v. Sant Baksh, AIR 1920 Oudh 180; 
Manaklal Bhagchand Sahu v. Bhagwandas Hiralal Chaurasia, 
1968 M.P.L.J. 806 at pp. 807-808. 
227  Bana Bhai v. Chandrabhavy, AIR 1931 Nag 60 at p. 63; 
Fulchand v. Pularam, 1963 M.P. L.J. (Notes) 84. 
228  KP. Ambady v. K.M. Balan, AIR 1959 Ker. 273 at pp. 274. 275; 
1958 Ker. L.T. 801. 
229  Rajagopala Padayachiv Varadaraja Pandachi,  AIR 1925 
Mad. 84 at pp. 84. 85: 47 M.L.J. 605. 
  
- 589 - 
the land. He should receive an annuity in moiet ies f rom his 
two brothers and i f  either defaulted he should resume that  
port ion of  his share, which had gone to the defaulter.  I t 
was held that i f  the contract ing part ies were merely 
remitted to their  orig inal posi t ions there could be no 
quest ion of  penalty.  A return to the status quo at the t ime 
when the agreement was entered into does not vest the 
property in the respondent.  So he cannot be said to forfei t 
what at that t ime was not his.  
 
So, also a clause in a mortgage of  movables entai l ing 
forfeiture of  the r ight of  redemption on fai lure to perform 
certain condit ions was held to be unenforceable.230 But i t  
cannot be said that a forfe iture clause in the Art ic les of  
Associat ion of  a company by which the company could 
declare the shares of  a person forfeited in certain 
cont ingencies is in the nature of  a penalty so as to attract  
the provisions of  Sec. 74 of  the Indian Contract Act. The 
Companies Act does not bar a forfeiture clause of  the type,  
but i t  specif ical ly prov ides for i t .231  
 
 
  Recovery of damages in shape of penalty:  
 
"Damages", as imposed by Sec. 14- B of  the Employee's 
Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 
inc ludes a punit ive sum quantif ied according to the 
circumstances of  the case. In "exemplary damages" this 
aggravat ing element is prominent.  Const itut ional ly 
                                      
230  Salt v. Marquiss of Northampton (1892) AC. 1 : 61 L.J. Ch. 49, 
followed in Raghunadhiya v. Sobina Saldanha, 36 M.L.J. 161 : 
49 I.C. 722 and Venkata Satyanarayana v. National Insurance 
Co. Ltd ., AIR 1947 Mad. 51: (1946) 2 M.L.J. 426; Dwarika v. 
Bhagawati, AIR 1939 Rang. 413 at p. 416. 
231  Bhagawati Prasad v. Shlromani Sugar Mills, AIR 1949 All. 195 
at p. 197. 
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speaking, such a penal levy included in damages is 
perfect ly within the area of  implied powers and the 
Legislature may, while enforcing collect ions, legit imately 
and reasonably provide for recovery of  addit ional sums in 
the shape of penalty so as to see that avoidance is 
obviated. Such a penal levy can take the form of  damages 
because the preparat ion for  the injury suf fered by the 
default  is  more than the narrow computation of  interest  on 
the contr ibution. The expression "damages" occurring in 
Sec. 14-B is,  in substance, a penalty imposed on the 
employer for  the breach of  the statutory obligat ion.  The 
object of  imposit ion of penalty under Sec. 14- B is not 
merely to provide compensat ion for the employees. The 
imposit ion of damages under Sec.14-B serves both the 
purposes. I t  is meant to penal ise default ing employer as 
also to provide preparat ion for the amount of  loss suffered 
by the employees.  I t  is not only a warning to employers in 
general not to commit a breach of  the statutory 
requirements of  Sec. 6, but at the same t ime it  is meant to 
prov ide compensat ion or redress to the benef ic iar ies, i .e. ,  
to recompense the employees for the loss sustained by 
them. There is nothing in the sect ion to show that the 
damages must bear relat ionship to the loss,  which is 
caused to the benef iciar ies under the scheme.232  
 
  Reasonable compensation:  
 
The expression "reasonable compensation" means such 
compensation, as the Court, taking al l  things into 
considerat ion, deems just and equitable in the 
circumstances. I t thus gives wide discret ion to the Court:  
                                      
232  Organo Chemical Industries v. Union of India. AIR 1979 SC 
1803 at pp. 1809. 1816. 
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"The only restr ict ion is that the Court  cannot decree 
damages exceeding the amount previously agreed upon by 
the part ies. The discret ion of  the Court in the matter  of 
reducing the amount of damages agreed upon is lef t 
unqual i f ied by any specif ic l imitat ion, though, of  course, 
the expression 'reasonable compensation' ;  used in the 
sect ion necessari ly implies that the discret ion so vested 
must be exercised with care and caut ion, and on sound 
pr inciples."233 The inclusion in the contract of  a st ipulat ion 
for payment of  l iquidated damages excludes the r ight  to 
claim any unascertained sum of  money as damages. 
Where the part ies have deliberately speci f ied the amount 
of  l iquidated damages there can be no presumpt ion that 
they at the same t ime intended to al low the party who has 
suf fered by the breach to give a go-bye to the sum 
specif ied and c laim instead of  a sum of money which was 
not ascertained or ascertainable at the date of  the 
breach.234  
 
I f  i t  thinks reasonable under the circumstances, there is 
nothing to prevent  a Court f rom awarding a sum, which is 
equal to the sum, agreed upon,  or the penalty stipulated 
for.235 In Sunder Koer v. Sham Krishen,236 the Privy Council  
awarded compensation at the same rate as the increased 
interest st ipulated for.  The mere fact  that the plaint i f f  has 
                                      
233  Nait Ram v. Shib Dat, I.L.R. 5 All. 238 at p. 242 : Nagappa v. 
Venkataramayya Reddi, AIR 1931 Mad. 137 at-pp. 138: 
Preston v. Humphreys, AIR 1952 Cal. 315 at p. 318. 
234  Chunilal v. Mehta and Sons, AIR 1962 S.C. 1314 at p. 1319: 
(1962) 1 L.L.J. 656. 
235  Abbake Heggadthl v. Kinhimma Shetty, I.L.R. 29 Mad. 491 at p 
496; Mir Hazar Khan v. Sawan Ali, 1910 P.R. 81; Srinivasa 
Dikshltulu v. Rangayya, 25 I.C. 702; Bala Sunder Naiker v. 
Ranganadham Iyer, AIR 1929 Mad. 794 at p. 796; Raj Inder 
Bahadur Singh v. Bhagwan Dina, 7 C.W.N. 963; Muthu Chettiar 
v. Maruthunalgum Pillai, AIR 1930 Mad. 428 at p. 428. 
236  Sunder Koer v. Sham Kr ishen ,  I.L.R.  34 Cal. 150. 
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himself  deemed i t  advisable to only claim compound 
interest at the lesser rate than what mentioned in the 
mortgage bond does not necessari ly,  prec lude the Court  
f rom even grant ing a lower rate than that,237 for the reason 
that,  as soon as the original  contract was deemed 
unenforceable, he is ent irely in the hands of  the Court and 
he cannot be permit ted to subst itute for the or iginal one a 
new contract  which he thinks reasonable.238 But when in a 
case the contract  was completed and the part ies have 
mentioned a f ixed sum as damages in case of  breach, then 
ordinari ly unless there is something to show that the 
amount is exorbitant or unconscionable, the Court would 
award that amount  as damages for breach of  contract.239 In 
Lachhman Das v. Bhoja Ram ,240 i t  was held that  i t  was not  
the pla int i f f  but the defendants who were responsible for 
the breach of  the contract;  and there can be no doubt that  
they must refund Rs. 3,200 which was paid to them as 
earnest money, and also Rs. 140 admittedly received by 
them for purchasing stamp paper. As regards 
compensation, i t  is impossible to f ix with any reasonable 
certainty the actual amount of  the loss result ing to the 
plaint i f f  f rom the breach of  the contract;  but the contract  
i tself  prov ides that in the event of  a breach Rs. 3,200 was 
to be paid as damages by the party fai l ing to perform his  
part  of  the contract, and no equitable ground has been 
made out which would justi fy interference with this  
stipulat ion. Such reasonable compensation wi l l ,  however, 
be measured by the actual loss sustained by the plaint i f f  
and the contract  made by the part ies est imat ing their 
                                      
237  Gangadhar Rao Madhorao Chitnavis v. Parashram, AIR 1928 
Nag. 120 at p. 122. 
238  Challaphroo v. Banga Behan Sen. 31 I.C. 394 at p. 396; Panna 
Singh v. AIjun Singh, AIR 1929 P.C. 179 at p. 180. 
239  Lekh Singh v. Dwarka Nath, AIR 1929 Lah. 249 at p. 252. 
240  Lachhman Das v . Bhoja Ram ,  AIR 1925  Lah. 284 at p. 286. 
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damages is  i tself  evidence, though not conclusive,  of the 
damages sustained.241   
 
  In a Calcutta case it was held: 
 
(1)  That the sum of  Rs. 50 per day is l iquidated damages 
and not penalty.  The sum was payable on a single event  
only, v iz.  non-complet ion of  the delivery of  the plant by 
06/03/1952.  
 
(2)  It  was proposed to award compensation at the rate of  
Rs. 25 per day.   
 
(3)  It  is c lear that on 25/04/1952, the plainti f f  cancelled 
the contract and put i t  out of  the power of the defendant  to 
fulf i l l  his obl igation under the contract.  So the plaint i f f  is 
enti t led to Rs. 25 per day upto the 25/04/1952.  Therefore,  
for the period 07/03/1952 to 25/04/1952,  the plaint i f f  is  
enti t led to Rs. 1,250 on this head of  c laim.   
 
(4)  That the ef fect of  this clause for compensation was 
that in case the defendant fai led to complete the del ivery 
of  the plant by 06/03/1952, the plaint i f f  would accept  the 
performance of  the contract af ter the st ipulated t ime 
subject to the payment of damages which are f ixed. Mere 
extension of  t ime is only a waiver to the extent  of  
substant iat ing the extended t ime for the Or iginal t ime but  
this did not amount to a waiver of  the provis ion for  
compensation.242  
 
                                      
241  Mahadeo Prasad v. Siemens (India) Ltd , AIR 1934 Cal. 285 at 
p. 287. 
242  M. Preston v. J.S. Humphreys, AIR 1955 Cal. 315 at pp. 315. 
316. 318; (1954) Cr. L.J. 178. 
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  Measure of damages: 
 
Under Sec. 73 of  the Indian Contract Act where the buyer 
commits breach of  contract by refusing to accept goods 
of fered to him by the sel ler, the measure of  compensat ion 
is the dif ference between the contract price and the actual  
pr ice of  the goods. This is amply borne out from the 
language of  the sect ion as well as f rom I l lustrat ion (d) 
appended to i t.  Fai lure to earn expected prof i t by the sel ler 
out of  the bargain would be covered by the expression "any 
low or damage caused to him thereby" used in Sec. 73.243 
The method of  computing the damages is the same as in 
cases where the part ies have not f ixed any sum in the 
contract,  and the general rules contained in Sec. 73 of  the 
Indian Contract  Act discussed in the foregoing chapters 
have to be appl ied in assessing them.244 Thus, in a case 
where a certain quant ity of  indigo plant was not delivered 
according to contract and though the part ies had provided 
for the payment of  a certain sum as damages in cases of  
default ,  i t  was said that, in arr iv ing at the "reasonable 
compensation payable to the plainti ff .  i t  is necessary to 
ascertain the quantity of indigo which would have been 
pressed out of  the st ipulated quantity of  indigo plant ,  to 
ascertain the pr ice at which indigo might have been fair ly 
sold in the market  during the season to which the contract 
relates, and to deduct f rom such price the ordinary charges 
on producing and sell ing the quant ity of indigo in 
quest ion.”245 Again, where the defendant agreed to borrow 
a sum of  Rs. 20,000 on a mortgage for three years f rom 
                                      
243  Cohen v. Cassim Nana, I.L.R. 1 Cal. 264 : Union of India v. S 
Kesar Singh, AIR. 1978 J. & K. 102 at p. 107. 
244  Datubhai Ibrahim v. Abubakar Molidina, I.L.R. 12 Born. 242 at 
p. 245; Acharat Singh v. Sant Singh. AIR. 1935 Pesh. 57 at p. 
58. 
245  Nait Ram v. Shib Dat, I.L.R. 5 All. 238 at pp. 242, 243. 
  
- 595 - 
the plaint if f  at the rate of 7½ per cent, per annum and also 
agreed that in the event of his default he would pay the 
interest on the whole amount for the full period of the loan. 
it  was held that the only reasonable compensation which the 
plaint if f  was entitled to get is the difference in interest 
between the agreed rate and that realized by the plaintiff 
f rom his banker with whom the money was deposited for 
such period (four months in the case) as might be 
reasonably required to f ind another borrower, together with 
the expenses and cost incurred in preparing the necessary 
deeds.246 So also in the case of a breach of contract to 
purchase property the damages though f ixed by the part ies, 
may be awarded according to the difference between the 
contract price and the market price.247 But i t  has been 
stated that where the part ies have themselves f ixed the 
value of their r ights, that amount is the proper measure of 
damages sustained,248 and therefore, in such a case where 
the Court thinks it  to be a reasonable sum, an inquiry into 
the quantum according to the rules contained in Sec. 73 
would be useless.  
 
  Measure of damages under Sec.  74 of the 
Indian Contract Act: 
 
Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act deals with the 
measure of damages in two classes for cases:  
 
( i) where the contract names a sum to be paid in case 
of breach, and  
 
                                      
246  Dutubhai Ibrahim v. Abubaker Molidina, I.L.R. 12 Born. 242 at 
p. 246; Dadabhoy v. Pestonji, I.L.R. 17 Born. 
247  Lakshmanan Chetti v. Subramanyam Chetty, 50 I.C. 69: 9 
L.W. 312. 
248  Koer' Sen v. Sukho, 27 I.C. 503 : 13 A.L.J. 6. 
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( i i )  where the contract contains any other stipulation 
by way of penalty.  The measure of damages in the 
case of breach of a stipulation by way of penalty is 
by Sec. 74 reasonable compensation not exceeding 
the penalty stipulated for. It is that in every case of 
breach of contract the person aggrieved by the 
breach is not required to prove actual loss or 
damage suffered by him before he can claim a 
decree and the Court is competent to award 
reasonable compensation in case of breach even if  
no actual damage is proved to have been suffered 
in consequence of the breach of contract. But the 
expression "whether or not actual damage or loss 
is proved to have been caused thereby" is intended 
to cover dif ferent classes of contract which come 
before the Courts. In case of breach of some 
contracts it may be impossible for the Court to 
assess compensation aris ing from breach while in 
other cases compensation can be calculated in 
accordance with established rules. Where the Court 
is unable to assess the compensation, the sum 
named by the parties if  it  be regarded as a genuine 
pre-estimate may be taken into considerat ion as 
the measure of  reasonable compensation, but  not 
i f  the sum named is the nature of  a penalty.  Where 
loss in terms of  money can be determined, the 
party claiming compensation must prove the loss 
suffered by him.249 
 
 
                                      
249  Maula Bux v. Union of India, AIR 1970 S.C. 1955 at pp. 1958-
1959: State of Gujarat v. M.K. Patel and Co .. AIR 1985 Guj. 
179. 
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  Stipulation by way of penalty-Necessity of 
proving actual damage: 
 
 
An undertaking to pay a sum of money or to forfeit a sum of 
money fixed in terrorem without reference to any est imated 
damages on breach of the contract is in the nature of a 
penalty and the party claiming compensation must prove 
the loss suffered by him. The undertaking to pay the sum of 
Rs. 10,000 without reference to any actual damages is only 
in the nature of a penalty. The duty of the Court "not to 
enforce the penalty" arises in this case. The st ipulation in 
any contract for payment of any part icular sum or forfeiture 
of the amount already paid as advance is relevant only to 
f ix the maximum amount that could be awarded as against 
the party in breach. The Court has to exercise the 
discretion to award only such amount as may reasonably be 
est imated to be damages arising out of the breach. Where it 
is possible to prove actual damage sustained as here. It is 
necessary for the party not in breach to prove the actual  
amount of damages suffered, so that to that extent the 
amount already paid may be al lowed to be retained. In the 
instant case there is no proof of any amount actually 
suffered as damages. In these circumstances, there is no 
scope for any cut being affected out of the amount paid to 
the defendants. The defendants are bound to repay the sum 
of Rs. 10,000. There is no justi f ication for awarding interest 
prior to the suit.250  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
250  Ramaswamy Gounder v. Kuppuswami Gounder, (1978) 2 
M.L.J. 313 at p. 318. 
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  Duty of the plaintiff  to prove loss, when loss 
can be determined in terms of money: 
 
In Maula Bux v. Union of India,251 it  has been held that 
the expression "whether or not actual damage or loss is 
proved to have been caused thereby" occurring in Sec. 74 
of the Indian Contract Act, is intended to cover different 
classes of contracts which come before the Courts. In case 
of breach of some contracts it may be impossible for the 
Court to assess compensation arising from breach, while in 
other cases compensation can be calculated in accordance 
with the established rules. Where the Court is unable to 
assess the compensation, the sum named by the parties, i f  
it  be regarded as a genuine pre-est imate may be taken into 
consideration as the measure of reasonable compensation, 
but not i f  the sum named is in the nature of a penalty.  
Where loss in terms of money can be determined, the party 
claiming compensation must prove the loss suffered by him. 
This rat io has also been approved by the decision in Union 
of India v. R.D. & Co.252  
 
  Actual loss need not be proved: 
 
A plainti f f is entit led under this section to recover 
compensation, even though he has suffered no actual loss 
or damage from the defendant 's breach. This const itutes a 
material departure from the rule contained in Sec. 73, which 
lays down that, in order to recover compensation under that 
section. It is necessary for a plaint if f  to prove actual  loss or 
damage. But in assessing the amount of "reasonable 
compensation" payable under Sec. 74, the Court wil l be 
                                      
251
  Maula Bux v. Union of India , AIR 1970 S.C. 1955. 
252  Union of India v. R.D. & Co.,  AIR 1973 SC 1908; Nagpur 
Nagank Sahakari Bank Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1981 AP 
153 at pp. 160, 161. 
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guided by the amount of actual loss sustained.253 If  the 
Court considers that the sum named is not excessive or 
unreasonable it shall allow it  or otherwise reduce it LO the 
f igure i t considers reasonable. In cases where there is no 
data to estimate the amount of damages actually caused the 
discretion of the Court is unfettered in al lowing what i t  
considers "reasonable compensation" subject to the 
maximum f ixed by the part ies. Where a party asserts that 
the amount mentioned in case of breach is a "genuine pre-
est imate of damages" calculated by the contracting part ies, 
and should not be disturbed on that account, it  must be 
established that this is so, and the Court,  if  satisf ied, wil l  
adopt it  as "reasonable compensation" to be awarded. But 
the f inal say is with the Court and not with the l it igant.254 If 
as a matter of fact no loss is proved to have been sustained 
by the plaint if f ,  which fact may be taken into considerat ion 
in f ixing the quantum of damages payable as reasonable 
compensation under the section.255 That is to say, where no 
actual loss is proved to have been suffered owing to the 
breach of contract,  which contained a penalty for the breach 
of it ,  the Court wil l award such compensation as it  considers 
reasonable under the circumstances having in view the fact 
that the plaint if f  has not suffered any loss.256 If  on the 
other hand, the case is one, in which exnecessitate rei, it  is 
impossible to f ix the exact amount of damages, the Court 
wi ll not exercise the power conferred by Sec. 74 of reducing 
                                      
253  Panna Singh v. AIjun Singh, AIR 1929 PC 179 at p. 180; 
Pasalapudi Brahmayya v.  Tugala Gangarasu (1963) 1 Andh. 
W.R. 149. 
254  Moolchand Behan Lal v. Chand & Co .. 48 P.L.R. 243. 
255  Meyappa Chetty v. Nanchamma Achi, AlR 1929 Mad. 783 at 
p. 784; Satyanarain Amolchand Bhutt v. Vital  Narain Gawdar, 
AIR 1959 Born 462 at p. 468 : 59 Born. L.R. 1071 : I.L.R. 
(1957) Born. 840. 
256  Ramnath Zutshi v. Secretary of State. 12 I.C.46. 
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the contract damages.257 What Sec. 74 means is that a 
party cannot get the full  amount mentioned in the contract 
as a matter of absolute right or as a matter of course. If the 
party proves that he has suffered damage to the extent of 
the full  amount or that the Court considers, even without 
any proof, that the ful l  amount is a reasonable 
compensation which can be awarded under the 
circumstances the Court can award the ful l amount. One 
thing, however, is clear, viz. that the party is ent it led to get 
some amount not exceeding the sum named, which the 
Court considers as reasonable compensation whether or not 
actual loss or damage is proved to have been suffered by 
him.258  
 
  Right to a reasonable compensation: 
 
The Supreme Court in Fatehchand v. Balkishan Dass,259 has 
pointed out that a Court could grant a relief by grant ing a 
reasonable compensation where the Court is of the opinion 
that the compensation claimed amounts to a punishment or 
is one which acts in terrorem. At the same time, their 
Lordships observed that Sec. 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 
1872, undoubtedly gives an aggrieved party a r ight to 
reasonable compensation from the Court for a breach of 
contract. It is not disputed that the applicants in both the 
contracts had committed a serious breach of the contract. In 
fact, counter-aff idavit f i led by the respondents would clearly 
show that the contractors made grossly inadequate supplies 
and that too far beyond the period f ixed. Having regarded, 
                                      
257  Mir Hazar Khan v. Sawan Ali. 81 P.R. 1910; 148 P.L. 1910. 
258  Preston v. Humphreys, AIR 1955 Cal. 315 at p. 318: 
Pravudayal v. Ramkumar. AIR 1956 Cal. 41 : 95 C.L.J. 280; 
Govind Chandra Sambarsingh v. Mahapatra Upendra Singh, 
AIR 1960 Orissa 29: 25 Cut. L.J. 360. 
259  Fatehchand v. Balkishan Dass ,  AIR 1963 SC 2405. 
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therefore, to those circumstances, it  cannot be said that the 
arbitrator was not just if ied in grant ing even one-half  of  the 
total compensation claimed by the respondents. The mere 
fact that the arbitrator has ignored certain legal pr inciple in 
awarding compensation to the applicants wil l not be 
suff icient to attract the jurisdict ion of the Jammu and 
Kashmir Court to interfere under Sec. 30 of the Indian 
Arbitrat ion Act, unless it is shown that from the reasons 
given by or the notes appended to by the arbitrator in his 
award these principles have been misconstrued.260  
 
10.12 CONCLUSION:  
 
At common law the question whether the sum of money or 
other performance so st ipulated for, is a penalty or 
l iquidated damages can only arise when the event upon 
which it becomes payable is a breach of the contract 
between the parties. It does not arise where the obligation 
to pay exists on entering the contract as an advance 
payment or deposit, or is a true alternative mode of 
performing the contract.  The distinction has given r ise to 
li t igation in the context of hire purchase agreements. 
Finance companies sometimes provide that, in the event of 
termination of the agreement, not only shall  they be entit led 
to take possession of the goods hired and to forfeit 
instal lments already paid, but that the hirer shall also pay a 
certain sum as compensation for ' loss of prof it on the 
transaction'. If  the hir ing is terminated as a result of a 
breach of the agreement by the hirer, the Courts may hold 
this payment to be a penalty in terrorem. But if  i t is 
terminated voluntari ly by the hirer, or by his death or 
bankruptcy, so that there is no breach of the agreement, the 
                                      
260  Sardar Baldev Singh Sardool Singh v. Union of India, AIR 
1965 J. & K. 28 at p. 31. 
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question of a penalty or l iquidated damages cannot arise. 
This produces the anomaly that i t  may be more expensive 
for a hirer to behave honourably and terminate the 
agreement voluntari ly than to repudiate and break the 
contract-a situat ion which has now been mit igated by the 
Consumer Credit  Act 1974 in respect of credits not 
exceeding £15,000 to individuals and by the Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts Regulat ions 1994 in respect of terms 
in sale and supply contracts with consumers. The courts 
have, however, been unwill ing to extend the common law 
rule. 
 
Where the clause is a liquidated damages clause the 
plaint if f  wil l  recover the stipulated sum without being 
required to prove damage and irrespect ive of any actual  
damage, even where this is demonstrably smaller than the 
stipulated sum.1H9. However, where the actual loss is 
greater,  the plainti ff  is l imited to the stipulated sum. In 
Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. Ltd. v. Widnes Foundry Ltd,261: 
 
The appellant agreed to pay 'by way of penalty the sum of 
£20 per week for every week we exceed 18 weeks' in the 
delivery of certain machinery. Calculated on this basis, the 
damages recoverable by the respondent on breach 
amounted to some £600, but its actual loss amounted to 
£5,850. It therefore claimed that it  was ent it led to disregard 
the penalty and to sue for the damages actually suffered. 
 
It was, however, clear from the circumstances that the 
parties must have known that the damage, which would be 
incurred, might great ly exceed the stipulated sum. The 
                                      
261  Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. Ltd. v.  Widnes Foundry 
Ltd.,  [1933] A.C. 20; aff irming Widnes Foundry v. 
Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. ,  [1931] 2 K.B. 393. 
  
- 603 - 
House of Lords therefore held that the sum was not a 
penalty, but was merely the amount which the appellant had 
agreed to pay by way of compensation for delay, and that 
the damages must be limited to this agreed amount.  
 
 
Where a clause is held to be penal, the damages incurred 
must be assessed in the usual way. In such circumstances 
the plainti ff  might be able to recover a sum greater than the 
stipulated sum. Even though, i t  cannot be said that the 
clause has a penal effect in such circumstances and 
although this means that a plaint if f  who has acted unfairly 
by inserting a penal clause would be treated more 
favourably than one whose clause is a genuine attempt to 
' l iquidate'  prospective damages. However, this result can be 
seen as following from the principle that the validity of a 
clause is determined by reference to the t ime at which the 
contract is made. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER - XI 
 
 
QUANTUM AND MITIGATION OF DAMAGES 
 
 
11.1  INTRODUCTION:   
 
To understand the exact meaning of word “Quantum of 
Damages”, one has to f i rst understand the meaning of word 
“Measure of Damages”. The expression “Measure of 
Damages” is a technical phrase, which signif ies the basis 
the footing, or the standard upon which the amount of  
damages in any given case is calculated. There are several  
factors, which inf luence Judges, Juries or any other 
decision making authority in determining the quantum of  
damages, which is to be awarded to a plaint if f  who is 
complaining of an injury at the hands of the defendant.  
Even after this long t ime of development of the law of 
damages, there is no invariable and fix rule available to be 
followed in the determination of the quest ion, as to what is 
the exact amount of compensation, which the injured party 
is entit led to receive for injury caused to him. In making this 
attempt to pay the compensation in a nature of damages or 
in their endeavour to place the plaintif f  in the posit ion he 
occupied before he sustain the injury, the courts of law 
have often to speculate in a vague f ield. For example, in 
some cases, in case of breach of contract, with exception of 
the breach of promise of marriage, the determinat ion of the 
amount of damages is a simple matter depending upon the 
consideration of a simple and more clearly def ine set of 
circumstances. The whole dif f iculty is due to the endeavour 
to reduce every injury and the result ing damage to money 
value. In case of contract, i t  is easy to def ine the injury in 
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terms of money, for almost every contract has pecuniary 
value attached to i t. But in case of wrongs other than those 
aris ing from contract it  is most dif f icult rather impossible to 
set a money value upon the injury suffered, in terms of  
money, the injury sustain by the loss of a l imb or by 
wounded feeling? It is, at the best, a vague of speculat ion 
in a dark f ield and courts of law have often confess inabi lity 
to make a complete and adequate compensation under the 
head damages, however, much more the sufferer may 
deserve the same.  
 
Lord Halsbury, L.C., has pointed out the aforesaid concept 
in his own beautiful f ramework of f lowery language. His 
Lordship pointed out that “the whole region of inquiry into 
damages is one of extreme dif f iculty. You very often cannot 
even lay down any principle upon which you can give 
damages, nevertheless it is remitted to jury, or those who 
stand in the place of the jury, to consider what 
compensation in money shall be given for what is a wrongful 
act. Take the most famil iar and ordinary case, how is 
anybody to measure pain and suffering in money’s count? 
Nobody can suggest that you can by any arithmetical  
calculation, establish what is the exact amount of money 
which would represent such a thing as pain and suffer ing 
which a person has undergone by reason of an accident. In 
truth, I  think, it  would be very agreeable to say that a 
person would be ent it led to no damages for such things. 
What manly mind cares about pain and suffering that is 
past? But nevertheless the law recognizes that as a topic 
upon which damages may be given.”1 There is thus, some 
degree of inevitable speculat ion and uncertainty in 
                                      
1  The Mediana, (1900) A.C. 113; United India Fire and 
General Insurance Company Ltd.,  Guntur  v. Mowl i Bai,  
AIR 1985 A.P. 263 at pp. 266, 267. 
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measuring the amount of damages for a given wrong, and 
Baron Wilde has r ightly observed in Gee v. Lancashire and 
Yorkshire Rly. Co.,2 that the question of the measure of 
damages has produced more dif f iculty than, perhaps, any 
breach of the law.  
 
But yet, eminent Judges have, from t ime to t ime, laid down 
certain rules and standards in accordance with which Courts 
of law have to be guided in awarding compensation for a 
given injury; and these rules have become known as 
“measure of damages”, by which you determine the 
quantum of damages payable to the injured party. In act ions 
for breach of contract, it  may be found possible to measure 
the damages with precision and a near approach to 
accuracy but more often they are not commensurate with 
the loss actually suffered. In actions in case of breach of 
contract, the measure of damages can be more accurately 
calculated, but in cases of personal wrongs no hard and 
fast rule can be laid down and the measure depends upon a 
variety of circumstances. More frequently they are not given 
to the ful l extent of a perfect compensation commensurate 
with the injury sustained.  
 
  QUANTUM OF DAMAGES: 
 
11.2 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE TO DETERMINE THE 
QUANTUM OF DAMAGES: 
 
There are three fundamental principles upon which the 
entire law proceeds to determine the quantum of damages. 
Those three fundamental principles are l isted as below: 
 
                                      
2  Gee v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Rly. Co., (1860) 6 H & N. 
211. 
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(I) Restitutio in integrum;  
(II)  Remoteness of damage; and 
(III )  Mit igation of damage. 
 
Now let us understand the aforesaid three fundamental  
principles, which determine the quantum of damages in 
detail with reference and discussion of decided case law in 
England and India as well.  
 
11.2.1 Restitutio in integrum: 
 
The f irst  and foremost principle to determine the quantum of 
damages is restitution in integrum.  I t  has already been 
observed, in al l  cases of wrongful acts, which are aris ing 
out of breach of contract, the law only adopts the principle 
of restitut ion in integrum subject to the qualif ication that the 
damages must not be too remote. In other words, that they 
must be such damages as f low direct ly and in the usual 
course of things from the wrongful act.3 Therefore, where an 
injury is to be compensated by damages, in sett l ing the sum 
of money to be given in reparation of the damage, one 
should as nearly as possible get at least that sum of money 
which will  put the party who has been injured or who has 
suffered, in the same posit ion as he would have been in, i f  
he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now gett ing 
compensation or reparation.4 In other words, the award 
must be of such a sum as that by which he is the worse for 
the defendant’s wrong doing. The rule appears to be the 
same in actions upon contract also, for a party who has 
                                      
3  The Argentino,  (1888) 13 P.D. 191. 
4  Liv ingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co., (1880) 5 A.C. 25; 
Hermanand Mohatta v. Asiatic  S.N. Co., AIR 1941 Sind 
146 at p. 150. 
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sustained loss by reason of a breach of contract is, with 
respect to damages, ent it led to be placed in the same 
situat ion as he would have been in if  the contract had been 
performed.5  But as Lord Dunedin has forcibly put it ,  
“restitut ion in integrum is a phrase which is properly applied 
when you wish to express a condit ion which is imposed 
upon a person seeking to rescind a contract. The true 
method of expression, I think is, that in calculating damages 
you are to consider what is the pecuniary sum which will  
make good to the sufferer, in so far as money can be, the 
loss which he has suffered as the natural result of  the 
wrong done to him.”6 
 
There is no particular l imit to the amount of damages that 
can be awarded by a court of law, and in proper cases the 
amount may rise to almost any sum of money7 while, on the 
other hand, it  may be a single farthing.8 I t is largely in the 
discretion of the Judge or the jury, but is regulated by well-
established rules.  
 
11.2.2 Remoteness of damage: 
 
The next principle in determining the quantum of damages 
is the rule of the concept of remoteness of damage in case 
of breach of contract. This enti re concept has suff icient ly 
elaborated in a previous chapter of the research work. 
However, at the cost of repet it ion and to give an idea about 
the fundamental principle of quantum of damages in a 
cont inuation of two other principles the researcher wants to 
                                      
5  Robinson v. Harman, (1848) 1 Exch. 885. 
6  Admiralty Commissoner v. S.S. Valeria, (1922) A.C. 42; Rogers 
Shellac Co. v. John King & Co., AIR 1926 Cal. 564 at p. 565. 
7  Jugul Kishore Marwari v. Babu Homeshwar Singh, AIR 1922 Pat. 79 
at p. 84. 
8  Mostyn v. Coles, (1862) 7 H. & N. 872. 
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give an idea about the said concept in nutshell. It  f requently 
happens that when a wrongful act is committed, a person 
suffers damage, but although he may have a cause of 
act ion for wrongful act,  yet he cannot lay any claim for 
compensation for the damage, because the connection 
between the damage and the wrongful act is too remote.  
This is precisely what is called the principle of “remoteness 
of damages”. The principle of remoteness of damages is  
based upon the very well known Latin maxim “ injure non 
remota causa sed proxima spectator”, and prevents the 
plaint if f  f rom recovering any damages that do not f low or 
arise as a direct consequence of the wrongful act 
complained of.  
 
11.2.3 Mitigation of damage: 
 
Last amongst the three universally recognized principle is 
that which underl ines the rule as to mitigation of damages. 
This concept is required to be discussed in detai l so here 
the researcher would like to give an idea about the said in 
few words. In al l claim for damages arising out of breach of 
contract, a duty is cast upon the plaint if f  to mitigate or 
minimize the damages. By saying this, the posit ion has 
been made very clear by the Courts, Jury or decision 
making authority that the burden is cast upon the plaintif f  to 
take all  reasonable an possible precautions to reduce the 
amount of loss or damage arising from the breach 
committed by the other side i.e. defendant.  Any loss or 
damage, which with the exercise of reasonable care the 
plaint if f  could have avoided, wil l be deemed too remote to 
be recoverable.  
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11.3 QUIA TIMET ACTION: 
 
While discussing the concept of quantum of damages it is 
very necessary to understand it clearly that i t is certainly 
not mandatory for the court to grant or to award damages as 
and when the injured comes up before the court for asking 
the damages for breach of contract. Rather it is more 
appropriate to say that it  is discretion of the court to decide 
that whether a part icular claim for damages f i led because of 
some breach committed in performance of contract is 
genuinely required to be awarded. So to uti l ize this 
discretion lawfully,  reasonably and within four corners of 
legal, economic and social structure the courts have 
imposed certain restrict ions upon themselves and as a part 
of that the courts have sett led down certain standard 
requirements, which are required to be fulf i l led before 
awarding damages or before quantifying the damages.  
 
In more recent cases decided by Hon’ble Bombay High 
Court,9 a dif ferent note is struck to the effect that the court 
is not bound in al l  cases to award damages under Section 
73 of the Indian Contract Act, on the higher scale, but that 
the stricter rule of English law can be applied under 
appropriate circumstances, even in cases aris ing in this 
country. In these cases it was assumed that in al l contracts 
for sale of land there is an implied agreement that,  i f  
without any default  on the part of the vendor, he was unable 
to make out a marketable ti t le, the bargain would be off  and 
the vendor would only have to pay damages on the lesser 
scale.  
 
                                      
9  Vallabhdas v. Nagardas, 23 Bom. L.R. 1213; Shamsuddin 
v. Dayhabhai,  AIR 1924 Bom. 357 at pp. 357, 358. 
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Where the circumstances of a part icular case show that the 
purchaser is aware of the dif f iculties which the vendor had 
to face in clearing an adverse t i tle over the subject-matter 
of sale, and the failure on the part of the vendor to 
complete the contract was due not to any wi llful default  on 
his part, but solely to the impossibil ity of removing the 
adverse claim within the t ime f ixed for performance of the 
contract, i t  was held that the purchaser may be entit led to 
recover no damages at al l .10 So also, where according to 
the contract the vendee is required to purchase within a 
certain t ime but defers the performance for an unreasonable 
length of t ime, and the vendor rescinds the contract, the 
vendee is not enti t led to claim damages for the breach.11 
According to these cases no hard and fast rule can be laid 
down for the assessment of damages for breach of contract 
to sell immoveable property but much depends upon the 
circumstances of each case. Section 73 of the Indian 
Contract Act, does not authorize the award of damages in 
very case without reference to the circumstances. There is 
an amount of discret ion retained in the court in making the 
award, and regard must be had to the actual  loss, which the 
plaint if f  had sustained.12  
 
11.4 QUANTUM OF DAMAGES IN CASE OF 
ACQUISION OF LAND UNDER THE CONTRACT: 
 
The appropriate and proper quantum of damages on the 
scale is the different between the contract price and market 
prize on the date of breach of contract. Meaning thereby,  
damages have to be calculated on the price of property at 
                                      
10  Dhanarajgir j i v.  Tata and Sons, AIR 1924 Bom. 437 at p. 
479; Kapadganj Munic ipal i ty  v. Ochhavlal, AIR 1928 Bom. 
329 at p. 332. 
11  Surti  Chetti  v .  Gadala Parthasarthy, 61 I .C. 457. 
12  Dhanarajgir j i v.  Tata and Sons, AIR 1924 Bom. 437 at p. 
479. 
  
- 612 - 
the date of the breach of contract.13 There is,  however, a 
diff iculty informing an exact estimate of the market value of 
immoveable property, unlike the case of moveable property, 
courts have adopted two methods for estimating the value 
for purposes of awarding compensation for breach.  
 
First ly, the price at which the plaintif f  had contracted to 
resell the property has to be taken as evidence of the 
market value, provided it was a bona f ide re-sale.  
 
Secondly, where the defendant had agreed to re-sell  the 
property to a third person, that re-sale price may be taken 
as the measure since it  serves as evidence of the market 
value in the absence of anything to show it was fraudulent.14 
But,  whatever may be the evidentiary value of the re-sale 
price in the above method they are irrelevant for the 
purpose of reducing the damages below the market price if  
any available.15 I f  the vendor sells the property to a third 
person in breach of the contract,  and obtains a higher price,  
the measure of damages in such a case is the difference 
between the two prices.16  
 
So also, if  in the meantime the property were required by 
Government the difference between the agreed price and 
                                      
13  Akhtar Beg v. Haq Nawaz, AIR 1924 Lah. 709 at p. 711;  
Pannalal v. Hussaing Beg, AIR 1924 All  167; Abdul Ali v .  
Gokuldas, AIR 1927 Sind 49 at p. 52; Raj Coomar Rai v. 
Rajah Debendro Narain, 15 W.R. 41; Dhanrajgir j i  v . Tata & 
Sons, AIR 1924 Bom. 473; Lakshman Chetty v. 
Subrahmanya Chetty, 501 I.C. 69; Daniel , In re 91917) 2 
Ch. 405 : 87 L.J. Ch. .69. 
14  Goodwin v. Francis, (1970) L.R. 56 P. 296; Goff in v. 
Houlder, (1921) 50 L.J. Ch. 488; Ridley v. DeGurto, (1945) 
2 Al l  ER 654. 
15  Branding v. McNil l , (1946) Ch. 145. 
16  Radha Kishun Kaul v. Shankar Das, AIR 1927 Lah. 252 at 
p. 255; Tr i lokyanath Biswas v. Joykal i Chowdrani , 11 
C.L.R. 454. 
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the amount at which the land was valued in the land 
acquisition proceedings, apart f rom the statutory al lowance 
for the compulsory sale, will be the measure.17 
 
11.5 CONCEPT OF LOSS OF PROFIT AS A SPECIAL 
DAMAGE:  
 
Ordinari ly,  the purchaser cannot lay claim to the prof its,  
which he would have made if  the contract had been 
performed, as by fulf i l l ing his contract with a third person. 
Profits to be claimed must be laid as special damage under 
the second rule in Sec. 73 of the Indian Contract Act,  as 
damage, which the part ies knew when they made the 
contract to be likely to resul t f rom the breach.18 I f  the 
vendor knew about the contract which the purchaser had 
entered into for the sale of the property to a third person, or 
were informed about it  at the t ime of making the contract,  
loss of profits under such a contract would be the proper 
measure. In the absence of any of those special  
circumstances the ordinary measure, namely, the difference 
between the contract price and the market price has to be 
applied. At the same time it may b e stated that the prof it,  
which the purchaser could have made in a re-sale, i f  
uncontradicted by other evidence, is evidence of the market 
value. Any other special damage, i f properly laid can also 
be recovered, as for instance, loss of business by not 
gett ing sett led in the house.19I t  cannot,  however, be said 
that anyone entering into contract must be treated as 
having constructive notice of the nature of the other party’s 
business or of i ts probable bearing on the loss which the 
                                      
17  Nabin Chandra Saha v. Krishna Baroni,  9 I.C. 525. 
18  Dhanrajgir i j i   v .  Tata and Sons, AIR 1924 Bom. 473 at p. 
479;  Abdul Ali  v .  Gokuldas Lal j i,  AIR 1927 Sind 49 at 52; 
Janaki Nath v. Jamini Kanta, 22 I.C. 612.  
19  Ward v. Smith, (1832) 11 Price 19; Jaques v. Mi ller,  
(1877) 6 Ch.D. 153. 
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other party might suffer in consequence of a breach of 
contract. In Diamond v. Campbell Jones ,20 the defendants 
agreed to sell  to the plaintif f  a leasehold interest for a term 
expir ing in the year 2003 in property comprising of a 
basement and ground f loor and four upper f loors. The 
agreement was expressed to be subject to and with the 
benefit of  a contract for the grant of a new lease requir ing 
the conversion of the property into a ground f loor off ice and 
residential accommodation to be carried out by the lessee. 
In a suit for the repudiat ion of the contract the plaint iff 
claimed damages measured at the prof its he would have 
realized if  he had converted the property as contemplated 
and required by contract and had disposed of the premises 
when so converted. The plaint if f  was dealer in real property, 
but i t  was neither pleaded nor shown in evidence that the 
defendants knew what his occupation was or that he 
intended to carry out a conversion of the premises. The 
market value of the property at the date of the breach, 
without having been converted substant ial ly exceeded the 
original contract pr ice. I t was held that the plaintif f was only 
entit led to recover his difference in price, which would be 
the prof it he might make on sale, but not prof it he would 
have made upon conversion and sale in the absence of 
special c ircumstances to justi fy imputation of knowledge 
that the purchase intended to use the land in a particular 
manner.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
20  Diamond v. Campbell Jones, (1960) 1 Al l  ER 583; Goffine 
v. Houlder , (1921) 90 L.J. Ch. 488; Ridley v. De Gurto , 
(1945) 2 Al l  ER 654. 
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  MITIGATION OF DAMAGES: 
 
11.6 VARIOUS MEANINGS OF THE TERM 
“MITIGATION”: 
 
The expression “mitigat ion of damage” is an umbrella term 
applied to a number of matters some of which are related 
and some of which are completely unconnected. 
Surprisingly, in view of the importance of the subject,  these 
differences have not been fully analyzed in English law; yet 
it  is vital to an understanding of the issues to separate the 
various meanings of the term. 
 
11.6.1 Principal meaning: The three rules as to the 
avoiding of the consequences of a wrong: 
 
The principal meaning of the term “mitigation”, with which 
this topic deals, concerns the avoiding of the consequences 
of a wrong arising out of breach of contract, and forms 
probably the only exact use of the term. Even if  the 
subsidiary or residual meanings enumerated below cannot 
strict ly be called incorrect, it  would be well if  the use of the 
term “mitigat ion” in connection with them was qualif ied, i f  
not completely discarded, as matters are only confused by 
employing one term to describe disparate concepts.  
 
The principal meaning itself  comprises three dif ferent,  
although closely interrelated, rules. This analysis into three 
rules, although clearly implic it in the cases, is one, which 
has not formerly been given explic it  statement in Engl ish 
law. It is submitted that such a division lends clarity to a 
diff icult topic. The three rules are these: 
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(1) The f irst and most important rule is that the plaint iff 
must take al l reasonable steps to mitigate the loss to him 
consequent upon the defendant’s wrong and cannot recover 
damages for any such loss which he could thus have 
avoided but has failed, through unreasonable act ion or 
inaction, to avoid. Put short ly,  the plaint if f  cannot recover 
for avoidable loss. 
 
(2) The second rule is the corollary of the f irst and is 
that, where the plaint if f  does take reasonable steps to 
mitigate the loss to him consequent upon the defendant’s 
wrong, he can recover for loss incurred in so doing; this is 
so even though the result ing damage is in the event greater 
than it would have been had the mit igat ing steps not been 
taken. Put shortly, the plaint if f can recover for loss incurred 
in reasonable attempts to avoid loss. 
 
(3) The third rule is that, where the plainti f f does take 
steps to mitigate the loss to him consequent upon the 
defendant’s wrong, and these steps are successful, the 
defendant is entit led to the benefit accruing from the 
plaint if f ’s act ion and is l iable only for the loss as lessened; 
this is so even though the plaint if f  would not have been 
debarred under the f irst rule from recovering the whole loss, 
which would have accrued in the absence of his successful 
mitigating steps, by reason of these steps not being ones 
which were required of him under the f irst rule. Put shortly,  
the plaint if f cannot recover for avoided loss. 
 
11.6.2 Different subsidiary or residual meanings: 
 
There are subsidiary or residual meanings of the term 
“mitigation”. These have no connect ion with the three rules 
comprised in the principal meaning, because they are not 
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concerned with the avoiding of the consequences of the 
defendant’s wrong but come into play at an earl ier stage in 
the matter. The f irst appears in cases where the conduct,  
character and circumstances of the plainti ff  and the 
defendant affect the assessment of the damages; the 
second appears in cases where both the plaint if f  and the 
defendant are in breach of contract. 
 
(1) In certain breach of contract, measure of damages 
may be affected by the conduct, character and 
circumstances of both plaintif f  and defendant.  These factors 
are said to go in aggravation for in mit igation of the 
damage. Thus the damage is most commonly aggravated, 
and the damages correspondingly increased,21 by the 
defendant’s bad motives or wil lfulness; the prime il lustration 
of this is in defamation where one of the principal elements 
in estimating the damages is the mal ice of the defendant. 
The damage may also be aggravated by reason of the good 
character and reputat ion of the plaint if f ,  but there is less 
authority on this because generally no evidence can be 
introduced to show the good character o the plaintif f  unless 
his character is attacked in evidence by the defendant.  
Conversely, the damage may be mitigated, and the 
damages corresponding reduced, either by the defendant’s 
bona f ides or by the bad character and reputation of the 
plaint if f .   
 
This meaning of the term “mitigat ion” simply deals with 
particular items which go to show that the injury is not as 
great as would prima facie appear: no quest ion of 
subsequently lessening the loss arises. Indeed in al l cases 
it is important to look and see what the actual injury is, 
                                      
21  Rookes v. Barnard; [1964] A.C. 1129. 
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quite apart f rom subsequent steps taken by the plaint if f ,  and 
if  it  is shown to be less than normal, the measure of 
damages wil l be less than the normal measure in that 
particular kind of case; there is no need to say that the 
damages are mit igated by the amount by which they are 
less than the normal measure. The particular cases, both as 
to mit igat ion and as to aggravat ion, are therefore best dealt  
with when dealing with the particular wrong, which give rise 
to them. 
 
(2)  Where the plaint if f,  suing the defendant in respect 
of his fai lure to perform a contract, is also himself  in breach 
of contract, the loss thereby accruing to the defendant may 
in certain cases go in mit igation or reduct ion of the amount, 
which the plaint if f can recover in his action. Such cases 
tend to arise when the plaintif f ’s action is not for damages 
for breach of contract,  but is for money payable by the 
terms of a contract, such as the price or value of goods 
sold,22 of  services rendered,23 or of a combination of the 
two.24 
 
This meaning of the term “mit igat ion” deals with the manner 
in which damages result ing from a breach of contract by the 
plaint if f  can be deducted from the claim made by the 
plaint if f  in respect of that contract. It is analogous to cases 
of contributory negligence in that both part ies are at fault 
and a subtract ion is made: nevertheless a reduction of 
damages on the ground of contributory negligence is not 
referred to as “mitigat ion”. The only quest ion that arises in 
these contract cases is a mater of procedure and of 
pleading, namely whether the defendant can claim the 
                                      
22  Parsons v. Sexton, (1847) 4 C.B. 899. 
23  Chapel v. Hicks, (1833) 2 Cr. 7 M. 214. 
24  Allen v. Cameron, (18330 Cr. & M. 832. 
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damages for the plaint if f ’s breach in ful l or in part with or 
without pleading the matter as set-off or counterclaim. This 
question is not germane to a textbook on damages and does 
not cal l for treatment. Whether, where such a reduction is 
al lowed, the measure of reduct ion could have recovered in 
a separate act ion against the plaint if f . 
 
11.7 THE RULES AS TO AVOIDABLE LOSS: NO 
RECOVERY FOR LOSS WHICH THE PLAINTIFF 
OUGHT TO HAVE AVOIDED: 
 
The extent of the damage result ing from a wrongful act i .e.  
breach of contract;  can often be considerably lessened by 
well-advised act ion on the part of the person wronged. In 
such circumstances the law requires him to take all  
reasonable steps to mitigate the loss consequent on the 
defendant’s wrong, and refuses to al low him damages in 
respect of any part  of the loss, which is due to his neglect 
to take such steps. Even persons against whom wrongs 
have been committed are not entit led to sit back and suffer 
loss, which could be avoided by reasonable efforts, or to 
cont inue an act ivity unreasonably so as to increase the 
loss. This well -establ ished rule f inds its most authoritative 
expression in the speech of Viscount Haldane L.C. in the 
leading case of Brit ish Westinghouse Co. v. Underground 
Ry25 where he said: 
 
“The fundamental basis is thus compensation for pecuniary 
loss naturally f lowing from the breach; but this f irst principle 
is qualif ied by a second, which imposes on a plainti ff the 
duty of taking al l  reasonable steps to mit igate the loss 
consequent on the breach, and debars him from claiming 
                                      
25  Brit ish Westinghouse Co. v. Underground Ry, [1912] A.C. 
673. 
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any part of the damage which is due to his neglect to take 
such steps.”26 
 
There are a few general points about this doctr ine, which 
may conveniently be collected at this stage. 
 
(a) Application to contract: 
 
Lord Haldane referred only to pecuniary loss but 
presumably because he was dealing with a breach of 
contract. Most cases do indeed stem from contract and 
concern the mitigation of pecuniary loss; but the principle 
applies equally to non-pecuniary loss, as in the case of a 
plaint if f  who, having been physically injured, fai ls to take 
reasonable steps to obtain medical aid and thereby fai ls to 
cut down the pain and suffering result ing from the injury.  
 
(b) The question of duty: 
 
Lord Haldane spoke of the plaint if f as having a duty to 
mitigate, and this is the common and convenient way of  
stating the rule. The expression is, however, a somewhat 
loose one since there is no “duty” which is actionable or 
which is owed to anyone by the plaintif f .  He cannot owe a 
duty to himself; the posit ion is similar to that of a plaintiff 
whose damages are reduced because of his contributory 
negligence. Pearson L.J. in Darbishire v. Warran27 gave the 
proper analysis when he said: 
 
“It is important to appreciate the true nature of the so-called 
`duty to mitigate the loss’ or `duty to minimize the damage’. 
                                      
26
  Dunkirk Colliery Co. v. Lever, (1878) 9 Ch.D. 20, C.A.; Jamal v. Molla 
Dawood, [1916] 1 A.C. 175. 
27  Darbishire v. Warran, [1963] 1 W .L.R. 1976, C.A. 
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The plainti ff  is not under any contractual obl igation to adopt 
the cheaper method: if  he wishes to adopt the more 
expensive method, he is at l iberty to do so and by doing so 
he commits no wrong against the defendant or anyone else. 
The true meaning is that the plaintif f  is not entit led to 
charge the defendant by way of damages with any greater 
sum than that which he reasonably needs to expend for the 
purpose of making good the loss. In short, he is fully 
entit led to be as extravagant as he pleases but not at the 
expense of the defendant.”28 
 
This has been re-emphasised by Sir John Donaldson M.R., 
delivering the judgment of the court in The Solholt , where 
he said: 
 
“A plaint if f  is under no duty to mitigate his loss, despite the 
habitual use by the lawyers of the phrase `duty to mit igate’.  
He is completely free to act as he judges to be in his best 
interests. One the other hand, a defendant is not l iable for 
al l loss suffered by the plainti f f in consequence of his so 
act ing. A defendant is only l iable for such part of  the 
plaint if f ’s loss as is properly caused by the defendant’s 
breach of duty.” 
 
(c) The question of onus: 
 
The onus of proof on the issue of mitigat ion is on the 
defendant. If he fails to show that the plaintif f  ought 
reasonably to have taken certain mitigating steps, then the 
normal measure will apply. This has been long sett led, ever 
since the decision in Roper v. Johnson,29 and was conf irmed 
by the House of Lords in Garnac Grain Co. v. Faure & 
                                      
28  Wallems Rederij v. Muller , [1927] 2 K.B. 99 
29  Roper v. Johnson, (1873) L.R. 8 C.P. 167. 
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Fairclough30.  Yet in Selvanayagam v. University of the West 
Indies31 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held 
that, where a physically injured plaintif f had refused to 
undergo medical treatment to al leviate his injury, the burden 
was on him to prove that he had acted reasonably, a 
burden, which he was found to have discharged. Any 
suggestion that personal injury may dif fer from the 
commercial context which gave the rule as to onus its 
nemesis comes up against the two authoritative decisions of 
the House of Lords in which it was laid down that the 
burden of proof remains with the defendant in the particular 
case of the refusal of medical treatment, namely Steele v. 
Robert George & Co.32 and Richardson v. Redpath, Brown & 
Co.33 the latter case was indeed cited by their Lordships in 
Selvanayagam but without any appreciation of what it  had to 
say on the burden of proof, and their suggestion that the 
Austral ian case of Fazl ic v.  Mil ingimbi Community Inc.34 
places the burden of proof on the plaintif f  does not survive 
an examinat ion of that decision. The Guildford, the 
remaining authority cited by Their Lordships, was more 
explicit ly misrepresented. While a passage from Lord 
Merriman’s judgment there was prayed in aid in support of 
their Lordships’ confident assert ion that they “had no doubt” 
that the plainti ff  had the burden of proof and that this was 
“well established”, Lord Merriman was dealing not with 
mitigation at al l but with remoteness, where there has been 
a substantial degree of controversy on burden of proof with 
the better view favouring a plaintif f ’s burden. One can only 
conclude that the decision of the Privy Council, being 
                                      
30  Garnac Grain Co. v. Faure & Fairc lough, [1968] A.C. 1130 
31  Selvanayagam v. University of the West Indies, [1983] 1 
W.L.R. 585, P.C.  
32  Steele v. Robert George & Co., [1942] A.C. 497. 
33  Richardson v.  Redpath, Brown & Co.,  [1944] A.C. 62. 
34  Fazl ic v. Mil ingimbi Community Inc.,  (1982) 38 A.L.R. 424. 
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against the ent ire weight of authority, was arr ived at per 
incuriam. Certainly, its conclusion appears to have been 
sensibly ignored in subsequent cases, as by the Court of 
Appeal in London and South of England building Society v. 
Stone35 and again in Metelmann & Co. N.B.R. (London).36 
 
(d) A question of fact or a question of law: 
 
In Payzu v. Saunders37 both Bankes and Scrutton L.JJ. said 
that the quest ion of mitigat ion of damage is a quest ion of 
fact; more recent ly in The Solholt sir John Donaldson M.R. 
said that “whether a loss is avoidable by reasonable act ion 
on the part of the plaint if f is a question of fact not law” and 
that “this was decided in Payzu v. Saunders” . One result of 
this is that, once a court of f irst  instance has decided that 
there has been, or has not been, a fai lure to mitigate, i t  is 
diff icult  to persuade an appellate court to come to a 
different view; The Solholt itself  provides a good 
il lustration. Yet what was being referred to in both these 
cases was whether a plainti f f,  required to take al l  
reasonable steps to mit igate his loss if  he is to recover for 
that loss, has or has not fai led to do so. Whether there is in 
the particular circumstances a need to mit igate in the f i rst  
place will  be a question of law. 
 
(e) Need to mitigate before contractual breach: 
 
A plaintif f  need take no steps in mitigat ion unt il a wrong has 
been committed against him. Thus the attempt, which is 
often made, to use the “duty” to mit igate damage to force 
                                      
35  London and South of England bui ld ing Society v. Stone, 
[1983] 1 W.L.R. 1242. 
36  Metelmann & Co. N.B.R. (London), [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
614.  
37  Payzu v. Saunders, [1983] 1 W .L.R. 1242, C.A. 
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upon a party to a contract an acceptance of a repudiation of 
the contract by the defendant, is misconceived. Where a 
party to a contract repudiates it, the other party has an 
option to accept or not to accept the repudiat ion. If he does 
not accept it  there is sti l l  no breach of contract, and the 
contract subsists for the benefit of  both part ies and no need 
to mit igate arises. On the other hand, i f  the repudiat ion is 
accepted this results in an anticipatory breach of contract in 
respect of which suit can be brought at once for damages, 
and, although the measure of damages is st il l  prima facie 
assessed as from the date when the defendant ought to 
have performed the contract, this amount is subject to being 
cut down if  the plaint if f  fails to mitigate after his acceptance 
of the repudiation. 
 
These principles are il lustrated by sale of goods cases, 
especially by actions for non-delivery against a repudiat ing 
seller, and also, although there are fewer cases, by actions 
for non-acceptance against a repudiat ing buyer. Thus on a 
seller’s repudiation when the market was rising, i t was held 
in Brown v. Muller38 that a buyer who had not accepted the 
repudiat ion was ent it led to claim the normal measure of 
damages based on the market price at the t ime of due 
delivery, there being no need for him to take mitigat ing 
steps; in Roper v. Johnson,39 and again in Garnac Grain Co. 
v. Faure & Fairclough,40 that a buyer who had accepted the 
repudiat ion was st il l  entit led to claim the normal measure 
based on the market price at the t ime of due delivery, 
because, al though now required to mitigate, it  was not 
shown that he had fai led to do so; but in Melachrino v. 
                                      
38  Brown v. Muller , (1872) L.R. 7 Ex. 319; Leigh v. Paterson, 
(1818) 8 Taunt. 540. 
39  Roper v. Johnson, (1873) L.R. 8 C.P. 167. 
40  Garnac Grain Co. v. Faure & Fairc lough, [1968] A.C. 1130. 
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Nickoll41 it  was said that a buyer who had accepted the 
repudiat ion was l imited to the lower price at which it was 
shown that he could have bought equivalent goods in the 
market before the date of due delivery.42 The same 
principles apply mutat is mutandis  where it  is the buyer who 
has repudiated. And the law is i l lustrated for employment 
contracts by Shindler v. Northern Raincoat Co.43 where the 
defendant company, in the course of the plaint if f ’s 
employment by them under a 10-year agreement, wrongfully 
repudiated the contract by informing the plaint if f that they 
would not cont inue to require his services as from an 
apparent ly unspecif ied later date, but only removed him 
from off ice at an extraordinary general meeting of the 
company some months after this repudiation. It was held 
that the plaintif f  had no duty to mitigate by accepting 
alternat ive offers of employment between the defendants’  
wrongful repudiation and their removal of him from off ice 
because during this period there had been no breach: the 
plaint if f  had not accepted the repudiat ion and the 
“defendants had a locus poenitentiae”. Somewhat similar ly 
in Abrahams v. Performing Rights Society,44 where the 
contract provided for two years’ notice or for payment in 
lieu of not ice, the summary dismissal of the employee was 
held not to consti tute a breach of contract so that the 
employee was entit led to the payment in l ieu without any 
need to mit igate by taking alternat ive employment during 
the two years. By summarily dismissing the plaint if f  the 
defendant was not breaking the contract but electing 
                                      
41  Melachrino v. Nickoll ,  [1920] 1 K.B. 693. 
42  Kaines v. Osterreichische Warrenhandelsgesellschaft, [1993] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 1 C.A. 
43  Shindler v. Northern Raincoat Co., [1960] 1 W .L.R. 1038, 
Abrahams v. Performing Rights society, [1995] I .C.R. 
1028, 
44  Abrahams v. Performing Rights Society, [1995] I .C.R. 
1028,  
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between two modes of performance, namely serving not ice 
or paying money. His election of the latter meant that the 
money was due as a debt under the contract and no 
question of mitigation arose.  
 
(f)  Need to mitigate by discontinuing contractual 
performance:  
 
Nor, it  seems, need a plaint if f  take steps to mit igate loss, 
even after the defendant’s performance of the contract, 
which he has repudiated, fal ls due, by accepting the 
repudiat ion and suing for damages. He may instead, where 
he can do so without the defendant’s assistance, perform 
his side of the contract and claim in debt for the contract 
price. Even if this involves incurring expense in the 
performance of the contract, which in face of the 
defendant’s repudiat ion is rendered useless, the plaintif f  is 
not required to minimize the loss by accepting the 
repudiat ion and suing for damages. This conclusion was 
reached in White and Carter v. McGregor.45 The plaintif fs,  
advert ising agents, contracted with the sales manager of 
the defendant garage proprietor to display on l i t ter bins 
advert isements for the defendant’s garage for the three 
years. The defendant, on hearing of the contract, wrote at 
once to the plaint if fs to cancel it  but the plaintif fs refused, 
displayed the advert isements in accordance with the 
agreement, and sued for the contract price. The House of 
Lords, by a majority, held that the plainti f fs were entit led to 
carry out the contract and claim in debt for the price, and 
were not obliged to accept the repudiation and sue for 
damages.  
 
                                      
45  White and Carter v. McGregor, [1962] A.C. 413. 
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This decision was followed in Anglo-African Shipping Co. v. 
Mortner.46 The plainti f fs in New York agreed with the 
defendants in London to act as a confirming house in 
respect of an order for the purchase of goods by the 
defendants from American suppliers, and as the defendants’ 
shipping agents in procuring shipment of the goods to the 
defendants in London. It  was further agreed that the 
defendants, in addit ion to paying a commission, would 
reimburse the plainti ffs the price of the goods paid by them 
under their conf irmation of the order and al l expenses 
incurred by them as the defendants’ agents. After the 
plaint if fs had contracted personally with the suppliers to pay 
them the purchase price of the goods the defendants 
cancelled their order and then refused to pay the plaint i ffs. 
The suppliers having delivered the goods to the plainti ffs for 
shipment, the plainti ffs proceeded to ship them to the 
defendants in London and successfully sued the defendants 
for the price, expenses and commission. It was held that the 
plaint if fs were under no duty to mit igate by not shipping the 
goods once the defendants had said that they did not 
propose to accept them.  
 
How absolute is the plaint if f ’s right to ignore repudiation 
and carry on with performance may yet have to be worked 
out by the courts. Lord Reid in White and Carter v. 
McGregor47 said: 
 
“It may well be that, if  it  can be shown that a person has no 
legit imate interest, f inancial or otherwise, in performing the 
contract rather than claiming damages, he ought not to be 
al lowed to saddle the other party with an addit ional burden 
                                      
46  Anglo-Afr ican Shipping Co. v. Mortner, [1962] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 81.  
47  White and Carter v. McGregor, [1962] A.C. 413. 
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with no benefit to himself . It  a party has no interest to 
enforce a stipulation, he cannot in general enforce it: so it 
might be said that,  i f  a party has no interest to insist on a 
particular remedy, he ought not to be allowed to insist on it.  
And, just as a party is not al lowed to enforce a penalty, so 
he ought not to be al lowed to penalize the other party by 
taking one course when another is equally advantageous to 
him.” 
 
In the case itself  the defendant had not attempted to prove 
that the plainti ff  had no legit imate interest in complet ing 
performance, and it was improbable, added Lord Reid that 
any such case could have been made out.  In Anglo-African 
Shipping Co. v. Mortner48 the judge said that the facts of the 
case before him tended “to show the practical just ice” of 
White and Carter v. McGregor;49 for i f  the plaintif fs had 
been required to sell the goods in New York and not ship 
them to London there would have been ‘no doubt, al l kinds 
of arguments thereafter as to whether the plaint if fs had in 
fact sold them at the best possible price or as to whether 
they could have sold them in some other market”. And, 
further,  the plaint if f might have various sub-contracts for the 
purpose of performance, e.g. taking shipping space, and if  
there is a duty to mitigate by accepting repudiat ion “he 
would have to cancel those sub-contracts in a way which 
might be extremely damaging commercial ly to himself”.  
 
Later cases, however, have sought to dist inguish White and 
Carter v. McGregor.  In Hounslow London Borough Council  
                                      
48  Anglo-Afr ican Shipping Co. v. Mortner, [1962] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 81. 
49  White and Carter v. McGregor, [1962] A.C. 413. 
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v. Twickenham Garden Developments ,50 Megarry J, on the 
assumption that the borough council  there had wrongfully 
repudiated a contract for the construct ion of certain 
buildings, considered that the building contractors were not 
entit led to continue construction against the borough 
council ’s wishes. And in Attica Sea Carr iers Corporat ion v. 
Ferrostaal Poseidon Bulk Reederei51 the Curt of Appeal, on 
the assumption that in a charterparty by demise the 
charterers’ obligation to repair the vessel was a condit ion 
precedent to their r ight to redeliver her to the owners, 
considered that the owners were not entit led to claim the 
contract hire unt il  such t ime as the charterers repaired or 
redel ivered, and reversed the judgment of the court below. 
While in the Housnslow case Megarry J. adverted to Lord 
Reid’s qualif icat ion in White and Carter v. McGregor52 that a 
contracting party may not be entit led to perform his side of 
the contract where he has no legi timate interest in doing so, 
he relied on a further qualif ication introduced by Lord Reid 
to the effect that a contracting party may not be able to 
perform his side of the contract without some degree of 
intervention on the part of the other contract ing party,  
holding that White and Carter v.  McGregor53 had no 
applicat ion to the case before him “f irst , because a 
considerable degree of act ive co-operation under the 
contract by the borough is requisite, and second, because 
the work is being done to property of the borough”. On the 
other hand, Orr L.J. in the Att ica case relied on both of Lord 
Reid’s qual if ications, and in this Browne L.J. agreed with 
him, while Lord Denning M.R. based himself  solely on the 
                                      
50  Hounslow London Borough Counci l v . Twickenham Garden 
Developments, [1971] Ch. 233.  
51
  Att ica Sea Carr iers Corporation v. Ferrostaal  Poseidon 
Bulk Reederei ,  [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 250, C.A. 
52  White and Carter v. McGregor, [1962] A.C. 413. 
53  White and Carter v. McGregor, [1962] A.C. 413. 
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qualif icat ion as to legit imate interest. He considered that 
White and Carter v. McGregor54 “has no application 
whatever in a case where the plaint if f ought, in al l reason, 
to accept the repudiation and sue for damages – provided 
that damages would provide and adequate remedy for any 
loss suffered by him. The reason is because, in suing for 
the money, the plaint if f  is seeking to enforce specif ic 
performance of the contract – and he should not be allowed 
to do so when damages would be an adequate remedy”.  
That the plainti f fs ought, in al l reason, to sue for damages 
was undoubtedly so in the case before the Court of Appeal 
because, in Lord Denning M.R.’s words, “it  would be 
economic nonsense to go to the expense of repair ing” the 
vessel; not only would the repairs have cost twice as much 
as the ship would be able to sell her only as scrap. 
 
(1) The rule and its relationship to the normal 
measure of damages: 
 
Apart from cases in which the plaintif f ’s opportunity of 
mitigating has arisen through the possibil ity of further 
negotiation with, and in part icular through an offer made by, 
the defendant himself, there is no well-known decision, 
which il lustrates the rule that mitigable loss is not 
recoverable.55 The reason for this is that either the court 
has held that the plaint if f  has not fai led to mitigate the loss 
so that he recovers in respect of the whole damage, or,  
probably more commonly, the issue has never reached the 
point of l it igat ion because the plaintif f  has in his own 
interests taken the necessary steps to mitigate. Indeed, so 
clear is the way of mitigat ion in many cases that it  of ten 
tends to become incorporated into the normal measure of  
                                      
54  White and Carter v. McGregor, [1962] A.C. 413. 
55  Simson v. Pawsons & Leafs, (19330 38 Com. Cas. 151, C.A. 
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damages. When this happens it loses its ident ity and does 
not expressly appear as a separate issue.56  
 
Such a situation arises part icularly in cases of sale of 
goods. Thus, if  a seller fai ls to deliver the goods contracted 
for, the buyer cannot sit back on a rising market or wait 
unti l his sub-sale to a third party has fal len through, but 
must go into the market with all reasonable speed an buy 
equivalent goods there. This mitigat ing step is incorporated 
into the normal measure of damages by section 51 (3) of 
the Sale of Goods Act, 1979, which provides that in an 
act ion for non-del ivery the measure of damages, where 
there is an available market for the goods in question, is 
prima facie to be ascertained by the dif ference between the 
contract price and the market pr ice at the t ime the goods 
ought to have been delivered. Conversely, if  a buyer of 
goods fai ls to accept them, the seller must take steps to 
resell them to another and not sit back on a fall ing market.57 
This, similarly, is incorporated into the normal measure of  
damages by sect ion 50(3) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1979, 
which provides that in an action for non-acceptance the 
measure of damages, where there is an available market for 
the goods in quest ion, is prima facie to be ascertained by 
the dif ference between the contract pr ice and the market 
price at the t ime the goods ought to have been accepted. 
On the other hand, in contracts involving the rendering of 
services and the non-acceptance of these services as the 
breach, although it  is clear that the plaint if f  must try to sell  
his services elsewhere, this mitigat ing step may not yet 
have become finally incorporated into the normal measure 
of damages. This is so both in contracts of hiring and in 
                                      
56  Cf. Compania Financiera “Soleada” v. hamoor Tanker Corpn, The 
Borag, [1981] 1 W.L.R. 274. 
57  Dunkirk Coll iery Co. v. Lever , (1878) 9 Ch.D. 20, C.A. 
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contracts of carriage. The fullest statement of the normal 
measure of damages for wrongful dismissal is that of Erle 
C.J. in Beckham v. Drake.58 He said: “The measure of 
damages for the breach of promise now in question is 
obtained by considering what is the usual rate of wages for 
the employment here contracted for,  and what t ime would 
be lost before a similar employment could be obtained. The 
law considers that employment in any ordinary branch of 
industry can be obtained by a person competent for the 
place, and that the usual rate of wages for such 
employment can be proved, and that i t is the duty of the 
servant to sue dil igence to f ind another employment.” 
Similarly, the normal measure for fai lure to supply cargo for 
carriage is stated by Kay L.J. in Aitken Li lburn v. 
Ernsthausen59 thus: “The general rule is, that when such a 
breach by non-delivery or [ i.e. failure to supply] cargo 
occurs the owners are ent it led to damages to the amount of 
the freight thereby lost. But if  they f i l l  up the ship on their 
own account, the amount of freight so earned goes in 
reduct ion of such damages.” Yet for A.l. Smith L.J. in the 
same case the normal measure of damages was “the 
difference between the charterparty freight and the net 
freight actually earned, after deducting expenses”. The 
correct trend in these cases, it  is submitted, is towards the 
incorporat ion of the normal mit igating step into the normal 
measure of damages.60 
 
However, it  is important to be certain of what the normal 
measure of damages is, before deciding what form of 
mitigation is properly incorporated within i t.  Part icularly 
                                      
58  Beckham v. Drake, (1840) 2 H.L.C. 579. 
59  Aitken Li lburn v. Ernsthausen, [1894] 1 Q.B. 773., C.A. 
60  London building Society v. Stone, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1242, 
C.A. 
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instruct ive is a comparison of the normal measure of 
damages where goods sold are not delivered in breach of 
contract and of the normal measure where goods are 
misappropriated. In the case of sale of goods the buyer 
must go into the market for a replacement, or at least 
cannot sit  back on a rising market and then claim damages 
on the basis of the increased price: but no such step 
towards replacement need be taken by the vict im of a 
misappropriation.  
 
This is made particular ly clear by the Court of Appeal 
decision in Rosenthal v. Alderton.61 This established that a 
plaint if f  suing in the former detinue was ent itled to claim, in 
the absence of a return of the property, the market pr ice at 
the t ime of the judgment; thus any rise in the market price 
between detent ion and judgment was at risk of the 
defendant. Only if  the plaintif f  unduly delayed his act ion on 
a rising market would the damages be less than the market 
price at the t ime of judgment, as the failure to sue within a 
reasonable t ime was a failure to mit igate. Now det inue has 
been abol ished and superseded by conversion, but the 
result is the same in conversion though admittedly reached 
by a dif ferent route. The normal measure is taken to be not 
the value of the goods at the t ime of judgment but their 
value at the t ime of conversion, and to this there is added 
as consequential loss any market increase in value between 
then and the earl iest t ime that the action could have been 
brought to trial. This proposit ion appears to be established 
for conversion by the Court of Appeal decision in Sachs v. 
Miklos ,62 which permitted a plaint if f  to recover at the end of 
the Second World War the market value of goods converted 
                                      
61  Rosenthal v. A lder ton, [1946] K.b. 374, C.A. 
62  Sachs v. Miklos, [1948] 2 K.b. 23, C.A.; Hall  v . Barclay, 
[1973] 3 Al l ER 620, C.A. 
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near the beginning of the war, this value being great ly 
increased during the war years, provided that he neither 
knew nor ought to have known of the conversion during this 
period and provided also that there was not undue delay in 
his bringing an action after knowledge. However, although 
neither in detinue did, nor in conversion does, the plaintiff 
fail  at his peri l to replace on a rising market, he must accept 
redel ivery of the goods if  of fered by the defendant at tr ial,  
provided the goods are st i l l in the same condit ion. This 
followed natural ly in the case of detinue, which was 
primarily an action claiming redelivery rather than damages, 
but it  was also established for conversion from the t ime of 
Fisher v. Prince,63 decided in 1762. This power of the court 
to stay the proceedings where the goods are brought into 
court and the plainti ff  refuses to accept them does not 
indeed result in a smaller recovery for him: he merely is 
compelled to take specif ic rest itution in lieu of damages. 
 
The reason for basing the damages for failure to deliver 
goods in breach of contract, but not the damages for 
misappropriation of goods, upon the assumption of 
replacement may be that in the case of contract the plaint iff 
wi ll generally st i l l have available for purchasing a 
replacement in the market the money with which he had 
intended to pay the price. From this reasoning it would 
follow that even in contract a plaintif f  should not be 
restricted in his damages by reason of an assumption of 
replacement of the goods if he has already paid the contract 
price for them to the defendant. Indirect support for this 
view is given in a number of cases. Thus, in Gainsford v. 
Carrol l64 the plaint if f ’s contention that the damages for non-
deliver of goods sold should be the market price at the t ime 
                                      
63  Fisher v. Prince, 91762) 3 Bur. 1363.  
64  Gainsford v. Carroll ,  91824) 2 B. & C. 624. 
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of tr ial was rejected on the ground that he st il l had the 
money on breach with which he had intended to pay the 
purchase price. In Shaw v. Holland,65 an equivalent case of 
non-delivery of shares sold, the court rejected the time of 
tr ial as the t ime that the market price should be taken, as 
“the plaint if f  had his money in his own possession, might 
have gone into the market and bought other shares as soon 
as the contract was broken”. In Barrow v. Arnaud,66 where 
the defendant collector of customs was being sued by the 
plaint if f  for refusing to sign a bi l l  of  entry for his corn under 
a claim of customs duty, the plainti ff  recovered for the loss 
he suffered by reason of a fal l in the market, the court 
pointing out that he might not have had any money to pay 
the defendant the customs duty demanded. These cases 
generally make reference to actions for not replacing stock, 
where similarly i t  has been held, as in Shepherd v. 
Johnson,67 that the plaint if f  is ent itled to recover the market  
value to which the stock has risen between the t ime of the 
wrong and the t ime of the trial, because the defendant here 
holds the plaint if f ’s money and thus prevents him from using 
it. Yet when it came to the test in a sale of goods case in 
which the purchase price had been partially prepaid, it  was 
held in Startup v. Cortazzi68 that the plaint if f  st i l l should 
have replaced. Whether this is basically consistent with the 
dicta in and rationale of the above sale fo goods and shares 
cases, and with the decisions in act ions for not replacing 
stock, may be doubted. It  is, indeed, encouraging to see 
that the door is not closed to reject ion of the view embodied 
                                      
65  Shaw v. Holland, (1846) 15 M. & W . 136. 
66  Barrow v. Arnaud,  (1846) 8 Q.B. 595.  
67  Shepherd v. Johnson,  (1802) 2 East 211. 
68  Startup v. Cortazzi,  (1835) 2 C.M. & R. 165. 
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in Startup v. Cortazzi69 for Atkin L.J. in Aronson v. Mologa 
Holzindustrie70 treated the matter as an open point.  
 
At the other end of the scale from the problem that 
mitigating steps cannot be incorporated into the normal 
measure t i l l it  is known what the normal measure is, is the 
problem, which arises once the normal measure with buil t -in 
mitigating step has been established, of whether this step 
has indeed cut down the loss, since there are certain cases 
in which such cutt ing down is only apparent and not real.  
This is especially so in cases where the defendant has in 
breach of contract failed to accept goods which the plaint if f 
has sold him as in Thompson v. Robinson,71 or has 
manufactured and supplied to him as in Re Vic Mil l ,72 or has 
hired to him as in Interoffice Telephones v. Freeman.73 In al l  
these cases the plaintif f had indeed succeeded in selling, 
supplying or hir ing the goods in question to a third party at 
a simi lar prof it to that which he would have made under his 
contract with the plainti f f,  and in each case it was 
contended by the defendant that he had thereby avoided 
any loss and was, therefore, not ent itled to more than 
nominal damages. This content ion, however, ignored the 
fact that the state of the market was such that the plaintif f 
would have been able to make such a contract with a third 
party even if  the defendant had carr ied out his. In the words 
of Hamilton L.J. in Re Vic Mill,74  “the fal lacy … is in 
supposing that the second customer was a subst ituted 
customer, that, had al l  gone well, and makers would not 
                                      
69  Startup v. Cortazzi,  (1835) 2 C.M. & R. 165. 
70  Aronson v. Mologa Holzindustrie, (1927) 32 Com. Cas. 
276, C.A. 
71  Thompson v. Robinson,  [1955] Ch. 177. 
72  Re Vic Mil l,  [1913] 1 Ch. 465, C.A. 
73  Interoff ice Telephones v. Freeman, [1958] 1 Q.B. 190, 
C.A.  
74  Re Vic Mil l,  [1913] 1 Ch. 465, C.A. 
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have had both customers, both orders, and both prof its”. If , 
on the other had, the state of the market or the state of the 
defendant’s manufacturing facil i t ies was such that demand 
exceeded supply, the contract made with the third party 
would be a subst ituted contract, the loss would be avoided 
and damages would therefore be nominal: this was the 
posit ion in Charter v. Sull ivan75 which represents, in relat ion 
to the sale of cars, the converse of Thompson v. 
Robinson.76 
 
The same situation arises in cases of non-acceptance by 
the defendant of the plaint if f ’s services. The fact that the 
plaint if f  has made a similar service contract does not 
necessari ly entai l that he has avoided the loss. He wil l  not 
have done so if  he would have been capable of carrying out 
both contracts simultaneously, as well very frequently be 
the case where the plainti ff ,  especially if  a company, would 
perform the contract by employing others to do the actual  
work. If , on the other hand, the defendant has bargained for 
the plaint if f ’s exclusive services, any other service contract 
made by the plaintif f  on the defendant’s breach wil l  be a 
substituted contract, and the benefit  derived from it  wil l  be 
taken into account in assessing damages against the 
defendant. 
 
(2) Illustrations of circumstances in which there is 
no recovery for loss that should have been 
avoided: 
 
( i) In case of breach of contract  where the opportunity 
of mitigating has arisen through an off icer of the defendant 
himself , the general rule refusing recovery for mit igable loss 
                                      
75  Charter v. Sul l ivan, [1957] 2 Q.B. 117,  C.A. 
76  Thompson v. Robinson, [1955] Ch. 177; Lazenby Garages 
v. Wright,  [1976] 1 W.L.R. 459, C.A. 
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is sparsely il lustrated. In Simon v. Pawsons & Leafs77 the 
plaint if f  ordered certain material f rom the defendant which 
the defendant promised to stock for her but fai led to do so. 
The result of the plaint if f ’s not obtaining the material f rom 
the defendant was that she lost an appointment as maker of  
school clothes to a school. The Court of Appeal refused 
damages to her for her loss of this appointment because,  
inter alia,  she had had ample opportunity after she learnt of  
the defendant’s breach in fai l ing to stock material for her,  to 
buy equivalent material elsewhere but had made no attempt 
to do so. In Tucker v. Linger,78 where a landlord in breach in 
fail ing to supply materials to the tenant with which to repair 
the premises, the tenant failed to recover for damage 
caused to his crops in his barn by bad weather because the 
barn was out of repair,  s ince he ought to have provided 
himself  with the necessary materials and done the repair,  
and charged the landlord with the price of the materials.  
And where a tenant fai led to give notice to his landlord of 
disrepair, so that the landlord took no act ion and the 
disrepair, and with it the discomfort and inconvenience to 
the tenant,  were allowed to cont inue, this fai lure was held 
to be a fai lure to mitigate in Minchburn v. Peck .79 I t  was 
thus the damages for non-pecuniary loss that were reduced; 
the trial judge’s view, causing him to make no reduct ion in 
his award, that the doctr ine of mit igation was conf ined to 
commercial contracts and did not apply as between landlord 
and tenant, was rejected without dif f iculty by the Court of  
Appeal. 
 
                                      
77  Simon v. Pawsons & Leafs,  (1933) 38 Com. Cas. 151, 
C.A. 
78  Tucker v. L inger,  (18820 21 Ch.D. 18. 
79  Minchburn v. Peck, (1988) 20 H.L.R. 392, C.A.; Topfer v. 
Warinco A.G., [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 569.  
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(i i)  Where the opportunity of mitigating has arisen 
through the possibil i ty of further negotiation with, and in 
particular through an offer made by, the party in breach 
himself.  There is more ample authority for the proposit ion 
that the door to mitigation may be opened by the party in 
breach himself . In Payzu V. Saunders,80 the leading case on 
non-recoverable mitigable loss, Scrutton L.J. stated that 
counsel ’s content ion that “ in considering what steps should 
be taken to mitigate the damage all  contractual relat ions 
with the party in default must be excluded” was contrary to 
his experience. Yet i t  was held in Strutt v. Whitnell81 that a 
buyer of land, suing his seller after conveyance because he 
was unable to obtain vacant possession on account of a 
tenant refusing to leave, was not required, in mitigat ion of 
damage, to accept the offer of the seller to repurchase the 
land at the contract price. Submitt ing to the undoing of the 
contract and giving up his remedy in damages ent irely was 
said not to be called for, however, capricious the election to 
retain that remedy might be. In contrast to this, in The 
Solholt,82 where del ivery a day late by the sellers of a ship 
gave the buyers a right of cancellat ion which they exercised 
although the market value of the ship at the t ime had 
appreciated by $500,000 over the contract price, the court 
refused to award this amount, which represented the normal 
measure of damages, or indeed any amount to the buyers 
because they had failed to mit igate their loss by negotiat ing 
a further contract for the purchase of the ship at the original  
contract price, the judge below having found that such an 
offer, if  made to the sellers, would have been accepted by 
them. The Court of Appeal was bound both by the decision 
                                      
80  Payzu V. Saunders,  [1919] 2 K.B. 581, C.A. 
81  Strutt  v. Whitnel l ,  [1975] 1 W.L.R. 870, C.A.  
82  The Solholt ,  [1983] 1 L loyd’s Rep. 605, C.A. 
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in Payzu v. Saunders83 and that in Strutt v. Whitnell84 but 
was rightly scept ical about the latter,  reconcil ing it with the 
former only “by treating it as a decision turning on 
reasonableness and its own special facts”. Sir John 
Donaldson M.R. commented: 
 
“If the House of Lords ever had to consider the decision, i t  
might well hold that the judgments totally confuse the 
proposit ion that in deciding whether to rescind or aff irm a 
contract the innocent party need have no regard to 
considerations of mitigation of loss with the proposit ion 
that, having made such an election, he wil l  be able to 
recover such loss as was unavoidable fol lowing that 
election and that in some, perhaps exceptional,  
circumstances it may be reasonable at a stage after the 
decision to rescind or aff irm the contract to adopt a course 
of action which wil l  nul l ify the effect of that decision.”. 
 
The authorit ies deal with two types of contract: contracts of 
sale and contracts of service. As to contracts of sale, in 
Payzu v. Saunders85 the defendant sold goods to the 
plaint if f ,  which was to be delivered in nine monthly 
instalments and which was to be paid for within one month 
of each delivery less 2.5 per cent discount.  The plaint iff 
failed to make punctual payment on the f irst instalment and 
the defendant, in the bona f ide but erroneous belief that the 
non-payment was due to the plaint if f ’s insolvency, refused 
in breach of contract to del ivery any further instalments on 
the arranged credit. He offered to deliver to the plaintif f  at 
the contract price against cash, an offer refused, on a r is ing 
market, by the plaint if f . I t  was held that the plainti f f should 
                                      
83  Payzu V. Saunders,  [1919] 2 K.B. 581, C.A. 
84  Strutt  v. Whitnel l ,  [1975] 1 W.L.R. 870, C.A. 
85  Payzu V. Saunders,  [1919] 2 K.B. 581, C.A. 
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have mitigated his loss by accepting this offer and that;  
therefore, his damages were limited to what he would have 
suffered had he accepted it, which would have been only 
the loss of the useful period of credit. Similarly,  in 
Houndsditch Warehouse Co. v. Waltex,86 the seller, who 
was in breach of warranty of quality, offered to take back 
the goods and to pay the contract price for them; it was held 
that the buyer should have accepted this offer to mitigate 
his loss and that the damages must be reduced 
accordingly.87 And the further sale cases of Strutt v. 
Whitnall88 and The Solholt,89 concerning land and goods 
respect ively, have already been considered. As to contract 
of service, in Brace v. Calder90 two persons out of a 
partnership of four employing, the plainti ff  resigned from the 
partnership, this operating as a technical dismissal of the 
plaint if f .  The remaining two, however, offered to keep him 
on in his employment, but he refused this offer. I t was held 
that he should have accepted it in mitigation and he was 
awarded only nominal damages. And in Barners v. Port of 
London Authority91 where the plainti f f workman, injured by 
his employer’s negligence, refused an offer by the 
defendant employer of suitable alternative work, he was 
held entit led to special damages for loss of wages only up 
to the t ime of such offer.92 
 
Not every offer of the party in defaul t in such contract will  
be refused at the plaintif f ’s peri l : this is particularly true 
                                      
86  Houndsditch Warehouse Co. v. Waltex,  [1944] K.B. 579.  
87  Heaven & Kesterton v. Etablissements Francois Albiac, [1956] 2 
Lloyd’s Reo. 316. 
88  Strutt  v. Whitnal l ,  [1975] 1 W.L.R. 870, C.A. 
89  The Solholt ,  [1983] 1 L loyd’s Rep. 605, C.A.  
90  Brace v. Calder, [1895] 2 Q.B. 253, C.A. 
91  Barners v. Port of London Authority, [1957] 1 L loyd’s Rep. 
486. 
92  Anset v. Marshall, (1853) 22 L.J. Q.B. 118 
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with a contract of service. Thus in Payzu v. Saunders93 
Bankes L.J. said: 
 
“There may be cases where as matter of fact it  would be 
unreasonable to expect a plaint i ff  to consider any of fer 
made in view of the treatment he has received from the 
defendant. If  he had been rendering personal services and 
had been dismissed after being accused in presence of 
others of being a thief, and if  af ter that his employer had 
offered to take him back into his service, most persons 
would think he was just if ied in refusing the offer, and that i t  
would be unreasonable to ask him in this way to mit igate 
the damages in an action of wrongful dismissal.” 
 
And Scrutton L.J. pointed a contrast between service 
contracts and commercial contracts, saying: 
 
“In certain cases of personal service it may be 
unreasonable to expect a plaint if f  to consider an offer from 
the other party who has grossly injured him; but in 
commercial contracts i t is general ly reasonable to accept an 
offer from the party in default.” 
 
These principles are i l lustrated by Shindler v. Northern 
Raincoat Co.94 and by Yetton v. Eastwoods Froy.95 In former 
the plainti f f,  suing for wrongful dismissal, was held not to 
have acted unreasonably in refusing other offers of 
employment from the defendant company, primari ly because 
these offers, if  accepted, would have entai led his acting 
under the direct ion of persons with whom he had quarreled 
                                      
93  Payzu V. Saunders,  [1919] 2 K.B. 581, C.A.  
94  Shindler  v. Northern Raincoat Co. , [1960] 1 W .L.R. 1038. 
95  Yetton v. Eastwoods Froy, [1967] 1 W .L.R. 104. 
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in the course of the dispute over his dismissal96;  moreover, 
one of the offers had been made on the terms that the 
plaint if f  should not act on his legal r ights against the 
defendant company for damages for breach of contract. In 
the latter the plaint if f ,  dismissed as Managing Director of  
the defendant company, was held not to have acted 
unreasonably in refusing the defendant’s offer of 
employment as Assistant Managing Director, partly because 
this would have marked a signif icant step down in status 
and part ly because the dismissal had taken place in an 
arbitrary and high-handed fashion.97 Somewhat similarly,  in 
a converse case of servants’ refusing to work and 
subsequently offer ing to do so, it  was held in Bowes v. 
Press98 that the employer’s damages were not to be reduced 
on account of his refusal of this offer, for its acceptance 
would virtually have involved allowing the defendants to 
work under other than the contractual condit ions.  
 
(3) Standard of conduct which the plaintiff must 
attain when assessing what steps should have 
been taken by him: 
 
Although the plaint if f  must act with the defendant’s as well  
as with his own interests in mind,99 he is only required to act 
reasonably and the standard of reasonableness is not high 
in view of the fact that the defendant is an admitted 
                                      
96  Brace v. Calder, [1895] 2 Q.B. 253, C.A.;  Payzu V. Saunders,  
[1919] 2 K.B. 581, C.A. 
97  Clayton-Greene v. de Courville, 91920) 36 T.L.R. 790; Edwards v. 
Society of Graphical & Allied Trades, [1970] 1 W.l.R. 379; Basnett v. J 
& A Jackson, [1976] I.C.R. 63. 
98  Bowes v. Press, [1894] 1 Q.B. 202, C.A.  
99  Smailes v. Hans Dessen, (19050 L.T. 492; Darbishire v. Warran, 
[1963] 1 W.L.r. 1067, C.A.; Harlow and Jones v. Panex (International), 
[1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 509; Metelmann & Co. v. N.B.R. (London), 
[1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 614, C.A. 
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wrongdoer. Lord Macmil lan put this point well for contract in 
Banco de Portugal v. Waterlow100 in the following words: 
 
“Where the sufferer from a breach of contract f inds himself  
in consequence of that breach placed in a posit ion of 
embarrassment the measures which he may be driven to 
adopt in order to extricate himself  ought not to be weighed 
in nice scales at the instance of the party whose breach of 
contract has occasioned the diff iculty.  It is often easy af ter 
an emergency has passed to crit ic ize the steps, which have 
been taken to meet it,  but such cri t icism does not come well  
f rom those who have themselves created the emergency. 
The law is sat isf ied if the party placed in a dif f icult situat ion 
by reason of the breach of a duty owed to him has acted 
reasonably in the adoption of remedial measures and he will  
not be held disent it led to recover the cost of such measures 
merely because the party in breach can suggest that other 
measures less burdensome to him might have been 
taken.”101 
 
Whether the plainti ff  has acted reasonably is in every case 
a quest ion of fact, not of law. 
 
The criterion stated concisely in the words of James L.J. in 
Dunkirk Colliery Co. v. Lever,102 which were cited with 
approval by Viscount Haldane in Brit ish Westinghouse Co. 
v. Underground Ry,103 is that the plaint i ff  is not “under any 
obligation to do anything other than in the ordinary course 
                                      
100  Banco de Portugal v. Waterlow, [1932] A.C. 452.  
101  Bacon v. Cooper (Metals), [1982] 1 All ER 397; Harlow and 
Jones v. Panex (International) ,  [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 509; 
Hayes v. James & Charles Dodd, [1990] 2 All ER 815, C.A. 
102  Dunkirk Coll iery Co. v. Lever , (1878) 9 Ch.D. 20, C.A. 
103  Viscount Haldane in Brit ish Westinghouse Co. v. 
Underground Ry,  [1912] A.C. 673. 
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of business”. This terminology, with i ts reference is geared 
to contract, it  is probably better, to speak simply of the 
ordinary course or of the ordinary course of events. The 
il lustrative decisions pract ically al l go to show what the 
plaint if f  need not do in order to come up to the required 
standard: this in itself  suggests that the standard is not a 
demanding one. Nine such rules can be extracted from the 
cases.  
 
(I) A plaintif f  need not r isk his money too far. In 
Lesters Leather and Skin Co. v. Home and Overseas 
Brokers104 the plaint if f  bought snakeskins from the 
defendant to be delivered at a United Kingdom port, and 
properly rejected them on their arr ival as being not 
merchantable. The Court of Appeal awarded the plaintif f 
damages for his loss of prof it, rejecting the defendant’s 
argument that the plaint if f  should have mit igated by buying 
skins available in India on the ground that this was a risk, 
which he was not bound to take. Singleton L.J. quoted 
Sellers J.’s remark at f irst instance that “i t  is one thing to 
enter into a contract. It would be another thing to have got 
the goods actual ly here”.  And Lord Goddard C.J. said: “I  
cannot say that the buyers are bound to go hunting the 
globe to f ind out where they can get skins.” Similar ly, in 
Jewelowski v. Propp,105 where the plaint if f  was induced by 
the defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentat ion to advance 
money on a debenture to a company which later went into 
liquidation, it  was said that he could not be required to buy 
the company’s assets so that, by resell ing them afterwards 
at a higher amount than he paid for them, he would reduce 
his loss. Lewis J. said that a plaint if f  “cannot be called on to 
                                      
104  Lesters Leather and Skin Co. v. Home and Overseas 
Brokers, (1948) 64 T.L.R. 569, C.A. 
105  Jewelowski v.  Propp, [1944] K.B. 510. 
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spend money106 to enable him to minimize the damages”; 
this would be “going far beyond the rule”. 
 
(II)  A plainti ff  need not risk his person too far in the 
hands of surgeons. In Steele v. Robert George107 and again 
in Richardson v. Redpath,108 both workmen’s compensation 
claims, the House of Lords, and in Selvanayagam v. 
University of the West Indies,109 a damages claim, the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, held on the facts 
before them that the refusal of a physically injured plaint if f 
to undergo a dangerous and risky surgical operat ion did not 
constitute a fai lure to mitigate; and the same was held of 
the refusal in Savage v. Wall is110 of  a sl ight operation where 
medical evidence was evenly balanced on the prospects of 
its success. On the other hand, where the operation would 
not be regarded by reasonable men as a risky one, then a 
refusal to al low it will  be a failure to mitigate on the part of 
the plaint if f ;  such a result was reached by the Court of 
Appeal in Marcroft  v. Scruttons111 and again in McAuley v. 
London Transport Executive.112  
 
(III )  A plaintif f  need not have an abortion to end an 
unwanted pregnancy. This in Emeh v. Kensington Area 
Health Authority,113 where the defendants had performed a 
steri l izat ion operat ion on the plaintif f ,  a mother of three 
                                      
106  cf. Tucker v. Linger, (1882) 21 Ch.D. 18; cf. McAuley v. London 
Transport Executive, [1957] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 500, C.A. 
107  Steele v. Robert George  , [1942] A.C. 497. 
108  Richardson v.  Redpath, [1944] A.C. 62. 
109  Selvanayagam v. University of the West Indies,  [1983] 1 
W.L.R. 585, P.C.  
110  Savage v. Wall is ,  [1966] 1 L loyd’s Rep. 357,  C.A. 
111  Marcroft  v. Scruttons, [1954] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 395, C.A. 
112  McAuley v. London Transport Executive,  [1957] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 500, C.A.; Morgon v. T. Wall is , [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
165, C.A.; Xenox v. Curnow, (1975) 12 S.A.S.R. 301.  
113  Emeh v. Kensington Area Health Authority, [1985] Q.B. 
1012, C.A. 
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children, with the result that later found herself  once again 
pregnant, she was held ent it led to recover inter alia for her 
own loss of future earnings and for maintenance of the 
child, and the court would have none of the defendants’  
argument that these losses were the plainti f f ’s responsibi l ity 
as they stemmed from her own decision not to have an 
abortion. Slade L.J. said that “save in the most exceptional  
circumstances, I cannot think it r ight that the court should 
ever declare it unreasonable for a woman to decline to have 
an abortion in a case where there is no evidence that there 
were any medical or psychiatric grounds for terminat ing the 
particular pregnancy”. This is somewhat akin to the cases 
under the second rule, and indeed Slade L.J. pointed to the 
fact that the operat ion to terminate the plaintif f ’s pregnancy 
“would not have been entirely without r isk, and no doubt 
would have involved her in considerable pain and 
discomfort”. Since Emeh claims arising out of failed 
steri l izat ions have become quite common and it has been 
accepted in al l of these, where the precise measure of 
damages in relation to bringing up the child has been the 
issue, that the decision to have the child rather than 
undergo an abort ion was not a failure to mitigate.114 
 
(IV) A plaintif f need not take the r isk of start ing an 
uncertain l it igat ion against a third party. Thus in Pilkington 
v. Wood115 the plainti f f bought freehold land from a seller 
who purported to convey the property as beneficial owner, 
the defendant acting as the plaint if f ’s solicitor in the 
transaction. When the plaint if f  later tried to sell the property 
he found the t i t le was defective, since the seller was trustee 
of the property and has committed a breach of trust in 
buying it himself. In the plaint if f ’s act ion against the 
                                      
114  Allen v. Bloomsbury Health Author ity, [1993] 1 All  ER 651.  
115  Pilk ington v. Wood, [1953] Ch. 770.  
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defendant solicitor for negligence, the latter contended that 
before suing him the plaintif f  ought to have mit igated his 
damage by suing the seller on an implied covenant of t it le.  
This contention was rejected by Harman J. because, even 
conceding that the defendant had offered an adequate 
indemnity against costs in an act ion against the sel ler and 
that the seller was solvent and therefore worth suing, it  was 
not clear that the plaint if f  had a good prima facie r ight of 
act ion against the seller. The judge stated that he was of 
the opinion that “the so-called duty of mitigate does not go 
so far as to oblige the injured party, even under an 
indemnity,  to embark on a complicated and diff icult piece of  
l i t igation against a third party”.116 
 
(V) A plaintif f  need not destroy or sacrif ice rights or 
property of his own. This point was put with characteristic 
clar ity by Scrutton L.J. in Ell iott Steam Tug Co. v. Shipping 
Controller.117 The plaintif fs chartered a tug from the owners 
entit l ing them to the tug’s services until they should give 14 
days’ notice determining the charterparty. In the course of 
this contract the tug was requisit ioned by the Admiralty,  
f rom whom the plaint if fs proceeded to claim statutory 
compensation under two heads, namely fro the amount of 
hire for which they continued l iable under the charterparty,  
and for loss of prof its. The tr ibunal,  allowing compensation 
for only 30 days under each head, said that the plainti ffs 
should have minimized their loss by determining the 
charterparty and gave them the 30 days in which to have 
done so. Unfortunately there was no appeal to the Court of 
Appeal on the f i rst head, but Scrutton L.J. stated his 
                                      
116  Cf. Bri t ish Racing Drivers ’ Club v. Hextal l  Erskine & Co., 
[1996] P.N.L.R. 523.  
117  Ell iott Steam Tug Co. v. Shipping Control ler , [1922] 1 K.B. 
127, C.A. 
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disagreement with the tr ibunal on it.  “At common law”, he 
said: 
 
“the owner of a ship whiled under a duty to act reasonably 
to reduce damages is under no obligat ion to destroy his own 
property to reduce the damages payable by the wrongdoer. 
The leasehold tenant of a house would not be bound to stop 
paying rent to his superior landlord during the period during 
which a wrongdoer prevented him using the house, because 
by so doing he would reduce the damages the wrongdoer 
had to pay if  by so doing he lost the tenancy of the house 
after the wrong was repaired, or f inished in i ts ef fect. It  is 
common practice at common law to recover, (1) net prof its 
lost; (2) standing charges which have reasonably to be 
incurred and which are not made up by prof its by reason of 
the wrongdoer’s action. In other words in a case of 
temporary loss of a chattel, gross profits lost are recovered 
so far as expenses of earning them reasonably cont inue; 
and the reasonableness is from the point of view of the 
owner of the chattel. If  the expenses cease their amount is 
set off  against the gross prof it otherwise lost.” 
 
But the situat ion was dif ferent in Weir v. Dobell118 where the 
defendant sub-charted a ship from the plaint if f for a 
particular voyage at a rate higher than the plaint if f  had to 
pay under the head charterparty, which was for the same 
voyage and which, in the events that happened, the plaint if f 
had a right to cancel. In these circumstances it was held, 
when the defendant refused to load, that the plaintif f  was 
under an obligat ion to exercise his right to cancel the head 
charterparty in mit igation of damage. Here the vital factors 
were that the two charterparties were co-extensive and that 
                                      
118  Weir v. Dobell ,  [1916] 1 K.B. 722.  
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there was no residue of the head charterparty following on 
the termination of the sub-charterparty to preserve.  
 
(VI) A plaintif f  need not take steps to recover 
compensation for his loss from part ies who, in addit ion to 
the defendant, are l iable to him. This is an undoubted 
principle: indeed without such a principle it would have 
been unnecessary for the legislature to make provision for 
contr ibution and indemnity.119 And The Liverpool (No.2)120 
shows that, even if  the third party offers payment of the 
amount for which he is l iable, the plaint if f  is not required to 
accept it  in mitigation. In that case the defendants’ ship 
through negligence came into coll ision in port with another 
ship, which sank. The plaint if f  harbour board sued the 
defendants, whose l iabi l ity was l imited, for expense 
incurred and damage sustained in clearing the port of the 
wreck. However, the plaintif fs had also taken steps to 
enforce their statutory right against the owners of the wreck 
to recover from them any expenses outstanding after rais ing 
and selling the wreck, and not only had this amount been 
established but the money had been tendered, refused by 
the plaint if fs, and then put on deposit  by the owners of the 
wreck. In such circumstances the Court of Appeal held that 
the plaintif fs were under no duty to sat isfy part of their 
damages by accepting the money already on deposit.  
Harman L.J., delivering the Court ’s judgment, pointed to the 
analogy that “ it  has never been the law that a creditor 
having a security against a third party for his debt must give 
credit for that when proving in the bankruptcy”. 
 
                                      
119  The Liverpool  (No.2) , [1963] P. 64, C.A., at 83. 
120  The Liverpool  (No.2) , [1963] P. 64, C.A. 
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(VII)  A plaintif f  need not prejudice his commercial  
reputation. Thus, in Finlay v. Kwik Hoo Tong121 the plainti ffs 
had bought goods for August shipment to them by the 
defendants and had resold them on different terms, the 
contract of resale, unl ike the contract of sale, providing that 
the date of the bi ll  of  lading should be conclusive evidence 
of the date of shipment. The goods were not shipped by the 
defendants unt il September, but the bil ls of lading bore an 
August date. The plaint if fs could have wiped out their loss 
by forcing the goods on their sub-buyers, but to enforce 
their legal rights in the circumstances would have injured 
their commercial reputation, and they refused to do so. It  
was held that their refusal was reasonable and not a fai lure 
to mitigate. Similar, but in the context of the charterning 
and sub-charter ing of a ship by the plaint if fs, is The Lily 
Prima.122 And on the notorious facts of Banco de Portugal v. 
Waterlow,123 where there had been a large issue of forged 
bank noted printed by the defendant, it  was held by the 
House of Lords that the plainti f f bank was ent itled to give 
genuine notes in exchange for forged ones in order to 
protect i ts own credit and the national currency, and to 
claim from the defendant as damages for breach of contract 
the market value of the genuine notes given in exchange 
and the cost of print ing the genuine notes withdrawn from 
circulat ion.124 
 
(VIII) a plaint i ff  need not act so as to injure innocent 
persons. Banco de Portugal v.  Watelow,125 just considered, 
also il lustrates this, since the bank was held enti t led to give 
                                      
121  Finlay v. Kwik Hoo Tong, [1929] 1 K.B.  400, C.A. 
122  The Li ly  Pr ima, [1976] 2 L loyd’s Rep. 487. 
123  Banco de Portugal v. Waterlow,  [1932] A.C. 452. 
124  Finlay v. Kwik Hoo Tong, [1929] 1 K.B. 400, C.A.; H.L. Motorworks v. 
Alwahbi, [1977] R.T.R. 276, C.A. 
125  Banco de Portugal v. Waterlow,  [1932] A.C. 452. 
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genuine notes for forged ones not only to protect itself  but 
also in protection of innocent holders of forged notes. 
 
(IX) A plaint if f  wil l not be prejudiced by his f inancial 
inabil ity to take steps in mit igat ion. As Lord Collins said in 
Clippens Oil Co. v. Edinburgh and District Water 
Trustees126:  
 
“In may opinion the wrongdoer must take his vict im talem 
qualem,  and if  the posit ion of the latter is aggravated 
because he is without the means of mitigating it , so much 
the worse for the wrongdoer, who has got to be answerable 
for the consequences f lowing from his wrongful act.” 
 
What is particularly interesting is that in the famous case on 
remoteness of damage, Liesbosch Dredger v. S.S. 
Edison,127 Lord Wright cited this dictum of Lord Collins and 
concluded that it  was not in point since it was “dealing not 
with the measure of damage, but with the victim’s duty to 
minimize damage, which is qui te a dif ferent matter”.  He cast 
no doubt on its correctness however,128 and it has since 
been applied in Robbins of Putney v. Meek,129 a claim for 
non-acceptance of goods sold, where the prince at which 
the plaint if f  resold the goods was used in the calculat ion of 
his damages despite the fact that impecuniosity had forced 
him to dispose of the goods by what in normal 
circumstances would have been a premature sale. Also, in 
both Mart indale v. Duncan130 and Bunclark v. Hertfordshire 
                                      
126  Clippens Oil  Co. v. Edinburgh and Distr ic t Water Trustees, 
[1907] A.C. 291 at 303.  
127  Liesbosch Dredger v. S.S. Edison,  [1933] A.C. 449. 
128  Cf. Dodd Properties v. Canterbury City Council ,  [1980] 1 
W.L.R. 433 ; Compania Financiera “Soleada” v. Hamoor 
Tanker Corpn, The Borag, [1981] 1 W .L.R. 274, C.A. 
129  Robbins of Putney v. Meek,  [1971] R.T.R. 345. 
130  Martindale v. Duncan,  [1973]  1 W.R. 574, C.A. 
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C.C.131 impecuniosity was held to justi fy the plaintif f ’s delay 
in carrying out repairs, in the one case to his car and in the 
other to his f lat, again by an application, in the latter case, 
of Lord Coll ins’s dictum. Part icularly important is the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Dodd Properties v. 
Canterbury City Counci l132 awarding to the plaintif fs,  
claiming in nuisance for the cost of repair of their building 
damaged by the defendants’ pi le-driving operations, 
damages based upon the much higher cost of repair at the 
t ime of act ion which was heard some ten years after the 
damage had been done. Megaw L.J. said: 
 
“Once i t is accepted that the plainti ff  was not in any breach 
of any duty owed by him to the defendant in fai l ing to carry 
out repairs earl ier than the t ime when it was reasonable for 
the repairs to be put in hand, this becomes, for all  practical 
purposes, if  not in theory, equated with a plaintif f ’s ordinary 
duty to mit igate his damages.” 
 
Accordingly, Lord Coll ins’s dictum in Clippens,133 accepted 
by lord Wright in The Liesbosch,134 takes over; with this 
Donaldson L.J. agreed. However, the decision for the 
plaint if f  in that case was reached in terms of remoteness as 
much as in terms of mitigation, and it is thought that the 
precise point at which the dictum in Clippens135 takes over 
from the decision in Liesbosch136 may st il l  have to be 
worked out. 
 
                                      
131  Bunclark v. Hertfordshire C.C., (1977) 234 E.G. 381 and 
455. 
132  Dodd Propert ies v. Canterbury City Council , [1980] 1 
W.L.R. 433, C.A.  
133  Clippens,  [1907] A.C. 291 at 303. 
134  The Liesbosch, [1933] A.C. 449.  
135  Clippens,  [1907] A.C. 291 at 303. 
136  The Liesbosch, [1933] A.C. 449.  
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11.8 THE COROLLARY: RECOVERY FOR LOSS 
INCURRED IN ATTEMPTS TO MITIGATE THE 
DAMAGE: 
 
The plaint if f ,  during his efforts to mit igate the damage, may 
incur further loss, which wil l  of ten be a loss which is not in 
addit ion to, but in place of and less than, the loss which he 
is attempting to mitigate. This is particular ly so in the case 
of expenses. The expenses incurred by the plaintif f  as the 
result of the breach of contract for which recover is al lowed 
in the cases are generally expenses incurred to avoid or 
minimize a loss. This is so where money is laid out in 
acquiring or hiring a substi tute where the plaint i f f ’s property 
is damaged, destroyed or misappropriated137;  where medical 
expenses are incurred to ameliorate the plaintif f ’s physical 
injury caused by the defendant138;  where there is 
expenditure upon advertisements to counteract the effect of 
the defendant’s infringement of the plaintif f ’s trade mark,  139 
or upon extensive inquires to detect the extent of the 
defendant’s unlawful machinations in inducing breaches of 
contract and in conspiracy.140 These various examples may 
be considered as examples of steps taken in mit igat ion of  
damage, but some of them are so common, such as medical  
expenses in personal injury cases, that they tend not to be 
thought of specif ically from this angle.141 Whether regarded 
specif ically as mit igation or not, the rule al lowing recovery 
for such expenses is at base the corollary of the rule 
refusing recovery for loss that could reasonably have been 
mitigated.  
                                      
137  Davis v. Oswell, (1837) 7 C.& P. 804 (conversion); Moore v. D.E.R., 
[1971] 1 W.L.R. 1476, C.A. (destruction); Bacon v. Cooper (Metals), 
[1982] 1 All ER 397. 
138  S. v. Dist i l lers Co. (Biochemicals), [1970] 1 W.L.R. 114. 
139  Spalding v. Gamage, (1918) 35 R.P.C. 101, C.A. 
140  Brit ish Motor Trade Associat ion v. Salvadori, [1949] Ch. 556. 
141  Cf. Compagnia Financiera “Soleada” v. Hamoor Tanker 
Corpn, The Borag, [1981] 1 W.L.R. 274 C.A. 
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Indeed the corollary goes further, and allows recovery for 
losses and expenses reasonably incurred in mitigat ion even 
though the result ing damage is in the event greater than it 
would have been had the mit igating steps not been taken. 
This pr inciple, which at one time boasted no clear 
il lustration, was applied in Lloyds and Scott ish Finance v. 
Modern Cars and Caravans (Kingston) .142 The defendants 
there had sold to plaint if fs a caravan which was not their 
property and which was subsequently seized by the sherif f 
who, upon the defendants protesting, inst ituted interpleader 
proceedings against them. At the defendants’ suggest ion 
the plaintif fs claimed the caravan, but this claim was 
withdrawn after legal advice that it  was not maintainable, 
and the plaintif fs paid the costs of the interpleader 
proceedings. It was held that these costs could be included 
within the damages for breach of warranty. Edmund Davies 
J. considered that where steps intended to be by way of 
mitigation were “taken at the instigat ion of the defendants, I  
do not think it is open to them to assert that such steps 
were not reasonable”. Somewhat similar is Esso Petroleum 
Co. v. Mardon.143 There the defendant had taken a three-
year tenancy agreement of a f i l l ing station of the strength of 
the plainti ff  oil  company’s est imate of the stat ion’s potent ial 
throughput of petrol, an est imate that proved disastrously 
optimist ic. When the truth came out the defendant gave the 
plaint if fs not ice, but the plainti ffs, eager to keep the stat ion 
open and controlled by a good tenant, offered to the 
defendant, who accepted, a new tenancy agreement on 
more favourable terms. The losses in the business however 
cont inued, and accordingly the overal l  loss to the defendant 
                                      
142  Lloyds and Scott ish Finance v. Modern Cars and Caravans 
(Kingston), [1966] 1 Q.B. 764.  
143  Esso Petroleum Co. v. Mardon, [1976] Q.B. 801, C.A. 
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was exacerbated rather than reduced. In the defendant’s 
successful counterclaim for breach of warranty and 
negligent misrepresentat ion when sued by the plaint if fs for, 
inter alia,  possession of the premises, the Court of Appeal 
refused to accept that the effect of the statement 
constitut ing both the warranty and the misrepresentat ion 
was spent by the date on which the defendant entered into 
the new tenancy agreement, reversing on this the judge 
below who had taken such date as the cut-off  point for the 
damages. In entering into the second tenancy agreement 
the defendant was act ing reasonably in an effort to mit igate 
the loss to himself  and the plaint if fs so that the loss 
sustained after that date was attributable to the original  
statement and was recoverable as damages from the 
plaint if fs.  
 
Clear i l lustrat ions in English law of unsuccessful mit igat ing 
act ion which was not inst igated by the defendant are, 
however, hard to f ind. The general principle, as stated, may 
be said to be akin to, and even a part  of, the rule, met with 
the remoteness of damages, that a plainti ff ’s intervening act 
reasonably taken to safeguard his interests, whether taken 
in the “agony of the moment”144 or not,145 does not rel ieve 
the defendant of l iabi l ity for the result ing loss. The principle 
was recognized by Lord Atkinson in Wilson v. United 
Counties Bank146 where he said: 
 
“If one man inf l icts an injury another the resort by the 
sufferer to reasonable expendients for the bona f ide 
purpose of counteract ing, curing or lessening the evil  
                                      
144  Jones v. Boyce, (1816) 1 Stark. 493. 
145  Canadian Pacif ic Co. v. Kelv in Shipping Co., (1927) 138 L.T. 
369, H.L. 
146  Wilson v. United Counties Bank, [1920] A.C. 102 at 125.  
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effects of the injury done him, does not necessari ly absolve 
the wrongdoer, even though the sufferer’s efforts should in 
the result, undersigngedly aggravate the result of the 
injury.” 
 
On a more general place is the comment of Winn L.J. in The 
World Beauty147 where he said that he was not aware of any 
express statement in the cases: 
 
“but it  is implicit in the principle, that if  mit igat ing steps are 
reasonably taken and addit ional loss or damage results 
notwithstanding the reasonable decision to take those 
steps, then that will be in addit ion to the recoverable 
damage and not a set-off against the amount of it .” 
 
The case that f irst got near to being an example of this 
situat ion if  Jones v. Watney, Combe, Reid & Co.,148 and 
act ion for personal injury in which the defendant contended 
that he was not l iable in damages for the aggravat ion to the 
injury to the plainti ff ’s foot by reason of her walking on the 
foot too soon after the accident.  Lush J. directed the jury to: 
 
“ look at all the circumstances of the case, the medical  
advice received, the need for act ion, the usual or 
extraordinary character of what is actually done, and the 
precautions taken during the doing of it .  The injured person 
need not act with perfect knowledge and ideal wisdom, but 
upon the other hand cannot claim damages for such injuries 
as are really due to wanton, needless, or caress conduct on 
his own part. If  what is done reasonably and carefully 
                                      
147  The World Beauty, [1970] P. 144, C.A. at 156. 
148  Jones v. Watney, Combe, Reid & Co., (1912) 28 T.L.R. 
399. 
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augments the injuries, that may be regarded as natural  
consequence of the accident.” 
 
The jury held the defendant l iable for the total injury. More 
recent ly, Metelmann & Co. v. N.B.R. (London)149 has 
provided an i l lustration, but i t  is in the peculiar context of 
anticipatory breach of contract, which has its own special  
rules as to mit igation. Thus, where in a sale of goods there 
is a repudiation by the buyer before the t ime f ixed for his 
acceptance, the damages are sti l l  prima facie calculated at 
that t ime but become subject to a duty to mitigate on the 
part of the seller once he has accepted the repudiat ion, In 
Metelmann the seller, immediately upon acceptance of the 
buyer’s repudiat ion, made a sale in a reasonable attempt at 
mitigation but, as events turned out,  on the date f ixed for 
acceptance the market price was higher. The seller was 
nevertheless held ent it led to have the damages based upon 
the lower price at which the sale had been made. As 
Browne-Wilkinson L.J. put i t :  “In addit ion to the basic 
damages … Metelmann is entit led to be compensated for 
the addit ional damage f lowing from the attempt to mitigate.” 
 
11.9 THE RULE AS TO AVOIDED LOSS: NO 
RECOVERY FOR LOSS WHICH THE PLAINTIFF 
HAS AVOIDED, UNLESS THE MATTER IS 
COLLATERAL:  
 
Frequently a plaintif f  wil l have taken the required 
reasonable steps of mitigat ion and thereby have avoided 
such part of the loss as was avoidable. No dif f iculty arises 
in such circumstances. But the plainti f f may have gone 
further and by sound action have avoided more 
consequences than the dictates of the law required of him. 
                                      
149  Metelmann & Co. v. N.B.R. (London), [1984] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 614, C.A.  
  
- 659 - 
In such circumstances the posit ion has been def init ively 
stated by Viscount Haldane L.C. in the leading case of 
Brit ish Westinghouse Co. v. Underground Ry .150 He put the 
rule thus: 
 
“When in the course of his business he [the plaint if f ]  has 
taken action arising out of the transaction, which action has 
diminished his loss, the effect in actual diminution of the 
loss he has suffered may be taken into account even though 
there was no duty of him to act.” 
 
Later in his speech he said similarly: 
 
“Provided the course taken to protect himself  by the plaint iff 
in such an action was one which a reasonable and prudent 
person might in the ordinary conduct of business properly 
have taken, and in fact did take whether bound to or not, a 
jury or an arbitrator may properly look at the whole of the 
facts and ascertain the result in estimating the quantum of 
damage.” 
 
He emphasized, however, that “the subsequent transact ion, 
if  to be taken into account, must be one arising out of the 
consequences of the breach and in the ordinary course of 
business”, and the important practical question if  therefore 
what steps taken by the plaintif f  sat isfy this def init ion. 
 
Viscount Haldane’s formulation of  this rule, with its 
reference to steps taken in the ordinary course of business, 
is general to contract: this is understandable since Brit ish 
                                      
150  Brit ish Westinghouse Co. v. Underground Ry, [1912] A.C. 
673. 
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Westinghouse Co. v. Underground Ry151 was a case of 
breach of contract A wider formulat ion is that matter 
completely collateral and merely res inter alios acta  cannot 
be used in mit igation of damage.152 This has the great meri t 
of  stat ing the rule of once concisely and completely: but i t  
gives no indication of how the rule operates and of what 
solutions would be reached when applying it to particular 
circumstances. Indeed the l ine between those avoided 
consequences, which are collateral and those, which are 
not is an exceedingly diff icult one to draw. It is thought that,  
in considering the relevant decided cases which are widely 
dispersed over many f ields, Viscount Haldane’s formulation 
is of value, and that assistance is also derived from a 
division into act ions taken before breach and act ions taken 
after breach, and from a subdivision of the latter group into 
act ion taken by third parties and act ions taken by the 
plaint if f .   
 
Where it appears that steps have been taken by the plaint if f 
to avoid loss, being steps, which are not completely 
collateral, and which are therefore, to be taken into account 
in assessing the damages, the onus is on the defendant to 
prove that,  and also how far, loss has thereby been 
avoided.  
 
Thus, in The World Beauty,153 where the plaint if fs’ ship had 
been damaged in a col lis ion while engaged on a charter and 
the plaintif fs had attempted to mitigate their loss by 
advancing the commencement of a later charter, i t  was held 
                                      
151  Brit ish Westinghouse Co. v. Underground Ry, [1912] A.C. 
673. 
152  Brit ish Transport Commission v. Gour ley, [1956] A.C. 185; 
Salih v. Enfield Health Authori ty, [1991] 3 Al l  ER 400. 
153  The World Beauty, [1970] P. 144, C.A. at 156. 
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in their claim for loss of profits that it  was for the defendant 
to prove the value of the advancement.  
 
(1) Actions taken after breach by third parties: 
 
Similarly, actions taken after breach by third parties cannot 
be within the principles laid down in Brit ish Westinghouse 
Co. v.  Underground Ry154 as what is envisaged are steps 
taken by the plainti ff himself.  
 
This is well i l lustrated by cases in which the plaintif f  has 
suffered personal injuries and a third party has gratuitously 
come to his f inancial rescue by payment of medical or l iving 
expenses, or continued payment of wages, or by way of a 
general sum not in relation to a part icular head of loss. In 
Liffen v. Watson155 the plainti ff ’s father provided her with 
free board and lodging during the period when she was 
unable to cont inue in her employment as a domestic 
servant, her employer having remunerated her not only by 
wages but by board and lodging; in Dennis v. L.P.T.B.156 the 
plaint if f ’s employer and the Ministry of Pensions paid the 
plaint if f ,  in sick pay and in pension, amounts which together 
equaled his wages in Cunningham v. Harrison157 ex grat ia 
payments had again been made by a sympathet ic employer; 
in Redpath v. Belfast and County Down Ry158 a charitable 
fund, voluntarily subscribed to by the public, was set up to 
aid a sum from this fund. No deduct ion was made in any of 
these cases from the damages on account of such payment. 
The benefit this, accruing to the plaintif f  may not remain 
                                      
154  Brit ish Westinghouse Co. v. Underground Ry, [1912] A.C. 
673. 
155  Lif fen v. Watson, [1940] 1 K.B. 556, C.A. 
156  Dennis v. L.P.T.B., [1948] 1 Al l  ER 779. 
157  Cunningham v. Harr ison, [1973] Q.B. 942, C.A. 
158  Redpath v. Bel fast and County Down Ry, [1947] N.I.  167. 
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with him, as he may be under an obligat ion to pay back to 
the third party if  he should recover damages from the 
defendant; indeed the court in Dennis v. L.P.T.B.159 directed 
that the relevant amount of the damages, when received by 
the plaint if f,  should be held by him under an obligat ion to 
pay it  over to the third party, and the House of Lords has 
now in Hunt v. Severs160 imposed a trust where the damages 
are in respect of the plaintif f ’s care needs. It may be said 
however that today this situation is not l ikely to ar ise with 
the deduct ion of more and more collateral benefits in 
personal injury cases. 
 
Nor are al l the il lustrations conf ined to cases involving 
personal injuries. Thus, in Gardner v. Marsh and Parsons,161 
where the plaintif fs purchased a leasehold maisonette with 
a serious structural defect which their defendant surveyor 
had fai led to detect, they were held to be ent it led to the 
normal measure of damages based on the vale of the 
property in i ts defective state at the time of purchase162 
although the defects had been rect if ied at the plaint i ffs’ 
landlord’s expense two years after the discovery of the 
defect and some vi le years after the purchase. The 
landlord’s action in repair ing the property was said, in 
familiar terminology, to be collateral and res inter al ios 
acts,  and also was in no sense part of a cont inuous 
transaction of which the purchase was the incept ion. 
 
In one situat ion, which must be regarded as exceptional, 
act ion taken by a third party after breach wil l  reduce the 
damages. This is where the defendant has converted the 
                                      
159  Dennis v. L.P.T.B., [1948] 1 Al l  ER 779.  
160  Hunt v. Severs, [1994] 2 A.C. 350. 
161  Gardner v. Marsh and Parsons, [1997] 1 W.L.R. 489, C.A. 
162  Phil ips v. Ward, [1956] 1 W.L.R. 471, C.A.; Perry v. 
Sidney Phil l ips & Son, [1982] 1 W .L.R. 1297, C.A. 
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plaint if f ’s goods and the goods are then applied to paying 
off  a debt owed by the plaint if f  to a third party. If  this 
applicat ion is one that is authorized by law and which the 
defendant is powerless to prevent, as where the plainti ff ’s 
landlord distrains the goods for the plaint if f ’s arrears of 
rent, then the amount of the debt thus satisf ied will  to in 
reduct ion of the normal measure of damages in conversion, 
i.e. the market value of the goods. In Plevin v. Henshall163 
such a reduction was al lowed even after judgment, the 
distress itself taking place after judgment. And even where 
the application of the goods or their proceeds to the 
payment of the plaint if f ’s debts is not one which the 
defendant was powerless to prevent, and indeed is an 
applicat ion which the defendant himself  may have effected, 
this factor may go in reduct ion of the damages. The 
authority for this proposit ion l ies in the Court of  Appeal 
judgments in Underwood v. Bank of Liverpool,164 where the 
defendant bank had converted cheques of the plaintiff 
company by credit ing them to the company’s sole director.  
Although the question of damages was not up for decision, 
Scrutton L.J. took the view, with which Atkin L.J. agreed, 
that the fact that the sole director had used some of the 
proceeds of the cheques in discharging the plaint if f 
company’s l iabi l i t ies might to in mitigat ion of damages, and 
an inquiry as to the exact facts in this regard was directed. 
He referred to the dictum of Byles J. In Edmondson v. 
Nuttal l165 that “you could not mit igate damages for 
conversion of a bag of money converted paid the debt of  the 
plaint if f ”, and added that he was: 
 
                                      
163  Plevin v. Henshall,  (1833) 10 Bing. 24.  
164  Underwood v. Bank of L iverpool,  [1924] 1 K.B. 775, C.A. 
165  Edmondson v.  Nuttal l , (1864) 17 C.B.  (N.S.) 280. 
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“not sure that the learned judge had in his mind the 
equitable doctrines under which a person who had in fact 
paid the debts of another without authority was al lowed the 
advantage of his payments.” 
 
This reference to equity and to equitable doctr ines166 
suggests that the court is moving away from str ict common 
law conceptions of damages altogether, and tends to 
highlight the exceptional nature of the type of case under 
consideration. This exceptional qual ity is also emphasized 
both the str ict l imits placed upon allowing the amount of a 
plaint if f ’s paid debts to go in reduction of the damages 
awarded him and by the fact that the rationale of these 
limits is not very clearly def ined. This i t was held in 
Edmondson v. Nuttall167 that, where the application of the 
goods to the payment of the debt was authorized by law but 
the legal process was in favour of the defendant himself  as 
the plaint if f ’s credi tor, no reduction of the normal measure 
of damages fell to be made. And in Lloyds Bank v. 
Chartered Bank,168 where the plainti f f was suing for 
conversion of cheques by the defendant bank in paying 
them to the plaint if f ’s accountant, the Court of Appeal held 
that the damages were not to be reduced by reason of the 
fact that the accountant had used some of the cheques to 
pay not the plaintif f ’s debts but his own debts to the 
plaint if f .  Final ly, it  should be noted that in certain cases, 
notably in act ions for wrongful distress for rent, deduct ion 
of the amount of the debt paid from the value of the goods 
is made in order to arrive at the normal measure of 
damages without the necessity of any resort to doctrines of  
                                      
166  Reid v. Rigby, [1894] 2 Q.B. 40 ; Bannatyne v. MacIver, 
[1906] 1 K.B. 103, C.A.;  Reversion Fund and Insurance 
Co. v. Maison Cosway, [1913] 1 K.B. 364, C.A. 
167  Edmondson v.  Nuttal l , (1864) 17 C.B.  (N.S.) 280. 
168  Lloyds Bank v. Chartered Bank, [1929] 1 K.B. 40, C.A. 
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mitigation. Thus, the normal measure of damages is the 
value of the goods wrongfully distrained less the rent due in 
act ions both for irregular169 and for excessive170 distress.171 
 
(2) Actions taken after breach by the plaintiff: 
 
Actions taken after breach by the plaintif f  himself  are 
directly within the principles laid down in Brit ish 
Westinghouse Co. v. Underground Ry172:  i t  is here that is 
found the core of the problem. The matter is not well 
worked out in the authorit ies and al l that can be done is to 
sketch what the law probably is. Some applicat ions of the 
rule are admittedly simple and are so straightforward as 
generally to be taken for granted. Thus, where the plaint iff 
has recovered damages from a third party, who is also 
liable. He cannot recover damages over again from the 
defendant for the same loss.173 Again, where a plaintif f  has 
accepted the return of his goods, which the defendant had 
converted, he cannot sue the defendant for their value.174 
 
The diff icult cases generally concern contracts of sale of 
goods, where on the defendant’s default the plaintif f  taken 
steps to remedy his situation by acquiring subst itutes or by 
disposing of the goods to a third party.  It is suggested that 
the basic rule is that the benefit to the plaintif f ,  i f  it  is to be 
taken into account in mit igation of damage, must arise out 
of the act of mitigat ion itself .  
                                      
169  Biggins v. Goode,  (1832) 2 Cr. & J. 364. 
170  Wells v. Mody, (1835) 7 C.&P. 59. 
171  Keen v. Priest, (1859) 4 H.& N. 236;  Attack v. Bramwell ,  
(1863) 3 B & S. 520.  
172  Brit ish Westinghouse Co. v. Underground Ry, [1912] A.C. 
673. 
173  Burn v. Morris, (1834) 2 Cr. & M. 579. 
174  Moon v. Raphael, (1835) 2 Bing.N.C. 310; Evans Marshall & Co. v. 
Bertola S.A. and Independent Sherry Importers, [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
17, H.L. 
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Thus, where a seller fai ls to deliver goods, or del ivers 
defect ive goods, and the buyer wishes to claim damages for 
the loss of prof it he would have made from the goods, he 
must show that he has taken reasonable steps in mit igat ion 
by attempting to acquire a substitute. If  then, in acquir ing 
such a substitute the plaintif f  gains some benefit,  this must 
be taken into account in assessing the damages. This was 
the situat ion in the leading case of Brit ish Westinghouse 
Co. v. Underground Ry.175 Turbines supplied under contract 
to the plaint if f  rai lway company were deficient in power and 
in economy of working and not in accordance with the 
contract. The plaintif f  used them for a t ime, but ult imately 
replaced them by others of a different make and design 
which were more powerful and which brought in greater 
prof it than the original  machines would have, even had they 
been up to standard. The plaint if f  claimed to recover as 
damages the cost of the substitute, a consequential loss, 
but this loss was held not recoverable since the 
consequential gain in prof its and saved expenses was to be 
taken into account, and on balance no net loss showed on 
the purchase of the substitute. Somewhat similar is Erie 
County Natural Gas Co. v. Carrol l.176 There the plaint i ff  had 
transferred gas leases to the defendant, reserving the use 
of such gas as would be suff icient to supply certain plant 
operated by him in his business. When the defendant 
wrongfully cut off the gas supply due under the reservation 
clause, the plaintif f  procured the gas required for his plant 
by the acquisit ion of other gas lease from independent 
sources and by the construct ion of works to produce gas. 
                                      
175  Brit ish Westinghouse Co. v. Underground Ry, [1912] A.C. 
673.  
176  Erie County Natural Gas Co. v. Carroll ,  [1911] A.C. 105, 
P.C. 
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When subsequently the plaint if f  sold his business, he sold 
for more than they cost him the substituted gas leases and 
the works constructed by him. The Judicial committee of the 
Privy Council,  reversing the Ontario Court of Appeal,  held 
the plaint if f  entit led to only nominal damages in his action 
against the defendant for breach of contract on the ground 
that the measure of damages was the cost to the plaint if f  of 
procuring the subst itute gas. Lord Atkinson said: 
 
“It would have been competent for the plaintif fs to have 
abstained from procuring gas in substitution for that which 
the defendants should have suppl ied to them, and have 
sued the defendants for damages for breach of their  
contract. They did not take that course. They chose to 
perform on behalf of the defendants, in a reasonable way, 
that contract for them and to obtain from an independent 
source a suff icient quantity of gas similar as near as might 
be in character and quality to that which they were ent it led 
to receive. In such cases i t is well established that the 
measure of damages is the cost of procuring the substituted 
article, not at al l the price at which the subst ituted article 
when procured could have been sold by the person who has 
procure it. ” 
 
In the converse situat ion, where the breach of contract was 
a failure by the defendant to accept goods which the 
plaint if f had agreed to manufacture and supply, it  was held 
by the House of Lords in Hil l v. Showell177 that evidence was 
admissible t show that the plainti ff  was enabled, because of 
the breach, to execute other prof itable orders, s ince this 
was relevant in assessing the damages in the plaint if f ’s 
claim for loss of prof its. Viscount Haldane said: 
                                      
177  Hil l v .  Showel l,  (1918) 87 L.J.K.B. 1106, H.L. 
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“If in the course of his business, he [the plaintif f ]  has taken 
act ion which has actually ar isen out of the situat ion in which 
his machinery was rendered free by reason of the breach, 
and by taking on new contracts occasioned by this situat ion 
has diminished his loss, he must give credit  for the 
diminution, even though he may have gone somewhat out of 
his way to make f resh efforts because of the posit ion in 
which he found himself  with unemployed machinery.” 
 
On the other hand, where a seller fails to deliver goods, 
delivers them late, or delivers defective goods, and the 
buyer claims only the normal measure of damages with no 
claim for lost prof its or other consequential losses, there is 
no necessity for the buyer, in the interests of mit igation, to 
buy other goods in the market in the case of failure to 
deliver, or to sell  the goods on del ivery in the case of delay 
or defects. It should follow therefore, if  the plaint if f  in the 
one case buys later when the market has fal len, or in the 
other case sells later when the market has risen, that this 
gain to the plainti f f should redound to his advantage and not 
be brought in so as to reduce his damages. A clear 
il lustration of this proposit ion is provided178 by Jones v. 
Just,179 where the plaint if f  bought f irst  quality hemp and 
second quality hemp was delivered. The market price of 
hemp then rose, enabling the plaint if f  to resell the delivered 
hemp at substantially the market price at which the f irst  
quality hemp had stood at the t ime of delivery. Nevertheless 
the normal measure of damages under section 53 (3) of the 
                                      
178  Werthein v. Chicoutimi Pulp Co., [1911] A.C. 301, P.C; 
Williams v. Agius, [1914] A.C. 510; Slater v. Hoyle & 
Smith, [1920] 2 K.B, 11, C.A . ;  Bence Graphics 
International  v. Fasson U.K., [1997] 1 All  ER 979, C.A. 
179  Jones v. Just,(1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 197. 
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Sale of Goods Act,  1893 was held to apply.180 On the other 
hand, in the rather special s ituation which arose in Pagnan 
& Fratell i v.  Corbisa Industrial Agropacuaria,181 where the 
plaint if fs, after non-delivery, subsequently bought not 
substitute goods in a fallen market but the self-same goods 
from their own seller at a renegotiated and substantially 
reduced price, which purchase was found by the court not to 
be an independent or disconnected transact ion but to be 
part of a course of continuous deal ing between the part ies, 
it  was held, applying the principles laid down in Brit ish 
Westinghouse Co. v. Underground Ry,182 that this later 
purchase must be taken into account so as to oust the 
normal measure of damages under section 51 (3) of the 
Sale of Goods Act, 1979 and to debar the plaint if fs from any 
recovery.183 
 
In the converse situat ion where a buyer of goods fai ls to 
accept them and the seller subsequently resells them on a 
rising market, a corresponding result is reached. The 
principal case is Jamal v.  Moola Dawood .184 A buyer of 
shares refused to accept them, the market rose and the 
seller re-sold; this gain to the seller was ignored in 
assessing the buyer’s damages. And in Campbell Mostyn v. 
Barnett185 this was applied to a sale of goods.186 
                                      
180  Jewelowski v.  Propp ,  [1944] K.B. 510 . 
181  Pagnan & Fratell i  v . Corbisa Industr ial Agropacuaria, 
[1970] 1 W.L.R. 1306, C.A. 
182  Brit ish Westinghouse Co. v. Underground Ry, [1912] A.C. 
673.  
183  Jamal v. Moola Dawood, [1916] 1 A.C. 175, P.C.;  
Campbel l Mostyn v. Barnett,  [1954] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 65, 
C.A. 
184  Jamal v. Moola Dawood, (1875) L.R. 10 C.P. 300. 
185  Campbel l Mostyn v. Barnett,  [1954] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 65, 
C.A. 
186  Oldershaw v. Holt ,  (1840) 12 A. & E. 590; Hardley v. 
Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex. 341. 
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Outside the authori ties on the sale of goods or shares, two 
cases involving a temporary deprivation of the use of a ship 
provide on this issue an interesting contrast. In Jebsen v. 
East and West Indian Dock Co.187 the defendant, in breach 
of a contract to discharge the plainti ff ’s ship, was late in 
completing her discharge with the result that the plaintif f 
lost the fares of the passengers who were due to sail on the 
ship for America. In consequence, another two ships, also 
owned by the plaintif f ,  gained these passengers, but it  was 
held that this factor could not be allowed to reduce the 
plaint if f ’s damages. Here the benefit  which the defendant 
wished to offset arose from the emergence of the 
opportunity to put other property of his, which happened to 
be available, to immediate prof itable use in substitut ion, 
accordingly did not ar ise out of any act of mitigation, and 
therefore, was properly disregarded. On the other had, in 
The World Beauty188 the benefit  did ar ise out of the act, or 
in this case acts, of mitigat ion and had therefore t be 
brought into account. At a t ime when freight rates were low 
the plaintif fs’ tanker suffered serious damage in a coll ision 
while operating under a charterparty negotiated at a t ime 
when, fol lowing upon the closure of the Suez Canal towards 
the end of 1956, freight rates were very high. The plaintif fs 
chartered another ship at the low rates then prevailing, 
employing her as a subst itute ship to perform the charter, 
and on complet ion of the necessary repairs to the damaged 
ship advanced by some 100 days her employment under a 
second charter, which had also been negotiated when 
freight rates had been very high and which was a seven-
year t ime charter. The Court of Appeal held that against the 
losses due to the coll ision must be set both the profit made 
                                      
187  Jebsen v. East and West Indian Dock Co., (1875) L.R. 10 
C.P. 300. 
188  The World Beauty, [1970] P. 144, C.A. 
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by the subst itute ship under the remainder of the f irst 
charter and the gain attr ibutable to the making of the profit 
on 100 days of the second charter seven years earl ier than 
it would otherwise have accrued. Credit had not to be given, 
however, for the whole of the high 100-day prof it under the 
second charter because the earning of that prof it did not 
f low from a step taken in consequence f  the col lis ion but 
from the negotiation of the second charter months 
previously.189 
 
Somewhat similar is the decision in Nadreph v. Willmet & 
Co.190 The plaintif fs, who held the leasehold reversion on 
certain premises, wished, on the expiry of the tenancy to 
which their holding was subject, to retain for their own use 
the part  of the premises which their tenants had themselves  
sub-let while being wil l ing to grant the tenants a new 
tenancy of the part of which they were in occupation. The 
defendants, the plaintif fs’ sol ic itors, served not ice on the 
tenants, as instructed, terminat ing their tenancy but stat ing, 
contrary to instructions, that the plaint if fs would oppose a 
grant of a new tenancy of any part of the premises, with the 
result that, by virtue of the provisions of the Landlord and 
Tenant Act, 1954, the tenants became ent it led to claim 
compensation of ₤133,276 from the plaint if fs. The 
defendants successful ly argued that they were ent it led to 
set off  against the damages arising from the l iabi l ity to pay 
compensation any greater benefit that the vacat ion by the 
tenants of the part of the premises which they occupied 
would bring to the plaint if fs, by way of securing another 
tenant or for use for their won business, than would have 
resulted from the cont inuance of the tenants’ occupation of  
                                      
189  The Timawra, [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 166; The Krit i  Rex,  
[1996] 2 L loyd’s Rep. 171. 
190  Nadreph v. Wil lmet & Co., [1978] 1 W .L.R. 1537. 
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the premises. This benefit would arise out of the act of 
mitigation itself , whether the act of occupying and using the 
premises or the act of lett ing to another tenant, and it was 
no answer to rely upon the assert ion, as the plaint if fs did, 
that “there is no authority which establishes that a benefit  
secured in mit igation of damage of one kind can be set off 
against damage of a whole different kind”. 
 
The World Beauty191 apart, all the cases so far considered 
have been of contract.  Bellingham v. Dhillon192 neatly 
i l lustrates the applicat ion here of the basic rule that benefit 
is taken into account where arising out of the act of 
mitigation itself. Because of injuries received in a car 
accident for which the defendant was liable, the plaint if f, 
who owned and ran a driv ing school,  lost the opportunity of  
buying on hire purchase  an expensive driving simulator, 
which enabled driv ing tuit ion to be given in a lecture room 
rather in a car on the road. Some three-and-a-half  years 
later,  however, he was able to buy the same equipment as 
liquidated stock for a fraction of the original price. In his 
claim for the three-and-a-half  year loss of profits which he 
would have made had he had the original simulator,  it  was 
held that there must be brought into account the prof its in 
fact earned by the substitute simulator. In the result  the 
plaint if f was unable to show any loss on the simulator 
venture. Salih v. Enfield health Authority193 is a more 
unusual i l lustration. Parents of a child born suffering from 
congenital  rubella syndrome sued the health authority for 
failure to diagnose and warn of this danger with the result  
that no steps were taken to terminate the pregnancy. The 
parents had planned to have further children but decided 
                                      
191  The World Beauty, [1970] P. 144, C.A. 
192  Bell ingham v. Dhi llon, [1973] Q.B. 304. 
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- 673 - 
not to do so because of the diff iculty and strain involved in 
bringing up a handicapped child. In these circumstances, 
their c laim for the cost of maintenance of the handicapped 
child was held by the Court of Appeal, reversing the judge 
below, to be l imited to the extra cost of caring for the child’s 
special needs and did not include the basic cost of 
maintenance. Cit ing Viscount Haldane’s formulation of the 
rule for contract in Brit ish Westinghouse Co. v. 
Underground Ry,194 together with the wider formulat ion 
Butler-Sloss L.J. giving the leading judgment went on to 
say: “The contemplated cost … would be spent on an 
identical purpose, in pari material with the costs of [the 
handicapped child] and cannot be said to be merely 
collateral. The decision of the parents not to have another 
child and the consequential saving of l ikely future 
expenditure is, in my judgment, a relevant consideration 
upon which the defendants were ent it led to rely.” In contrast 
to these two cases the action taken by the plaintif fs in 
Hussey v. Eels195 was held not to cut down their loss. A 
negligent misrepresentat ion was made by the defendants 
that the bungalow that they were sel ling to the plaintif fs for 
₤53,250 had not been subject to subsidence. Because 
repairs would be very cost ly the plaint if fs decided that the 
best course was to demolish the bungalow and to apply for 
planning permission to erect two others in its place. They 
then sold the property with the benefit of  the planning 
permission, which they had obtained, to developer for 
₤78,500. In their claim for damages they were held ent it led 
to the normal measure represented by the contract price 
less the value of the bungalow in its unsound condit ion at 
the date of the sale; the defendants’ argument that the 
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plaint if fs’ loss had been el iminated by their sale to the 
developer was rejected.  
 
A prof it on the resale of defective property, the purchase of 
which has been induced by a negl igent misrepresentat ion, 
was not to be taken into account in the assessment of 
damages for the misrepresentat ion if  the resale was not 
part of a cont inuous transact ion commencing with the 
original purchase of the property. Since the plaint if fs had 
purchased the house to l ive in and had indeed lived in it for 
a considerable period, i t fol lowed that when they unlocked 
the property’s development potential they did so for their 
own benefit and were not required to bring it into account in 
mitigation of damages.  
 
Similar to this is Dominion Mosaics and Tile Co. v. Trafalgar 
Trucking Co.196 The bui ldings in which the plaint if fs carried 
on their business were so damaged by a f ire negligent ly 
caused that they acquired new premises in which to 
cont inue. Subsequently, having taken a lease of st i l l further 
premises, they sold the new ones at a prof it. In their 
successful claim for the cost of acquir ing the new premises 
the plaint if fs were held not accountable for this prof it; the 
negligent defendants, it  was said, were not entit led to the 
benefit of  any successful property dealings carr ied out by 
the plaint if fs. 
 
11.10 CONCLUSION: 
 
I t  is indeed true that the legislature cannot visualize al l  the 
situat ions, which would arise in future. But the framers of 
the Indian Contract Act, 1872, while draft ing the provision 
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of breach of contract were careful, caut ious and vigi lant 
enough for the wordings used in Section 73. In India, the 
duty to mitigate the damages is in case of breach of 
contract has been thoroughly recognized and laid down in 
the explanat ion attached to Sect ion 73 of the Indian 
Contract Act and il lustration (b) attached with it.  I t  was 
enacted therein that “in estimating the loss or damage 
aris ing from a breach of contract, the means which existed 
of remedying the inconvenience caused by the non-
performance of the contract must be taken into account.” 
The language of the explanation is not to be found in any of 
the English in practical application. Though, the expression 
“means which existed of remedying the inconvenience” is 
not happi ly worded, various High Courts in the country have 
interpreted it to mean that i t lays a duty upon a person 
complaining of breach of contract, to use common 
intel l igence and prudence, and take all natural and obvious 
steps available to diminish the loss arising from the breach.  
 
In Thawardas Pherumal v. Dominion of India ,197 decided by 
the Supreme Court the appellant who was a contract 
entered into a contract with the Dominion of India for the 
supply of 21/2 crores of pucca br icks to the C.P.W.D., a 
department of the Dominion government. Delivery was to be 
at the ki ln site but owning to the default of the C.P.W.D. in 
not removing the burnt bricks, which were ready for 
removal, delay occurred in the t imetable and the rains set in 
with the result that the rains destroyed 88 lcas of katcha 
bricks. As this loss was occasioned by the default of the 
C.P.W.D. the contractor claimed that he should be paid 
                                      
197  Thawardas Pherumal v. Dominion of India , AIR 1955 S.C. 
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their prices. The Union government rel ied on clauses of the 
agreement which is in these terms: “The department will not 
entertain any claim for idle labour or for damage to unburnt 
bricks `due to any cause whatsoever’.” If ,  with that in view, 
Government expressly stipulated, and the contractor 
expressly agreed, that Government was not to be liable for 
any loss occasioned by a consequence as remote as this, 
then that is an express term of the contract and the 
contractor must be t ied down to it.  The contractor had a 
duty under Sec. 73 of the Indian Contract Act to minimize 
the loss, accordingly he would have had the right to remove 
the bricks himself  and stack them elsewhere and claim 
compensation for the loss so occasioned. Alternat ively, he 
could have sold the bricks in the market and claimed the 
difference in price, but ordinarily he could not have claimed 
compensation for damage done to the kaccha bricks unless 
he could have shown that kind of damage, ordinari ly too 
remote, was expressly contemplated by the parties when 
the contract was made; Sec. 73 of the Indian Contract Act. 
Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act speaks of 
compensation for breach of contract.  Under explanat ion to 
Sec. 73, the burden is on the plaintif f ,  who has proved the 
breach of the contract, of further establishing that he has 
taken al l reasonable steps to mit igate the loss, consequent 
on the breach of the contract. In the instant case, it  is the 
case of the plaint if f  that the sugar company did not receive 
as per the agreement 47 and odd tones of sugarcane at the 
agreed rates. The Courts below have concurrently held that 
the defendant company committed breach of contract. That 
being so it is obvious that the plaint i ff  is entit led to 
damages. To that extent there is no dispute whatsoever. 
The point of dif ference starts after that stage. It is 
submitted that the plainti ff  did not place any material as 
required under Sec. 73 of the Indian Contract Act as 
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contained in the explanation thereto, that he made any 
honest attempts to mitigate the damages by trying to sell  
the sugarcane in the open market and that he thereby 
incurred any loss. It is no doubt true that in view of the 
explanation to Sec. 73, a duty is cast on the plaintif f  who 
goes to Court for damages to plead and prove that he took 
al l reasonable steps to mitigate the damages. In the instant 
case, according to the plaint if f ,  the defendant company 
refused to take 47 and odd tones of sugarcane. If  that is so, 
it  was his duty to plead how he tried to mit igate the 
damages by sell ing the sugarcane in the open market. He 
has not done so. He has neither pleaded nor proved that he 
made any such attempt. In the circumstances, therefore, 
there is no basis to award any damage to the plaintif f. 
However, taking a broad and commonsense view, the 
plaint if f  should be compensated at Rs. 5 per tonne.198 
 
Under the Contract Act there is a duty on a person claiming 
damages on account of breach of contract to mitigate the 
damages.199  
 
In the case of contracts for sale or purchase of goods, the 
defendant may show that the plaintif fs could have gone into 
the market and obtained a new contract on better terms.200 
I f  the plaintif f  is the purchaser, the defendant wi ll get the 
benefit of  a fal l ing market, whi le, if  the seller is the plaintif f , 
the purchaser wil l  get the benefit  of  the rising market.  In 
each case, if  he goes to the market,  the loss, which would 
otherwise have resulted to him from the defendant’s breach 
of contract, would be avoided. If  he could so prevent the 
                                      
198  Mysore Sugar Co. v. Y.B. Boraiah,  (1981) 1 Kant. L.J. 263 
at pp. 265, 266, 267. 
199  Bengal Coal Supplying v. Union of India, (1968) 70 Bom. 
L.R. 254 at p. 257. 
200  Bilas Ram v. Ezekia l,  33 I.C. 1 at p. 9. 
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loss at a tr if l ing expense, or with reasonable exertions, he 
wi ll be fulf i l l ing his duty to mit igate the damages.201  
 
Thus, from the aforesaid comparat ive study on the topic of 
quantum and mit igat ion of damages, it  is clear that a 
plaint if f  cannot claim as damages any sum,  which is due to 
his own negligent act. In other words, one can say that a 
party is not entit led to damages if , by the use of reasonable 
precautions, he might have avoided the loss. So, where the 
plaint if fs sued in respect of damage caused by rain water to 
bags of dried prawns stored in the defendant’s godowns, 
and where it appeared that there was quite suff icient t ime 
for the plaintif f to have taken delivery and that he allowed 
the goods to deteriorate, and become unsaleable, it  was 
held that the plainti ffs had fai led to do what they might have 
done to remedy the inconvenience.202 So also, where a 
lessee vacated the premises before the expiry of the term, 
the lessor was held bound to mitigate the damages by 
lett ing out the premises on such rent as he could get and 
claim the dif ference alone from the lessee.203 Again where 
the lessee unreasonably refuses to take possession of the 
leasehold premises, the lessor though entit led to damages 
is under a duty to make reasonable efforts to secure 
another tenant and otherwise cover the loss.204 In the 
converse case, where the lessor fai ls to put the lessee in 
possession, the latter is bound to mit igate the loss aris ing 
from such fai lure, by making reasonable efforts to secure 
                                      
201  Rangaswami Iyer v. Venkatarama Iyer, 28 I .C. 635 at p. 
637. 
202  Commissioners for the Port of Rangoon v. Moola Dawood, 
9 I.C. 470. 
203  Govindaswami Chett iar v. palaniappa Chett iar , 48 M.L.J. 
397. 
204  Lakshmi Narain v. Verno, 5 P.l .R. 1907 : 137 P.R. 1906. 
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other land upon lease.205 Where a lessee fails to take 
possession of the land, which was the subject matter of the 
lease, even though it was available for him to do so, he 
cannot claim damages from the lessor for non-delivery.206 
Again, where the defendant fai led to build a wall according 
to agreement and such fai lure was l ikely to produce damage 
to the plaint if f ’s house, it  was held that the plaint if f  was 
under a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent damage 
and that it  was not open to him to stand by and recover any 
loss which might have been so prevented.207  
 
As the researcher is making a comparat ive study of Engl ish 
Law and Indian Law on the subject of damages for breach 
of contract, necessary comparison has been made on the 
topic of mitigat ion of damages also. While comparing the 
legal posit ion of both these countries i t is found that no 
remarkable difference is there between English Law and 
Indian Law so far as rule relat ing to mitigation of damages 
is concerned. The only thin l ine dif ference, which was 
noticed during this comparative study,  is that, the rule in the 
explanation to Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act is 
applied with great care and caution. One can say in more 
strict and rigid manner than that is in England.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
205  Amanchi Venkata Ramastrulu v. Nama Venkana, 37 M.L.J. 
355; Ma Hnin Yi v. Chew Whee Shein, AIR 1925 Rang. 
261 at p. 262. 
206  Ghulam Haidar v. Iqbal Nath, AIR 1939 Lah. 118 at p. 122. 
207  Ramkaur v. Shankar Dutt,  108 I.C. 433. 
CHAPTER - XII 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
12.1 GENERAL CONCLUSION – SOME SUGGESTIONS: 
 
 
The law regarding damages for breach of contract has 
began its journey few centuries ago and after passing 
through tough time and confusions it has reached to the 
level where it stands today with reasonable good clarity but 
even these days the law of damages seems to be changing, 
and the whole developing for the better, al l the t ime, every 
day, with each new challenge. Certainly, much more change 
has appeared between the posit ions which was prevai ling 
few centuries ago and today and much more change, we 
can st i l l apprehend which is prevail ing today and in each 
and every tomorrow. A pointer to the shif ts of emphasis and 
changes of signif icance in the subject over the period of 
t ime is al l that is required for the development of the law of 
breach of contract.  
 
Recovery for non-pecuniary loss in contract, which was 
marching ahead at the t ime few decades ago, has taken 
down turn and new landmark has been achieved in the said 
subject through Watt v. Morrow 1and other cases. The 
impact of contr ibutory negligence for breach of contract has 
now been well def ined and well sett led in 
Forsikringsakt ieselskapet Vesta v. Butcher (No. 1).2 
                                      
1  Watt v. Morrow, [1991] 1 W .L.R. 1421; [1991] 4 Al l ER 
937; (1991) 23 H.L.R. 608; 54 B.L.R. 86; [1991] 2 
E.G.L.R. 152; [1991] 43 E.G. 121. 
2  Forsikr ingsaktieselskapet Vesta v. Butcher (No. 1), [1989] 
A.C. 852; [1989] 2 W.L.R. 290; (1989) 133 S.J. 184; 
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Decisions on causation cont inue to trouble the law; the 
issue has been said to be one of common sense in Galoo v.  
Bright Grahame Murray,3 but i t is dif f icult to see how far an 
appeal to common sense, itself  elusive, takes us. The 
attenuation of The Liesbosch,  wi th its concern over 
impecuniosity,  has continued in Mattocks v. Mann .4 The 
diff icult  border line between the need for proof on the 
balance of probabi lit ies and the need to show only loss of 
chance has been usefully elucidated in All ied Maples v. 
Simmons & Simmons5 and other cases. The correctness of 
Brunsden v. Humphrey6,  al lowing two act ions for damages, 
has been seriously doubted in Talbot v. Berkshire County 
Council.7 The availabil ity of exemplary damages, severely 
restricted since Rookes v. Barnard,8 is now further conf ined 
to causes of action in which they had been awarded before 
that restr ict ion was introduced in A.B. v. south West Water 
Services .9 A realist ic approach towards holding for 
l iquidated damages as against penalty has manifested itself 
in Phil ips Hong Kong v. Att.-Gen. of Hong Kong10 as has 
also a l iberal att i tude to the recovery of deposits where they 
smack of penalty in Workers Trust and Merchant Bank v. 
                                                                                                 
[1989] 1 All ER 402; 1989 Fin.L.R. 223; [1989] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 331; (1988) 4 Const. L.J. 75, H.L. 
3  Galoo v. Bright Grahame Murray, [1994] 1 W .L.R. 1360; 
[1994] 1 Al l ER 16; [1994] B.C.C. 319 
4  Mattocks v. Mann, [1993] R.T.R. 13; The Time, June 19, 
1992, C.A. 
5  All ied Maples v. Simmons & Simmons, [1995] 1 W.L.R. 
1602; [1995] 4 All  ER 907; [1995] N.P.C. 83; (1995) 145 
N.L.J. Rep. 1646, C.A. 
6  Brunsden v. Humphrey, 91884) 14 Q.B.D. 141, C.A. 
7  Talbot v. Berkshire County Council ,  [1994]Q.B. 290; 
[1993] 3 W.L.R. 708; [1993] 4 All  ER 9; 
8  Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129; [1964] 2 W.L.R. 
269; 108 S.J. 93; [1964] Al l ER 367; [1964] Lloyd’s Rep. 
28, H.L. 
9  A.B. v. South West Water Services, sub nom. Gobbons v. 
South West Water Services [1993] Q.B. 507 [1993] 2 
W.L.R. 507; [1993] 1 Al l ER 609. 
10  Phil ips Hong Kong v. Att .-Gen. of Hong Kong, 91993) 61 
B.L.R. 41. 
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Dojap Investments.11 The courts have at last become 
prepared to reduce the number of years for which interest is 
awarded where there has been excessive delay in bringing 
a case to trial in Metal Box v. Currys12 and the reduct ion of 
awards of interest on account of tax has fortunately 
cont inued in Deeny v. Goods Walker (No. 3)13.  In a 
misguided development, depart ing from over a century of 
authority, decisions are appearing refusing the recovery of 
costs incurred in other proceedings in Brit ish Racing Drivers 
Club v. Hextal l Erskine & Co.14 With a buyer of goods 
claiming for breach of warranty, there has been an 
important change of heart on the relevance of his 
successful ly selling on to his sub-buyer in Bence Graphics 
International v. Fasson UK .15 The restrict ive rule in Bain v. 
Fothergil l,16 applying in contracts for the sale and lease of 
land, has at last gone, succinctly abolished by statute (Law 
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1989, s. 3);  this 
f inal ly establishes the universali ty of the rule that the 
contracting party is entit led to the benefit of his bargain. 
The owner of a building defectively constructed by the 
contractor has been held entit led to no damages for 
pecuniary loss, yet to a modest amount for non-pecuniary 
loss, where the defects have resulted in no diminution in 
value and reinstatement would have been unreasonable in 
                                      
11  Workers Trust and Merchant Bank v. Dojap Investments, 
[1993] A.C. 573; [1993] 2 W .L.R. 702; [1993] 2 Al l  ER 370. 
12  Metal Box v. Currys, [1998] 1 W.L.R. 175; (1988) 132 S.J. 
52; [1988] 1 Al l  ER 341. 
13  Deeny v. Goods Walker (No. 3), [1995] 1 W .L.R. 1206; 
[1995] 4 Al l ER 289; [1996] L.R.L.R. 168. 
14  Brit ish Racing Drivers Club v. Hextal l  Erskine & Co., 
[1996] P.N.L.R. 523. 
15  Bence Graphics International v. Fasson UK, [1997] 1 All  
ER 979, C.A. 
16  Bain v. Fothergi l l , 91874) L.R. 7 H.L. 158. 
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Ruxley Electronics v. Forsyth.17 In employment contracts the 
refusal of damages for injury to reputation causing 
pecuniary loss has sensibly been departed from Malik v. 
BCCI ,18 a reversal by the House of Lords.  
 
Nearly three-quarters of century ago Baron Wilde has said 
in Gee and others v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Rly. Co.,19 
that “the quest ion of the measure of damages is one that 
has produced more dif f iculty than perhaps any branch of the 
law” and forty years later Lord Halsbury, L.C., in his 
celebrated judgment in The Mediana,20 has struck the same 
note when he said that “the whole region of inquiry into 
damages is one of extreme dif f iculty”. And yet the subject of 
Damages is the least studied and hence the least 
understood in India. This is mainly due, not to the 
infrequency of Actions for Damages in our Courts but ot an 
unfortunate misconception of the real scope and importance 
of the subject.  In India, the l it igants, the lawyers, and the 
system also, special ly in mofussil,  generally understands 
that any sort of l it igation brought before the Court of law 
under the heading “damages for breach of contract” is 
usually a lavish l it igation and not a l i t igation ar is ing out of 
necessity. The general impression is that the l it igat ion 
inst ituted for claiming damages for breach of contract is stil l  
considered as a l i tigation of a choice. But the t ime has 
already come when the Indian legal system can no longer 
afford to neglect the lit igat ion f i led under this branch of law, 
which from a pract ical point of view really open a new and 
                                      
17  Ruxley Electronics v. Forsyth, [1996] A.C. 344; [1995] 3 
W.L.R. 118; [1995] 3 Al l ER 268; 73 B.L.R. 1. 
18  Malik v. BCCI, [1997] 3 Al l ER  1, H.L.; [1995] 3 All  ER 
545, C.A.  
19  Gee and others v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Rly. Co., 
(1860) 6 H.&N. 211; 30 L.J.Ex. 11; 3 L.T.  328; 9 W.R. 103; 
6 Jur. (n.s.)  1119; 158 E.R. 87. 
20  “The Mediana”,  (1900) A.C. 113  
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extensive f ield for exploration. Modern commercial l i fe and 
widening self-consciousness of our civi l r ights great ly 
require thorough and detai l knowledge and involvement in 
the said subject.  It requires mastery not only of the 
principles of l iabil i ty, but also of the principles upon which 
damages have to be measured. However, i t  is regrettable 
that our legal l i terature which of late years is growing in 
enormous proposit ions, has not up to now furnished us with 
a comprehensive work on the subject of damages for breach 
of contract.  
 
While making research on the subject of damages for 
breach of contract,  the topic of frustrat ion of contract was 
also considered. The study of frustration of contract also 
proved to be an interesting and fascinating study. There 
was a t ime when contract was considered as a piece of 
private legislation, sacred, sacrosanct, to which man was 
required to do obeisance from afar but not to go near the 
sanctum sanctorum.  Part ies stood in awe of the sacred pact  
as it  were placed on par with Holy Scripture so sanctif ied as 
no to be def iled by human touch. Even the judges shied 
from touching the contract by supplying an obvious gap or 
implying a term, by pleading helplessness in the matter. It  
was repeatedly averred by the courts that it  was for the 
parties to make the contract and for the courts to enforce it.  
Like all  human inst itutions, nothing is static but the change 
is so impercept ible that i t  is dif f icult  to pinpoint any point of 
t ime when the old doctrine was discarded and the new 
doctr ine evolved. When the courts pleaded impotence and 
proceeded to enforce the contract as worded, despite the 
fact that the enforcement perpetrated injustice, there was 
certain amount of resentment in the minds not only of the 
lawyers but the judges themselves apart from the l it igating 
public and a search was made for a solution. It was 
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unthinkable to take it lying down that the courts were 
instruments of doing injust ice by enforcing such an 
atrocious covenant. It was very strongly felt that the court 
should do its duty as an instrument of doing just ice and f ind 
a way out how to go about it .  English ingenuity did not fail  
to meet the situat ion and a doctrine of implied term was 
resorted to by courts. Once the courts assumed the role of 
interfering with the contract in order to do just ice between 
the parties by introducing implied terms as fair and 
reasonable, the old and impregnable fort if icat ion of absolute 
liabil i ty crumbled. 
 
But the dif f iculty with the Indian legal system was that the 
law of damages was in an extremely uncertain, ambiguous 
and confused state for number of decades.  It  was a mixed 
bag. It was consist ing part ly Hindu Law, partly 
Mohammedan and partly English Law.  Which principle of 
which law would be appl ied by the Court to decide a dispute 
was most dif f icult  to predict beforehand t il l the judicial  
pronouncement was made.  In the Mofussil,  under the 
maxim of just ice, equity and good conscience, some 
principles of English law were being imported.  In the 
presidency towns, the Supreme Courts were required to 
administer Hindu Law, Mohammedan Law and English Laws 
of damages.  In actual practice, the Hindu and 
Mohammedan laws were not very much appl ied end, by and 
large the English Law was in vogue in the presidency towns.   
 
So when the Brit ishers came to India for trading and in the 
process of trading became the rulers of India t i l l  that day 
the Indian legal system was not equipped with codif ied law 
as far as law regarding breach and damages aris ing out of 
such breach are concerned. Being rulers of India, Brit ishers 
gave legislations, precedent and authority of the crown. Law 
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of damages was completely developed under the shadow of 
the Brit ish regime. However, the word “Damage” has 
nowhere been def ined in either English Law or in the Indian 
Contract Act, 1872. But with the gradual development of 
stable and systematic legal system we are now able to 
arrive at c lear meaning of damages and various heads in 
which it can be claimed.  
 
I t  is c lear that any aggr ieved or injured party can claim 
damages under any of  the above-mentioned heads of  
damages for breach of contract,  and get compensation only 
i f  he proves to suf fer injury because of  the breach 
committed by the defendant.   To put i t  in simple words, one 
may say that before a person can get any damages,  he 
must prove that he had suf fered an injury. Law does not  
taken into account  al l  harms suf fered by a person, which 
caused no legal injury.  The damage so caused is cal led 
damnum sine in jur ia. The term ‘ in juria ’ is to be understood 
in i ts rightful and proper sense. I f  such legal in jury is 
proved, i t  becomes the duty of  the Court to do just ice to 
the sufferer but whi le doing so the Judges have to i temize 
the damages in order to calculate the interest.  This does 
not mean that the total award is  necessar i ly to go up 
higher on that count. The total  award is st i l l  to be one,  
which gives him fair  compensat ion in money for his injury. 
Care must be taken to avoid the r isk of  overlapping. 
 
The best example of  i t  is the landmark decis ion of  Hadley 
v. Baxendale,21 which def ines the k ind of  damage i .e. 
appropriate subject of  damages and excluded al l  other 
kinds as being too remote. The decision was concerned 
solely with what is  correct ly called remoteness of  damage, 
                                      
21  Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Exc. 341.  
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and it  wil l  conduce to clar ity i f  this expression is reserved 
for cases wherein the defendant denies l iabi l i ty for certain 
consequences that have fol lowed f rom his breach. The 
other quest ion is which must be kept quite dist inct f rom the 
aforesaid, concerns the principle upon which damage could 
be evaluated or quant if ied in terms of  money. This may 
appropriately be cal led the quest ion of  measurement of  
damages. The princip le adopted by the Courts in many 
cases dat ing back to at  least 1848 is that of  rest itut io in 
integrum.   I f  the plaint i f f  has suf fered damage that is not 
too remote, he must,  so far as money can do it ,  be 
restored the posit ion he would have been in had that 
part icular damage not occurred.  From the aforesaid 
discussion, i t  is now crystal c lear that what is awarded 
under heading of  damages for breach of contract is,  what  
is to be the loss which the plaint i f f  has suf fered and not 
the prof it  which the defendant has made. 
 
It is pertinent to note that, except in few cases of contract 
where specif ic performance may be granted, damages 
constitute the main, if  not the only form of, relief , which a 
person complaining of an injury of any kind is enti t led to 
derive. In nearly 8% of the cases decided in our Courts the 
Common law relief  by way of damages is being claimed by 
the injured party, either in the shape of prof its, interest, 
costs and expenses or other money compensation such 
endless forms of losses, which f low from a given injury. I t is 
thus of immense importance that the practit ioner should 
have a clear grasp of the principles which regulate the 
award of Damages. Knowledge of what damages direct, and 
what damage is indirect and remote, and knowledge as to 
when, how and in what manner the injured party should 
perform the duty of mitigating the damages, is so essential  
that for want of proper appreciat ion a good cause is often 
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lost. In some cases the l iabi li ty to compensate is itself  so 
mixed-up with dif ferent questions.  
 
The purpose to undergo the entire research exercise lies in 
a question that what can be the reasonable amount of  
damages, which can be awarded in the circumstances when 
the breach of contract is proved. For instance, there is a 
case which famously known as Dr. Fishel’s case.22 In which 
there is no doubt that Dr. Fishel was in breach of contract in 
fail ing to obtain the requisite consent for his paid outside 
work. The University can seek to recover damages aris ing 
out of breach. On the tradit ional view this means the 
University can recover such loss as has resulted from the 
breach. But the core question arise here is what that loss is 
in the present situat ion and peculiar circumstances of this 
fact?  
 
In order to answer this quest ion it is necessary to identify 
exactly wherein the breach l ies. It is not, as the claimant 
al leges, in the fai lure to obtain consent.  Strict ly,  the breach 
is doing the outside work; if  consent had been obtained, 
that would have relieved Dr. Fishel from any liabil ity for 
breach of contract, but he was under no contractual 
obligation actually to apply for consent. The quest ion, 
therefore, is what loss has resulted from the fact that Dr. 
Fishel did this work. It cannot demonstrate any loss. For 
reasons given, the University benefited from the work. 
Indeed, there is doubt whether there would, or could 
legit imately, have been any complaint had Dr. Fishel done 
precisely the same work but unpaid by the foreign cl inics. If 
any claim for damages for breach of contract is to succeed, 
                                      
22  Nott ingham University v. Fishel, 2001 (11) Reports of 
Patents, Designs and Trade Marks cases 367 at pp. 393, 
394 (Q.B.D.). 
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i t  has to be on the basis that restitutionary damages (or 
perhaps more accurately, compensation) are available. Mr. 
Dutton has advanced a further argument that the 
employee’s duty of loyalty and good faith obliged Dr. Fishel 
to inform the University that he was being paid for his 
outside work. The argument then is that had the University 
been aware of the opportunity to do outside work, it  would 
have sought to do it itself . This premise is wrong. It cannot 
be said that as a general pr inciple an employee is bound to 
inform his employer if  and when he is doing outside work in 
breach of his contract. Mr. Dutton rel ied upon the case of 
Neary v. Dean of Westminster,23 in which Lord Jauncey, 
sitt ing as Special Commissioner appointed to hear the case 
on behalf  of Her Majesty the Queen as Visitor, held that in 
the circumstances of that case the employee in quest ion 
was in breach of the duty of trust and conf idence in fai l ing 
to inform the Abbey authorit ies of certain act ivit ies he was 
conducting on his own behalf . However, in that case Lord 
Jauncey clearly considered that the employee had taken 
advantage of his posit ion as Organist at the Abbey for his 
own benefit. In other words, the duty to inform the Abbey 
authorit ies arose because Dr. Neary had used his posit ion 
to earn secret prof its; he ought to have accounted for these 
to his employers in the absence of ful l disclosure and 
consent. It  is similarly contended in this case that Dr. Fishel 
was a f iduciary who abused his posit ion for his own benefit. 
I f  that is right, then it may be said that by act ing in secret 
Dr. Fishel has both acted in breach of his f iduciary duty and 
in breach of contract. But the contractual claim then adds 
nothing to the f iduciary claim. In absence of the f iduciary 
obligation, the employee is not obliged to disclose the fact 
that he has earned sums from third parties. Indeed, were he 
                                      
23  Neary v. Dean of Westminster , 91999) I.R.L.R. 288. 
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to be so obliged, this would circumvent the wel l established 
rule in Bell v.  Lever Brothers Ltd. ,24 that employees are not 
obliged to disclose their own past misconduct or breaches 
of contract.  
 
Even if  the conclusion is wrong that Dr. Fishel was not 
contractually obliged to disclose his act ivit ies to the 
University, it  cannot be considered in any event that the 
University has shown that it  would have taken the contract 
for i tself . This must be establ ished on the balance of 
probabili t ies since it is asking what the claimant would have 
done in the past had there been no breach as referred in 
All ied Maples Group v. Simmons and Simmons .25 In this 
case also it was considered that the research benef its were 
a poor reward for the t ime involved. The logic of his posit ion 
is that if  he had been ful ly aware of what was going on, he 
would not have supported the work on the grounds that i t  
was not in Nurture’s interest, whether or not Nurture itself  
was paid in place of the staff. Similarly, Professor Chiplin,  
who was Pro-Vice-Chancellor for about four years unt i l July,  
1995, said he would not have approved the work because of 
the length and frequency of the absences abroad. 
Accordingly, the Court was not sat isf ied that on the balance 
of probabili t ies the University would have elected to do the 
work even if  it  had been given the opportunity to do so. 
Finally,  it  is c lear that it  could not in any event have been 
done without the co-operat ion of Dr. Fishel himself . He 
could not have been required to do this work abroad. On the 
principle that it  must be assumed that, he would have acted 
to l imit his damages, he could have refused to work abroad 
and thereby have scuppered the contracts. Mr. Dutton says 
                                      
24  Bell  v. Lever  Brothers Ltd.  (1932) A.C. 161. 
25  All ied Maples Group v. Simmons and Simmons, (1995) 1 
W.L.R. 1602 at 1610.  
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that the answer to that is that he did in fact do the work and 
therefore it  should be assumed that he would have done so 
whoever was the contract ing party. However, he did not do 
the work purely in pursuance of his contract of employment, 
and it cannot be said why he cannot say that in that 
different context i t  should not be assumed that he would 
have been will ing to go beyond his contractual obligations.26  
 
12.2 JUSTIFICATION OF HYPOTHESIS: 
 
The hypothesis is put forward by making comparative and 
analytical study of judicial trend prevail ing in England and 
India on the subject of damages for breach of contract. The 
impact of court  intervention is both qualitative and 
quantitative with the help of legislat ions.  In the light of the 
research work, the researcher is free to commence from the 
principles of breach of contract to construct an argument, 
which is more in l ine with faci l i ty of exposit ion and 
applicat ion, while at the same time consonant with the 
economic reali ty. The start ing point of the said is the nature 
of the opinion, which is said to arise on breach of contract.  
That is, whenever there is breach which will  cause 
substantial deprivat ion of the expected benefit of  the 
contract to the innocent party. The innocent party has the 
choice to ascertain his right to sue for damages amongst 
the other remedies avai lable. But by ascertaining this right,  
the innocent party wil l  have to move on with certain 
alarming situat ions.  
 
 
 
                                      
26  Nott ingham University v. Fishel , 2001 (110 Reports of 
Patens, Designs and Trade Marks Cases 367 at pp. 391, 
392 (Q.B.D.). 
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(I) The unhelpfulness of the present legal system 
in certain situations: 
 
The legal rule must be well equipped with clear def init ion if  
it  is to be properly used. Any sort of lacking in clarity in 
statutory provision is also responsible to contribute in 
creat ing helplessness situation.  In certain situations the 
cont inued performance by the party who is committ ing 
breach seems to be possible but as the legislation provides 
for remedies for breach of contract, the innocent party feels 
helplessness in insist ing the implementat ion of a contract in 
strict  jacket manner. In certain situat ions it is found that 
cont inued performance is optimally desirable but somehow 
the posit ion is that the lacking in “co-operat ion” att itude 
also massed up the relat ionship and ult imately resulted into 
breach of contract.  
 
The essence of legit imate interest nebulous and wrong legal 
advice also strongly contr ibutes in creat ing such situat ion. 
In White & Carter (Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor,27 its creator 
Lord Reid did not trouble himself  to describe exact ly or 
posit ively what const itutes a legit imate interest, though we 
know that i t includes not merely wishing to increase the 
damages payable and so one could very well imagine the 
predicament of both plaint i ff  and defendant counsel.  
 
In Clea Shipping Corporation v. Bulk Oi l International Ltd. 
(The Alaskan Trader)28 as to what should be argued. It has 
been urged that the dif f iculty of calculating damages for the 
                                      
27  White & Carter (Counci ls) Ltd. v. McGregor, [1962] A.C. 
413; [1962] 2 W.L.R. 17; 105 S.J. 1104; [1961] 3 Al l E.R. 
1178; 1962 S.C.H.L. 1; 1962 S.L.T. 9, H.L. 
28  Clea Shipping Corporat ion v. Bulk Oil International Ltd. 
(The Alaskan Trader), (1984) 1 Al l  ER 129. 
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breach would be one ground on which to found a legit imate 
interest and also the dif f iculty of mitigat ing the loss which 
might arise. Yet i t  is to be quest ioned, with all respect, 
whether either of these is helpful  or indeed relevant.  
 
(II)  Difficulty of assessment of damages: 
 
This has remained up to now one of the most capricious 
concepts of English law rivaled only by the “f loodgates of 
l i t igation” and the “unruly horse of public policy” but 
damages for breach of contract to negotiate for fare and 
reasonable sum  would  be  overly  so.29  I t  can be called in 
aid30 or rejected31 whatever the need arises, a classic case 
knife and pick-axe.32 To argue here that the factor of 
diff iculty in assessing the damages gives a party a 
suff icient ly legit imate interest to cont inue performance 
appears dangerous. It places in the hands of the innocent 
party a passport to specif ic performance of the contract or 
worse. Who is to determine the suff iciently dif f icult  
standard? What of an honest though unreasonable mistaken 
belief  that damages would be dif f icult to assess? Why 
should a layman be cal led upon to decide a question that 
may stump the court, as it has? Are the damages dif f icult to 
assess? Too dif f icult? It is submitted that this aspect of the 
legit imate interest theory serves only to becloud the issue 
further.  One aim of the court should be to prevent 
unnecessary waste. To permit an unwanted continued 
                                      
29  Courtney and Fairbarn Ltd. v. Tola ini Bros (Hotels) Ltd. , 
(1975) 1 Al l  ER 716; Mallozi v. Carpel l i ,  (1976) 1 LL LR 
407; Danwin Productions Ltd. v. EMI Fi lms Ltd., (1984) 
Times 9 March. 
30  Vigars v. Cook,  (1919) 2 K.B. 475; Sapwell  v. Bass, 
(1910) 2 KB 486. 
31  Chaplin v. Hick, (1911) 2 KB 786; Manubens v. Leon,  
(1919) 1 KB 208. 
32  Swan & Reiter , Contracts: Cases, Notes and Mater ia ls  2- 
55 (1978). 
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performance on the ground that the innocent party f inds the 
resultant damage too dif f icult to assess in monetary terms 
smacks of that exactly.   
 
(III )  Difficulty of mitigation: 
 
Far from being a reason for continuat ion of an undesired 
performance this would seem at best to be an item to be 
considered in the f inal assessment of damages. There is no 
“duty” as such cast on a party to mitigate.33 Why should the 
fact that he cannot do so afford him rights over the other 
party? Even if i t were to be conceded that it  would be useful 
to have a continued performance else a great investment of 
either property or ski l l  would be wasted, yet this ought not 
to sound in total l iabi lity for the repudiator.  First, it  is 
neither at his request nor for his benefit and second, i t  
bears no relation to the mitigat ion factor as such. I t is 
ultimately an effort  to prevent total waste rather than one to 
reduce losses of the innocent party.  In fact, i t might be 
contended that continued performance wil l increase the 
losses, so that the argument is absurd. The dif f iculty of 
mitigation it is submitted therefore ought not to be relevant 
in determining whether or not a legit imate interest exists.  
 
Another l imitat ion which seemingly and cumulat ively exists 
on this r ight to cont inued performance is that there be no 
need for the co-operation for the repudiator in order for the 
innocent party to be able to cont inue performance.34 This 
did not arise in the Clea Shipping Corporat ion v. Bulk Oil  
International Ltd. (The Alaskan Trader).  35 There, on the 
                                      
33  The Solholt  (1981) 2 Lloyds Rep. 574 at 580. 
34  Finel l i  v . Dec,  (1986) DLr (2d.) 393 (ont.  CA) Cf  
35  Clea Shipping Corporat ion v. Bulk Oil International Ltd. 
(The Alaskan Trader), (1984) 1 Al l  ER 129. 
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present view of the law, the carpenter can only cont inue 
building the kennels if  he is construct ing them on his 
premise. If they are being constructed on the premises of 
the dog owner then he could not cont inue performance.36 
For a contractual r ight as valuable as this to arise by virtue 
of the fortuity of its place of performance (whether 
expressed or impl ied) reduces the option to a mere lottery. 
The parties would have bargained on the assumption that 
the agreement would have been performed and not aborted; 
now depending on where the performance was to be in our 
case, there may or may not be a right to cont inue 
performance or to accept the repudiation and claim 
damages respect ively. The facts of White & Carter 
(Councils) Ltd. v.  McGregor,37 demonstrate clearly the 
fortuity factor in the analysis. In normal circumstances, the 
material for the advert isements would have had to be 
supplied by the defendants but it  so happened that these 
advert isements were the same as those in previous 
contracts between the part ies. By this circumstance, the 
plaint if fs were enti t led to cont inue a knowingly undesired 
performance. But how is their posit ion dist inguishable in 
substance from that of the f irst t ime adviser with no prior 
information to go on? Is the issue basically one of fact, that 
is, is it  possible for there to be continued performance or 
not? It would arguably be a fairer system where the r ight 
depended on something less haphazard.  
 
                                      
36  George Baker Transport Ltd. v. Eynon,  (1974) 1 WLR 462; 
Denmark Productions Ltd. v. Buscobet Productions Ltd.,  
(1969) 1 QB 699. 
37  White & Carter (Counci ls) Ltd. v. McGregor, [1962] A.C. 
413; [1962] 2 W.L.R. 17; 105 S.J. 1104; [1961] 3 Al l E.R. 
1178; 1962 S.C.H.L. 1; 1962 S.L.T. 9, H.L. 
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In any even, what does cooperat ion mean in this context? 
Lord Reid used it as an alternat ive to assent.38 So if A  is 
building a kennel for B,  a dot owner who has informed A 
that he no longer wants it, then it can be argued that A does 
not have B ’s cooperation to cont inue performance. It 
certainly cannot be said that he has B ’s assent.  On this 
analysis, the innocent party should be unable to cont inue 
performance unti l  he has the “go ahead” from the 
repudiator. Yet, by virtue of the fact that the plaint if f  in 
White & Carter (Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor,39 was allowed 
to continue it must be taken that assent alone is not 
necessary.40 This limitation also is unhelpful.  First, i t  seems 
far too capric ious to be the bedrock of a principle in a 
ref ined legal system and second, it  is unclear and perhaps 
meaningless. 
 
Added to the submitted unhelpfulness of these l imitations is  
the fact that they are of dubious legal authority. The point 
may now be academic but in White & Carter (Councils) Ltd. 
v. McGregor,41 Lord Reid was the only one of the bare 
majority who alluded to them. Megarry J. (as he then was) 
reasoned in Hounslow LBC v. Twickenham Garden 
Development Ltd.42 that there was no need to hold that the 
decision of the majority of a bare majority should be 
considered the true decision in the case. But, with al l  
                                      
38  White & Carter (Counci ls) Ltd. v. McGregor, [1962] A.C. 
413; [1962] 2 W.L.R. 17; 105 S.J. 1104; [1961] 3 Al l E.R. 
1178; 1962 S.C.H.L. 1; 1962 S.L.T. 9, H.L. 
39  White & Carter (Counci ls) Ltd. v. McGregor, [1962] A.C. 
413; [1962] 2 W.L.R. 17; 105 S.J. 1104; [1961] 3 Al l E.R. 
1178; 1962 S.C.H.L. 1; 1962 S.L.T. 9, H.L. 
40  Roberts v. El lwel ls Engineering Ltd.,  (1972) QB 586. 
41  White & Carter (Counci ls) Ltd. v. McGregor, [1962] A.C. 
413; [1962] 2 W.L.R. 17; 105 S.J. 1104; [1961] 3 Al l E.R. 
1178; 1962 S.C.H.L. 1; 1962 S.L.T. 9, H.L. 
42  Hounslow LBC v. Twickenham Garden Development Ltd.,  
(1970) 3 Al l  ER 326. 
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respect, one wonders how it can be otherwise, short of 
ignoring the obvious mathematical aspect of the problem. 
Without Lord Reid, it  is true; there would have been no 
majority but then the quest ion would not have arisen either. 
Is it  his consideration for his association with the other two 
that his ratio decidendi be the ratio decidendi of  the case? 
Not unless the tai l  wags the dog! The submission therefore, 
is that the limitations on the right to cont inue performance 
are both unhelpful and dubious legal validity.  
 
(IV) The problem of mitigation even if there is duty 
to mitigate: 
 
I t  is often argued that it  seems to be generally accepted 
that the duty to mitigate or reduce loss in a contractual 
context ar ises only on breach of contract. But even if  (i t  is 
assumed without admission) there is no breach unt i l  
accepted as such, there is sti l l a duty to mit igate. The duty 
to mit igate is not a mere appendage to a breach of contract  
but must be viewed in the loss al locat ion context. Certain 
principles governed the al locat ion of loss and one of these 
is that the loss wil l be borne by the person who caused i t 
i.e. by the guil ty mind who is responsible for committ ing 
breach. Why avoidable loss is not recoverable and 
conjoint ly why one should take reasonable steps to reduce 
loss, is that where a loss to occur as result of these steps 
not having been taken, it  would be held that the loss would 
have been legally caused by the omission of the person who 
could have very well avoided it.43 Thus the other party will  
not be held responsible. True it is that loss wil l be caused 
most often by breach in a contract setting but surely too it 
                                      
43  Brace v. Calder, (1895) 2 KB 253; Bri t ish Westinghouse 
Electr ic  Co. v. Underground Electr ic  Rly Co., (1912) AC 
673; Jamal and Moola Dawood Sons & Co., (1916) AC 
175; Payzu Ltd. v. Saunders, (1919) 2 KB 581. 
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may be caused by any conduct, which can potentially 
amount to malperformance of one’s promised obligat ions.44 
Mit igation would, therefore, be relevant whenever loss is 
foreseen, the potent ial sufferer should do al l  that is 
reasonably practicable to al leviate i t.  In the f inal analysis,  
just as a breach of contract may lead one to fear an 
impending loss so too may an unretracted repudiation. Until  
it  is retracted the innocent party ought reasonably to 
foresee that he wil l  be disappointed in his expectations and 
wi ll suffer a loss. At such a stage the duty to mit igate would 
arise in both i ts aspects. Thus, one can readily 
acknowledged that mitigation involves the taking reasonable 
steps to reduce the loss seemingly less highlighted is that 
the mitigator must also refrain from taking steps which 
would reasonably increase the loss.  
 
12.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION: 
 
(I) It is indeed true that damages can never be an exact 
science; it  is more a compromise or adjustment. At the 
same t ime, there is no denial to the fact that the people 
involved with a commercial transaction have their own 
working style and limitations while dealing with the 
contractual matter,  breach arising out of contract and the 
compromise to be made in the situation of breach of 
contract. The business people sti l l have hesitation or rather 
one can say fear of a lengthy court proceeding and the 
tedious technicali ties of the proceedings. From the 
comparative and analytical study on judicial trend prevai ling 
in England and Indian on the subject of damages for breach 
of contract the researcher found that in India, the concept 
                                      
44  Rockingham County  v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F 2d. 301; 
Evans v. Yakina Valley Grape Growers Association, 108 P 
2d 671 at 683 (1988). 
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of nominal damages is yet not developed to the extent in 
which it is developed in England. Even in the circumstances 
when legal breach of contract is proved but if  the party who 
is making grievance for such breach has not suffered any 
monetary loss out of it  is sti l l required to face certain 
hassles in the l i t igat ion.  It is submitted that there is a dire 
need that now in such situat ion the courts in India should 
also come up heavily on the party responsible for 
committ ing breach after the contract is being made and 
breach is being proved, even if  the nature of damages 
which is required to be awarded is nominal damages.  
 
(II)  'Aggravated damages' , which are compensatory in 
that they compensate the v ictim of a wrong for mental  
dist ress, or injury,  in circumstances in which that in jury 
has been caused or increased by the manner in which the 
defendant committed the wrong, or the defendant 's 
conduct subsequent to the wrong. The concept of  such 
aggravated damages is not developed at i t  ful lest as far 
as the contractual obligat ion is concerned.   
 
( II I )  'Exemplary damages'  are intended to make an 
example of  the defendant; they are punit ive and not  
intended to compensate the plaint i f f  for any loss, but  
rather to punish the defendant.  The important quest ion 
which is aris ing on and of ten before the courts of Law in 
India is whether once the l i t igat ion gets over and the 
verdict being given by the competent court regarding the 
part icular issue of  damages arising out of  breach of  
contract,  is there any need to award exemplary damages? 
After going through the number of  judicial  
pronouncements,  i t  is observed that courts in India are, 
even today, l iberal  enough in not exercising its power in 
awarding compensation or damage under the head of  
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exemplary damages or punit ive damages. And the l iberal  
approach of  the Hon’ble courts in India has always been 
misused and underest imated by the party who is 
responsible for breach of  contract just because of  the 
reason that the courts of law in India is yet not harsh,  
str ict  and quite enough to award exemplary damages l ike 
the courts in England.  
 
(IV) The concept of vindictive damages or retributory 
damages is also not found in the judgment delivered by the 
Indian courts. Indian legal system is st il l  lacking in awarding 
damages under this head. For the proper uti l izat ion and 
implementat ion of law of damages for breach of contract the 
Hon’ble Courts should be strict enough in awarding 
damages under this head also.  
 
(V) Even after suffering with the heavy losses because of 
the breach committed by the other side it is the plainti ff  only 
who wil l have to prove that he has suffered with the losses.  
This seems to be one of the most painful and helpless 
situat ions for the l it igant who is knocking the doors of the 
courts of law with folded hands and with great faith in the 
system. A Criss-cross between two recent judgments of  the 
Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Union of India v. T.D.L. Patel45 
and Union of India v. M/s. Commercial Metal Corpn.46 
tr iggered off  a controversy, unfolded hitherto such 
magnitude :  whether, on breach of contract by the 
defendant-seller, the plaint if f -buyer is l iable to prove his 
loss on actual purchase of similar (substituted) goods to 
enable him to vindicate his claim for damages in a court of 
law? In other words, are the courts debarred from awarding 
                                      
45  Union of India v. T.D.L. Patel ,  AIR 1971 Del.  120. 
46  Union of India v. M/s. Commercia l Metal Corpn., AIR 1982 
Del.  267 at 271. 
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damages without there being an actual loss due to no-
purchase? If  so, wil l not this theory knock the bottom out of 
the law of damages, because it wi l l annihi late the not ional 
assumption of loss, based upon the dif ference between 
market pr ice and contract price?  
 
(VI) The present state of the law as far as concept for 
damages for breach of contract is concerned, is sti l l  
unsatisfactory as there is no system, which provides some 
sort of penal consequences for committ ing breach. This is 
perhaps one of the strongest reasons that the promise, 
which is given voluntari ly by the party at t ime of entering 
into contract, is taken so casually by the same party at the 
t ime of committ ing breach of it .   
 
(VII)  Researcher strongly feels that the system is 
unsatisfactory to the extent that the damages for breach of 
contract being a l it igation of a commercial nature, not well 
equipped with any sort of alternat ive dispute redressal 
machinery. Some time the party may not really intend to 
commit breach or rather we may say that party who is 
committ ing breach also has the strong will ingness to 
cont inue with the contract and to perform his part of 
obligation but because of, lack of proper and genuine legal 
advice about the benefit to perform his part of obl igation 
and the consequences aris ing out of non-fulf i l lment of 
obligation, the party commit blunder to discontinue with the 
contract and by that makes himself guilty for breach of 
contract.  
 
  
 
 
